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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the implications of the work ofMicheI Foucault for the
Enlightenment project. Specifically, it asks whether and how the modem drive to
explam the world so as to guide political action and promote progressive change, can
be defended in the light of Foucault's critique ofWestern philosophy, his
reconceptualisation of power relations and his account of the subject. Firstly, it is
shown how Foucault's genealogy, a hybrid and polemical approach, aims to call into
question the theories and practices which underpin the present. Genealogy
problematizes what we have come to take for granted, and in so doing it requires that
we rethink not only the nature and history ofWestern philosophical thought but also
the role of intellectuals. To attempt to write a history of truth is to ask what one can
know ofa concept which structures the very limits of our knowledge. It is to become
/
aware of the forces and constraints involved in our production of truth, and thus to
bring to light the complex relationship between knowledge and power.
Secondly, Foucault argued that, since ancient times, forms ofknowledge and relations
ofpower, characterised by individualising and totalising tendencies, have steadily but
discontinuously integrated into disciplinary technologies which have been instrumental
in constituting the sovereign human individuals which philosophy assumes as given.
Following Foucault's lead in focusing not on what power is, but on how it operates
historically and in concrete ways, it is shown how Foucault reconceptualised relations
of power as strategies ofgovernance which depend on the existence of free subjects
capable ofresistance. Thirdly, the spotlight falls on the role ofrelations ofpower and
knowledge, especially the human sciences, in manufacturing subjectivity (from souls
and bodies to individual actors), which is in turn related to Foucault's call to
irreverently question the limits of philosophy and to engage in aesthetic stylistic
experimentation upon ourselves within and against the bounds imposed on us by our
present. The thesis concludes by arguing that Foucault's iconoclastic genealogy ofour
limits and our possibilities leaves us with a rich set ofanalyses and strategies with
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References to the following texts by Foucault, referred to repeatedly throughout the
thesis, have been abbreviated as listed below. Normal ordering (eg. 1974a; 1974b;
etc.) has been retained below and in the Bibliography.
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OT The Order ofThings: An Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences (London,
Tavistock, 1970)
AK The Archaeology ofKnowledge (London, Tavistock, 1974a)
HS The History ofSexuality: An Introduction (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1981a)
SP "The Subject and Power", Afterword to H.L.Dreyfus & P.Rabinow Michel
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Brighton, Harvester, 1982b) 208-
226
DP Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe Prison (Harmondsworth, Peregrine,
1986a)
DPS "Disciplinary Power and Subjection" in S.Lukes (ed) Power (Oxford, Blackwell,
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NOTE ON LANGUAGE USAGE
/
Oxford English has been used throughout this thesis. Hence' -s-' has been used instead
of'-z-'. (When quoting directly, the original spelling has been used.) The only
exception to this rule is the key Foucauldian term, 'problematization' (and derivatives:
'problemize' and 'problematize'), where the original '-z-' has been retained
throughout.
In quotations, all emphases are in the original, except where indicated otherwise.
INTRODUCTION
What might be called the Enlightenment project ofmodem social theory, the urge to
explain the world so as to facilitate control, guide action and promote progressive change,
has over the last few decades of the twentieth century been fimdamentally called into
question by what may be broadly labelled postmodernism. The grand 'totalising'
explanatory narratives of the human sciences have been accused of 'violently
A _ -
appropriating' reality; the comfortable divisions of politics and power between those who
have and those who don't, and between those with good or God on their side and their
reactionary Others, have been declared to be simplistic and naive; and the yearning for the
social construction of a better society has faltered in the face ofa redeemed and
rehabilitated nihilism which has declared the death of the subject. Critics of
postmodernism accuse it ofsuperficiality, extreme abstraction, relativism, political
conservatism, passivity and fatalism, and decry its implications for the central
,
Enlightenment practices of scientific analysis, transformative political action and
intentional human agency. The current fimctioning ofmodem societies is integrally bound
up with the Enlightenment project; if the latter falters or changes, so must the world as we
know it. Social theory thus cannot declare itself immune from the challenge of
postmodernism, and is driven to defend itself or perish in the attempt.
One of the most important theorists to be labelled a postmodernist was Michel Foucault
(1926-1984). It is not important here whether or not Foucault was a postmodernist - he
I claimed to be "not up to date" with the term (Raulet 1983: 204) - or even whether it is
possible to talk in this way of some kind ofunified postmodern theory. What is important
are the implications ofFoucault's oeuvre for our Enlightenment derived understandings of
theory, politics and human subjects, given the extent to which this oeuvre is said to call
into question some, ifnot all, ofour most cherished assumptions. Foucault's argument
that the Western 'will to truth' is an effect of successive but discontinuous epistemes
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premised upon complex relations of power, stands alongside other arguments that truth is
..... ....... ....,. - -
an illusion fostered by Western logocentrism or the metaphysics of presence (Derrida), or
premised upon desire and the libido (Lacan: Deleuze and Guattari), and as such has......... ... .. ,. ..
tremendous implications for how we analyse, strategise and relate to ourselves and others.
The central problem under investigation in this thesis is straightforward and yet far-
reaching: in the light ofFoucault 's work, and related contemporary debates around the
salvageability or otherwise ofthe Enlightenment project. what kind offuture exists for
social theory andpractice? Three specific questions flow from this. First, is theory,
analysis and explanation possible after Foucau1t? Second, what are the implications of
Foucault's work for our understanding ofpower relations and political action? Third, and
related, what are the implications ofhis work for our understanding ofthe self-
·conceptions, ethical relationships and social practices ofhuman subjects? These three
questions directed at Foucault's work are themselves products of the Enlightenment; it
may be said that what is being raised here is the question ofwhether and how modernity
can be defended, and ifnot, whether any alternatives exist.
Foucault's work was a series of attempts to understand why it is that we in the West, in
our arduous and incessant search for truth, have also built into and around ourselves
intricate and powerful systems intended to manage all that we know and do. Central to
his critical, historical ontology of Western, and especially Enlightenment, reason is an
investigation of the constitutive relations between the operation ofpower relations, the
production ofknowledge, and ways ofrelating ethically to oneself and others. This
investigation can be summed up in the following questions:
how is it that the human subject took itselfas the object ofpossible knowledge?
Through what forms of rationality and historical conditions? And finally at what
price? (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 202). .
This thesis is an attempt to answer these questions. To answer the first question entails an
analysis of the origins ofmodem social theory in the Enlightenment (Chapters One and
~.jl
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Two). To answer the second requires an historical account of the development of
Western political rationalities (Chapter Three). To answer the third demands an
examination of the relations of power which underpin contemporary thought and which
regulate and subject modern individuals (Chapters Four and Five).
I
The consistency over time of these three central foci ofknowledge, power relations and
subjects in Foucault's work, and the amount oftime he spent repeating and reworking
the~ especially in interviews, belies the common charge (though there are exceptions, for
example, Smart 1983: 63) that his was a contradictory or incoherent project (Taylor 1985:
167), or that he led multiple and not necessarily complementary lives (Macey 1993; Eribon
1993). On the contrary, it will be argued here that Foucault's life and work were entirely
coherent, with each aspect thereof - his intellectual work, his political activities, his
personal life - dovetailing closely. Indeed, it will be shown how his various political
engagements (for example, on behalf of the GIP) flowed out ofhis theoretical
investigations (into the interconnections between relations ofpower, forms ofknowledge
and practices of subjection) which in turn corresponded to his personal ethics (to create
oneself as a work ofart). Foucault's search for the foundations ofmodern mechanisms of
knowledge and power relations and their intersection in the human subject was thus more
than just an academic exercise. He made explicit the fact that a search such as this cannot
..-"'------------- ---- ------------. ----
but have ramifications for all areas of social life, from-the ways in which we conceive of
~ .-- - . --- - .- -- . . ._-._- - ---- -. _.. -
the world in which we live to our relationships with others and with ourselves. His search<---- . -~ - - - . - .-. --
was as much political as it was personal, as much of contemporary relevance as it was
historical, and as much about transforming 'the world as it was about self-transformation.
In the process of developing an holistic conception ofFoucault's work, this thesis also
seeks to challenge and question several widespread but mistaken interpretations, and take
up and further other more accurate and useful appropriations. In this regard, reference
will be made to Foucault's major critics and sympathisers, including but not only Jean
Baudrillard, Zygmunt Bauman, Richard Bernstein, Judith Butler, William Connolly,
Jacques Derrida, Peter Dews, Nancy Fraser, Jiirgen Habermas, Ian Hacking, Ernesto
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Laclau, John Rajchman, Richard Rorty, Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Charles Taylor.
In the realm of theory, Foucault's approach is said not only to deny us the use of
traditional analytical tools but to render superfluous the practices that Western theorists in
particular have engaged in for the past two hundred ifnot two thousand years. On the
contrary, it will be argued that many of the tools of analysis and theoretical practices
bequeathed to us by Western philosophy are necessary for problematizing our history and
rethinking the nature of our present and ourselves. Genealogy itself is an eclectic, hybrid
and polemical approach which, combining philosophy, history and literature, and
emphasising conditions ofpossibility rather than causes, is intended to produce specific
effects; and while the games which intellectuals play may be changing, they are no less
significant nor less serious.
Secondly, Foucault's conception ofpower is said to be dogmatic and all-encompassing,
) ( leaving no room for progressive resistance or change and flowing over into the realm of
; J theory such that truth itself becomes questionable. Yet Foucault offers us an analysis of
relations ofpower as strategies of governance which depend for their operation on the
existence of free subjects capable not only ofresistance but ofpositively producing effects
of truth in reality. Thirdly, in relation to concerns about the human subject and its
analytical, political and ethical dimensions, Foucault is said merely to repeat the
poststructuralist dictum that 'man is dead' and to offer us little comfort or direction as we
near the fin de millenium. But it will be argued that the subject is alive and well in
Foucault's universe, an indispensable element in the functioning ofpower relations and the
production ofknowledge as well as in everyday ethical practices of liberty which integrate
genealogy as a critical philosophical enterprise with a personal aesthetics ofexistence.
As integrated, coherent and defensible as Foucault's work will be argued to be, it must
also be distinguished from accounts which approach Foucault from specific angles, in
'--~----------------
terms ofhis archaeological methodology (Major-Poetz11983; Gutting 1989), his relation
to Marxism (Poster 1984), his sexual proclivities (Miller 1993), or as an icon for gay
politics (Halperin 1995). This thesis does not purport to be a faithful 'commentary' on the
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work ofFoucault, nor simply a defence ofFoucault against his critics. It is not some sort
of critical hagiography which will claim not only to have rescued Foucault but also to have
discovered the truth ofhis work, by "reestablish[ing] historical facts as against the
sedimented layers of legend11 (Eribon 1993: xi).
On the contrary, against the grain of much postmodern theorising but in the full awareness
that to attempt to 'tame' Foucault in his elusivity, by assuming the unity ofhis oeuvre in
order to demonstrate its consistency over time, is in fact to interpretively construct this
unity and to do violence to his thought, this thesis intends to apply Foucault's own
methods to this task. Thus it seeks to explore alternative conceptions of theory, politics
and the subject, intimated but not always developed in Foucault's work, by approaching
Foucault in the same manner as Foucault approached Nietzsche:
The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to deform
it, to make it groan and protest (Foucault 1980a: 53-4).
The outcome of thus making Foucault's thought 'groan and protest' and in the process
transform itself, will, no doubt, be an invented Foucault, a fabricated Foucault, a fictional
Foucault. But it will also be a consistent Foucault' a useful Foucault, an applied Foucault.
It will be a Foucault who in being brought to reflect upon his own oeuvre finds himself
reflected in the manner in which his oeuvre has been organised here.
To follow Foucault in this way is no more and no less than to attempt to coherently,
logically and effectively reconstruct his work. To follow is to come after and to
supersede, but also to adhere to and to comprehend; a follower is a disciple but could as
well be a pursuer or forensic detective; and the practice offollowing requires discipline,
perseverance and endurance but also playful imitation and intuition. In this light, this
thesis asks two sets ofquestions. On the one hand, what follows or comes after Foucault?
What are the implications ofhis work for how we conceive of theory, politics and
ourselves? On the other hand, how might we follow, be guided by or conform to
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Foucault's thought? It is the argument of this thesis that the second set ofquestions
depends on the first set: one can only follow (or be faithful to) Foucault ifone follows (or
recognises the disruptive implications of) Foucault. As Baudrillard (quoted in Macey
1993: 360) coolly remarked: "To forget him [Foucault] was to do him a service; to
, .
adulate him was to do him a disservice". In the context of this thesis, then, to use
Foucault is necessarily to abuse him; conversely, one can only abuse him by using his
work.
Methodologically, this thesis falls only partly within the history of ideas: it focuses on
explicating the substance ofFoucault's oeuvre, but situates this oeuvre only indirectly in
relation to its theoretical milieu or socio-economic context (chiefly, the way in which the
extension ofdisciplinary mechanisms, disillusionment with the politics of revolution, and
globalisation have de-familiarised our present). Primarily, the thesis is a political,
philosophical and historical examination ofthe consistency and coherence ofFoucault's
thought taken on its own terms, aiming to push it as far as it can go - ifnecessary beyond
its own limits, so as to reflect on its implications for what and where we are at present and
where we might go from here. While it is not specifically concerned with the truth or
otherwise ofFoucault's propositions, it deals extensively with the debate around issues of
truth. While it does not seek to verifY the the accuracy ofFoucault's historical
pronouncements, it is particularly interested in the effects that a genealogical approach, or
a history of the present, can have on how we think about theory, power and subjects.
While I have attempted to reduce to a minimum those moments where, as a result of my
intention to use him in order to abuse him, my voice and the voice ofFoucault seem
imperceptibly to merge, such lapses in critical distance are both partly unavoidable and to
some extent desirable since in this thesis FoucauIt is pitted against himself. It is also fitting
that a thesis of this nature, dealing with a theorist of this kind, attempts to embody the
precepts that it seeks to elucidate. When I began this wor,k some five years ago, all I
knew ofFoucault was what I had read in the writings ofothers. Having completed my
MA on the topic of South African Marxist historiography, I knew that Foucault was
7
critical ofMarxism, and I too had begun to move in a 'post-Marxist' direction under the
impact ofErnesto Laclau's and Chantal Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy
(1985). My interest was piqued, and this is the outcome: a thesis written as much for
myself, for reasons ofpersonal transformation and curiosity, as it is written to fulfill the
requirements (to pay the theoretical, economic and institutional price, as Foucault would
have said) ofacademia. Thus, this thesis is not just an examination ofthe implications of
Foucault's work for theory, politics and human subjects; it is in itself a theoretical
reflection, a political experiment and a personal meditation.
While notoriously difficult to pin down and categorise, Foucault nevertheless was
extraordinarily clear about his own self-conception and the general location of his work in
relation to modern and contemporary theories, ranging from the Kantian tradition and
Nietzsche to the Frankfurt School and structuralism. Indeed, the Kant who framed the
theme which has preoccupied modernity - what can we know, when we are what we seek
to know? - is also the Kant to whom Foucault was wont to return and pay critical homage.
For Foucault, the attitude or ethos appropriate to modernity ought to consist ofa
permanent critique ofourselves as critical bearers and subjects ofEnlightenment:
[I]t is a question of searching for another kind of critical philosophy. Not a critical
philosophy that seeks to determine the conditions and the limits of our possible
knowledge of the object, but a critical philosophy that seeks the conditions and the
indefinite possibilities of transforming the subject, of transforming ourselves
(Foucault 1993a: 224 nA).
Thus it requires that we transform Kant's question of the limits ofknowledge into a
practical and potentially 'transgressive' genealogical critique which is simultaneously
critical, analytical and experimental. The present needs to be examined systematically and
historically along three axes corresponding to the different modes by which human beings
are made subjects: our knowledge of and control over things, our power over and actions
upon others, and our relations with ourselves as ethical beings. It thus seems appropriate
that a thesis which seeks to offer an holistic and integrated understanding of the relevance
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and implications ofFoucault's oeuvre for contemporary debates around theory, politics
and human subjects, should be organised along the axes identified above by Foucault
himself
Accordingly, the central chapters of this thesis will focus on Foucault's examination of the
history oftmth which culminated in the Enlightenment, and his critique of Western
rationalities (Chapter One); his problematizing genealogical approach and how it might be
applied to the Enlightenment, as well as its ramifications for the work of intellectuals
(Chapter Two); the history of the emergence of Western political rationalities in the form
of sovereignty and discipline (Chapter Three); the analysis of the relations between power,
states ofdomination, freedom and resistance, allowing for a reconceptualisation ofpower
relations as strategies ofgovernance (Chapter Four); and the role of relations ofpower in
the production ofknowledge and subjectivity (Chapter Five).
In Chapter One it will be shown how Foucault, in the great Socratic tradition, sought the
grounds for grounds, the 'invisible' assumptions and practices that make possible who we
are and what we do. He was thus grappling with questions which lie so close to the heart
of Western philosophy and its attendant institutions, rituals and practices that they are
often deemed, to be at best unanswerable and at worst dangerously subversive. To attempt
to write a history of tmth and how truth was produced, has functioned and has been
transformed, is to ask what one can know ofa concept on which our very knowledge
depends. It is to pose anew the question of the Kantian constmction of the limits to our
knowledge of our Enlightened present. It is simultaneously to become aware of the forces
and constraints involved in our production of truth, and thus to bring to light the complex
relationship between knowledge and power.
Foucault deplored what he considered to be the inadequacy ofmost ofour existing tools
for analysing the forces that shape and drive our present, and consequently much of his
work was devoted, albeit indirectly, to developing mechanisms and methods which would
be more appropriate. Foremost amongst the cultural inventions at our disposal is the
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pennanently critical and reflexive attitude ofan enlightened modernity itself. Foucault
aimed to show how our supposedly self-evident present can be exposed as a fragile,
complex interconnection ofmultiple and often recent historical processes, and how this
self-evidence can be breached by making visible those singular, fragmented, heterogeneous
events which are both internal to and yet exteriorise the present and as such cannot easily
be subsumed into conventional theological, anthropological, historical or philosophical
generalities. Consequently, he directed his attention to rethinking the conditions of
possibility of, and the relations of interdependence between, various experiences,
discourses, practices and institutions.
This paradoxica~ immanent critique of the Enlightenment is what Foucault called
genealogy, the focus of Chapter Two. Within this 'history of the present', the concept of
'problematization' plays a major role. Problematization refers both to the way in which
specific historical practices give rise to or condition the emergence ofobjects ofanalysis,
which themselves will be an amalgam ofexperiences (such as madness or sexuality),
discourses (such as psychiatry or sexology), practices (such as confinement or
surveillance) and institutions (such as asylums ot confessionals), as well as to the ways in
which genealogy and genealogists are able to transform a 'given' into a question and in so
doing require the rethinking ofpolitics, philosophy and ethics. The concept of
problematization will be illustrated with reference to the phenomenon ofmadness,
showing how the science which concerns itself with mental illness - psychiatry - is in fact
the analytical corollary ofhistorical forms of constraint directed at producing the
experience we call madness. The need to rethink: the role of intellectuals in terms of both
their collusion with and problematization of modem political rationalities follows from
this.
In Chapter Three. genealogy is enlisted in the service ofhistoricallv rethinking how we.... ... - _.. ..- ........
might understand power. Modem theories ofpower understood as sovereignty form an
initial comparative backdrop to a rough periodisation, distilled from several ofFoucault's
texts, of the steady but discontinuous integration ofWestern relations ofpower and
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technologies of the self from ancient times to the present. Characterised by, firstly,
individualising and totalising tendencies operating in tandem, and secondly, an intimate
relationship between power and knowledge, Western technologies ofpower began by
likening kings and leaders to shepherds leading their flocks, with enormous implications
for the relationship between leaders and led. Consequent upon the disintegration of
feudalism, new forms ofpolitical rationality began to take shape, as increasing importance
was given to pedagogical and ethical technologies of self-formation aimed at
individualising subjects, such as the confession, and policing mechanisms directed at entire
populations. The disciplines once confined to monasteries and barracks became general
formulas of domination, spreading throughout the social body to form the 'disciplinary
society'. With this, we enter the age of the effectivity of knowledge, the productivity of
networks ofpower and above all the fabrication of individuals via the procedures of
hierarchical observation, normalising judgement and examination. The Enlightenment thus
gave birth not only to various civil liberties, critical humanistic philosophies and scientific
and technological advances, but also to disciplinary mechanisms (represented in ideal form
by the Panopticon) without which modem societies could not exist.
In Chapter Four, the history of disciplinary relations of power gives way to an in-depth
and critical analysis ofFoucault's extensive discussions ofpower relations. For Foucault,
in order to free ourselves from this juridico-discursive conception ofpower, we need to
develop an 'analytics', as opposed to a 'theory', ofpower relations, focusing not on what
power is, but on how it operates. Multiple, local and unstable relations of power are seen
as inherent in all human interactions, and constitute the foundations for global states of
domination such as capitalism, patriarchy and racism. Since power relations are taken to
assume freedom and to perpetually encounter resistance as they act upon the actions of
others, they can be described less as a confrontation between two adversaries (coercion)
or as the linking of one to the other (consent) than as government. One of the most salient
characteristics ofFoucault's understanding of modem disciplinary networks ofpower is
that they constitute individuals as subjects (and subjects as individuals); but far from
denying subjects' capacity to think and act freely and to resist, relations ofpower make
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critique, agency and resistance possible. Resistance is not seen as external to but as
immanent within relations ofpower: transgression and its limit, the transgressor and that
which is denied, rejected or opposed, are premised upon, and even owe their very
existence to, each other, affirming and negating each other in a perpetual but productive
paradox. In turn this makes necessary an analysis of the effects, rather than assuming the
efficacy, of power relations in any given society; and Foucault arrives at a
reconceptualisation of power relations as war-like 'strategies ofgovernance' which also
produce knowledge and subjectivity.
Chapter Five examines in more detail the manner in which power relations, while
fabricating knowledge and producing subjects, themselves are said to be extended by these
forms ofknowledge being generated by subjects, and at the same time are exercised by
subjects over objects of knowledge, not least themselves and others. The role and
functions of ideology and science, particularly the human sciences as vehicles and effects
ofmodem disciplinary society, are considered especially in relation to the manufacture of
subjectivity, from souls and bodies through to individual actors. The humanism so
prevalent in theoretical analysis since the Enlightenment (perhaps even as early as the
Renaissance), is claimed to be a product of the logic ofbio-power aimed at managing the
lives ofrational subjects. The Chapter concludes by considering the place ofFoucault
himself in relation to his thought, his politics and his ethics: while resisting attempts to
categorise him, he nevertheless called for experimentation with and upon ourselves within
and against the bounds imposed on or proposed to us by the relations of power and forms
ofknowledge which structure the present. In order to think our own history, we are
encouraged to undertake an aesthetic ethical stylisation ofour selves, creating ourselves as
works ofart, and irreverently going beyond the limits ofmodem philosophy so as to freely
determine ::tltefIl.B.tive futures,
The thesis concludes by assessing the implications ofFoucault's work for current
understandings of theory, politics and human subjects, suggesting that relativism,
pessimism and nihilism are possible but certainly not the only nor the primary lessons that
can be drawn. Foucault's iconoclastic genealogy of both the limits and the possibilities
entailed by modem humanist philosophies, theories of sovereignty and enlightened,
empowered and emancipated individual subjects is as much a part ofmodernity as an
attempt to render it unfamiliar and available for refabrication. Without offering us false
hope, he has left us with a rich, nuanced and personalised set ofhistorical analyses,
criticisms, methodologies and strategies, on the basis ofwhich we can essay (or think:)
how to assay (or test) the limits ofwhat we have become.
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CHAPTER ONE: ENLIGHTENMENT, TRUTH AND THE CRITIQUE
OF REASON
The dominant tradition ofWestern philosophy, at least since Plato, has been logocentric
(Derrida 1978; Habermas 1987: 311) or orientated toward "an order of meaning -
thought, truth, reason, logic, the Word - conceived as existing in itself, as foundation"
(Culler 1983: 92). Specifically, logocentrism consists in positing a central reference point
around which all else revolves, a fixed origin or ultimate meaning which ranges between
abstractions such as God, reason, the unconscious or the mode ofproduction, and a
concrete Subject, either an individual ego percipi or a collective entity such as women or
workers. From this central starting-point all other entities and events can be identified,
explained, and evaluated, usually in terms of the myriad of hierarchical binary oppositions
that imbue Western thought.
The main Enlightenment tradition of rationalist, humanist, individualist and materialist
thought gave a particular gloss to this logocentrism, within the context ofother
conceptual, practical and institutional developments: the formal separation of the 'private'
and the 'public'; the emergence ofa world system ofnation-states; an expansionist
capitalist economic order based on private property; industrialism; and, not least, the
growth of large-scale administrative and bureaucratic systems of social organisation and
regulation (Hall, Held & McLennan 1992: 3). Conceiving of the world as "an essentially
ordered totality" (Bauman 1987: 3-4), conducive to explanation and control,
Enlightenment thought bequeathed to modernity a faith in the capacity of human reason to
objectively and scientifically describe and explain the nature of reality, both natural and
social, thus providing humanity with the knowledge required to transform the world and
construct a better society.
While the findings of science reduced men's ignorance, it was the method of science
which freed their minds from error and superstition, thereby freeing them ... of
prejudice, dogmatism and wtolerance (Marsak 1972: 6).
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In obedience to this faith in reason, the modem epoch has centred itself around the
sovereign subject of Western humanism, 'Man', "atomistic and autonomous, disengaged
and disembodied, potentially and ideally self-transparent" (McCarthy 1987: ix). Rational,
speaking subjects, are taken to be constantly involved in a process of searching for truth,
representing and intervening in the world, and lacking or possessing power in relation to a
fixed and essential reality.
This philosophical turning-in-upon-itselftook place in the period between Descartes,
~ whose c..og~to ergo sum,had grasped the subject-object ofphilosophy as abstract
subjectivity, and Kant, who saw it as absolute self-consciousness. Modem philosophy
thus took shape as "the structure ofa self-relating, knowing subject, which bends back
upon itself as object, in order to grasp itself as in a mirror image - literally in a
'speculative' way" (Habermas 1987: 18; Dews 1987: 21). Arrogant and self-con£dent, les
philosophes ofthe Enlightenment emphasised the necessity, universality, unity, certainty,
homogeneity, self-presence and unconditioned status ofhuman reason, while delimiting
their own era from what they saw as the gloomy myths of the immediate Christian past
and the rhetoric and metaphor of distant Antiquity. Universal human rationality coupled
with empirical scientific analysis promised to banish the darkness ofcivil war, lawlessness,
religious intolerance, dogmatism, superstition, ignorance, immaturity, disease and
perverSIOn.
Ironically~ then, a superstitious and unenlightened fear ofdarkness filled the space
occupied by plague and war during the Middle Ages and madness during the Renaissance
(Macey 1993: 97), making visible and pressing the limitations, doubts and deficiencies of
the new modem order at the very moment of its consolidation.
A fear haunted the latter half of the eighteenth century: the fear ofdarkened spaces,
of the pall ofgloom which prevents the full visibility of things, men and truths. It
sought to break up the patches ofdarkness that blocked the light, eliminate the
shadowy areas ofsociety, demolish the unlit chambers where arbitrary political acts,
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monarchical caprice~ religious superstitions~ tyrannical and priestly plots~ epidemics
and the illusions of ignorance were fomented (Foucault 1980a: 153).
Hence the Gothic novels of dark dungeons and evil monsters~ ruined chateaux~ forbidding
bastilles and nefarious kingdoms. Hence, too, the overwhelmingly educative desire of the
Enlightenment, and the strenuous efforts aimed at demarcating and managing large
populations~ not least via the panoptic technologies which percolated through and
reworked the realms ofmedicine~ justice~ industry~ welfare~ mental illness~ town planning~
warfare, education and sexuality.
Foucault laid much of the responsibility for the philosophical formalisation and
justification of these disciplinary practices at the door ofKant, whose critique ofreason~
which "marks the threshold ofour modernity"~awakened us from dogmatism only to
plunge us into an anthropological sleep (OT: 242; 341). However, he recognised that it
was also Kant who made it possible for us to criticise these legacies of the major
Enlightenment tradition. At the end ofthe twentieth century~ modem Western philosophy
is once again bending back upon itself, critically re-examining what are said to be the now
increasingly shaky foundations of our faith in the power of knowledge, in the capacity of
scientific reason to illuminate, transform and improve nature and society. Within and
against the tradition ofKant~ Foucault's work reopens the question of the nature of
Enlightenment: in what ways did the Enlightenment take Western thought in new
directions, and in what ways did it repeat or renew that which was already present? What
were and are the implications for contemporary understandings oftheory~ politics and
human beings, of the grounding ofour thought on, paradoxically~ ourselves? How and
why have recent theoretical and socio-economic developments rendered the main
Enlightenment tradition an object of contemporary preoccupations? Finally, to what
extent are all critics ofmodernity, regardless oftheir position in the politico-philosophical
spectrum, "united in their goal of enlightening the Enlightenment about its narrow-
mindedness" (Habermas 1987: 57)? Or could it be that the Enlightenment is not
authoritatian, but disciplinarian, and not narrow-minded, but simply perverse?
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I Kant and Enlightenment: philosophy as the problematization of a present
Foucault argued that the Enlightenment was "the moment when the West for the first time
affirmed the autonomy and sovereignty of its own rationality" (Foucault 1980c: 53). At... - .. .. ...
the end of the eighteenth century, "theoretical and experimental physics dislodged
__ .. " J<..... ... -
philosophy from its ancient right to speak: of the world, the cosmos, finite or infinite
space" and "reduced philosophy to the field ofa problematic of time" (Foucault 1980a:
149).
[A] profound historicity penetrates into the heart of things, isolates and defines them
in their own coherence, [and] imposes upon them the forms of order implied by the
continuity oftime (OT: xxiii).
A condition and consequence of this was Kant's (and, later, Hegel's and then
Heidegger's) ruminations upon the nature of the present, modernity, conceived ofas a
perpetual transition to the future or - what is much the same thing - a continuous renewal
ofthe past (see Habermas 1987: 6; Calhoun 1995: 14). With Kant's text, "An Answer to
the Question: What is Enlightenment?", "we see philosophy - and I don't think: I'm
exaggerating when I say that it is foJ;' the first time - problematizing its own discursive
contemporaneity" (Foucault 1988a: 88) or "its own discursive present-ness" (Foucault
1993b: 11). Most importantly, this problematic of the present time, "that finitude which ...
discover[ed] that it was its own foundation", "caused the figure ofman to appear" (OT:
372).
Aufklarung for Kant "is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity" (Kant 1996:
51), that is, the point at which human beings attain maturity by shrugging off the authoritv
.... --...... -- - ...
of others which they had imposed upon themselves, this achieving self-determination or... ........ . - ,
better, self-discipline (Foucault 1984a: 34-38). Since "modem philosophy ... derives in
great part from the Kantian question, 'Was ist Aufk1arung?'" (Foucault, in Raulet 1983:
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199), one can argue that"one of the main functions of modem philosophy has been an
enquiry into the historical point at which reason could appear in its 'adult' form,
'unchaoeroned'" (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 200). Foucault thus clearly located his own
J"- .... # ,.
corpus "within the critical tradition ofKant" (Foucault 1994: 314, emphasis in the
original; also cited in Macey 1993: xx); in addition, much of his empirical documentation
was drawn from that period between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries
which is commonly understood to have given birth to what we in the West sanguinely
label 'modem philosophy' .
This historical point ofmaturity, this moment ofEnlightenment, is also - is still - our
present, in perpetual self-reflective transition. It is no coincidence that
the Aujklarung calls itselfAujklarung. It is certainly a very singular cultural process
that became aware of itself by naming itself, by situating itself in relation to its past
and future, and by designating the operations that it must carry out within its own
- - - - - ...
present (Foucault 1988a: 89; 1993b: 12).
Kant's text on the Enlightenment posed the issue ofhow we can and do philosophise
about a world ofwhich we are a part: what can we know, when we are what we seek to
know? In various forms, this paradoxical theme runs throughout modernity and is not yet
exhausted; indeed, we find it in Kant's mentor, Rousseau, who feared that, given the
enslavement of man in society, "[i]t would take gods to give men laws" (Rousseau 1973:
194). Marx, who was also strongly influenced by Rousseau, dealt with the problem by
dialectically linking human agency to material circumstances such that it becomes possible,
indeed essential, "to educate the educator himself' (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 156).
In the twentieth century, Husserl grappled with the Kantian problem ofthe limits of
knowledge in the form of the question: "Can reason and that-which-is be separated,
where reason, as knowing, determines what is?" (Husser11996: 230). Heidegger referred
to it as the hermeneutic circle: "Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding,
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must already have understood what is to be interpreted" (Heidegger. in Mueller-Vollmer.. .... ... -- ~
1986: 225); and Giddens famously took this further in his 'double hermeneutic':
sociology deals with a universe which is already constituted within frames of
meaning by social actors themselves, and reinterprets these within its own
theoretical schemas (Giddens 1976: 162).
For Habermas, this paradox, which he also refers to as the problem of self-referentiality,
features not only in the Enlightenment philosophy of the subject but in the work of its
postmodern critics as well (Habermas 1987: 127). Yet while there can be no doubt that
this problem lies at the heart ofFoucault's enterprise - which is hardly surprising given
that Foucault is a "remarkably able Kantian" (Hacking 1986b: 238) - it will be argued that
this is no cause for a wholesale retreat, via "the alternative that Hegelleft in the lurch back
in Jena", to a concept of communicative reason (Habermas 1987: 74). On the contrary,
this paradox is the nettle that must be grasped, not in order to overcome or resolve it, so
as to smooth the way for the Enlightenment project, but in order to expose and address it,
so as to begin the apparently impossible and yet necessary task of reconceptualising our
'Enlightened' modernity, "the difference ofour present" (AK: 204).
Charles Taylor has shown that this paradox at the heart ofmodern thought was in large
measure the result of the influence ofLocke's empiricist approach, though it was a
consequence, too, of the radical certainty experienced by Descartes's cogito within the
frame provided by St.Augustine's inward-looking theology. The modem s~lfis able to
objec~~~sengage itself from the world (and in this way constitute itself as a free
.- ---------------- - . -- -_. --. - - .
agent) only by :first radically reflecting upon itself as a self: "R~dic~~?~jectivity is only
-- -~--- --- -~--
intelligible and accessible through radical subjectivity" (Taylor 1992: 176). This Western
---.~. . . ~--+- ,.~- -- .- -_.
philosophical theme of self-reflection, which has led us to seek to discover the truths we
believe to lie within us, has, Taylor assures us, taken several turns over the past two and a
halfmillenia. From Plato to Descartes, an increasing emphasis was placed on the 'interior--------_.- ...---------_. -- ,- "~ .. -
dimension' ofthe self With Kant,th1s"alliiension appears to absorb philosophy itself. in
---- ! ... ...
the sense that we are exhorted to reflect upon philosophy as itself a reflection upon
f~
19
modernity, and upon ourselves as beings awakened to the fact of our presence at the heart
ofthis self-reflective present. Despite the continuities in the philosophy of the subject
from Descartes to Kant, there is also a great distance between Kant' s 'Was heisst
Aufklarung? ,, in its concern with the present and with historical subjects, and the
universal, unhistorical subject of the Cartesian question: 'Who am IT (SP: 216).
Thus,
what we see appearing in Kant's text is the question of the present as the
philosophical event to which the philosopher who speaks of it belongs .... All this -
philosophy as the problematization ofa present, and as the questioning by the
philosopher of this present to which he belongs and in relation to which he has to
situate himself - might well be said to characterize philosophy as the discourse of
modernity on modernity (Foucault 1988a: 88; 1993b: 11).
\ Whereas Renaissance and Classical thought could not represent the representer - man
\could be listed as a being, but man as the being who lists was not represented - Kant
Idefined human beings as simultaneously knowing subjects and objects of their own
i
I knowledge (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: xv) - man becomes both an active, meaning-giving
!
\subject and an object within nature, society and language.
Since Kant, the I assumes simultaneously the status ofan empirical subject in the
world, where it is available as one object among others, and the status ofa
transcendental subject over against the world as a whole, which it constitutes as the
totality ofthe objects ofpossible experience (Habermas 1987: 262).
From this paradoxical position emerged what Foucault referred to as the
transcendental/empirical double of 'Man', limited by, and enmeshed in, a language which
was once transparent but had become opaque. Instead oflamenting man's finitude and
limitations, Kant made them the basis ofall positive knowledge: since language no longer
represented, what needed to be shown was how representation and knowledge were
nevertheless possible.
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[T]he threshold ofour modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective
methods to the study ofman, but rather by the constitution ofan empirico-
transcendental doublet which was called man (OT; 319; emphasis in the original).
As Dreyfus and Rabinow put it, "[m]odernity begins with the incredible and ultimately
unworkable idea ofa being who is sovereign precisely by virtue of being enslaved, a being
whose very finitude allows him to take the place of God" (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 30).
By thus identifYing man's factual limitations with and differentiating them from the
conditions that make knowledge possible, the figure ofman as conceived of by Kant
appeared
(1) as a fact among other facts to be studied empirically, and yet as the
transcendental condition of the possibility of all knowledge; (2) as surrounded by
what he cannot get clear about (the unthought), and yet as a potentially lucid cogito,
source ofall intelligibility; and (3) as the product ofa long history whose beginning
he can never reach and yet, paradoxically, as the source of that very history (Dreyfus
& Rabinow 1982: 31).
This paradox upon which Kant founded modem philosophy offered up a series oftempting
but, arguably, ultimately fruitless dichotomies in which his successors immersed and
largely lost themselves: what Foucault referred to as the transcendental and the empirical,
the cogito and the unthought, and the retreat and return ofthe origin. Some, like Comte
and positivism, followed Kant's transcendental aesthetic, attempting to provide an
empirical basis for all knowledge on the grounds that our senses supply the conditions of
possibility ofknowledge, thus founding knowledge in a theory ofperception (a theory of
man based on human nature). Others, like Hegel and Marx, followed Kant's
transcendental dialectic, giving an historical basis to knowledge (a theory in which man's
essence, ifnot itselfhistorical, emerges historically). What is common to both these
positions is the assumption that "there is some truth in itself, accessible either through
perception or through history, and that some discipline is in possessionofa neutral
discourse capable ofrevealing this truth" (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 33). It is this
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rationalist~ subject-centred and self-reflective form of the Western philosophical search for
truth, this necessity that our culture has imposed upon itself, that is now being
problematized by recent socio-political developments, particularly new scientific and
technical rationalities, disillusionment with progress and revolutionary change, and the
effects ofthe West's global cultural and economic hegemony.
1/ The Enlightenment as a contemporary preoccupation
Within the frame ofthe problem bequeathed to us by Kant, that our knowledge of
ourselves and our present is grounded upon paradox, Foucault suggested that the
Enlightenment has become central to contemporary preoccupations as a result of three
specific developments:
the importance of scientific and technical rationality in the development of the
productive forces and the play ofpolitical decisions ... [,] the history ofa
'Revolution' the hope ofwhich had been, since the end ofthe eighteenth century,
borne by a rationalism ofwhich one is entitled to ask what part it may have played in
the effects ofdespotism in which this hope lost itself ... [~ and] the movement which,
at the close of the colonial era, led it to be asked of the West what entitles its
culture, its science, its social organisation, and finally its rationality itself, to be able
to claim universal validity: was this not a mirage associated with economic
domination and political hegemony? (Foucault 1980c: 54)
Arising both during and as a result of the Enlightenment, these developments have made
our present both possible and problematic: first, the relationship between powerful
scientific and technical rationalities and equally powerful political and economic forces - in
short, the intimate embrace ofpower and knowledge; second, the 'Revolution' and
associated progressive social transformation, which, manifested concretely in France and
more abstractly in the work ofKant, Begel and Marx, runs like a thread throughout
modernity; and third, the ever-deepening and -widening global hegemony ofthe now post-
Golopial West.
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The first problematizing process referred to above in fact constitutes what is in large part
the subject-matter of this thesis; the second and third processes can be dealt with more
readily and immediately. The question of the Revolution is central to the present in that
the French and Russian revolutions have dominated modern theory and practice, treating
history as a progressive teleology, placing scientific rationalities and their liberal and
Marxist surrogates on pedestals, and directing the energies ofmillions against relations of
power conceived of in terms of sovereignty. Marx associated the rise ofa globalising
modernity, which he tended to equate with capitalism, with this impulse towards
revolutionary political change:
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of
production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole
relations of society All fixed, fast-frozen relations ... are swept away .... All that
is solid melts into air (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 224).
Foucault, while echoing these sentiments, nevertheless insisted that equal salience be
granted to the non-political aspects of the revolution:
The power of the bourgeoisie is self-amplifYing, in a mode not ofconservation but
of successive transformations.... Hence both its precariousness and its supple
inventiveness. Hence the fact, the possibility, of its fall and of the revolution has
been integral to its history almost from the beginning (Foucault 1980a: 160-61).
This question of the revolution, which "has dominated all modern thought, like all politics"
(Foucault 1977b: 160), can, like the question of the Enlightenment of which it forms a
part, be traced back to Kant, who defined the 'will to revolution'
as at once event, rupture and historic upheaval, as failure, but also as value, as the
sign ofa disposition which operates in history and the progress ofmankind ... [; as]
a permanent virtuality which cannot be ignored: it is the guarantee for future history
ofthe continuity ofprogress (Foucault 1993b: 17).
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Here at the end of the twentieth century, Kant's idea of revolution as progress has ahnost
disintegrated, and the questions we might be asking now are twofold: "'What are we, are
we superfluous in this age when what should be happening is not happening?''', and 'Is the
revolution desirable?' (Foucault 1977b: 159-160). The question to be asked of the
revolution is no longer 'when' or 'how', but 'what does it tell us about how we think of
our history?' (see Rajchman 1991: ix).
As a result, our very identities as modem beings are being called into question by the
failure of revolutionary change to materialise or, when a revolution does indeed take
place, by its failure to live up to expectations. Given this,
we are perhaps experiencing the end ofpolitics. For politics is a field that has been
opened by the existence ofthe revolution, and if the question ofthe revolution can
no longer be posed in these terms, then politics is in danger of disappearing
(Foucault 1977b: 160).
One might safely discount Foucault's rather exaggerated suggestion that politics is in
danger ofdisappearing; rather than the end ofpolitics, the mounting tide of criticisms of
modernity suggests only that we are experiencing the end of politics as we have known it -
a politics organised around self-reflective sovereign identities practically engaged in
progressive social transformation - with the addition'll and problematic dimension that no
alternative form ofpolitics has as yet been discerned.
However, as the third ofFoucault's problematizing processes makes clear. since at least
.& .......... "
the end of the Second World War we have witnessed an intensifYing political contestation
of the nevertheless consolidating planetary hegemony of the West. The lights which were
kindled in parochial Konigsberg and clannish Edinburgh, as specific groups in specific
countries ofeighteenth century Europe began to grapple, at the moment of their self-
reflective awakening, with the realisation of their finitude, have since come to illuminate
and transform the globe. Colonialism, imperialism and industrialisation, not to mention
our modem obsession with truth and discipline, have set in motion an irreversible and
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relentlessly accelerating process - the Westernisation of the world (Latouche 1993: 160) -
which~ moreover~ is already beyond the control ofanyone group or country. This rise to
global dominance ofthe Western regime of truth is no doubt unique in human history,
evidence ofa "singular historical destiny" despite the fact that it is now "almost universal"
(Foucault 1988a: 223; 1984a: 47). Historically~ Western societies have been amongst the
most aggressive and the most conquering; "they alone evolved a strange technology of
power treating the vast majority ofmen as a flock with a few as shepherds" (Foucault
1981e: 231); never before has there been "such a tricky combination in the same political
structures of individualization techniques, and oftotalization procedures" (SP: 213); and
"a very singular cultural process" was required in order for the West to become aware of
and name itself as 'enlightened' (Foucault 1988a: 89; 1993b: 12).
Yet, notwithstanding the complexity and sophistication of Western structures of
knowledge and power (Foucault 1981e: 239-40)~ or the fact that the multiplicity~
variability and malleability of its games of truth has no doubt "given the West, in
relationship to other societies, possibilities ofdevelopment that we find nowhere else"
(Foucault 1987b: 128), the light which came to illuminate the world now finds itself, at the
moment ofwhat ought to have been its greatest brilliance, flickering feebly in the grip of
the fierce storm ofinternational political realignments, the impact of informational
technologies on culture and economics, philosophical disillusionment and environmental
crisis. As Giddens puts it: "The declining grip of the West over the rest of the world is
not a result ofthe diminishing impact of the institutions which first arose there but, on the
contrary, a result of their global spread" (Giddens 1991: 52). For Foucault, the Iranian
revolution was "perhaps the first great insurrection against a planetary system" (Foucault,
quoted in Eribon 1993: 287) ironically dependent on a commodity which it itself lacks,
namely oil; but particularly since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the
breakup of the Soviet Union, waves of transformation have swept across the world and
are now lapping at the doorstep ofa supposedly victorious Western capitalism. The
extraordinary phenomenon of Western hegemony is in fact unthinkable outside ofcomplex... "'- - ... ....
relations of interdependence with all that the West deemed external or marginal to its own
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concerns, from internal others (Jews, women, Eastern Europeans) (Hall 1992a: 280) to
Asian, African and Latin American cultures. What has come to be called 'the West' "did
not simply reflect an already-established western society: rather, it was essential to the
very formation of that society" (Hall 1992a: 278). Only by conceiving of the rest of the
world as the childhood of civilisation and ofhistory as a series of developmental stages
related to modes of subsistence (hunting, pasturage, agriculture and commerce) could the
theorists of the Western Enlightenment represent their own context as the pinnacle of
civilisation. The 'Rest' was represented as 'other' in terms ofa Golden Age or state of
nature, populated by innocent, sensual 'noble savages' whose only vice was that they were
not Enlightened and hence remained potentially dangerous, childish and lacking in reason
(Hall 1992a: 300; Bauman 1987: 111; 1988: 220).
Indeed, seeing in the Rest its own distorted image, aspirations and fears (Hall 1992a: 307),
the very existence ofthe West as 'West' and as unique depended and continues to depend
on its "contact and self-comparison with other, non-western, societies (the Rest)" (Hall
1992a: 278):
Without the Rest (or its own internal others), the West would not have been able to
recognise and represent itself as the summit ofhuman history. The figure of 'the
Other', banished to the edge of the conceptual world and constructed as the
absolute opposite, the negation, ofeverything which the West stood for, reappeared
at the very centre of the discourse ofcivilization, refinement, modernity and
development in the West (Hall 1992a: 314).
The margins are at the centre: Western scientific rationalities are assailed from within by
postmodern and postcolonial theories and from without by traditional, ethnic, mystical and
religious forms ofknowledge; Western political and military might, despite the collapse of
the 'evil empire' ofcommunism and the success of the Gulf War, continues to be regarded
with suspicion and fear in the United Nations and the developing countries at large; and
Western economic power remains tied, at least in the short term, to the uncertain fortunes
ofa budget-deficient American empire faced with strong East Asian competition.
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The West, along with its Enlightened rationalities and powers, has begun to reach its
limits; this does not mean, however, that its present planetary dominance can be
discOlmted'or that it has exhausted all of its effects:
the Orient is for the West all that the West is not, even though it is there that it must
seek its primitive truth. A history of this division throughout its long western
evolution should be written, followed in its continuity and its exchanges, but it must
also be allowed to appear in its tragic hieratism (Foucault, Preface to Histoire de la
Folie: iv, in Macey 1?93: 146).
Thus the twentieth century crisis of the Western Enlightenment is the product of several
processes which, though rendering problematic, and even threatening, how we presently
think and act, are only likely to transform what we are and do to a degree consonant with
their location and implication within that which they problematize. Indeed, recognising
this situatedness is an essential prerequisite for problematization itself (Calhoun 1995: 77).
It is no longer possible, if it ever were an option, for our present to recover or re-invent
some (mythical) past age or state ofaffairs in which relations between West and East, or
North and South (or, for that matter, between groups or individuals within the West
itself), were less skewed and muted; there is no reason, however, why this ought to
preclude us from describing "the itinerary of the silencing" (Macherey, quoted in Spivak
1990a: 31).
To sum up, what is presently at stake and in question is the unique, Enlightenment-
sculpted rationalism ofthe West,
which claims universality whilst developing itself in the contingent, which affirms its
unity yet proceeds only by piecemeal modilications and general reorganisations,
which validates itselfby its own sovereignty but which cannot be dissociated in its
history from the inertias, sluggishness, and coercions to which it is subject (Foucault
1980c: 54),
and which, simultaneously armed and enslaved by cold science and impassioned by dreams
ofparadise, is now coming up against its own boundaries. That which was bequeathed to
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us by les philosophes and authoritatively systematised by Kant has come full circle, the
return ofthe same as other:
Two centuries later, the Enlightenment returns: but not at all as a way for the West
to take cognizance of its pr~sent possibilities and of the liberties to which it can have
access, but as a way of interrogating it on its limits and on the powers which it has
abused. Reason as despotic enlightenment (Foucault 1980c: 54).
Indeed, it is the very success of the imperious rationalisation ofmodern society, once
sustained by a Utopian imagination which was both a condition for and an effect of the
rapid advancement of technology, that has laid the foundations for an 'Information Age'
which is itself responsible for modernity'sfin de millenium disillusionment with itself
From its beginnings, the Enlightenment project, or at least elements thereof, have been
suspiciously and critically examined in the work ofRousseau, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud,
and it is both the accumulation of such critiques coupled with the manifest failure of their
proposed alternatives which, coinciding with world wars, genocide, famine,
underdevelopment, moral relativism and a generalised theoretical impasse, has produced
disillusionment - and made both possible and necessary the reassessment ofmodernity.
11/ The history of truth
While the Enlightenment is clearly central to modernity, the history of Western
rationalities cannot be collapsed into that which is in fact only our most recent past.
Even if the Enlightenment has been a very important phase in our history, and in the
development ofpolitical technology, I think we have to refer to much more remote
processes ifwe want to understand how we have been trapped in our own history
(Foucault 1981e: 226; SP: 210).
The history of the West, both pre- and post-Enlightenment, has been characterised by that
"most general ofpolitical problems ... the problem oftruth", or, more specifically, "the
production and transformation of the true/false division" (Foucault 1981£: 11); and
M
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Foucault's formulation of the issue clearly captures the precarious and problematic nature
of what must be undertaken. Ifwe are indeed 'trapped' in a history which is ours and
which has made us what we are, how is it that we can be aware of, let alone come to
understand, this fact? We find ourselves "at the centre ofa labour by whose principles
[we are] governed" (OT: 318); neither autonomous makers ofhistory nor powerless
puppets ofcircumstance, we are instrumental in determining a history which has
determined that we are instruments.
We are doomed historically to history, to the patient construction ofdiscourses
about discourses, and to the task ofhearing what has already been said (Foucault
1976a: xvi).
It is this productively constraining predicament - constraining, in that our thought can
never be universal, but productive, in that "a certain apprehension" is nevertheless made
possible (OT: 372) - which can and must be explained ifwe are to reproduce or renew
how we distinguish what we take to be true from what we take to be false.
Generally speaking, then, "[t]he question of the Western world" as a whole is "why truth?
And why are we concerned with truth, and more so than with the self? And why do we
care for ourselves, only through the care for truth?" (Foucault 1987b: 126). Why, indeed,
for the dichotomy between true and false which for thousands ofyears we have taken for
granted is not, Foucault believed, inherent in the very nature of things, but instead was
produced at a specific point in history, "between Hesiod and Plato" (Foucault 1984b:
112). In the sixth century RC., truth had resided in "what discourse was or did, ... the
ritualized ... act ofenunciation"; only one hundred years later, truth had been displaced to
what discourse said, "the utterance itself, its meaning, its form, its object, its relation to its
reference" (Foucault 1984b: 112). While Foucault does not explicitly say so, there are
parallels with Heidegger here, who argued that Plato distorted the pre-Socratic conception
oftruth as something unhidden or unconcealed and internal by associating it with the
visible but external light of the Ideas:
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In this shift in the notion of truth, the essence of truth is no longer the unfolding of
unhiddenness, but rather resides in the essence of the idea, relinquishing
unhiddenness. Truth is correctness of the gaze, not a feature of beings themselves
(duBois 1991: 133).
Truth as being and conduct becomes truth as object and representation, giving rise to a
conception ofphilosophy as "the gazing up at the 'ideas'" (Heidegger, quoted in duBois
1991: 133). And ever since Plato, this reformulation of the division between true and false
has "never stopped shifting" and modifying itself, varying oVer time according to "the
range ofobjects to be known; ... the functions and positions of the knowing subject, [and]
'" the material, technical, and instrumental investments ofknowledge" (Foucault 1984b:
113; emphasis in the original).
Institutionally supported, "reinforced and renewed" by pedagogy, systems of books,
publishing, libraries, learned societies and laboratories, and "more profoundly ... by the
way in which knowledge is put to work, valorized, distributed, and in a sense attributed, in
a society", the will to truth also exerts "a power ofconstraint ... on other discourses" in
the manner in which Western literature has attempted to ground itselfon the revealed
truths of 'nature' or 'science', the way in which economic practices since the sixteenth
century have sought to ground themselves in theories of wealth and production, and the
mode in which the penal system justifies itselfin socio-psychological knowledge (Foucault
1984b: 113; aT: 352). Today, the will to truth grows ever more implacable, to the extent·
that it is even attempting to assimilate, modify and ground the two other great, arbitrary,
historically modifiable, institutionalised and violent systems ofexclusion and constraint
which, according to Foucault, forge our knowledge: social and political prohibitions on
the right to speak, and the division between reason and irrationality or madness (Foucault
1984b: 113).
For Foucault, the common denominator in all the often widely varying "games of truth"
that have been played in Western history is not the existence of true statements but the
functioning ofmechanisms that make such statements possible and persuasive,
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not the production of true utterances but the establishment of domains in which the
practice of true and false can be made at once ordered and pertinent (Foucault
1981£: 8-9).
The rules which order truth are a function of the will to power which Foucault, like
Nietzsche, finds at the base of the will to truth:
The locus of emergence for metaphysics was surely Athenian demagogy, the vulgar
spite of Socrates and his belief in immortality, and Plato could have seized this
Socratic philosophy to turn it against itself Undoubtedly, he was often tempted to
do so, but his defeat lies in its consecration (Foucault 1977a: 160).
Not only does "the great Circe, Cruelty" (Nietzsche, quoted in Stem 1979: 80) preside
over the birth of all human knowledge, but her malice infests the very procedures designed
to discover the truth. Plato's allegory of the cave is a case in point: coercion marks the
entire process whereby the prisoners are set free, "forced to stand up" and dragged
"forcibly up the steep and rugged ascent" into the painfully dazzling light ofthe sun
(Solomon 1982: 95).
Ever since then, Western philosophy has progressively referred "all thought and all truth to
consciousness, to the Self, to the Subject"; much more than a mere footnote to Plato,
philosophy has certified the subjugation of Western civilisation (Foucault 1989: 61; aT:
330). Chapters Three and Five will take up, in more detail, this theme ofthe disciplined
production ofknowledge and transformation of the self under the auspices ofauthoritative
others, which runs throughout Foucault's work:
Only relations offorce and labor, the coercion through questioning to arrive at truth,
... the power of the master, can enable the achievement of truth, of the philosophical
life (duBois 1991: 122).
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Given these rather servile and ignoble origins, it seems rather perverse that Western
philosophy has spent millennia elaborating upon the universality and necessity of what
effectively was no more than a particular, contingent and culturally specific Hellenism.
Yet it is this very perversity that makes it possible for Foucault to attempt, apparently
irrationally, to write the chequered history of truth or, better, the history of shifting
"ensemble[s] ofrules for the production of the truth" (Foucault 1987b: 127). Only by
reflecting upon ancient Greek thought as an arbitrary yet centrally determining experience
in our past, might we be able to free ourselves from our own history (Foucault 1989: 325;
see also Rajchman 1991: viii).
The universalising impulse of the Western rationalities to which we are so inured have not
only produced (as opposed to discovered) irrationalities (in the sense that all we know of
madness is what reason tells us of it) but in their blind conviction of their own universality
have committed acts ofviolence against particular forms ofknowledge and moralities
whose fate it was to be unable to match Western power.
The idea has been that ifwe live in a world ofreason, we can get rid of violence.
This is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no incompatibility
(Foucault 1980e: 4).
Against these depredations committed in the name ofreason, truth and science, we must
try to discover "what is this rationality so compatible with violence" (Foucault 1980e: 4).
Instead oftrying to define violence out ofan ideal rationality, we must examine how
rationalised violence works;
[i]nstead of trying to find out what truth, as opposed to error, is, it might be more
interesting to take up the problem posed by Nietzsche: how is it that, in our
societies, 'the truth' has been given this value, thus placing us absolutely under its
thrall? (Foucault 1988a: 107).
NietzschEf's formulation of the problem is worth repeating:
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What then is truth? A mobile army ofmetaphors, metonymics, anthropomorphisms
- in short, a sum ofhuman relations which, poetically and rhetorically intensified,
became transposed and adorned, and which after long usage by a people seem fixed,
canonical and binding on them. Truths are illusions which one has forgotten are
illusions, worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses,
coins which have their obverse effaced and are now no longer of account as coins,
but merely as metal (Nietzsche, quoted in Stem 1979: 185-6; emphasis in the
original).
The very real, very powerful illusion that is truth has a history that demands to be told: as
much because, in our confessional culture, it is always truth which is doing the telling, as
because it is a task from which we in the present, "bound to the back ofa tiger" (OT:
322), shrink only at our own peril.
IV Riveting rules and tainted tools
To write a history of the rules that have governed the production of truth is to
reemphasise the importance of the Enlightenment for our present concerns. As children of
the Enlightenment, the analytical tools that we have at our disposal are often responsible
for, or are at least implicated in, the problems which confront modernity aujin de
milIenium, from Northern cultural imperialism to Southern genocide, from Christian
conservatism to Islamic fundamentalism, or from the AIDS pandemic to impending
ecological disaster. Tools such as
'anthropological' or psychological notions like those of curiosity, the need for
mastery or appropriation through knowledge, distress before the unknown, reactions
to the threat of the undifferentiated; historical generalities such as the spirit ofa
period, its sensibility, its types of interests, its conception ofthe world, its system of
values, its essential needs; [and] philosophical themes such as a horizon of
rationality that makes itself known through time (Foucault 1977a: 201),
have not only justified or contributed to these problems ofplanetary significance, but are
also deplorably inadequate and "imprecise", particularly when it comes to tracing and
reflecting upon the trajectory of the will to truth out ofwhich they emerged: "'True'
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discourse ... cannot recognize the will to truth which pervades it" (Foucault 1984b: 114).
In other words, ifwe wish to understand how we in the West have been 'trapped' in our
own, Enlightened history, ifwe wish to undertake a "permanent criticism" (Foucault
1982c: 34) or "persistent critique ofwhat one must inhabit" (Spivak 1990b: 276; 1990a:
103), we must necessarily adopt a critical attitude to contemporary methods ofanalysis
and critique.
It follows that the commonplace concepts ofconsciousness and continuity, freedom and
causality, and sign and structure need to be supplemented unot replaced by an emphasis
on "the event and the series, along with the play of the notions which are linked to them:
regularity, dimension of chance (alea), discontinuity, dependence, transformation"
(Foucault 1984b: 128; see also AK: 21). Like the soliloquy in Shakespearian drama, the
event breaks and provokes reflection upon (as if from the outside), the continuity ofour
historical metanarratives. The causality we discern at the heart of our history is an
'illusion which we have forgotten is an illusion'; it can only be countered by another
illusion, that ofa complex web ofconditions ofpossibility or relational 'dependencies': "I
would like to substitute this whole play ofdependencies for the uniform, simple notion of
assigning a causality" (Foucault 1978b: 13; 1988a: 265; 1984b: 127). The noble cause or
the great man ofhistory must make way for the humble event, that which
is disguise of repetition, the always singular mask that conceals nothing, simulacra
without dissimulation, incongruous finery covering a nonexistent nudity, pure
difference (Foucault 1977a: 177),
and which stands in relations ofdependence upon discernible practices, including "power
structures, fairly closely related institutional forms ... [and] ... different forms of
knowledge" (Foucault 1988a: 265). "To study the conditions ofexistence ofa given
social identity, then, is to study the power mechanisms making it possible" (Laclau 1990:
32). Dionysian rather than Apollonian, this history ofrule-govemed and rationalised yet
arbitrary and fabricated events contains no greater meanings or deeper truths than
conventional histories ofprogressively interlaced causes and effects: history in this sense
.~1l
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"is not a subject who w~ars a series ofmasks; it is, as Dionysus was, no more than the
process of the appearance ofa series ofmasks" (Flynn 1981: 333).
Thus, to focus, conventionally but narrowly, on the causal factors which supposedly
determined the situation in which we presently find ourselves, would be to reduce the
multiplicities, contingencies, discontinuities and contradictions of history - a kaleidoscopic
melee ofchaotic and bizarrely metamorphosising events whose accidental provenance can
be explained only from "the hollow forms of bordering formations" (Habermas 1987: 253)
- to a singular, necessary, continuous and coherent process, a "total description" no doubt
centred upon a transcendental subject (AK: 10). To explain, instead, how we have come
to understand ourselves and our history in such terms, requires that one examine, in
Nietzschean fashion, the complex and turbulent power-play of conditions ofpossibility and
effects (Foucault 1984b: 127); it requires a recognition of "the singular randomness of
events" under circumstances "where there is only 'the iron hand ofnecessity shaking the
dice-box of chance'" (Foucault, quoting Nietzsche [The Dawn 130], 1977a: 155; see also
197ge: 81). What is important about this formulation ofNietzsche's is that it does not
take the form ofeither/or but instead ofbothland: both chance and necessity are inherent
in history, and while Western thought has attempted to-reduce ifnot eliminate the role of
the former, to reverse this emphasis and to attempt to purge history of the latter is no less
problematic. What Benveniste had to say about language is also applicable to history: "If
language is something other than a fortuitous conglomeration oferratic notions and
sounds uttered at random, it is because necessity is inherent in its structure as in all
structure" (Benveniste, quoted in Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 106).
The dichotomies so dear to Western logocentric thought - such as necessity and
contingency, identity and difference, determinism and freedom, and structure and agency -
thus need to be rethought in unconventional ways, but not by reversing them or
substituting one pole for the other. As Rorty notes,
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[w]e do not escape from Platonism by saying that 'our essence is to have no
essence' ifwe then try to use this insight as the basis for a constructive and
systematic attempt to find out further truths about human beings (Rorty 1980: 378);
and Derrida adds:
an irrationalism, like nihilism, is a posture that is completely symmetrical to, thus
dependent upon, the principle ofreason) (Derrida 1983: 14-15).
Instead, as Adorno put it,
it is not the purpose ofcritical thought to place the object on the orphaned royal
throne once occupied by the subject. On that throne the object would be nothing
but an idol. The purpose ofcritical thought is to abolish the hierarchy (Adorno
1973: 181).
Alternatively, one might attempt to substitute for both poles ofa dichotomy a term which
already encapsulates them, along the lines ofDerrida's differance or arche-writing or
Heidegger's Being. The difficulty with such substitutions, however, is that they can
become absolutised as foundations, manifesting what Habermas characterised as "the
Dionysian motifof the god making his promised presence all the more palpable to the sons
and daughters of the West by means of his poignant absence" (Habermas 1987: 181).
Nevertheless, Foucault made use of this device on several occasions: in his introduction
to Binswanger's Dream and Existence, for example, he suggested that the dream is like a
knot that ties human freedom to the necessity of the world (Foucault 1984/5: 47):
Does it [the dream] not designate at one and the same time the content ofa
transcendent world and the original movement ofa freedom? The dream is
deployed ... in a world which secretes its opaque contents and the forms ofa
necessity which cannot be deciphered. Yet at the same time it is free genesis, self-
accomplishment, emergence ofwhat is most individual in the individual (Foucault
1984/5: 54).
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However, in The Order ofThings, he remarked that the pursuit of "that third and
intermediate term in which both the experience of the body [or freedom] and that of
culture (or necessity] would be rooted" was a specifically modem version of the quest for
the Holy Grail and, as such, counter-productive and futile; instead oftrying to explain both
agents and structures through recourse to something like "actual experience", it would be
more fruitful to ask if that being ('Man'), which is being burdened with experience,
actually exists (OT: 321-22). That is to say, such intermediate terms ought not to be
taken to be new foundations but merely temporary tools designed to undermine both poles
ofa dichotomy which itself is only a forgotten construct:
One must pass to the other side - the good side - but by trying to turn off these
mechanisms which cause the appearance oftwo separate sides, by dissolving the
false unity, the illusory 'nature' of this other side with which we have taken sides
(Foucault 1977b: 159).
In this way one "designates the erosion to which both [sides] are subjected, the dispersion
that creates a hiatus between them, wrenching them loose from a calm, rooted, and
definitive positivity" (OT: 372). While Foucault persisted, in later work, in attempting to
erode dichotomies and dissolve unities by introducing a third term or intermediate layer of
analysis, he removed from the latter all hint of foundationalism, whether positive or
negative: as we shall see in Chapters Three and FOUf, in Discipline and Punish and The
History ofSexuality the question ofpower is approached simultaneously from two sides
not in order to arrive at a new theory ofpower (for power as such does not exist) but only
what Foucault called an 'analytics' or 'micro-physics' ofpower relations (HS: 90-91; DP:
26).
It follows that causality and continuity - which dominate modem historical analysis - are
neither denied by Foucault, nor simplistically replaced with their opposites, but instead
decentred when one writes a history ofthat which they exclude: discontinuous events
conditioned by relations ofpower and forms ofknowledge. While Western history,
especially the recent history ofmodernity, can be said to be coherent, this coherence "does
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not derive from the revelation ofa project but from a logic ofopposing strategies"
(Foucault 1980a: 61). It is a coherence premised, paradoxically, on a fundamental
incoherence: as Adomo put it,
not to be denied ... is the unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered
moments and phases ofhistory - the unity of the control ofnature, progressing to
rule over men, and finally to that over men's inner nature. No universal history
leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot
to the megaton bomb (Adomo 1973: 320).
By reformulating our understanding ofhistory such that its unity and order is neither
assumed nor denied, it becomes possible to breach the spurious self-evidence which
dissolves events into some conventional theological, anthropological or philosophical
"ideal continuity" leading to one or other consoling Utopia (Foucault 1977a: 154; 1981f:
6; aT: h'Viii). Instead, deep within (rather than on the other side ofor beyond) this
historical fissure glitters the perilous and disturbing promise ofmultiple Heterotopias,
dessicating our thought, contesting our origins, dissolving our myths and making strange
the familiarity ofour historical present.
It would be to miss the point entirely, however, on the basis ofFoucault's stress on the
role ofchance, dependency and discontinuity, to label him 'an historian ofdiscontinuity'.
When historical analyses were dominated by continuist readings, Foucault subjected them
to a merciless critique; a correspondingly one-sided emphasis upon discontirmity would
have received an equally savage response. Resisting such labelling from interlocutors, he
argued that "no one is more ofa continuist than I am: to recognise a discontinuity is never
anything more than to register a problem that needs to be solved" (Foucault 1981f: 5).
Certainly, Foucault was deeply mistrustful ofa continuist reading ofhistory that
presupposes "the repetition and extension of the same mechanisms through the history of
our societies ... as ifa sort ofcancer will envelope the whole social body" (since, in fact,
confinement in the seventeenth, hospitalisation in the nineteenth, and social security in the
twentieth century were very different phenomena) (Foucault 1988a: 163-4); and his
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article, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", is perhaps his most sustained critique of
historical continuity (Foucault 1977a: 146, 148, 153, 162). Nevertheless, while
acknowledging in an interview that The Order ofThings identified a "self-evident
discontinuity" (between a 'hilarious and folkloric' book ofmedicine from 1750, and a
book of 1820 which is much closer to the self-understanding ofcurrent medical science),
Foucault went on to argue:
is this discontinuity really a discontinuity? Or, to be precise, what was the
transformation needed to pass from one type ofknowledge to another type of
knowledge? For me, this is not at all a way ofdeclaring the discontinuity ofHistory
[as the book had been interpreted]; on the contrary, it is a way ofposing
discontinuity as a problem and above all as a problem to be resolved.... [Readers]
failed to see that the whole work of the book consisted precisely in setting out from
this apparent discontinuity ... and trying, in a way, to dissolve it (Foucault 1988a:
100; see also AK: 174).
Elsewhere he noted in similar vein: "What I have wanted to establish is the very contrary
ofa discontinuity, since I have rflade manifest the very form ofpassage from one state to
another [that is, from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth centuries]" (Foucault
1989: 16).
Davidson (1986: 223) has argued that the unearthing ofdiscontinuities is not an
assumption but a consequence ofFoucault's genealogical approach to contemporary
continuist readings ofhistory. Genealogy, which will be examined in detail in Chapter
Two, does not seek to substitute some new set of truths for supposedly discredited older
ones, but to rethink the will to truth itself. To this end discontinuity is no more than a
precarious, indeed perilous, means itself in need of rethinking, which is why Foucault
preferred to conceive of the discontinuities that he inevitably unearthed as taking the form
ofunderdetermined or self-mutating "discontinuous systematicities" (Foucault 1984b:
129). This last is a telling ifparadoxical phrase, suggesting that patterns are to be
discerned even amidst chaos. It also correlates with the way in which Foucault argued in
The Archaeology ofKnowledge that a 'discursive formation' coheres: "systems of
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dispersion" (AK: 37; emphasis in the original). Thus, Foucault consistently followed his
own advice not to seek the truth of past or present but to question everything that
masquerades as truth: "The history ofdiscontinuities is not given once and for all, it is
itself 'impermanent' and discontinuous" (Foucault 1980c: 56). Even when presented with
an example ofwhat many contemporary historians would not have hesitated to label 'a
discontinuity' , namely, the transition from ancient Greece and Rome to early Christianity,
Foucault demurred: "the coming ofChristianity, considered as a massive rupture with
earlier moralities and the dominant introduction of a quite different one, is barely
noticeable" (Foucault 1988a: 241).
It is vitally important to emphasise that to historicise reason and truth in this way, by
rethinking the conditions ofpossibility ofevents understood to be contingent and
discontinuous, is exactly the opposite ofattempting to step outside ofourselves and our
history. As heirs to a tradition of thought which for the last two hundred years has
consisted of "a critical analysis ofour world", of "the problem ofthe present time, and of
what we are, in this very moment" (SP: 216), we often appear to assume that many ofour
supposedly 'critical', even 'postmodem', philosophical tools and linguistic categories are
by that fact free from any assumptions which we might set out to examine, that they
somehow escape what is no less than a tradition, albeit a critical one. Instead, we must
recognise that, paradoxically, the tradition ofmodem thought can only be criticised from
within, with irredeemably tainted concepts; the rationality ofcritique assumes the values of
Enlightenment, and thus "[w]hoever wants to change things can apparently do so only by
making this impotence itself and his own impotence as well into a factor ofwhat he does"
(Adomo, in Adomo & Becker 1983: 107).
The critique ofevery self-absolutizing particular is a critique of the shadow which
absoluteness casts upon the critique; it is a critique of the fact that critique itself,
contrary to its own tendency, must remain within the medium ofthe concept
(Adomo 1973: 406).
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Moreover, the future is forever rewriting its history, in that one's perspective on the past
inevitably modifies what is taken to be 'the point oforigin' (Foucault, in Elders 1974:
150): modem scientific discourses, in particular, ceaselessly remake their own histories as
they search for what is true and discard what is not (Foucault 1980c: 56). Since our
"reason is self-created" (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 202), we have critical recourse only to
it.
This state ofaffairs is paradoxically as enabling as it is disabling, as radical as it is
conservative: the master's tools may never dismantle the master's house, but they contain
fuzzy blueprints ofhow the house was constructed and might be reconstructed. It is true
that we can never achieve that neutral, external and objective standpoint so lusted after by
science; and thus the postmodern incredulity towards meta-narratives is undeniably
disabling for those who find themselves unable to dispense with the modem search for
certainty and order. It is, however, just as true that our location within our own history-
our exact and faithful alignment with an historically mutating reason - makes it possible for
us to measure and analyse, not the origin or nature of truth or power or subjects, but their
contemporaneous functioning, strategies and effects. We may not be able to describe our
own archive, but we can "illuminate, ifonly in an oblique way", the field ofwhich it is a
part (AK: 130). While all theory and interpretation may be internal to particular
traditions, traditions are never singular or unitary but, being marked by differences which
help sensitise the theorist, can be internally compared, examined and criticised (Calhoun
1995: 64, 84). As E.H.Carr once put it, "Man's capacity to rise above his social and
historical situation seems to be conditioned by the sensitivity with which he recognises the
extent ofhis involvement in it" (Carr 1964: 44).
It follows that, like patterns in chaos or continuity amidst discontinuity, the analytical tools
at our disposal, in spite of their inadequacies, offer at varying times and given various
conditions certain use-values or at least clues as to their own function within the modem
order:
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(a]mong the cultural inventions ofmankind there is a treasury ofdevices,
techniques, ideas, procedures, and so on, that cannot exactly be reactivated, but at
least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point ofview which can be very
useful as a tool for analyzing what's going on now - and to change it (Foucault
1984a: 350).
Human history and inventiveness has thus made available to us a wealth of instruments
and approaches which, though undeniably context-specific, are potentially capable of
helping to constitute "a certain point ofview" which can assist both analysis and change.
For example, it is no doubt much more and much less than a curious coincidence that
Foucault's call for 'permanent criticism' was prefigured in the early writings ofthat
unabashed nineteenth century modernist who demanded "the reckless critique ofall that
exists" (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 36).
In these terms, answers become possible to the impossible question which asks, given that
the politics of truth in the present, consisting ofa perpetually changing but supposedly
universal scientific knowledge, is both the condition for and the effect ofWestern
historicity, "what historical knowledge is possible of a history which itselfproduces the
true/false distinction on which such knowledge depends?" (Foucault 1981£: 11). Can it be
argued that the Western will to truth is truly arbitrary, historically specific, exclusive and
violent? As Peter Dews has argued, the issue centres upon
the sense in which a philosophical position which assumes the foundations of the
classical forms ofcritique to be necessarily and oppressively identitarian can itself
continue to perform a critical function (Dews 1987: xvi).
Leaving aside for the moment that Foucault did not see critique as necessarily identitarian,
and that he emphasised its productivity rather than its oppressiveness, one can respond to
Dews' main point by suggesting that any critique ofreason cannot, but must, 'perform a
critical function': it cannot actually critique or accurately represent the object ofcritique
because in being identitarian it imposes its own conception which it then treats as an
adequate representation, but it must critique, because it is only by (vainly) attempting to be
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critical that it is able to be identitarian. It cannot critique in the sense of identifying and
explaining the world, yet it is forced to (attempt to) critique because if it does not believe
in and practice the illusion of its capacity to know what is other, it in itself is in danger of
discovering to its horror that it lacks any real, self-present existence - and that no doubt
would be its last thought on that or any other matter, the moment ofmadness or suicide
which periodically materialises in Foucault's thought. Thus, it is only by assuming the
possibility of truth that truth can be questioned. But having said this, its equally important
inverse must be stated: it is only through a questioning of truth that it becomes possible to
assume its existence or efficacy.
V The spectre of relativism
Unlike Dews, even that most tenacious defender ofEnlightenment values, Jiirgen
Habermas, has accepted that
[sJo little can the structures that make truth possible themselves be true or false that
one can only inquire ... about the genealogy of [this will to truthJ from some
network ofthe practices ofpower (Habermas 1987: 248).
Yet it is precisely because Foucault wishes to write a genealogy oftruth and
Enlightenment w~thout recourse to cherished categories such as historical continuity and
causation that the chiefcriticism levelled at his work is that it is relativist, unable to avoid
what Habermas refers to as the paradox of "self-referential critique" (Habermas 1987:
127; Dews 1987: 189). This millennia-old objection to theories which dare to step offthe
straight and narrow path ofconventional philosophy in order to question its foundations
consists ofthe simple claim that such theories are self-refuting. Any theory that calls the
grounds ofall theory into question, by doubting or relativising truth, must itselfbe subject
to doubt. The basic assumption underlying Foucault's historical critique of the Western
will to truth, argues Habermas, that "the meaning ofvalidity claims consists in the power
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effects they have", is self-referential: if correct, it destroys its own foundations; iffalse,
the undertaking is pointless (Habermas 1987: 279).
Habermas goes further by contending that the problem of self-referentiality imposes such
strict limits on the nature ofcritique that one must back off from it and investigate
alternative possibilities inherent in a counter- (as opposed to a post-) Enlightenment
discourse such as that ofcommunicative rationality (Habermas 1987: 5,295,301). For to
embrace self-referentiality and hence relativism is also, for Habermas, to blunt critique: if
the grounds on which criticism rests are equivocal, then so too is criticism itself By
assimilating itselfto power, reason relinquishes its critical force - and yet
this description of the self-destruction of the critical capacity is paradoxical, because
in the moment ofdescription it still has to make use of the critique that has been
declared dead. It denounces the Enlightenment's becoming totalitarian with its own
tools (Habermas 1987: 119).
Or, as Habermas puts it later with specific reference to the respective efforts of
Horkheimer and Adomo, and Derrida, to escape our Enlightenment heritage:
The totalizing self-critique of reason gets caught in a performative contradiction
since subject-centered reason can be convicted ofbeing authoritarian in nature only
by having recourse to its own tools. The tools of thought, which miss the
'dimension ofnonidentity' and are imbued with the 'metaphysics ofpresence', are
nevertheless the only available means for uncovering their own insufficiency
(Habermas 1987: 185).
From this line of reasoning, Habermas draws the implication that the Enlightenment
cannot be totalitarian, and its critical tools worthless, for otherwise one would not have
tools capable ofcriticising it as totalitarian. It follows that, while there are elements of
Enlightenment thought which are worth criticising, there are also elements worth
salvaging, and an opportunity exists to build a new and better theory concerned with
human fre~om and progress.
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Foucault agreed with Habennas that modernity, as an "attitude" or "mode of relating to
contemporary reality", is not to be distinguished from 'premodernity' or 'postmodernity'
but should be contrasted against attitudes of "countermodernity" (Foucault 1984a: 39).
Yet he saw no reason to avoid or step back from his attempt to carry out a critique of
Western and particularly Enlightenment reason. Part of the ,eason for this is that it is
possible to draw out a second, equally valid but far more paradoxical, implication of the
performative contradiction, and that is that we in fact cannot tell if the Enlightenment is
totalitarian, because the only tools which we have available for such an analysis are
premised on a conception ofEnlightenment as liberation and progress. Nor can we tell if
its tools are insufficient, because the Enlightenment would be incapable ofcriticising its
own (in)capacity to criticise; the performative contradiction thus both requires that which
one Vv1.shes to dispense with - the critical capacity of reason - and dispenses with that
which one requires - the rational capacity to criticise. Thus there is more than just a single
alternative to the problems which late modem theorists of almost all persuasions perceive
in the Enlightenment; and instead of balking, with Habermas, at paradox, it is equally
viable to embrace it. Paradox is our Kantian heritage, but instead ofbemoaning and
resisting it, we could celebrate and exploit it. It is the latter stance which seems to best
characterise Foucault's position, when he suggests that the analytical tools bequeathed to
us by the Enlightenment (not to mention those that preceded the Enlightenment) cannot
either be accepted uncritically or dismissed as irredeemably tainted; rather, one must
"accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation"
(AK: 26). Thus, while he is right to point out that anyone who takes and wishes to hold
the position that paradox is at the foundation ofphilosophy, must also claim that there is
no way out, not even a way back (Habermas 1987: 128), Habermas' conviction that self-
referentiality is untenable prevents him from considering the alternative, immanent in
Foucault's approach, of total and effective immersion in paradox.
Habermas claims that "if thinking can no longer operate in the element of truth, or of
validity claims in general, contradiction and criticism lose their meaning. To contradict, to
negate, now has only the sense of 'wanting to be different'" (Habermas 1987: 124;
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emphasis in the original). Firstly, while Habennas is right to point out that the possibility
ofcritique is dependent on the existence of truth, he is simply wrong to infer that Foucault
denies the presence or efficacy oftruth in and for thought; on the contrary, Foucault is
interested in the conditions of possibility of truth (which is to say that the truth in question
must exist, because othervvi.se criticisms thereof would be impossible) understood not as
some kind ofArchimedean point, but as a set of powerful and effective mechanisms which
at best manufacture such a point in the process ofordering our world.
Secondly, Habermas' argument in this instance suffers from his thoroughly Enlightenment
understanding ofcritique as an operation that necessarily negates and transcends, unmasks
and goes beyond, and as such is an indispensable part ofa dialectic that seeks Aujhebung.
Yet it is not difficult to conceive ofa non-dialectical and pseudo-transcendental but
nevertheless meaningful critique that, aware of the impossibility of avoiding truth, engages
in the more limited and finite enterprise of unmaski!1g the series ofmasks worn by a
faceless reason. For the activity ofcontradiction, even where the truth that gives
contradiction its edge is in question, need not be attenuated into a mere 'wanting to be
different' (which presupposes a desiring subject), nor must it ultimately culminate in a
resolution (the desire for transcendence) but can also be an 'exposing what is different'
(which is pseudo-transcendental in that it seeks only to recognise, not resolve,
differences). The intention here is not to celebrate difference but to de-limit it (in both
senses of the word), to criticise not for the sake of 'difference' but for the sake of 'the
same' (which is like placing difference at the centre ofone's vision, in order to be able to
perceive the same out of the corner ofone's eye), so as to distinguish it (difference) from
the same which is now it's (difference's) other, and hence to call 'the same' into question-
indeed, in order to render 'the same' questionable and available for critical examination, to
produce it as an object for analysis.
Habermas offers an analogy to support his argument that recourse to a theory of power
shorn ofvalidity claims transforms the effect ofcritical 'unmasking' such that it is no
longer like a lightning-flash of insight, "the way understanding the point ofa joke causes
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liberating laughter" (Habermas 1987: 127; emphasis in the original), but instead like the
way Nietzsche's affirmative de-differentiation produces shock. In this he does not pay
sufficient attention to the fact that much ofFoucault's work focuses not on illuminating
what is in shadow ('understanding ajoke') but rather on making visible the effects of
assuming a boundary between light and shadow (the fact that the joke is as much a
product of the listener or the one 'understanding' as of the joke-teller, from which it
follows that critique depends on that which is being critiqued), and hence that what is
interesting for Foucault is how and why we modems take so much for granted that light
illuminates shadow which conceals (for shadow also delineates light which also dazzles),
that truth unproblematically underpins critique (for critique also manufactures truth), and
that a joke has a point independent of a listener (for to fail to catch a joke destabilises the
self-identity of the joke itself as much as that of the listene~ and the teller). The act of
'understanding a joke' not only produces laughter but makes the joke itselfpossible; the
act ofcritique both conditions and depends upon that which is being criticised.
In short, to criticise "the permanent anthropologism ofWestern thought" (Foucault 1993a:
222), to question these continuist, universalist, rationalist and subject-centred forms of
knowledge which arrogate to themselves the privileges and powers ofscientific truth, need
not entail relativism. While Foucault's approach and truth-claims are open to similar
questioning (Margolis 1991: Q03; Habermas 1987: 273-4), so too are those ofhis critics,
who problematically "affirm conceptions of truth and subjectivity constantly called into
question in the modem episteme" (Connolly 1985: 372) such as "abstract justice" or
"decontextualized individuals" (Calhoun 1995: 75). This impasse does not prevent these
questions from being asked, nor from having effects. One can accept "the fact ofscience",
even if "only in order to ask the question what it is for that science to be a science" (AK:
192). Instead ofasking, 'What is true knowledge?', what Foucault questioned was "the
way in which knowledge circulates and functions, its relations to power" (SP: 212). Truth
here is neither absolute - objective, universal and complete in itself - nor relative to an age,
a context, a power or a being: absolutist truth-claims are defended on relativist or
pragmatic grounds (that they preserve essential values and make theoretical analysis
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meaningful), while relativist and pragmatic truth-claims respond in absolutist terms that
truth simply is relative or pragmatic (Culler 1983: 155). Truth is always, and
paradoxically, both absolute and relative; indeed, for want ofa better term, one might say
that truth is absolutely relative, or relatively absolute: truth is manufactured by social
forces which are themselves enthralled by truth.
It would be better, however, to speak of truth in completely different terms: truth is an
operation, functional or dysfunctional as the case may be, and what is held to be true is a
product ofat least three factors: relations ofpower which saturate it, forms ofknowledge
which surround it, and rules ofconduct which infuse it. Might makes the right upon
which it depends for its definition and its legitimacy. It follows that even if, following
Nietzsche, "there are indeed nothing but appearances determined by perspectives, then the
viewpoint ... which posits a real world behind appearances would be no less valid than any
other perspective" (Dews 1987: 179). Historically, this latter viewpoint has prevailed not
because it is true but because it has proved capable ofproducing powerful effects of truth.
Fittingly (ifalso ironical and most paradoxical), foremost amongst the Western cultural
inventions at our disposal is the critically reflexive attitude ofan enlightened modernity
itself(Giddens 1991: 36-9). To accept this, argued Foucault, does not entail doctrinal
faithfulness but a recognition that what connects the present to the Enlightenment is "a
philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent critique ofour historical era"
(Foucault 1984a: 42). This ethos knowingly directs the Enlightenment question at the
Enlightenment itself, aiming to imagine the present as "otherwise than it is, and to
transform it not by destroying it but by grasping it in what it is" (Foucault 1984a: 41), and
to this extent the analysis of the present at the same time generates a critical
transformation of its object. On the one hand, as Jameson has warned, to speak thus of
'permanent criticism' or 'permanent revolution' is characteristic ofcapitalist modernity
itself, and thus "the exhilaration with such revolutionary dynamism is a feature ofthe
bonus ofpleasure and the reward of the social reproduction of the system itself' (Jameson
1984: xx). On the other hand, to deconstruct modernity requires, problematically, that
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one assume that it is homogeneous (Lethen 1986), unidimensional and uncontested
(Calhoun 1995: 98), when it patently is not. But while modem mechanisms such as these
ensure that one does not escape the will to truth and power, since it is the principle from
which one proceeds, nor is one hopelessly entangled in it, for not only is this principle
under scrutiny but it is also complexly folded in upon itself in potentially contradictory
ways.
This is the radicalism ofmodem self-reflectivity, manifested in self-referentiality: paradox
forms the basis ofmodernity, and it is this paradox which is being problematized. As a
"reflection upon the nature of reflection itself', "the reflexivity ofmodernity actually
subverts reason" (Giddens 1991: 39). Yet self-referentiality ought not to be taken to be an
obstacle to be avoided, for it is a resource to be fostered; it is not a doom but the conduit
to an inventory which is both a repertoire ofwhat is and a forge of what might be. The
object ofcritique is always already critique's object. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault
argued that the power relation underlying punishment is duplicated by an "object relation"
in which the criminal is caught up, objectified and individualised. Most relevant for our
purposes here, "this object relation is not superimposed, from the outside, on the punitive
practice .... [but instead] originate[s] in the very tactics ofpower and of the arrangement
of its exercise" (DP: 102). By analogy, the device ofsubjecting the present to an
objectifYing critique only repeats what is already immanent within critique itself Indeed, it
is only by demonstrating its immanent relationship to its object that a critique can avoid
being merely an arbitrary subjective expression or a slightly less arbitrary imposition of
ex1:emal values (Calhoun 1995: 87). Thus, a strategy which seeks to exploit the
contradictions ofmodernity could be called 'homeopathic', in that it gives modernity a
taste of its own medicine: by constituting modernity as its object, it re-enacts the
archetypical modernist manoeUVTe. In this vein, Foucault demonstrates his proximity not
only to Kant but also to Kant's mentor, Rousseau, who hoped to find "an antidote in the
poison" ofcorrupting civilisation (Starobinski 1993: 127-131).
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Against those who would deride this manoeUVTe as futile, even impossible, Foucault
enjoined us to refuse "the 'blackmail' of the Enlightenment" (Foucault 1984a: 42),
the blackmail which has very often been at work in every critique of reason or every
critical enquiry into the history ofrationality (either you accept rationality or you fall
prey to the irrational) operates as though a rational critique of reason were
impossible ... (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 201).
One does not have to be 'for' or 'against' the Enlightenment, either accepting it and its
rationality or criticising and tl)ing to escape it. It is quite possible to be both for and
against (Foucault 1982c: 33) aspects or even the whole of the Enlightenment, in the sense
that the 'homeopathic' approach mentioned above assumes the relevance and importance
ofthat which is being examined (the Enlightenment) for that which provides the means of
critical examination (again, the Enlightenment).
As Habermas rightly notes, "[e]ngagement marks his [Foucault's] learned essays right
down to the style and choice ofwords" (Habermas 1987: 282); but this is no reason to
dismiss the latter's arguments, least of all his critique ofmodem reason. Habermas
presumes that because criticism presupposes a normative judgement, Foucault's apparent
reluctance to address normative issues calls his criticisms into question. However, one
may perfectly well abstain from the question ofwhether some discourses or regimes of
power are more legitimate than others, and even question the very basis ofmodem
normativity, without lapsing into incoherence. In the first place, modernity is itself an
invention, one which "has to create its normativity out a/itself' (Habermas 1987: 7;
emphasis in the original); why should this immanent productivity not take place
reluctantly, sarcastically, irreverently or paradoxically?
Without sarcasm modem-day Enlightenment can have no healthy relation to its own
history. We can only choose between a pessimism - reminiscent ofdecadence -
loyal to its beginnings and a light-hearted disrespect in pursuit oforiginal tasks
(Sloterdijk 1984: 193).
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In the second place, the very process through which this 'self-creation ofnormativity', this
perpetual transition to the future or continuous renewal of the past, occurs, must
conceivably be available for problematization - for being treated as an object which can be
interrogated as to whether and how it happens, and how it may have been, or may still
become, different. Thus there is no reason why Foucault, that consummate "denouncer of
the normality of anonymous norms" (Canguilhem 1995b: 283), needs to treat the
normativity that modernity has generated as a given; it is perfectly legitimate - and,
indeed, normative - to question the very basis ofnormativity. In this way one can both
presume the fact ofnormativity, and that that fact is problematic, thus simultaneously
asserting and denying normativity, or modernity itself Foucault's supposed
"cryptonormativity" (Habermas 1987: 275) is thus nothing more than a red herring.
A critical history ofEnlightenment reason presupposes the at least partial utility of
Enlightenment reason itself: as Foucault remarked in the conte»,..1: ofour specifically
Hegelian heritage, "to make a real escape [from Hegel, or, by analogy, from the
Enlightenment] ... presupposes an exact appreciation ofwhat it costs to detach ourselves
... " (Foucault 1984b: 134). Thus it is not futile but essential to subject modem rationality
to critical scrutiny; or, better, specific modem rationalities in specific fields, since
rationality is not singular (SP: 210) and "[i]t is not reason in general that I am fighting. I
could not fight reason" (Foucault 1980e: 4). In fact, it is precisely modem philosophy's
self-conception as a 'permanent critique', philosophy conceived ofas the problematization
of the present, which should prompt us to examine, again and again and in the best
tradition ofKant, the context which has made possible a form ofthought which is
conscious of its own context: "What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical
effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers?" (Foucault 1984a: 249; emphasis in
the original; Foucault, in Friedrich 1981: 88).
It is precisely here that Dews' and Habermas' criticisms fall short in Foucault's reckonina
/:),
for while the last agrees that to abandon the work ofKant is to risk lapsing into
irrationality (Foucault 1984a: 248), he also points out that
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if it is extremely dangerous to say that Reason is the enemy that should be
eliminated, it is just as dangerous to say that any critical questioning of this
rationality risks sending us into irrationality (Foucault 1984a: 249).
A rational critique ofreason is in fact the only critique possible, and far from being
irrational, it is a logical and consistent extension and application of the principal strands of
the Western philosophical tradition. Derrida states the case well:
\Vho is more faithful to reason's call, who hears it with a keener ear, who better sees
the difference, the one who offers questions in return and tries to think through the
possibility of that summons, or the one who does not want to hear any question
about the reason ofreason? (Derrida 1983: 9)
At least since Plato, we have not been able to define a strategy exterior to an imperious
reason which is implacable, enthralling, despotic and perfidious. Yet we remain able to
criticise and strategise in terms ofreason; and through appropriate forms ofgovernance,
including technologies of the self and techniques ofpower, we may yet "invent a way in
which power can be exercised without instilling fear" (Foucault 1976b: 459) or at least
"allow these games ofpower to be played with a minimum ofdomination" (Foucault
1987b: 129).
It is indeed in this field ofobligation to truth that we sometimes can avoid in one
way or another the effects ofa domination, linked to structures of truth or to
institutions charged with truth .... not by playing a game that was a complete
stranger to the game oftruth, but in playing it otherwise or in playing another game,
another set, other trumps in the game oftruth (Foucault 1987b: 126).
While the greater one's freedom, and the more open the game, "the more attractive and
fascinating it is" (Foucault 1987b: 131), and "the greater the temptation on both sides to
determine the conduct ofothers", all games of truth are multiple, variable and open to
modification, lacking a 'complete, peremptory and exclusive definition', and hence
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[t]here is always a possibility, in a given game oftruth, to discover something else
and to more or less change such and such a rule and sometimes even the totality of
the game oftruth (Foucault 1987b: 128).
This is the hope held out by Foucault: that an immanent critique ofEnlightenment reason
may have transformative effects upon the world that that reason has built (as well as upon
the critical tools which the same reason has bequeathed to us). To be drawn in or enticed
into the Western will to truth is a necessary condition for one to draw it out, in all senses
of that phrase: to expose and outline it, to continue it and to push it to its limits and
beyond.
Such a critique, which is rational without either taking rationality for granted or lapsing
into irrationality, does not attempt, in Habermasian fashion, to avoid the 'blackmail' of the
Enlightenment "by introducing 'dialectical' nuances while seeking to determine what good
and bad elements there may have been in the Enlightenment" (Foucault 1984a: 43).
Notwithstanding Canguilhem's assessment that Foucault's thesis (which was published as
Madness and Civilization) evinced "from beginning to end a dialectical vigor that comes
in part from his sympathy with the Hegelian vision ofhistory and from his familiarity with
the Phenomenology ofMind' (Canguilhem 1995a: 280), Foucault had little use for
dialectical analysis, not least because it drives theory in the direction ofharmony and
closure. Only four years after Canguilhem's report, in an article published in 1964,
Foucault clearly celebrated the fact that homo dialecticus - "This figure [which] has been
the master subject and the object slave ofall the discourses concerning the human, in
particular human alienation" - was, as he saw it, dying (Foucault 1995: 292). Dialectical
analysis, closely associated with the Hegelian and Marxist currents hegemonic in France
until at least the mid-1950s, was an obvious target for Foucault, who concluded that we
must try to think criticism and struggle "in terms ofa logic free of the sterilising
constraints of the dialectic" (Foucault 1980a: 144).
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Let us then follow Foucault, and proceed with the analysis ofourselves as beings
profoundly determined by a peculiar history ofwhich the most prominent recent episode
was the Enlightenment, an analysis oriented toward "what is not or is no longer
indispensable for the constitution ofourselves as autonomous subjects" (Foucault 1984a:
43).
[I]t is a matter at bottom ofexamining a reason, the autonomy ofwhose structures
carries with it a history ofdogmatism and despotism - a reason, consequently, which
can only have an effect ofemancipation on condition that it manages to liberate itself
from itself(Foucault 1980c: 54).
By questioning the apparently self-evident yet precarious rationality ofour present, we can
both make visible the intimate relationship between truth and power and indicate a way
forward. It is important to be clear here: this rational critique of reason or
problematization ofthe present, directed as it is against the very procedures that for over
two hundred years have been promising us emancipation, can paradoxically only have an
emancipatory effect by freeing rationality from itself In order to achieve this, one must
simultaneously acknowledge the modem roots of this discursive practice and go beyond it,
for to liberate something from itself is also to transform it beyond recognition. Here is the
answer to the conundrum at the heart ofmodem thought: it is not a question ofeducating
the educator, or liberating the liberator, but of re-educating education and liberating
liberation itself As even the most consummate defender of the Enlightenment project,
Habermas, has recognised, "[m]ythic traditions cannot be revised without danger to the
order of things and to the identity of the tribe set within it" (Habermas 1987: 114-5); it
follows that to call into question the rational scientific myth that is Enlightenment is to
undermine not only modem philosophy but also the established order of things - our
present - and the identities set within it - our very selves.
It is thus necessary to identifY which ofour taken for granted assumptions and everyday
practices can be expelled from our discursive armoury; among these will surely be many of
the ways in which we commonly think: and act in relation to objects (knowledge), others
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(power) and ourselves (ethics). We must try to imagine "what the world and thought and
truth might be ifman did not exist" (OT: 322), rather than imagining that modernity and
its truths will "'liberate man in his O\vn being'" (Foucault 1984a: 42), for it is precisely this
latter fantasy, which demands that we turn in upon and regulate ourselves, that has both
founded and justified successive disciplinary regimes of truth:
Was the labor then so arduous that it had to be enchanted by this promise? Or had
this knowledge become so costly - in political, economic, and ethical terms - that in
order to subject everyone to its rule, it was necessary to assure them, paradoxically,
that their liberation was at stake? (HS: 80).
On the contrary, the rational critique ofreason "compels him [Man] to face the task of
producing himself' (Foucault 1984a: 42); it demands that we "give up thinking ofman, or,
to be more strict, to think of this disappearance ofman" (OT: 386), which requires that we
liberate ourselves from this form in which we have only recently taken shape, by,
paradoxically, reformulating what it means to be human.
The notion ofcritique as used in Foucault's work - the critique ofEnlightenment reason,
the genealogy oftruth, the reconceptualisation ofpower relations and the critique ofthe
subject - thus has important implications for how we ought to understand theory, practice
politics and act ethically. To criticise is simultaneously to re-interpret and to re-fashion; it
is to transform both that which is being criticised and that which is criticising. All
criticism, even the most negative, the most 'trivial, uncomprehending and ignorant'
criticism, is not only, "in a certain manner, formed and nourished" by that which is under
critique, but it also involves "a certain manner ofcoding and transcribing a book, a
singularly systematic transformation" (Foucault 1971b: 58). To criticise something is to
practically engage and enter into a relationship with that thing, to the extent that both
terms of the relationship will be different as a result.
I don't think that one can oppose criticism and transformation, 'ideal' criticism and
'real'transformation. A critique does not consist in saying that things are not good
as they are. It consists in seeing what kinds ofself-evidences, liberties, acquired and
f;r
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non-reflective modes of thought, the practices we accept rest on.... Criticism
consists in ... showing that things are not as obvious as we might believe, doing it in
such a way that what we accept as going without saying no longer goes without
saying. To criticize is to render the too-easy gesture difficult (Foucault 1982c: 33-
4).
Theoretical criticism is thus a practice: it does not merely express a disagreement but
'does this in such a way' as to effectively and practically alter reality, whether this is the
reality ofa theory or a teArt, a function or an enterprise, an action directed at others or
oneself. To criticise, or to transform, then, is to introduce "impostures within the critical
space ... like monsters within the realm of [the] living" (Foucault 1971b: 58); it is to
fabricate or fiction that which is common, or familiar, or taken for granted. And like all
monsters, these fabricated but effective criticisms, composed largely ofmyths, lack
universality and objectivity; the effects that are put into play are precarious and ultimately
doomed, forever "waiting for their St.George" (Foucault 1971b: 58).
The rational critique ofthe effects, limits and dangers ofmodem reason, premised as it is
on that which is under question, is much more productive and creative than it is negative
and destructive. The critic does not seek to reconstitute an immanent secret in a pre-given
text, but constructs, imagines or invents an object for analysis out ofdiverse textual
materials: "Placing himself at the exterior of the text, he constitutes a new eA'terior for it,
writing texts out oftexts" (Foucault 1989: 21). This critical construction of the world
correlates with the modem need to create meaning by articulating it:
We find the sense oflife through articulating it.... Discovering here depends on, is
interwoven with, inventing. Finding a sense to life depends on framing meaningful
expressions which are adequate (Taylor 1989: 18).
Invention, not liberation or truth, is the name ofFoucault's game. Having establish.ed that
a rational critique ofreason - the questioning of the Enlightenment using its own tools, or
the problematizing of the Western will to truth - is not only possible but necessary, the
following chapter will explore in more detail how Foucault's genealogical approach
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attempted to operationalise such a critique. Utilising the concept of 'problematization', it
will be shown, in relation to the specific phenomenon ofmadness and thereafter with
respect to the Enlightenment itself, how one might go about conducting such an immanent
critique.
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CHAPTER TWO: GENEALOGY AND THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF
ENLIGHTENMENT
Foucault's immanent critique of the present is built upon the examination of the conditions
ofpossibility and effects ofsingular and relatively insignificant chance events. This
critique, which redefines modernity as an attitude which demands that we constantly re-
invent ourselves, is "genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method" (Foucault
1984a: 46, 50).
Genealogy is a form of "gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary" erudition which
opposes itself to the search for origins (Foucault 1977a: 139, 140) and instead by
examining errors, perversities, accidents and conditions ofpossibility, "disturbs what was
previously considered immobile; ... fragments what was thought unified; [and] ... shows
the heterogeneity ofwhat was imagined consistent with itself" (Foucault 1977a: 147).
Genealogy thus "introduces discontinuity into our very being - as it divides our emotions,
dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our body and sets it against itself' (Foucault 1977a:
154; 1984b: 127). Disrupting, fragmenting, multiplying and dividing, the rationale behind
Foucault's genealogical approach is simultaneously analytical, political and personal: one
must be familiar with one's object, including one's self, before one can defamiliarise or
problematize it, or transform oneself
Archaeology, on the other hand, can be characterised as a practice or 'science of the
archive' (Foucault 1989: 3; AK: 128-31) which Foucault suggested was not exactly a
discipline but a "domain of research" (Foucault 1989: 1). Archaeological research
examines not the meaning or truth but the 'positivity' ofdiscourses, their historical a
priori or conditions ofpossibility, existence and transformation (AK: 126-27). In
addition, by treating the practices, institutions and theories ofa particular socio-historical
period as on the same plane in terms oftheir "common traits", "structures" or "invariants",
archaeology is intended to permit the researcher to avoid "every problem concerned with
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the anteriority of theory to practice, and the inverse" (Foucault 1989: 2-3). Hence one
must read "Don Quixote, Descartes, and a decree by Pomponne de Belierre about houses
of internment in the same stroke" (Foucau1t 1989: 3); the adoption ofwhat he called a
"theoretico-active", as opposed to Sartrean 'practico-inert', approach (Foucault 1989: 2),
would allow the researcher to treat such diverse texts not merely as 'literature' (and as
such largely devoid oftruth), 'philosophy' (accurately reflecting reality) or 'law'
(delimiting practice) but as both conditions and effects of the period in question, and thus
having both practical effects and theoretical implications. Whereas the efficacy ofmodem
science makes it assume its own truth but ignore its historicity, archaeology, by
recognising its own historicity (that the rules which define it as a discursive practice "are
caught up in the very things that they connect" - AK: 127), and by not - or only-
pretending to be true, seeks to produce effects. A "theoretico-active" approach thus takes
cognisance ofthe effective implication of itself in the discursive practices under analysis,
rather than assuming its distance from them. In short, for archaeology, the madness ofa
knight who tilts at windmills is as important a benchmark ofthe times as a cogito which,
never doubting its own sanity, issues a proclamation demanding the knight's internment.
In his inaugural lecture, however, and despite having recently published The Archaeology
ofKnowledge, Foucault preferred to refer to what we are here calling 'archaeology' as a
"
'critical' analysis. He argued that such an analysis, standing alongside a 'genealogical'
analysis, reverses commonplace assumptions about authors being the origin ofworks in
order to grasp the effects ofrelations ofpower in producing, excluding, limiting and
appropriating knowledge and subjecting individuals. In these terms, the effects ofpower
upon knowledge and individuals must be analysed in relation to "how they [relations of
power] are formed, in response to what needs, how they have been modified and
displaced, what constraint they have effectively exerted, to what ex1:ent they have been
evaded" (Foucau1t 1984b: 130). From this point on, Foucault referred less and less to
'archaeology', and more and more to 'genealogy', and given his increasing interest in how
relations ofpower produce forms ofknowledge, this is hardly surprising.
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The word 'archaeology' also bothered Foucault in its connotations ofa search for origins,
or an excavation ofsomething which had been concealed. Despite referring once or twice
to the need to undertake, as in Marxist ideology-critique, a critical unmasking ofthings
which appear to be self-evident, neutral or independent, Foucault, as a good Kantian, did
not believe that that which might be excavated or unmasked constituted anything essential
in itself; indeed, as a student ofNietzsche, he took this insight further and suggested that if
one were able to remove the mask, all that might be found would be the traces ofother
masks. His contemporary Roland Barthes captured this dismissal offoundations well-
though referring specifically to texts, he could as well have been writing about history or
society:
Ifuntil now we have regarded the text as a species of fruit with a kernel (an apricot,
for example) the flesh being the form and the stone the content, it would be better to
see it as an onion, a construction of layers (or levels, or systems) whose body finally
contains no heart, no kernel, no secret, no irreducible principle, nothing except the
infinity of its envelopes which envelop nothing other than the unity of its own
surfaces (Barthes, quoted in Merquior 1986: 171-2).
Thus, instead of attempting to unveil a hidden truth, or to archaeologically unearth a
buried treasure, Foucault sought to reveal that which is so obvious and so superficial that
it is passed over- and accepted without further comment:
What I'm looking for are not relations that are secret, hidden, more silent or deeper
than the consciousness ofmen. I try on the contrary to define the relations on the
very surface ofdiscourse; I attempt to make visible what is invisible only because
it's too much on the surface of things (Foucault 1989: 46; see also AK: 131).
For the purposes of this thesis, then, I follow Arnold Davidson who has argued that
Foucault's initial emphasis upon 'archaeology' as a description of the conditions or rules
(the episteme, 'savoir' or historical a priori - AK: 15) by which statements and domains
ofobjects come to be produced was not so much displaced or abandoned as widened by
his later, more thoroughly genealogical approach (Davidson 1986: 227; see also Gutting
1989: 270-71).
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To return, then, to genealogy: rather than seeking universal structures ofknowledge or
moral action (if la Habermas), genealogy investigates how we have constituted and
recognised ourselves as subjects and attempts to work out "the possibility ofno longer
being, doing or thinking what we are, do or think", in this way "seeking to give new
impetus ... to the undefined work offreedom" (Foucault 1984a: 46, 50). In this task, as
we saw in Chapter One, it is paradoxically assisted by the very drive to universality of
modem thought, especially the human sciences: notwithstanding the mostly good
intentions of the Western search for disembodied truth and rationality, "it is the culture
and society ofwestern science and philosophy that is ultimately being defended, not
timeless mental values" (McLennan 1992: 341; emphasis in the original). The more the
human sciences attempt to transcend history and attain universality, the more clearly they
reveal their rootedness in history (aT: 371).
From within the present, genealogy reconfigures the past which made both it and modem
scientific thought possible; it thus sets our recent history against itself, and
reconceptualises modernity as
an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique ofwhat we are is at
one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and
an experiment with the possibility ofgoing beyond them (Foucault 1984a: 50).
The modem ethos is thus understood as "a limit-attitude" which simultaneously confirms
Kant's inauguration ofmodem philosophy and transforms his question of the limits of
knowledge into "a practical critique that takes the form ofa possible transgression":
in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by
whatever is singular, contingent, and the product ofarbitrary constraints? (Foucault
1984a: 45; emphasis in the original).
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The Enlightenment located and defined itself in relation to a present which it
problematized. In order to understand what it means for us to be children ofthe
Enlightenment, we must problematize those forces, conditions and representations which
Foucault once likened to the "positive unconscious" ofscience and human knowledge
(OT: xi; 1989: 39; see also Macey 1993: 162) (analogous to Heidegger's "Lichtung" or
clearing - Fraser 1989: 38) and which have made our present possible, particularly our
peculiar, even unique, configuration ofscientifically sanctioned modes ofsoothsaying and
subjection.
I Problematization: theory as practice
Analysing, criticising, and experimenting with alternatives to, what we, as denizens of the
present, have become, Foucault wanted to know
whether one cannot discover the system ofregularity, ofconstraint, which makes
science possible, somewhere else [than the conscious actor], even outside the human
mind, in social forms, in the relations ofproduction, in the class struggles, etc.
(Foucault, in Elders 1974: 160).
Differently put:
The history ofthe 'objectification' of those elements which historians consider as
objectively given (if I dare put it thus: of the objectification ofobjectivities), this is
the sort ofcircle I want to try and investigate (Foucault 1981£: 14).
He pursued this investigation into the history of, and systemic or structural basis for, what
we presently consider to be true, primarily through recourse to what he called
'problematization' (otherwise translated as 'problemization'):
Problematization doesn't mean representation ofa pre-existing object, nor the
creation by discourse ofan object that doesn't exist. It is the totality ofdiscursive
or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play oftrue and false
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and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form ofmoral reflection,
scientific knowledge, political analysis, etc.) (Foucault 1988a: 257).
Problematization thus does not refer to conventional methods of analysis which are
premised on a relationship between thought and the world, or between the analysis and
what is being analysed, as processes assumed to be both separate and yet more or less
closely aligned. Instead, problematization refers to the practical conditions which make
something into an object ofknowledge, and specifically to the networks ofpower,
institutional mechanisms and existing forms ofknowledge which direct the attention of
theorists to specific phenomena and in this way produce new knowledge.
Genealogy consequently starts from the assumption that objects of analysis are neither
purely e:x.1:ernal to and independent of, nor entirely internal to and dependent on, thought.
Thought is not merely a mental, cognitive, speculative or linguistic phenomenon; as a set
of practi<;es in its own right, it is implicated in constituting the objects ofwhich it speaks
and has specific and identifiable political effects. Consequently,
the idea that to devote oneself ... to properly theoretical and speculative activities is
to turn away from politics strikes me as completely false (Foucault 1989: 42; aT:
328).
For Foucault, 'theory' (or forms ofknowledge) and 'practice' (or relations ofpower) are
not opposed but are so closely intertwined that "theory does not express, translate, or
serve to apply practice: it is practice" (Foucault 1977a: 207-8), and "violent,
discontinuous, pugnacious, disorderly, ... and perilous" to boot (Foucault 1984b: 126; aT:
328). Contrary to those who aver that he upholds a 'theory/practice' dichotomy
(Rabinow 1984: 9), for Foucault theory is practical and political in at least four ways: in
the sense that theory is produced by and through powerful groups which in this way
distinguish themselves from and exclude others; in the sense that it "is the thing for which
and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is to be seized" (Foucault
1984b: 110); in the sense that theory plays a role in producing the objects it will
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subsequently analyse; and in the sense that theory may help to constitute "a certain point
ofview" (Foucault 1984a: 350) or offer tools which are not only analytically useful but
can engender disturbances in and disruptions ofwhat we consider to be real.
It follows that theory is not a representation of given facts, events or states ofaffairs.
Instead, it is at one and the same time a condition ofpossibility, alongside other political,
economic and social conditions ofpossibility, ofstates ofaffairs, problematizing and
rendering them as objects amenable to analysis and intervention, and the effect of the
interplay between relations ofpower and knowledge immanent within these states of
affairs. Modern thought, including Foucault's, is "both knowledge and a modification of
what it knows, reflection and a transformation of the mode of being of that on which it
reflects" (aT: 327). Derrida's account of the nature of rational analysis is useful here:
The modern dominance of the principle ofreason had to go hand in hand with the
interpretation of the essence ofbeings as objects, an object present as representation
[Vorstellung], an object placed and positioned before a subject. This latter, a man
who says'!" an ego certain of itself, thus ensures his own technical mastery over the
totality ofwhat is. The 're-' ofrepraesentatio also expresses the movement that
accounts for - 'renders reason to' - a thing whose presence is encountered by
rendering it present, by bringing it to the subject ofrepresentation, to the knowing
self(Derrida 1983: 9-10; emphasis in the original).
Rational, objective analysis ofreality (what is) is inseparable from the interpretation of
beings as objects, which 0 bjectifies or reifies some beings in relation to others. This is the
violence ofa modern reason which, historically, has adopted a colonising relationship with
all other societies, including its own (aT: 377); it is centred around "representational
man", said to be endowed with "hard eyes permanently open to a nature that he is to
dominate" (Derrida 1983: 10). Antiquity's optical and visual metaphors of light and sight
have not been lost on a thought which, comparatively recently, declared its age to be an
'enlightened' one: "the eye ... has the power to bring a truth to light that it receives only
to the extent that it has brought it to light" (Foucault 1976a: xiii). Speculative, voyeuristic
and honed to a sharp self-reflective edge by its need to generate its normativity out of
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itself, modem reason drives subjects constantly to treat themselves and others as objects
(Habermas 1987: 7).
Consequently, what we know of the other, what knowledge we produce in knowing the
other (by extorting truth or provoking action), is conditional upon the forms in, and
relations ofpower and knowledge through, which we constitute it, and actually reveals
more ofourselves than of the other (Bauman 1987: 9; Hall 1992a: 294). "The subaltern
cannot speak" (Spivak 1988: 308): the other is always the other for us, its exotic charm
demarcating the limitation ofourselves (OT: x'\'). It is never the other as other ('in itself)
because the latter is effaced and muted in the very process by which meaning, identity or
voice is inscribed upon it. To attempt to know or give voice to the other is literally to
forge that knowledge or voice and the subject represented by it, to produce an artificial
and counterfeit representation of the other which subordinates it even in the process of
empowering it. Despite the fantasies oforal history, there is no "authentic" popular voice:
some subjects speak for others as much as theory speaks for the facts. In interpreting
beings as objects, reason (re)presents them fourfold - as objects in relation to a subject, as
objects represented or portrayed, as objects represented or spokenfor, and as objects
placed andpositioned before a subject. The objects ofreason are accounted for (made
known) and encountered (as ifdiscovered) by literally rendering them present, constituting
them in a form available for analysis and mastery (Deacon 1996: 232). Similarly, what
Foucault calls problematization is a process ofrendering or representing reality, and
'theory', as both part of this process and a product thereof, can be said to produce and
reproduce itselfand the episteme or apparatus (see below) ofwhich it forms a part.
In the light of this, Foucault's assertion in The Archaeology ofKnowledge that theories or
discourses are "practices that systematically form the objects ofwhich they speak" (AK:
49), should be understood in the sense elucidated by Laclau and Mouffe, such that theory
"is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organises social relations" (Laclau &
Mouffe 1985: 96; emphasis in the original). Laclau and Mouffe draw a distinction
between "the being (esse) ofan object, which is historical and changing, and the entity
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(ens) [or existence] of that object" (1987: 85; emphasis in the original). To the e>..ient that
theory is involved in the production ofthe 'being', esse or meaning of its objects of
analysis, though not their actual existence or ens, theory is part of the process which
constitutes or problematizes reality. Rorty, too, points out that there is a simplistic sense
in which
the way people talk can 'create objects', in the sense that there are a lot of things
that wouldn't exist unless people had come to talk in a certain way. Examples of
such things are universities, contracts, governments, international monetary
exchange mechanisms, traditions ofhistoriography, revolutions in philosophy, and
so on (Rorty 1986: 42).
Even if it has only recently begun to operationalise it, philosophy ofscience has long been
aware that "it is the theory which decides what we can observe" (Einstein, quoted in
Heisenberg 1971: 63). In all these instances, and more, reality is not something given,
"out there", a set ofbrute data more or less easily accessible to a theory which describes
and explains it and proceeds to modify or transform it in accordance with social and
economic needs, cultural demands or political power. Reality, instead, is ultimately always
the product ofthese constituting and colonising activities of theory; reality is a terrain
which coalesces and metamorphosises under the impact of the conceptual maps which
claim, after the fact, to merely, ifostentatiously, illuminate that which is said to exist
independently of, and external to, the scientific observer.
This is a fundamental insight, and while it infuses Foucault's work, it was stated most
clearly by Baudrillard, for whom reality is a ''precession ofsimulacra - it is the map that
engenders the territory" (1983: 2; emphasis in the original). Truth, consequently, does not
consist in the accuracy of theory's depiction ofreality (a correspondence model), but in
the power of theory's production ofreality (which as both Alcoff(1993: 109) and Rorty
(1978: 143) have argued, more or less resembles a coherence model): "[t]ruth is
inseparable from the procedure establishing it" (Deleuze 1988: 63). Theory is not a
passive representation ofsomething else, deemed to be activity or practice, but is "itselfa
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mode ofaction in the world" (Uhner 1985: 183) which, in the form ofa Foucauldian
genealogical approach, is also a regulatory violence intentionally done to objects of
knowledge (Foucault 1984b: 127).
[T]he reality represented does not determine the representation or the means of
representation. Instead, the process ofsignification itself gives shape to the reality it
implicates (Henriques et al 1984: 99).
As even as uncompromising a critic as the Marxist, Callinicos, accepts, however, it does
not necessarily follow from Foucault's understanding of theory as a problematizing
practice (which Callinicos associates with Nietzschean 'perspectivism'), that reality is a
product of theory alone, or that mind literally creates matter. Instead, theory does not
always successfully produce reality; it may have unintended consequences and effects; and
it is also a product ofa perpetual struggle (Callinicos 1987: 107).
Thus, despite some provocative and polemical formulations in Foucault's early work, such
that
[r]eality does not exist .... language is all there is, and what we are talking about is
language, we speak within language (Foucault, quoted in Macey 1993: 150),
there is no need to revert to the various idealist positions ofPlatonic forms, early Christian
theology or Hegelian metaphysics. Theory is always confronted by reality, and must
grapple with it in its specific context, to the extent that theory must to some degree
assume the givenness of its object (and thus objectifY it). As a result the object is always
derived and contrived, at most the compacted sediment of epochs of socially produced and
practiced relations ofpower and forms ofknowledge.
Foucault's genealogical approach thus acknowledges the power of 'discursive' (or
'idealist') as much as 'non-discursive' (or 'materialist') factors to constitute what is taken
to be real. Not only is it the case that, as Giddens once put it, '''What passes for social
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reality' stands in immediate relation to the distribution ofpower" (Giddens 1976: 113), but
theories of reality also extend or alter the way power is distributed. However, there is an
additional dimension to the relationship between that which we commonly describe as
theory and reality, and that is that theory is itself modified by the reality which it in part
constitutes. In its confrontation with the real, the observing or theorising subject which
represents others, itself and the world as exiemal objects, transforms itself to the same
degree as it transforms the real. The identity ofsocial beings as much as of their
discourses is "purely relational" and is "constantly deferred" (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 86),
in that it depends upon being recognised - in the Hegelian sense - or concretely validated
by these representations which it reifies; however, the moment ofrecognition also
conceals this relational character:
The principle of reason installs its empire only to the extent that the abyssal question
of the being that is hiding within it remains hidden, and with it the question ofthe
grounding of the ground itself(Derrida 1983: 10).
It follows that to problernatize reality, or to write a history ofthe present, is as much to
transform the selfas it is to render the objects ofreason present and to expose and unmask
the ground ofthe current episteme. "We must understand how actors - even cultures, ifI
may be permitted that shorthand - change in becoming capable ofunderstanding various
others" (Calhoun 1995: 80). This issue of the freely determined transformation of the self
under the impact ofvarious political rationalities will be addressed in more detail in the
following section and in Chapter Five.
Problematization, then, refers to the totality ofhistorical practices, "discursive or non-
discursive", which raise an issue, pose a question or introduce a hitherto unacknowledged
element into the field of thought; it is "the historically conditioned emergence ofnew fields
ofexperience" (Burchell1993: 277). This totality ofpractices, or 'apparatus', which
includes 'discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws,
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic
propositions', consists of "strategies of relations offorces supporting, and supported by,
~-r
68
types ofknowledge" (Foucault 1980a: 194-6). Here Foucault acknowledges a shift in his
use ofconcepts, from 'episteme' in The Order a/Things, and 'episteme' and 'savoir' in
The Archaeology 0/Kl1owledge, to 'apparatus' in The History a/Sexuality:
what I call an apparatus is a much more general case of the episteme; or rather, that
the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the apparatus in its
general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more
heterogeneous (Foucault 1980a: 197; emphasis in the original).
Prior to arriving at this position in the mid-1970s, where conditions ofpossibility are
understood as simultaneously intra-, inter- and "e:>..1:radiscursive" (the latter referring to
"economic, political and social changes") (Foucault 1978b: 13), Foucault had tended to
distinguish between what is discursive and what is non-discursive (Foucault 1989: 19,59;
Deleuze 1988: 31-2) - for example, between discourse and the "nondiscursive context in
which it functions (institutions, social relations, economic and political conjuncture)"
(Foucault 1978b: 10).
This conceptual shift, then, marks the abandonment ofa narrow identification between
language and discourse, and a consequent thoroughgoing 'materialisation' or
'institutionalisation' ofdiscourse. It is also a mark ofthe extent to which Foucault's ideas
were themselves products oftheir time and context: the claim that theory is a practice
which does not merely reflect but produces reality was also articulated by Althusser, for
whom ideology had both a material existence and acted as a political weapon (Althusser
1971: 21, 157). One consequence of the post-1968 climate which resonated through both
Foucau1t's and Althusser's work was
above all to grasp ideas in their materiality, not only insofar as they are texts and
words but also in that, fundamentally, they also produce institutions and forms of
conduct - that te:>..1: and practice are so intermingled that the project ofprivileging
one or the other is already restrictive, and contains the embryo ofdogmatic
reduction (Chatelet 1979: 24).
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Althusser's structuralist Marxism was unable to avoid such a reduction "in the last
instance"; Foucault, as we shall see, attempted to avoid this problem by linking knowledge
to power relations and problematizing them both.
Foucault's theoretical trajectory in this respect is again echoed by that ofLadau and
Mouffe, who rejected his early distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices,
in texts such as The Archaeology ofKnowledge, on the grounds that discursive practices
were identified exclusively with language; and instead affirmed "that every object is
constituted as an object ofdiscourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive
condition ofemergence" (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 107). Whereas Foucault at the time
understood the episteme and its component discursive practices largely ifnot exclusively
as linguistic or theoretical phenomena, discourse for Ladau and Mouffe is defined as the
"totality which includes within itself the linguistic and the non-linguistic" (Laclau &
Mouffe 1987: 82), and thus to argue that every object is discursive, that 'nothing can be
constituted as an object outside ofdiscourse' (or, in Foucault's terminology, eJ\.ira-
epistemically), is not to say that nothing exists outside oflanguage but that nothing has
meaning outside ofdiscourse (or the apparatus, following Foucault's conceptual shift).
Even though 'institutions' are really the only 'non-discursive' elements within Foucault's
apparatus - "all the field of the non-discursive social ... is an institution" - Foucault in fact
shared Laclau's and Mouffe's desire to avoid both what was tantamount to linguistic
idealism and a simple correspondence between language and world: "1 don't think it's
very important to be able to make that distinction [between 'discursive' and 'non-
discursive'], given that my problem isn't a linguistic one" (Foucault 1980a: 198).
The genealogical concept ofproblematization thus alerts dne to the violence of
representation and blurs the stark clarity ofconventional distinctions between thought and
reality, theory and practice and cause and effect. Problematization refers simultaneously
to the historical process ofproducing an object for thought (the conditions ofemergence),
the specific discursive and non-discursive mechanisms involved in this production (the
apparatus), as well as the manner in which human beings, particularly but not exclusively
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intellectuals, find themselves engaged objectively, communicatively and governmentally
with both process and product (technologies ofpower, knowledge and the self):
Actually, for a domain ofaction, a behaviour, to enter the field of thought it is
necessary for a certain number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it
lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number ofdifficulties around it.
These elements result from social, economic, or political processes (Foucault 1984a:
388).
To one set ofdifficulties, several different responses can be made simultaneously, and the
task is to discover "the general form ofproblemization that has made them possible - even
in their very opposition" (Foucault 1984a: 389).
This development of a given into a question, this transformation of a group of
obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to
produce a response, this is what constitutes the point ofproblemization and the
specific work ofthought (Foucault 1984a: 389).
Problematization is thus very far from deconstruction (Foucault 1984a: 389), perhaps
simultaneously its inverse and its precondition, in that it is characterised by the
coalescence of a problem whereas deconstruction seeks to subvert what has been
problematized.
In concluding this section, it must be borne in mind that Foucault's analyses were
themselves made possible by various 'social, economic, or political processes' which de-
familiarised and rendered problematic conventional understandings of the relationships
between knowledge, relations ofpower and soothsayingsubjects. Foucault seldom
adumbrated these processes, no doubt because he was often too completely immersed in
them, but in each case he insisted that the important thing was not to centre one's analysis
on the conceptualised object - the Enlightenment, for example, or relations ofpower -
itself, but to focus on "the historical conditions which motivate our conceptualization"
(SP: 209). Some ofthe processes or historical conditions which made the Enlightenment
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central to contemporary preoccupations - the eXiension ofdisciplinary mechanisms;
disillusionment with the politics of revolution; and globalisation - were referred to in
Chapter One; others which prompted Foucault's reconceptualisation ofpower relations
will be discussed in more detail in Chapters Three and Four; the next section will examine
how Foucault's own work brought about a problematization of the phenomenon ofmental
illness.
11 The problematization of madness
The productive power ofdiscursive and non-discursive historical practices can be
illustrated with reference to the problematization ofmadness. Madness, for mainstream
psychology, is a given phenomenon, a brute objective datum which requires analysis,
explanation and treatment. Foucault was not immune from such conceptions. Even in the
midst ofhis critique ofreason's 'internment' of its 'other', there is a definite sense in
Madness and Civilization ofa romanticisation ofmadness as some kind ofnatural,
incorruptible 'thing-in-itself peering over the asylum walls (Weeks 1989: 55; Hacking
1986a: 29). Derrida went so far as to argue that Foucault's book not only portrayed
madness as a unique ifunfortunate entity, but in the process reaffirmed its misery: "a
powerful gesture ofprotection and internment", Madness and Civilization was "a
Cartesian gesture for the twentieth century. A reappropriation ofnegativity" (Derrida
1978: 55). However, Foucault later dissociated himself from this conception (AK: 16,47;
1980a: 118), and while he continued to insist that the Western history of truth which has
brought about the institutionalisation ofmadness is essentially despotic and perverse, this
fact does not confer any particularly noble traits upon madness:
The rationality of the abominable is a fact ofcontemporary history. The irrational,
however, does not, because ofthat, acquire any indefeasible rights (Foucault,
quoted in Blanchot 1990: 81).
f-.....
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Even a critic as unyielding as Habermas accepts that Foucault's early romanticisation of
madness had been exorcised from his work by the time of The Birth ofthe Clinic
(Habermas 1987: 241).
Instead, Foucault's approach ought to be understood as relating "an almost Kantian story
in which our experience ofthe mad is a mere phenomenon conditioned by our thought and
our history" (Hacking 1986a: 29). Madness is not a phenomenon about which medical
science and psychiatry have gradually accumulated knowledge and on that basis have
recommended forms of institutionalised cure, but rather something historically produced,
evaluated and labelled on the basis ofand through forms ofconstraint.
Is it not important to our culture that unreason could become an object of
understanding only to the exient that it first had been an object ofexcommunication?
(Histoire de la Folie 1972: 119, quoted in Eribon 1993: 96).
Ifthe medical personage could isolate madness, it was not because he knew it, but
because he mastered it; and what for positivism would be an image ofobjectivity
was only the other side of this domination (Madness and Civilization 1965: 272,
quoted in Eribon 1993: 97).
The language o'fpsychiatry, which is reason's monologue on madness, could only be
established on the basis ofsuch a silence [that is, the silence established by reason's
definition ofmadness as mental illness] (Histoire de la Folie 1961: ii, quoted in
Macey 1993: 95; emphasis in the original).
This complex network of relations which Foucault at times referred to as "power-
knowledge" is, he argued, "productive ofconsciousness and gives an absolute right to
non-madness over madness: the power ofcompetence over ignorance, ofnormality over
disorder and deviation, ofcommon sense's access to reality over the errors of illusion,
hallucination and fantasy" (Foucault 1981c: 237).
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Canguilliem, in his report on the thesis which was to become lv1adness and Civilization,
points out that, for Foucault, madness is a specific experience literally created (as opposed
to merely explained) by the power-effects that accompany science:
Mr.Foucault essentially endeavors to show that madness is an object ofperception
in a 'social space' structured in diverse ways throughout the course ofhistory, an
object of perception created by social practices rather than grasped by a collective
sensibility, rather, above all, than broken down analytically by speculative
understanding (Canguilliem 1995a: 278).
The object of perception that is madness is not only a product of social practices but is
simultaneously subjected to exclusion and confinement:
police and juridical practices and the historical constitution of a social experience of
internment were necessary in order for categories of abnormality to emerge from
that point as realities offered to knowledge. Medical knowledge ofmadness that
benefits science rests without any doubt on an active experiment in social
segregation based on anathema (Canguilliem 1995a: 279; emphasis in the original).
In return for a knowledge ofmadness, then, science and the modem world, let alone those
deemed to be mad, have had to pay a huge price: "the price ofconstituting the mad
person as absolutely other, paying not only the theoretical price but also an institutional
price and even an economic price, as determined by the organization ofpsychiatry"
(Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 202). The theoretical price ofobjectifying ourselves and
others, mediated by the human sciences; the institutional price ofsubjection to formal
disciplinary mechanisms; the economic costs of internment and therapy; and no doubt also
the political price entailed by exclusionary practices and the ethical price ofself-regulation
and confession.
The sciences that arose out of the Enlightenment constituted human beings as
simultaneously objects to be known and subjects that seek to know, at the price of
excluding other subjects designated as mad, perverted, dangerous, childish, criminal and
sick, not to mention the numerous classifications referring to race, class and gender.
~
74
Thus, it is through the exercise ofpower over others that madness first became an object
ofknowledge; it is the identification and isolation ofmadness that allowed for the
emergence of the human science known as psychiatry; and it is in turn psychiatric
knowledge that in purporting to explain madness facilitated the e}".1:ension of power
relations over all concerned: over those classified as mad as much as over those doing the
classifying and the rest ofus who conduct our lives in terms ofthe received division
between reason and madness.
Madness is, in addition, an experience which is inflicted upon a free being, and with
productive effects; it is not 'discovered' within a passive 'victim'.
It was indeed through a certain mode ofdomination exercised by certain people
upon certain other people, that the subject could undertake to tell the truth about its
madness, presented in the form of the other (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 207).
As anti-psychiatrist R.D.Laing (1960: 28) put it, "[t]he behaviour of the patient is to some
extent a function of the behaviour of the psychiatrist in the same behavioural field. The
standard psychiatric patient is a function of the standard psychiatrist, and of the standard
mental hospital". At the same time, mental illness, more than just a physiological,
psychological or neurological disease waiting to be discovered, is a mode of subjection in
which individuals may actively and voluntarily participate: "the madman is obliged to
objectify himself in the eyes of reason" (Foucault 1971a: 249). "[H]ysteria", for example,
"[is] the very illl\stration ofthe way in which the subject constitutes himself as mad"
(Foucault 1987b: 122) and at the same time a form of resistance, "a counter-blow against
the very exercise ofpsychiatry" (Foucault 1980a: 186). It is also no coincidence that
hysteria has been studied "exactly where there was a maximum ofcoercion to compel
these individuals to consider themselves mad" (Foucault 1987b: 122). Madness is thus an
experiential and conceptual product ofan exercise ofpower over a free and participating
subject: "the success ofa normalizing power also depends on the willing compliance of
the subject who is the target of the technologies ofnormalization" (Henriques 1984: 116).
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The mad, like criminals, must recognise and accept the diagnosis of those who declare
them to be mad, if they wish to be cured (or rehabilitated, as the case may be).
Nor is madness the only experiential phenomenon in which individuals participate in their
own subjection: processes ofeducating children and adults, of treating the sick, of
punishing criminals, ofministering to congregations, ofgiving alms to the poor, of
entertaining an audience, of advertising goods to consumers, ofcounseling deviants, of
providing therapy to patients, and ofdeveloping, enskilling or empowering anything from
an individual through a community to an entire country all involve individuals or groups
who actively constitute themselves as specific subjects in relation to, ifnot always in the
presence of, powerful and knowledgeable others who declare them lacking or deficient in
one or other form (Deacon & Parker 1995: 116). In all these cases, the productivity of
power relations are evident through the positive application ofknowledge, mediated
through others, to selves, resulting simultaneously in the disciplining and the
transformation ofall concerned and, indeed, potentially producing new forms of
subjectivity. In addition, Habermas has argued that pedagogical, medical, psychiatric and
penal knowledge offers what he calls an "ambiguous liberation" for both patient and
professional, and quotes, from the German version ofMadness and Civilization, a passage
not cited in the English edition: "The knowledge ofmadness presupposed on the part of
those who possess it a specific way ofridding themselves ofmadness, of freeing
themselves from the start from its dangers and its magic ... " (Foucault Wahnsinn und
Gesellschajt, quoted in Habermas 1987: 246; emphasis in the original). Knowledge of the
experience ofmadness is thus also a means ofprotecting oneself from it.
The experiential concepts with which Foucault concerned himself - not only madness, but
also sexuality, crime and health - ought to be understood as in themselves "evaluations, of
which remain to be grasped the norms of logical and technical formation" (Chatelet 1979:
23). In other words, forms ofknowledge, and in particular the modem human sciences,
are mechanisms which evaluate subjects in terms of their proximity to, or distance from, a
scientifically established norm and in this way constitute them as sane or mad, normal or
,,;,..
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perverted, law-abiding or criminal, healthy or sick; and it is the rules of formation of these
norms and evaluations, not a given experience in itself, that need to be explained. That
which science takes as symptomatic of a phenomenon is more often than not that which
has made that phenomenon and its attendant explanation possible; ostensibly causal factors
are preceded by their apparent effects:
our society has been afflicted by a disease, a very curious, a very paradoxical
disease, for which we haven't yet found a name; and this mental disease has a very
curious symptom, which is that the symptom itselfbrought the mental disease into
being (Foucault, in Elders 1974: 188-89).
As Canguilhem puts it, "what the supposedly scientific psychology ofthe nineteenth
century had attempted to establish as truth, the delimitation ofthe 'normal', is in fact only
the discursive consecration ofpractices for establishing the juridical incapacity ofan
individual" (Canguilhem 1995b: 283). Finally, to the extent that an experience such as
madness is not given but produced or problematized, so too does it require a new
problematization before "the problem ofthe division between reason and unreason [can
even] become possible" and available for analysis (Foucault 1989: 4); perhaps then it was
fitting that those, like Nietzsche and Artaud, who were among the first to problematize
this division, also fell prey to its effects.
11/ Problematizing the Enlightenment
In a roundabout but necessary way, we have arrived back at our starting point, namely, the
contemporary importance ofthe Enlightenment. Indeed, Foucault's genealogy ofthe
present would have been impossible unless 'a certain number offactors' had rendered
modernity and its Enlightenment origins 'uncertain' and 'unfamiliar' by 'provoking a
certain number ofdifficulties' around it: widespread civil apathy and philosophical
disillusionment juxtaposed against the scientific and technological progress ofa globalising
but no longer visibly revolutionary \Vestem culture. To this e:x.1:ent, the currently
problematic nature of the Enlightenment project, which genealogy seeks to address, was
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itself made possible by a prior genealogical process (in which the work ofNietzsche no
doubts figures prominently): genealogy is thus present at its own birth, as it were.
In asking, following Kant, "[W]hat is our present? What is the contemporary field of
possible experience?", Foucault seeks to problematize our present, to produce "an
ontology ofourselves" (Foucault 1993b: 18). Central to his proposed combination of
historical analysis and immanent critique of, and experimentation with, the legacies of the
main Enlightenment tradition, is thus "a certain form ofproblematization that defines
objects, rules ofaction, modes of relation to oneself' (Foucault 1984a: 49). He "put the
matter clearly" in an interview given in 1981 to the journal Ideology and Consciousness:
my problem is to see how men govern (themselves and others) by the production of
truth (Foucault 1981f: 8-9).
People govern themselves and others, and at the same time produce truth, in the context
ofrules, regimes ofpractices or programmes ofconduct which prescribe what is to be
done and what is to be known (Foucault 1981f: 5). In particular, it is the interplay
between that which orders human conduct - relations of power, including strategies of
resistance - and that which rationalises or justifies such conduct - forms ofknowledge,
including refinements in the technology and the instruments employed, and calculations of
the economic costs both of these means and ofthe resistance encountered (SP: 224; 1989:
188) - that fascinated Foucault:
(h]ow can one analyse the connection between ways ofdistinguishing true and false
and ways of governing oneself and others? The search for a new foundation for
each of these practices, in itself and relative to the other, the will to discover a
different way ofgoverning oneself through a different way ofdividing up true and
false - this is what I would call 'political spiritualite' (Foucault 1981 f: 11; emphasis
in the original).
In these two statements are brought together the three defining themes ofFoucault's
oeuvre - power, knowledge and human subjects - themes which he built into the title ofhis
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chair at the College de France: History (specifically, human history) of Systems (power)
ofThought (knowledge).
The following question flows out of these themes: through recourse to which forms of
knowledge and through what relations ofpower have human beings come to be what they
are? In other words, what can be said about the "rationalization of the management ofthe
individual" (Foucault 1980e: 4), these free subjects ofprocesses that they have fabricated
but over which they appear to have little control and even less understanding. But there is
a second, equally important question: how might these relations, forms and beings be
problematized and made different from what they are? It is in this latter instance that
spirituality enters the picture, defined as the transformations which a subject must make of
itself in order to accede to a mode of being, transformations which, at least in ancient
times, were almost identical with philosophy (Foucault 1987b: 125). Political spiritualite,
then (a form ofwhich Foucault is reported to have discerned in the early days of the
Iranian revolution - Bernauer 1981: 4), can be understood as self-transformation in the
light of truth under the aegis ofpower. To investigate anew the history of the will to truth
is simultaneously to re-examine the ways in which we govern ourselves and others in the
present and to prefigure or fabricate alternative conceptions ofknowledge, power and
identity.
To speak in this way of 'fabricating' history, knowledge and power will surely suggest to
some that Foucault was merely engaged in an elaborate and entertaining, but ultimately
speculative, game ofwriting fiction pretending to be fact. Indeed, he freely admitted that
his entire genealogical approach (the questions he asked, the objects and the form ofhis
analyses) was a "fabrication" (Foucault 1980a: 212). Describing himself (in Macey 1993:
426) as "simply someone who manufactures books", he suggested that The Order of
Things, for example,
is a pure and simple 'fiction': it's a novel, but it's not I who invented it; it is the
relationship between our period and its epistemological configuration and this mass
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ofstatements [about grammar, natural history and political economy] (Foucault
1989: 20).
This does not mean, however, that Foucault's writings can be discounted as some kind of
'irrelevant fantasy'. For Foucault, all present accounts of past events are fabrications:
given that "historians always take their problems from the present", from their personal
lives, their country's social and political life or their specific institutional environment
(Foucault, quoted in Friedrich 1981: 88), the constant flux ofour personal, political and
institutional present renders the past permanently open to re-interpretation, re-
interpretations which will in turn exert an effect - always violent (Heidegger 1969: 207;
Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 112) - on our current understanding ofourselves.
[1]f interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system ofrules,
which in itselfhas no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to
a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to
secondary rules, then the development ofhumanity is a series of interpretations
(Foucault 1977a: 151-52).
Taylor picks up on this to ask, pertinently but awkwardly: "where one can do violence by
distortion, may one not alleviate by a less unfaithful description?" (Taylor 1985b: 380).
This is awkward because one does not choose to do violence; all descriptions distort, and
there is no independent standard to which we can be faithful. But it also pertinent because
different descriptions distort differently, and when pitted against each other may serve to
problematize and modify the rules of the game. The genealogical purpose offabricating
history is not to reveal the past, nor to express a truth, but to disturb the cobwebs ofour
present. It follows, though, that Habermas' criticism ofFoucault's work as "presentistic"
lacks real force; Foucault does not claim that his conception ofhistory as "meaningless
kaleidoscopic changes ofshape in discourse totalities" can avoid contemplating such




Thus, when Foucault described what he did as "a kind ofhistorical fiction" which he knew
very well was not true, and perhaps even "singleminded, exaggerated" (Foucault 1980e:
5), he was not attempting to gain some literary status but in fact aiming to 'produce
effects oftruth in the present', or, at the very least, "somehow, to some degree, not
remain altogether foreign to some such real effects" (Foucault 1981f: 12):
What I want to do ... is to ... work out an interpretation, a reading of a certain
reality, which might be such that, on the one hand, this interpretation could produce
some of the effects of truth; and on the other hand, these effects of truth could
become instruments within possible struggles.... Deciphering a layer ofreality in
such a way that the lines of force and the lines of fragility come forth; the points of
resistance and the possible points ofattack; the paths marked out and the shortcuts.
It is the reality ofpossible struggles that I wish to bring to light (Foucault 1989:
189; 1980a: 62).
As Connolly puts it, Foucault's textual strategy sought "to excite in the reader the
experience ofdiscord between the social construction ofnormality and that which does
not fit neatly within the frame ofthese constructs" (Connolly 1985: 368; emphasis in the
original). By self-consciously and deliberately fabricating or reinterpreting the historical
understandings which support our conceptions of ourselves as modem beings, genealogy
seeks to make strange what we take to be familiar, and in this way to provide indirect
assistance to contemporary and usually localised struggles and forms ofknowledge - at the
very least "render[ing] them ... capable ofopposition and of struggle against the coercion
ofa theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse" (Foucault 1980a: 85; 1987c:
205), and at best making possible thefuture formation ofa political group - "a community
ofaction" - with its own independent values and objectives (Foucault 1984a: 385).
By deciphering reality in such a way that would be both epistemologically and strategically
useful, Foucault clearly paid more than mere lip-service to the interconnectedness between
theory and practice, seeing the former in particular as not only informing the latter but as
effective in its own right:
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any diagnosis concerning the nature of the present .... does not consist in a simple
characterization ofwhat we are but, instead - by following lines of fragility in the
present - in managing to grasp why and how that-which-is might no longer be that-
which-is (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 206).
It is in the light of this endeavour that Foucault's claims about writing historical fiction, or
seeking to produce effects oftruth, must be understood. Madness and Civilization, he
argued, had "an effect on the perception ofrnadness. So the book and my thesis have a
truth in the nowadays reality" (Foucault 1980e: 5). As Canguilhem has pointed out, this
work was later enlisted in support ofantipsychiatric protests, and to this extent "Foucault
comforted, ifhe did not sustain or lead, movements ofcultural and political indiscipline
that were still looking for justification" (Canguilhem 1995b: 285). To the degree that
Discipline and Punish, too, is said to have circulated within some French prisons during
the revolts of the early 1970's, "that's a proofofa truth - a political and actual truth':'
which started after the book was written", prompting Foucault to "hope that the truth of
my books is in the future" (Foucault 1980e: 5). Indeed, a few years later, and after the
publication of The History ofSexuality, a government commission requested Foucault's
advice in relation to a reform ofthe penal code with particular reference to censorship and
sexuality (Macey 1993: 373). A final example: "I am well aware that I have never written
anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that truth is therefore absent",
because fiction can function in relation to and induce effects oftruth, and can even make it
come about that a true discourse "engenders or 'manufactures' something that does not as
yet exist, that is, 'fictions' it" (Foucault 1980a: 193).
It is in this context that Foucault's own works can be listed amongst those tools available
both as disturbingly different 'points ofview' and as effective strategic implements:
All my books ... are little toolboxes, ifyou will. Ifpeople are willing to open them
and make use ofsuch and such a sentence or idea, ofone analysis or another, as
they would a screwdriver or a monkey wrench, in order to short circuit or disqualifY
systems ofpower, including even possibly the ones my books come out of, well, all
the better (Foucault, quoted in Eribon 1993: 237).
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On a more global scale, "[t]he role for theory today ... [is] to build little by little a strategic
knowledge (savoir)" (Foucault 1980a: 145) which might be useful for, or at least can be
made available to, various struggles. Foucault also conceived of the courses that he
taught at the College de France as modestly contributing to such a strategic knowledge:
they were intended "to initiate a series of individual analyses that will gradually form a
'morphology of the will to knowledge'" (Foucault 1977a: 199). This statement speaks
volumes for Foucault's understanding of the role ofknowledge in relation to its object:
not unsystematic and yet particular, the production ofknowledge does not function by
superimposing some grand narrative upon reality. Instead, and inductively more than
deductively, specific analyses, serially linked together, gradually coalesce into a shape
which composes a 'body ofknowledge' - which is simultaneously knowledge of an object,
the grounds which make that object possible, the tools with which the object is known,
and the known object itself (AK: 16).
'Fabricating' or 'fictioning' was thus a way in which Foucault sought to bring about
specific political effects; it also helps to show how what is taken to be true has in fact been
produced or manufactured, and as a result makes strange that which is so familiar and
visible that it is literally invisible. As he put it somewhat turgidly:
fiction consists not in showing the invisible, but in showing the extent to which the
invisibility of the visible is invisible (Foucault 1990b: 24).
Last but not least, 'fictioning' undermines the will to truth and opens up for interrogation
its high priest, the self-conscious human actor and author. It follows that what for many
ofhis interlocutors seemed polemical about his work was for Foucault a straightforward
and necessary, even unavoidable, approach:
The apparently polemical character [ofMadness and Civilization and The Order of
Things] stems from the fact that it is a question ofhollowing out the whole mass of
discourse that's accumulated under our feet (Foucault 1989: 30).
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This mass ofdiscourse, particularly our modern Enlightenment-inspired conceptions of
knowledge and power, is likened to "a molehill about to cave in", in that it is being
undermined, burrowed into and subverted by new conceptions and struggles (Foucault
1982a: 37). The differences between a Foucauldian and a Marxist approach could not be
more evident here: whereas the latter tends to favour topographical and structural
metaphors (the base and the superstructure; seizing the commanding heights), Foucault
preferred archaeological comparisons. There are no lofty edifices to be overthrown,
through purist, universal, climactic revolutionary transcendence, only humble molehills to
be (further) undermined, through implicated, specific, irreverent and perpetual subversion.
This attempt to undermine the very foundations ofmodern Western thought also has a
useful self-evaluative function built into it. Foucault sought to both provoke and examine
the effects on our historical self-understandings of a critique which pits modernity against
itself:
What I am trying to do IS provoke an interference between our reality and the
knowledge ofour past history. If! succeed, this will have real effects in our present
history (Foucault 1980e: 5).
More specifically,
I would just like to find out what effects the question [of the 'objectification of
objectivities'] produces within historical knowledge... , [I]t's a matter of the effect
on historical analysis ofa nominalist critique formulated elsewhere [in philosophy]
but by way ofan historical analysis (Foucault 1981f: 14).
Foucault's book's, then, "aren't treatises in philosophy or studies ofhistory: at most, they
are philosophical fragments put to work in a historical field ofproblems" (Foucault 1981 f:
4). Such an approach, ofprovoking the effects one then examines, also has the advantage
ofputting one's "nominalist method" to the test of history (Foucault 1981d: 353-54). As
Rajchman puts it, Foucault was not attempting to discover the truth ofthe present, or of
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the past, for that matter, but trying to bathe in an unfamiliar light those historical events
and practices through which the present has come to conceive of itself, its thought, its
politics and its denizens, in a particular way (Rajchman 1985: 52, 55-60; 1991: viii, 64).
Together with this nominalist approach which is highly suspicious of all claims to universal
truth (Rabinow 1984: 4), anti-universalism and non-foundationalism constitute perhaps
Foucault's only clearly-stated philosophical position:
, All my analyses are against the idea ofuniversal necessities in human existence.
They show the arbitrariness of institutions and show which space of freedom we can
still enjoy and how many changes can still be made (Foucault 1988b: 11).
"Nothing is fundamental" (Foucault 1984a: 247): neither truth, nor power, nor even the
conscious human subject stands outside ofevery social and historical web of relations, and
consequently if any of these can be said to have an essence, a universality or a necessity
this is no more than a label assigned to an arbitrary set of rules (truth), a strategic situation
forever in flux (power) and a being subject to these rules and strategies.
IV Philosophising with a hammer
Since the target ofFoucault's deliberate interventions into the history ofour present is
precisely what makes the present itself appear so solid and stable, "the archaeologist, like
the Nietzschean philosopher, is forced to resort to the blows of the hammer" (Foucault
1989: 30). This notion of 'philosophising with a hammer' once again highlights the close
interconnection, for Foucault, between theory and practice, in the sense that philosophy
does not merely analyse and interpret and then stand aside for politics to instigate change;
philosophy is an engaged, committed, passionate and practical activity which penetrates
into the order ofthings and, like the work ofRene Magritte which fascinated Foucault,
plays an ambiguous role: "supporting pegs and yet termites that gnaw and weaken"
(Foucault 1982a: 38). For example, in Magritte's picture, This is not a pipe, the manner
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in which an object to which we are accustomed (a pipe) is represented calls into question
the very nature of the object and allows its meaning to proliferate. The picture is not itself
a pipe; neither is the representation of the pipe; nor is the statement, 'This is not a pipe', a
pipe. Indeed, in relation to this picture Foucault identifies "seven discourses in a single
statement - more than enough to demolish the fortress where similitude was held prisoner
to the assertion ofresemblance" (Foucault 1982a: 49). Simple, taken for granted
identities, unities and meanings are in this way shown to be complex and multiple,
intersected and fought over by numerous systems. Here, by provoking an 'interference'
between present and past, fact and fiction, and being and existence, a genealogical
approach (and also, interestingly, an archaeological approach - AK: 131), by "mak[ing]
visible all of those discontinuities that cross us", by exposing the modest conditions of
possibility ofmuch-vaunted meaning, aims "not to discover the roots ofour identity but to
commit itself to its dissipation" (Foucault 1977a: 162).
Similarly, Magritte's L 'Art de la conversation (1950) can be seen as a representation (or
an ordering) ofthe order of things: it contains, apparently carved out ofstone, words -
reve (dream), treve (peace), and creve (death) - which by contrast represent mere fleeting
images (Foucault 1982a: 37). We need, therefore, to adopt, in all spheres of life, a
strategy similar to that which Magritte adopted in his painting: "deploying largely familiar
images, but images whose recognizability is immediately subverted and rendered moot by
'impossible', 'irrational', or 'senseless' conjunctions" (Translator's Introduction to
Foucault 1982a: 8). This strategy, directed at our recent history, seeks through parody
not to reveal truths but to fabricate them: by pushing the "masquerade" ofhistory "to its
limit", genealogy constitutes history as a "great carnival oftime where masks are
constantly reappearing", and in this way it 'unrealises' "the identification ofour faint
individuality with the solid identities ofthe past" (Foucault 1977a: 161). For example, the
hold ofmodem progressivist histories can be undermined by referring to the
discontinuities that have been papered over, to the instances ofchance that have been
suppressed by causation or to the impact of 'great men' who have been replaced with non-
gender specific popular masses.
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We must, nevertheless, be aware that the deployment ofwhat is familiar, albeit in a
fictionalised form which alerts us to its problematic status, must be done sensitively and in
a carefully calculated manner. Not just any deployment is likely to produce effects of
truth; on the contrary, most deployments will simply reinforce what we take for granted.
What is most important is for a deployment not merely to appropriate the familiar but to
"heretically misappropriate" it, following Judith Butler (interviewed in Worsley 1997: 20),
in the way that American 'gangsta rap' lyrics, or gay movements, or local South African
music, have taken up erstwhile derogatory labels such as 'nigger', 'dyke' and 'queer', and
'kaffir', respectively, as marks ofpride and self-assertion.
As in judo, the best answer to an adversary maneuver is not to retreat, but to go
along with it, turning it to its own advantage, as a resting point for the next phase
(Foucault, quoted in Baudrillard 1987: 65).
Deployments which recognise and exploit their implication in that which they critique and
resist are neither new nor exclusively 'postmodem': when a decree was issued by the
German occupational forces requiring Danish Jews to wear yellow Stars ofDavid for ease
of identification, the entire population, led by their King, successfully nullified it by
adopting the symbol as part oftheir everyday attire.
Black consciousness-raising strategies from Fanon through Malcolm X to Biko also
regularly stressed the importance ofpsychologically liberating oneself by positively
redefining discriminatory labels:
Merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards
emancipation, you have committed yourself to fight against all forces that seek to
use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being (Biko 1978:
62).
Thus, the strategy ofmaking the familiar strange, or ofparodying our past, must, to be
effective, simultaneously underpin and undermine; indeed, it can only successfully
!;.f
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undermine - and not simply find itself dismissed as irrelevant - if it rigorously re-examines
and thus to some extent restates that which underpins our present.
Foucault's preferred approach is thus very much that of the raconteur who tells the story
of the present with sufficient familiar material to make it recognisable but with enough left
out or embellished to make it different. Indeed, to tell the (often sordid, seldom heroic)
story ofmodem reason, may be more effective than engaging in arcane theoretical battles:
[E]xperience has taught me that the history ofvarious fonns of rationality is
sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism than is abstract
criticism. For centuries, religion couldn't bear having its history told. Today, our
schools ofrationality balk at having their history written, which is no doubt
significant (Foucault 1981e: 253).
To write a history ofreligion when religion is everything that there is, is tantamount to
blasphemy: not only does it de-sacralise religion and the world by suggesting that both are
finite and man-made, but it shows that revealed truth is no revelation but has been
modified and altered over time. Similarly, to write a history ofrationality when rationality
monopolises what is taken to be true is to be met with clairnsthat one's project is
impossible, or that it risks lapsing into irrationality or confusion; and yet such claims in
themselves constitute evidence that certain powers feel threatened. To demonstrate the
proxirnity ofreason and despotism, truth and power, to point out the countless, tiny
sources of power, "to force the institutionalized networks of information to listen, to
produce names, to point the finger ofaccusation, to find targets, is the first step in the
reversal of power and the initiation ofnew struggles against existing forms of power"
(Foucault 1977a: 214).
Thus the purpose of restating conventional wisdoms is to allow for the construction of "a
counter-memory - a transformation ofhistory into a totally different form oftime"
(Foucault 1977a: 160). By showing how the supposed 'neutrality' and 'objectivity' of
knowledge is based on "instinct, passion, the inquisitor's devotion, cruel subtlety, and
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malice" (Foucault 1977a: 162), genealogy, like Nietzsche's 'effective history', affirms not
only that "knowledge is perspective" but that "all knowledge rests upon injustice"
(Foucault 1977a: 156-7, 163). Genealogy is like describing a changing panorama solely
with reference to what one sees from the corner ofone's eye: it substitutes for the
penetrating but blinkered scientific gaze an oblique and informing glance. In addition, the
role ofchance events in determining the trajectory ofour recent history is brought back to
centre stage from the margins to which it had been consigned by objectivist interpretations
(Gray 1995: 108), in that the present is conceived ofas
a throw ofthe dice.... It is at once the chance within the game and the game itself as
chance; in the same stroke, both the dice and the rules are thrown, so that chance is
not broken into pieces and parcelled out, but is totally affirmed in a single throw.
The present [is] the recurrence of difference (Foucault 1977a: 194, 192).
A genealogy or history of the present thus requires that one eAieriorise the present and
recognise that its apparent order, necessity and identity has in fact been invented and
imposed on chaos, chance and difference. The issue is not that one thinks or does
something new, but that one thinks or does the old differently and, thus armed with a
counter-memory, it becomes possible to begin to envision andfabricate alternative
possible futures.
It is important to realise, however, that while such alternative futures might be constructed
in the light ofFoucault's work, they are not present in his work. Blanchot suggests that
at least two ofFoucault's works (The Archaeology ofKnowledge and "The Order of
Discourse"), which "seem to open the future to a new form ofknowledge", herald
"perhaps no other fulfillment than their very promise" (Blanchot 1990: 69). The former
teAi, for example, contains "many a formula from negative theology", where Foucault in
describing what he rejects gives one a glimpse of the positivity of that which is other than,
or outside of, what he rejects (Blanchot 1990: 74). This is a salient point, which ought to
be generalised: Foucault's work does not represent an alternative to, let alone a dialectical
transcendence of, modem forms of thought. Instead of offering an external alternative, it
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provides an internal alteration; it fulfills the modem demand for it to go beyond itself by
promising to do so, and in this way succeeds in effecting changes in modernity without
effectively changing anything. From within modernity, it articulates a critique which
modernity can neither disown nor tolerate. It is no more, and no less, than a question of
style:
Style is the possibility, at once hidden and indicated, under the sovereign necessity
of the words used, ofsaying the same thing, but differently (Foucault, quoted in
White 1979: 87).
Thus, the only sense in which Foucault's work offers an 'alternative' to that which it
critiques is immanent within the critique itself, an approach not dissimilar to that taken by
a young man who once declared: "we do not anticipate the world dogmatically but wish
to discover the new world by criticism of the old" (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 36).
Indeed, Foucault recommended that one pays no heed to those who say: "'Don't criticise,
since you're not capable ofcarrying out a reform''':
That's ministerial cabinet talk. Critique doesn't have to be the premise of a
deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an
instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should
be in processes ofconflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn't have to
lay down the law for the law. It isn't a stage in a programming. It is a challenge
directed to what is (Foucault 1981£: 13).
Hence, "[i]t is not up to us to take responsibility for institutions which need to be
reformed" (Foucault, in Macey 1993: 418); that would be to play the game by their rules.
Foucault also specifically denied looking for and refused to "accept the word alternative",
as in 'an alternative to the problems ofthe present'; rather,
I would like to do the genealogy ofproblems, ofproblematiques. My point is not
that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the
same as bad. Ifeverything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So
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my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism (Foucault
1984a: 343; emphasis in the original).
Blanchot adds that Foucault, "who once declared himself a 'happy optimist', was a man in
danger, who, without making a display of it, had an acute sense of the perils to which we
are exposed, and sought to know which ones are the most threatening and with which it is
possible to compromise" (Blanchot 1990: 68).
It follows that, firstly, the Western political rationalities that are Foucault's target are not
evil or bad, forms ofdomination from which we must supposedly liberate ourselves
(Foucault 1987b: 129). That is to say: "To exercise power over another, in a sort ofopen
strategic game, where things could be reversed, that is not evil. That is part of love,
passion, ofsex.'Ual pleasure" (Foucault 1987b: 129; 1987a: 5). However, to exercise
power or to produce knowledge always involves danger (Foucault 1988a: 168). In a
world in which nothing is fundamental, in which knowledge rests upon injustice and
interpretation is a violence we do to things, in which individual and group identities are
constituted as fractured and contradictory objects ofknowledge within the parameters of
relations ofpower, such that the essence ofourselves and others can never be known, and
in which experiences such as illness and sexuality are mechanisms ofsubjection, danger
lurks around every corner: the danger that a critique ofEnlightenment reason \vill end up
in irrationalism, and the danger that to believe this will render reason immune to criticism;
the danger that we may miscalculate the risks (Giddens 1991: 34-5) and consequences
involved in questioning the foundations ofour present, as well as the danger that we may
be experiencing the end ofthe world as we have known it, facing only "a terrifYing
emptiness, a kind ofvertigo, or even a fracturing ofour world and body-space" (Taylor
1989: 18).
Secondly, an answer to the Leninist question, 'What is to be Done?' (Lenin 1947), the
direction in which one might channel one's pessimistic hyperactivism, will depend not on
grand strategising but on local, contextual and everyday factors. "[T]he ethico-political
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choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger"; for example,
anti-psychiatric criticism contributed to the mass closure ofItalian mental hospitals during
the 1970s and the mushrooming of free clinics - "and they have new problems" (Foucault
1984a: 344). Just as power relations are not always to be abhorred, freedom is not always
to be welcomed: liberation in itself need not entail completion or satisfaction; rather,
"liberation opens up new relationships ofpower, which have to be controlled by practices
of liberty" (Foucault 1987b: 115).
V The bearers of Enlightenment
What, then, we are to do with the Enlightenment depends to a large extent on what the
Enlightenment has donewith us. It also depends on how exactly we are to understand
who 'we' are. Conventionally, 'our' role - that is, the role of people like Foucault, or like
those who make a living commenting on the work ofpeople like Foucault, such as the
author of this thesis, as well as, no doubt, most of its readers - has been summed up in the
attributes and activities assigned to the term 'intellectual'. At least since the
Enlightenment, but arguably stretching as far back as Plato's comments on the
'philosopher-king', intellectuals and the theories that they are said to have authored have
been taken to provide both governors and governed with a range ofanswers to the
questions, 'What is?', 'What do we know?' and 'What is to be done?'.
Authentic philosophers ... are commanders and law-givers: they say 'thus it shall
be!', it is they who determine the Wherefore and Wither [Sic.] ofmankind .... Their
'knowing' is creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is - will to
power (Nietzsche, quoted in Dews 1987: 206; emphasis in the original).
"VY'hether conceived ofas a "socially unattached intelligentsia (jreischwebende Intelligenz)"
(Mannheim 1954: 137-38), as "organic", "directive" and class-based or as "traditional" and
"independent" (Gramsci 1971: 5-8), all modem intellectuals invested a lot ofpower and
expended a great deal ofenergy to secure a position whereby they and no one else could
legitimately be called upon to identify the deficiencies of the present, map out the road
(,~
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ahead, assist those who struggle along this path and ultimately legislate a new world into
existence.
Foucault consistently abjured such a role for himself Intellectuals, he argued, are in the
process of abandoning their old "prophetic function", including not only "their claim to
predict what will happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for"
(Foucault 1977b: 161). Like Baudrillard (1987: 69), throughout his career, and especially
in interviews, Foucault deplored and refused to adopt what he referred to as the epitome
ofmodem intellectual practice, the "prophetic stance" (Foucault 1989: 190,282; 1977b:
161; 1987a: 9; 1988a: 15, 197; 1988b: 9, 146; see also 1977a: 207-8, and in Elders 1974:
171) of the would-be universal legislator "who calms down reality" (Foucault 1989: 191).
Planting his feet firmly against the ancient philosophical current which sees intellectuals as
key elements in social transformation, he proclaimed that "to tell others what they have to
do" (Foucault 1988a: 265), to try to advise or instruct them oftheir problems and
alternatives is in fact "to tie them down or immobilise them" (Foucault 1981f: 13; 1980a:
62); it is to prevent them from taking action independently ofand detrimental to e),.iant
structures ofknowledge and power.
While there are some similarities between Foucault's genealogy and the prophesying and
legislating stance of the human sciences, these are outweighed by the fundamental
differences. In critical social theory as Fay describes it, "the theory is itself the catalytic
agent which sparks social change by revealing to actors, given their developing situation,
how they ought to act" (Fay 1975: 100 n8). Foucault's immanent critique ofour history
and ourselves was also intended to catalyse or produce effects of truth, though by
revealing fictions and feuds rather than truths and moral principles. The primary
difference, though, is that Foucault refused to prophesy to a specific individual or group
what they ought to do, but sought to make it difficult for anyone, subordinate and superior
alike, to carry on thinking and acting in familiar ways. (Though genealogy does not tell us
what we ought to do, it itself does nevertheless do, and cannot avoid one or another of its
formulations being taken as prescriptive.) Genealogy aimed
.~.
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precisely to bring it about that they 'no longer know what to do', so that the acts,
gestures, discourses which up until then had seemed to go without saying become
problematic, difficult, dangerous. This effect is intentional (Foucault 1981 f: 12).
"(F]rom the moment one begins to be unable, any longer, to think things as one usually
thinks them, transformation becomes simultaneously very urgent, very difficult, and
altogether possible" (Foucault 1982c: 34).
The events ofMay 1968 had revealed, Foucault argued, that "the masses no longer needed
[the intellectual] to gain knowledge; they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know
far better than he and they are certainly capable ofexpressing themselves" (Foucault
1977a: 207; emphasis in the original); hence, no longer should they be (nor indeed,
following Marx (in McLellan 1977: 575), should they ever have been) treated as
expressing a mere "trade-union consciousness" (Lenin 1947: 31)) and as dependent on an
intellectual vanguard. Indeed, the intellectuals are part of the problem: in their elitism
they are often tempted to account for the masses "in terms offalse consciousness or the
banalization ofmass culture" (Hall 1986: 52), and thus what the latter might
spontaneously do or know is often blocked, prohibited and invalidated by systems of
power ofwhich "intellectuals are themselves agents" (Foucault 1977a: 207). At best, the
role of the intellectual is "not to shape a working-class consciousness, as that
consciousness already exists, but to allow that consciousness, that working-class
knowledge, to enter the information system", in other words, to disseminate it (Foucault,
in Macey 1993: 318). On the other hand, the intellectuals have their own problems to
worry about - how they can justify their existence now that their legislative practices have
been discredited in the eyes ofboth the masses and increasingly self-sufficient
governmental apparatuses (Bawnan 1987: 122).
In this new contexi, the role of the intellectual
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is no longer ... to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is to struggle
against the fonns ofpower that transform him into its object and instrument in the
sphere of 'knowledge', 'truth', 'consciousness' and 'discourse'.
In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is
practice. But it is local and regional, ... and not totalizing. This is a struggle against
power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most
invisible and insidious.... [I]t is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle
for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance (Foucault 1977a: 207-8).
This new role for intellectuals is a specific one: they must struggle in their own right, in
their own multiple but particular locales, and with their own weapons, not in the name of
but alongside and even as part of that ambiguously modem entity once treated as a
homogeneous but now increasingly differentiated and de-massified, the 'masses'. "[N]o
longer the rhapsodist ofthe eternal, but the strategist of life and death" (Foucault 1980a:
129), the intellectual must focus on concrete problems, as a savant or expert, in his or her
specific life or work environment (Foucault 1980a: 126-8), and speak not in the name of
universal values but in tenns ofhis or her own specific practices (Foucault, in Macey
1993: 268).
\
Already in 1967, Foucault had partially anticipated this notion of the 'specific intellectual':
philosophy no longer exists; not that it has disappeared, but it has been disseminated
into a great number ofdiverse activities. Thus the activities of the axiomatician, the
linguist, the anthropologist, the historian, the revolutionary, the man ofpolitics can
be fonns ofphilosophical activity .... [that is,] every activity that makes a new object
appear for knowledge or practice (Foucault 1989: 28).
And in The Order ofThings he suggested that the disciplines ofpsychoanalysis and
ethnology, seemingly privileged but mythologising 'counter-sciences' which call into
question the more established human sciences and their object of 'Man', were inherently
particularistic and as such perhaps most conducive to the emergence of the specific
intellectual (OT: 376). The category of the specific intellectual brings together the
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erstwhile universal intellectual- Voltaire's just 'man ofletters' - with those who once
were merely "competent instances in the service of the State or Capital- technicians,
magistrates, teachers" (Foucault 1980a: 127; emphasis in the original). In this respect,
there is little difference between Foucault's 'specific intellectual' and Gramsci's "new type
of [modern] intellectual" (Gramsci 1971: 9-10). As a result of the massive expansion of
the white-collar and service sectors, it is possible for psychiatrists, social workers, lawyers,
doctors, judges, academics or engineers to both do their jobs and also carry out
'intellectual' or 'critical' work once reserved for the writer (Foucault 1988a: 107).
Whereas biology and physics (Darwin and Oppenheirner) were the privileged zones of
formation of the specific intellectual (Foucault 1980a: 129), today the university and the
academic have emerged,
ifnot as principal elements, at least as 'exchangers', privileged points of
intersection. If the universities and education have become politically ultrasensitive
areas, this is no doubt the reason why. And what is called the crisis of the
universities should not be interpreted as a loss of power, but on the contrary as a
multiplication and re-inforcement of their power-effects as centres in a
polymorphous ensemble of intellectuals who virtually all pass through and relate
themselves to the academic system (Foucault 1980a: 127; see also Gramsci 1971:
10-11).
In this context, the work ofthe intellectual - for perhaps one ought no longer to speak of
the task or the role of the intellectual- is no longer to prophesy, to legislate, to "shape
others' political will", but to isolate, "in their power ofconstraint but also in the
contingency of their historical formation", the systems ofthought that we take for granted
(Foucault 1989: 282);
it is, through the analyses he carries out in his own field, to question over and over
again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people's mental habits, the way
they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine
rules and institutions and on the basis of this reproblematization (in which he carries
out his specific task as an intellectual) to participate in the formation ofa political
will (in which he has his role as citizen to play) (Foucault 1988a: 265).
"."
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This "reproblematization" ofwhat we take for granted is aimed at dismantling the existing
coordinates ofexperience in order to change the self and, consequently, the selves of
others: reproblematization is "an experience in which one risks oneself in the sense that
one emerges from it transformed not only in what and how one thinks, but thereby in how
one is or might possibly be" (BurcheIl1993: 277).
The function of the intellectual no longer has as its object the conscientisation of the
masses, though it deeply concerns them, nor can it claim to avoid the blandishments of the
state or capital. However, specific intellectuals occupy strategic positions, and the extent
to which they propagate scientific ideologies is secondary to their capacity to 'produce
effects proper to true discourses' (Foucault 1980a: 131). There are, ofcourse, many
dangers associated with this new conception of the intellectual, ofbeing unable to move
beyond the local and the particular, to generate outside support, to develop a global
strategy or to avoid being manipulated by local networks ofpower (Foucault 1980a: 130;
1984a: 46-7). Foucault was well aware that purely partial and local criticisms and
struggles could leave us defenceless and bewildered in the face of global structures of
domination. 'Hardly feeling capable' ofdoing more than merely "contribut[ing] to
changing certain things in people's ways of perceiving and domg things" (Foucault 1981£:
12), he was under no illusion about the difficulties inherent in this process, accepting that
"we have to give up hope ofever acceding to a point ofview that could give us access to
any complete and definitive knowledge ofwhat may constitute our historical limits"
(Foucault 1984a: 47) and realising "how much all this can remain precarious, how easily it
can all lapse back into somnolence" (Foucault 1981£: 12).
Nevertheless, Foucault rejected what he referred to as "this whole intimidation with the
bogy o~reform" (Foucault 1980a: 145), that criticisms and struggles which are specific
and localised will tend to be superficial and recuperable, rather than fundamental and
transcendent as associated with the universal intellectual. Such criticisms, he suggested,
are "linked to the lack ofa strategic analysis appropriate to political struggle" which
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ignores the fact that any balance of forces depends upon intermediate strategies and tactics
(Foucault 1980a: 145); that is, that even global forms ofdomination like racism, capitalism
and patriarchy are precariously grounded upon multiple and constantly shifting local
relations ofpower (see Chapter Four). He also argued that the apparent dangers of
abandoning a prophetic intellectual function are outweighed by its advantages, since, on
the basis of the specificity ofthe politics of truth, combined with mutual support and
politicisation, the position of the specific intellectual "can take on a general significance
and ... his local, specific struggle can have effects and implications which are not simply
professional or sectoral", but which can engage with the battle for or around the regime of
truth, namely, "the ensemble ofrules according to which the true and the false are
separated and specific effects of power attached to the true" (Foucault 1980a: 132). Here
Foucault's work links up with that ofBourdieu, who argued that the greater intellectuals'
independence from mundane politics due to their specific locations, the greater their
inclination to assert this independence and the greater their symbolic effectiveness
(Bourdieu 1989: 100).
VI Domains ofgenealogy: knowledge, power and the subject
Contrary to the opinion of those who have popularised what was referred to in Chapter
One as the 'blackmail' of the Enlightenment, the genealogical project ofproblematizing
Enlightenment reason is not 'disordered and contingent' but has "its generality, its
systematicity, its homogeneity, and its stakes" (Foucault 1984a: 47). Firstly, while it is
important to study specific contemporary experiences "like madness, illness, transgression
oflaws, sexuality [and] self-identity" (Foucault 1981e: 239), not only can these
phenomena "only be understood in relation to each other, not independently" (Foucault
1988a: 243), but they must also be located in terms oftheir longer, more general histories
(Foucault 1984a: 49). Second, these phenomena can be examined systematically along
three axes, each corresponding to the broad areas of "relations ofcontrol over things,
relations ofaction upon others, relations with oneself' (Foucault 1984a: 48).
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Three domains ofgenealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology ofourselves in
relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects ofknowledge;
second, a historical ontology ofourselves in relation to a field ofpower through
which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others; third, a historical
ontology in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents
(Foucault 1984a: 351).
As he pointed out in several interviews, his objective over the last twenty years ofhis life
was to write a "history of the present" (DP: 31), or more specifically, "create a history of
the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (SP: 208).
These modes correspond to the three historical ontologies mentioned above, "three modes
ofobjectification which transform human beings into subjects" (SP: 208): first, modes of
inquiry with supposed scientific status, which objectivise the speaking subject (linguistics),
the productive subject (economics), and the sheer fact of being alive (biology); second,
modes which objectivise subjects through "dividing practices", dividing subjects internally
or from others (mad/sane, sicklhealthy, criminals/'good boys'); and third, modes through
which a human being turns him- or herself into a subject (SP: 208). Three modes of
objectification, three axes for analysis: "the establishment ofa certain objectivity, the
development ofa politics and a government of the self, and the elaboration ofan ethics
and a practice in regard to oneself' (Foucault 1984a: 387; 1981e: 239; 1988a: 243).
It is important to note that it is these processes through which we govern ourselves and
others in the light of truth that produce specific experiences, and subject subjects, rather
than a subject being the origin ofan experience (Kritzman 1988: xviii; Laclau & Mouffe
1985: 115; Deleuze 1988: 112). In the second volume of The HistOlY a/Sexuality,
Foucault indicated that his study was planned as "a history of the experience ofsexuality,
where experience is understood as the correlation between fields ofknowledge, types of
normativity, and forms of subjectivity in a particular culture", with each domain of
experience corresponding respectively to
99
(l) the formation ofsciences (savoirs) that refer to it, (2) the systems ofpower that
regulate its practice, (3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to
recognize themselves as subjects of this sexuality (Foucault 1987a: 4; emphasis in
the original).
Experience is thus not the exclusive property of a subject, but a composite or correlative
product ofpower, knowledge and subjects; instead ofthe subject being the condition of
possibility ofexperience,
it is experience which is the rationalization of a process, itselfprovisional, which
results in a subject, or rather, in subjects. I will call subjectivization the procedure
by which one obtains the constitution ofa subject, or more precisely, ofa
subjectivity which is ofcourse only one ofthe given possibilities oforganization ofa
self-consciousness (Foucault 1988a: 253).
People do not have experiences, rather, experiences happen to people: "historical
experience is not something that ... we have (or not), it is some wcry(s) that ... we are (or
not)" (Corrigan 1990: 222; emphasis in the original).
Third, subsumed beneath these three broad areas ofknowledge, power and ethics and
providing homogeneity for one's analyses, are what Foucault refers to as "practical
systems" (1984a: 48). These practical systems have two aspects:
the forms ofrationality that organize their [men's] ways ofdoing things (this might
be called the technological aspect) and the freedom with which they act within these
practical systems, reacting to what others do, modifYing the rules of the game, up to
a certain point (this might be called the strategic side of these practices) (Foucault
1984a: 48).
It is here that Foucault comes closest to addressing what most modern theorists would
understand as the relationship between structure and agency, in that the 'technological'
aspect corresponds to the ways in which social life is organised, while the 'strategic'
aspect- which Foucault elsewhere (l984a: 50) refers to as "strategic games of liberties" _
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corresponds to the capacity ofpeople to act within and against the ways in \Xhich their
lives are organised.
Yet the manner in which he does this serves only to problematize and undermine the
conventional wisdoms. In the first place, by utilising a different terminology Foucault
opens the way for a reformulation of the issue; second, these 'technological' (or
structural) and 'strategic' (or voluntaristic) aspects are subordinated to the more general
focus on modes ofsubjection, and as such are not given primacy; third, both these aspects
are practices, which thus avoids reproducing the dichotomy between theory and practice;
fourth, freedom and rationality, commonly taken to presuppose one another, are
disassociated; and finally, the 'technological' aspect itselfconsists of 'forms ofrationality'
which, in conventional approaches, are more likely to be associated with human agency
and contrasted against supposedly more material structures, such as a mode ofproduction
or a state.
This Foucauldian way ofgrappling with the dichotomy ofstructure versus agency makes
more visible the implications and dangers of this Enlightened way ofthinking and also
alerts us to what is at stake. The dichotomy of structure versus agency has been described
as the master dichotomy ofMarxism (Anderson 1983: 33); Marxism itselfwas probably
the longest lived and most influential ofall the theoretical progeny ofthe Enlightenment.
What is ofconsiderable import in rethinking the dichotomy ofstructure versus agency,
then, is the complex relationship between Foucault and Marxism. This is not the place to
launch into a detailed analysis of the influence or otherwise ofeach for the other. A brief,
broad sketch is sufficient for our purpose, which is to suggest that conventional
oppositions between thought and reality, theory and practice and, not least, structure and
agency, all of which are essential to Marxism and many other modern theories, cannot be
maintained ifwe are to continue with the philosophical task outlined by Kant and repeated
by Foucault: the problematization of the present.
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VII Refracting Marx through Foucault
On the one hand, Foucault refused to locate himself in terms of the strictures of that
movement which for over a century has, laid claim to the mantle of radicalism, and rejected
the bulk of its theoretical arsenal. The Marxist theory of history -
a conception ofhistory organized on the narrative model as a great sequence of
events caught up in a hierarchy ofdeterminations: individuals are grasped at the
interior ofthis totality which transcen<:!s them and plays with them but ofwhich they
are perhaps at the same time the badly conscious authors (Foucault 1989: 12) -
was treated as an unfounded hypothesis (Foucault 1989: 15). The 'base-superstructure'
dichotomy so fundamental to Marxism in all its variations was dismissed in toto, and the
emphasis on economic needs and forces disparaged as a mere 'historical generality'; and
the reduction ofpower relations, conceived as primarily repressive, to a ruling class and its
State, was held to be yet another example of outdated but enduring theories of
sovereignty. Finally, the concept of ideology was treated as peripheral to what Foucault
preferred to think ofas the politics of truth; and some ofMarxism'sstrategic
pronouncements, such as its theory of 'the weakest link', were ridiculed as "barely on a
level with the preliminary training given to a sub-lieutenant in the reserves" (Foucault
1980a: 144). Marxism as a whole was likened to "a fish in water ... unable to breathe
anywhere else" than in the nineteenth century (OT: 262).
On the other hand, Foucault accepted that
[i]t is impossible at the present time to write history without using a whole range of
concepts directly or indirectly linked to Marx's thought and situating oneself within
a horizon ofthought which has been defined and described by Marx (Foucault
1980a: 53).
Foucault himselfmade reference to, and use of, elements of a Marxist, particularly
Frankfurt School, analysis and critique ofmodernity, as well as some Marxist terminology,
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in his writings up to and including the publication ofDiscipline and Punish (see, for
example, Foucault 1971d; in Elders 1974: 170ff; 1977a: 203-217; SP: 210; 1982c: 34; in
Raulet 1983: 200; 1988a: 95). On several occasions he suggested, in Marxist fashion, that
contemporary forms of rationality and modes of subjection "reside on a base ofhuman
practice and human history; and ... since these things have been made, they can be
unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made" (Foucault, in Raulet 1983:
206; DP: 305; Foucault & Sennett 1982: 9). By 1975, however, Foucault declared
himself "completely through with Marx" (in Macey 1993: 348). He also tended to
distinguish between Marx and Marxism, negatively associating the latter primarily with its
institutionalisation in political parties: "What I desire ... is not so much the defalsification
and restitution of a true Marx, but the unburdening and liberationofM~ in relation to
party dogma ... " (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 211).
Most importantly, Marx himself was hailed as being, along with Freud, one ofthe
"'initiators ofdiscursive practices'" who, unlike great authors like Homer who established
a discipline, produced the possibility and the rules of fonnation ofother texts (Foucault
1977a: 131) and thus "cleared a space for the introduction ofelements other than their
own, which, nevertheless, remain within the field ofdiscourse they initiated" (Foucault
1977a: 132). ~atever truths Marx may hold, they are no doubt generated by this fecund
feature ofhis work, among the effects of which is the periodic 'return to the origin', a
relentless search amongst successive generations of Marxists for the insights to be
e.l\.'tracted from spectres as diverse as the 'early Marx', the 'structuralist Marx', and the
'humanist Marx' (Foucault 1977a: 134-35). The productive power-effects offorms of
knowledge like Marxism is that this process constantly introduces internal modifications
and as such is "an effective and necessary means of transforming [the meaning and effects
ofMarxism as a] discursive practice" (Foucault 1977a: 135). This aspect ofMarxism
bears close affinities with Foucault's oft-professed desire to let loose 'effects of truth' at
the heart ofour Enlightened present. The relationship between Foucault and Marxism
was thus ambivalent: he acknowledged his indirect indebtedness to Marx at the same time
as he eschewed what Marxism had become.
'"....
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The kinds ofmutations that might be wrought by an encounter between Foucault and
Marxism, particularly the implications of the former's approach for the structure-agency
dichotomy, can be explored by means ofa re-examination ofMarx's eleventh thesis on
Feuerbach, that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the
point is to change it" (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 158). One of the effects ofMarx's thesis
was to firmly divide the world into those who seek to legitimate, and at most reform, the
inequalities of the present and those who engage in praxis aimed at their revolutionary
overthrow and transcendence. Thought and interpretation are assumed to supply
historical actors with knowledge which can inform political practice and social change,
Marx being adamant that every form ofknowledge which ideologically mystifies the
present could not merely be "understood in its contradiction" but also needed to be
"revolutionized in practice" (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 157). Taking into account that
Foucault's work tends to straddle these dichotomies of theory and practice and thought
and reality, a Foucauldian fabrication ofMarx's thesis might provoke a number of
metamorphoses (all ofwhich are conceivable, even if they could not be operationalised,
within the discursive practice which Marx bequeathed to us): practical transformation
depends on interpretation ("things ... can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that
they were made"); practical transformation engend~rs re-interpretation ("It is the totality
ofdiscursive or non-discursive practices that introduces something into the play of true
and false and constitutes it as an object for thought"); and, most importantly, to interpret
the world is also to change it ("a certain point ofview which can be very useful as a tool
for analyzing what's going on now - and to change it") (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 206;
1988a: 257; 1984a: 350).
Both Marx and Foucault share a desire to effect changes in the present. Both identify
interpretation as an integral part of that process, but while the former treats interpretation
as a condition for effecting desirable change, the latter wields interpretation as itself a
potentially effective instrument ofchange. While Marx distinguishes between scientific
and ideological thought, but treats them both as products of their context, Foucault
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distinguishes between different forms ofthought on the basis of their capacity, actual or
potential, to bring about political effects and thus treats them as conditions for, or
producers of, their context. It is this inherent productivity (one might say, paradoxicality),
of an historically peculiar \Vestem reason which entices its practitioners into a never-
ending pursuit of its supposedly hidden treasures; it is also this feature which indicates
what is at stake in, and what price must be paid by, any genealogical analysis of the
present. What, at a simple level, is at stake is the power of a particular discourse; but at a
more global level, at stake is the capacity ofWestern reason to mount a rational critique of
the links between its own rationalities and the ancient and all-too-human will to power.
Built into these stakes is a profound paradox, pregnant \vith peril as well as promise: "'the
paradox ofthe relations ofcapacity and power''', referring to the fact that, contrary to
Enlightenment expectations, the growth ofhuman capabilities and ofhuman autonomy
have gone hand in hand with the extension and intensification ofrelations ofpower
(Foucault 1984a: 47). This is because "disciplinary coercion establishes in the body the
constricting link: between an increased aptitude and an increased domination" (DP: 138).
Taylor phrases the problem in terms ofmodem self-identity: "We have to search for a
way in which our strongest aspirations towards hypergoods do not e>..iract a price of self-
mutilation" (Taylor 1989: 106). Leaving aside the teleological humanism implicit in this,
there is a substantial overlap in this respect (though in few others) between the approaches
ofTaylor and Foucault, who asked: "How can the gro\vth ofcapabilities be disconnected
from the intensification ofpower relations?" (Foucault 1984a: 47-8). One should in no
way interpret what Foucault is saying here as a utopian call to rescue our essential human
nature, truths and freedoms from their enthral1ment by relations ofpower; the only thing
essentially human about us is the manner in which we have been subjected. On the
contrary, he is calling for what most modem theories would deem to be impossible: a
critical analysis of the intersection offonns of knowledge and relations ofpower and their
role in the subjection ofhuman beings.
"-i\..
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Such a critical analysis is not only possible, it is the only possibility - ever since Kant
defined modern philosophy as the problematization ofa present, we modems (in the
human sciences) have necessarily careered from one theoretical dichotomy to the next,
returning always to the master dichotomy ofstructure and agency. Such an analysis is as
old as the Enlightenment itself: fittingly so, since it is Enlightenment which is (and has
always been) under critique. It is no more, and no less, than Enlightenment itself: it de-
limits the Enlightenment, simultaneously repeating it and making visible its 'other side'; by
making visible that which we take for granted, it problematizes and makes strange the
view, the viewer and what is under (re)view. Finally, the solution it offers - of
experimenting with and reinventing the capabilities of our autonomised selves - does not
attempt to stand outside of the problem. Having gone some way towards formulating the
problem - that the expansion ofhuman freedoms has been accompanied by the e>.iension
ofrelations ofpower - it remains now to investigate whether this is a coincidence to be
deplored or an exigencyto be explored. The following two chapters will attempt to apply
the insights of Foucault's genealogical approach to his own historical and analytical
account ofthe character ofmodern relations of power.
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CHAPTER THREE: POWER AS SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
HISTORY OF DISCIPLINE
I Power as sovereignty
Conventional histories ofpolitical philosophy recount the familiar tale of how the
government of some by others has progressed, over several centuries, from autocratic
forms towards increasingly popular and democratic modes of rule. At least since the
Middle Ages, and specifically since the twelfth century resurrection ofRoman Law, the
traditional questions with which political philosophy has concerned itselfhave been
formulated in terms ofsovereignty: the King and the prerogatives and limits ofroyal
power. Jean Bodin's ruminations on the concept of sovereignty, Machiavelli's precepts to
a Prince bent on establishing political order out of chaos, and, not least, the Hobbesian
account of the contractual constitution ofa sovereign state out of its component subjects,
have provided at least the starting-point ifnot a substantial proportion ofmuch modem
politicaltheory(deJouvenelI952: 34-46; Gray 1995: 159; Berki 1977). Itisthese
theories ofright or sovereignty, ostensibly concerned only with the centralisation of
political power in the state but complexly coupled with the development ofpower
technologies aimed at governing individuals (Foucault 1981e: 227), that Foucault referred
to as the embodiment of the prevailing "juridico-discursive" conception ofpower.
Starting out from a set ofassumptions about 'Man' as an autonomous individual or
collective agent, conventional political thought conceives of the nature of the state as a
constituted phenomenon with law as its power.
[T]he juridical model ofsovereignty presupposes the individual as the subject of
natura1laws or primitive powers [;] sets out to account for the genesis, in ideal
terms, of the State [; and] ... makes law the fundamental manifestation ofpower
(Foucault 198Od: 15).
107
As de Jouvenel explains, all theories "which explain and justify political authority by its
efficient cause .... are those of Sovereignty" (De Jouvenel1952: 34); and this sovereign
power, commonly identified with the state regardless ofwhether the latter is divine or
popular in its derivation, is taken to be a right, legitimately possessed and exercised (de
Jouvenel1952: 39-40). Lukes elaborates by arguing that, in all modem theories, "power
is attributed to (individual or collective) human agents" (Lukes 1977: 6); in addition, with
the possible exceptions of the work ofParsons and Arendt, the tendency is also to treat
power as restrictive and determining: "A exercises power over B when A affects B in a
manner contrary to B's interests" (Lukes 1974: 34; see also Hall 1984: 14-18, and Clegg
1989: 156-59).
This perennial interest in the rights and powers ofsovereign individuals in relation to those
ofsovereign states was an indication, for Foucault, that, despite numerous reformulations
of the problem (from Machiavellian to contractarian, liberal and Marxist), "[i]n political
thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king" (HS: 88-9). The
juridical problem ofsovereignty has persisted up to and including the modem period in
which, even with the emergence ofa political science, it has become "more acute than
ever" (Foucault 1979a: 19): Foucault believed that this conception ofa power that
declares 'Thou shalt not' is not limited to classical theories of sovereignty (Hobbes and
Locke) let alone superseded by later modem doctrines such as liberalism and Marxism, but
is so widespread as to be discernible in psychoanalytic theory (Freud and Lacan) and even
in "the contemporary analysis ofpower in terms of libido" (a reference to the work of
Foucault's friend and fellow philosopher Gilles Deleuze) (Foucault 1980a: 140).
Under this "juridico-discursive" conception, power is assumed to be rule-based or law-like
but above all negative: it represses, excludes, limits, refuses, censors, blocks, divides and
rejects. A grim force, it is believed to be homogeneous and centralised, in the hands of a
ruler, a state and its apparatuses, an elite or a ruling class; in such locations, self-conscious
sovereign individuals and groups are seen to possess and exercise it intentionally and
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comprehensively in a unitary, top-down and dominating fashion over comparatively
powerless others; the intrinsic freedom of those who are dominated is as a consequence
either Qustifiably) limited or, at times, (illegitimately) curtailed by prohibitory laws and
customs, and should they transgress they are liable to be punished; nevertheless, they may
resist and even overcome their oppression, by organising themselves into a counterpower;
power is also assumed to be e>..iemal to, and tending to the distortion of, knowledge, thus
generating distinctions between manifest truth and unsubstantiated belief, between science
and ideology and between the 'disinterested' theorist and the 'interested' ruler; and this
last, power-distorted knowledge, is taken to mask the true nature of things, thus
concealing oppression, generating alienation and making conscientisation and resistance
difficult (HS: 82-5; 1980a: 139-40; DP: 27-8).
This conventional account ofpower can be illustrated with reference to Marxist theories
ofthe state. Like liberalism and the classical 'reason of state' that preceded it, Marxist
theories of the state (which, apart from Marx himself, can be validly attributed only to
Miliband, Poulantzas and, to a lesser e>..ient, Gramsci) assume that "ideally and by nature,
power must be exercised in accordance with a fundamental lawfulness" (HS: 87). Even
though it sees the legal system that it criticises as merely a class violence aimed at
justifying social inequality and exploitation, Marxism does not challenge but reinforces the
conventional understanding ofpower as sovereign and repressive.
The excessive value attributed to the problem ofthe State is expressed, basically, in
two ways: the one form, immediate, affective and tragic, is the lyricism of the
monstre fro id we see confronting us; but there is a second way ofover-valuing the
problem ofthe State, one which is paradoxical becayse apparently reductionist: it is
the form ofanalysis that consists in reducing the State to a certain number of
functions, such as for instance the development ofproductive forces and the
reproduction of relations of production, and yet this reductionist vision of the role of
the State in relation to everything else makes it absolutely essential as a target to be
attacked and a privileged position to be taken over (Foucault 1979a: 20).
This essentialist conception of the nature of the state as a relatively autonomous
mechanism attempting to maintain bourgeois class domination by repressing opposition
(;~
privileged, capital and almost unique instrument of the power of one class over another"
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and reproducing the conditions ofmarket production is, for Foucault, far too simplistic to·_,
;
;
constitute an adequate account of the functioning of modem power relations, primarily ~
because it involves "a sort ofschematism ... - and which incidentally is not to be found in \
\





Against this approach, Foucault was adamant that all roads to power in modem societies
do not lead to the state nor to any other comparable institution; the state and its
apparatuses, as well as governments, classes, parties, institutions, constitutions, Bills of
Rights and rules oflaw are rather "only the terminal forms power takes" (HS: 92; SP:
213). He warned that any analysis ofpower relations in terms of specific and often
institutionalised rationalities (such as state apparatuses, schools and families), though
legitimate, must, firstly, take care to avoid confusing power relations with institutional
mechanisms ofreproduction and, secondly, recognise that a power relation's "fundamental
point ofanchorage ... is to be found outside the institution" (SP: 222; HS: 95,96). While
"fairly closely related" to power structures (Foucault 1988a: 265), institutions are only
-~~._--~-~~"".......
forms in whichJel.atioIlS-o(12owerJand_f~L1111£..Qf.kuoJYJ~..dg~)Jnaterialis~: traditional..•_---
predispositions, legal structures, customs and fashions, as in the family; apparatuses with
specific loci, regulations, hierarchies, and relatively autonomous functions, as in schools
and military institutions; and complex systems with multiple apparatuses like the state,
with the function ofgeneral surveillance "and, to a certain extent also, the distribution of
all power relations in a given social ensemble") (SP: 223; 1989: 188). Distinguishing his
work from that ofGoffinan which focused on 'total institutions' as institutions (Goffinan
1968), Foucault declared himselfmore interested in "the history ofrationality as it works
in institutions and in the behavior ofpeople" (Foucault 1980e: 4).
The state ma.!'~_the "n:.!?~t important" form ofpower, and "in a certain way all other....,......... .- .--- .~ ~~ ---_._..-.... _...._~_ _ ___ ~__ .__ .._~_.~.__~.". ~._... __. .__u.-"""
forms ofpower relation must refer to it", but "this is not because they are derived from it"
-''"''' ......... ,.,, __._.......__.......-.-... -.--.--..---~__..............._~ .......~ .....,,"'...., ._ ~ .. , • 4- .,. •.. ,-.d.,....... .... 4~ .__-.........o+~.~_......_ ...__ ,_,........,..., .....
but because "power relations have come more and more under state control (although this
--_.,. ---
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state control has not taken the same fonn in pedagogica~ judicial, economic, or family
systems)" (SP: 224). For example,
although the police as an institution were certainly organized in the fonn of a state
apparatus, and although this was certainly linked directly to the centre ofpolitical
sovereignty, the type ofpower that it exercises, the mechanisms it operates and the
elements to whichit applies them are specific (DP: 213).
Hence, without wishing "to minimise the importance and effectiveness of State power",
Foucault felt that "excessive insistence on its playing an exclusive role leads to the risk of
overlooking all the mechanisms and effects ofpower which don't pass directly via the
State apparatus, yet often sustain the State more effectively than its own institutions,
enlarging and maximising its effectiveness" (Foucault 1980a: 72-3; see also 1980a:
122,158; and 1977a: 213). Certainly, the idea that fathers, husbands, employers and
teachers 'represent' a state power which in turn 'represents' a class power "takes no
account of the complexity ofmechanisms at work" (Foucault 1980a: 188).
Nevertheless, ~tions ofpower as residing within sovereign and predominantly repressive
institutions remain widely accepted and practiced in modem society for several reasons:
they disguise real relations ofdomination, and justify their necessity; they conceal the---="'..................--._~-----._.........-"""
ubiquity ofpower relations, and obscure the venal conditions ofpossibility ofmodem
__....~,._M__-........_M __... '--__._.............."-----_- ~".•. _...•__,._...~.__ "... " ••.._V~."_'M__•• _ _.,~_
liberal democracies; and they help r~,gulate and energise these disciplinary conditions even
--...""........-..,."'.-" .-- ..........,..........- ~."._,,,_. __... -_._,~.......:"."'---_.
as they are being colonised by them. First, "power is tolerable only on condition that it
.,...~,.~'"'--.." ...,_.~ ....,_. ----,,~~--,-~._--'----, .._'~-~ ..- _. ....,.. ,,-- -.--.. , -- ~-_.,,-~.-.~_.-. "~-~._--. __..-.._-_.~-
mask [Sic.] a_substantial part ~Lk~~f. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its
""'--........,_ ._......-.•. ......_._c... ,~_~ •.-..,.,.-- ~~" ... _,~,........~,."....._,_"'___<>o_' ~·c.·~.,,·""·'_'~'''''''''''''~'_''''__ ''''''__ '.~__.''' .•,....~........"',.,__._~_,_,....",.""""'=..~_..;..........,..,. ....,,,,,•.,."'+__.
own mechanisms" (HS: 86; 1989: 98-9), and the role of the theory ofright has in part
__"_'''','w_•._ ,~ ,,_•...•~ .........,.....,i>
been to mask or "efface the domination intrinsic to power" (DPS: 231):
Right, in other words, exactly because it is anachronistic, has the contempormy
ideological function ofmasking disciplinary domination and thus contributes to it
(Fraser 1989: 58; emphasis in the original).
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The face ofpower is too terrible to reveal in full, not because power relations are only
about domination but because to believe that they are not, that power relations are only a
pure limit placed on our otherwise infinite desires, leaves intact "a measure of freedom",
slight but enough to ensure the continued acquiescence of the oppressed (HS: 86).
Second, this is linked to the degree of effectiveness ofcontemporary structures ofpower:
we tolerate and accord legitimacy to relations ofpower wearing the accoutrements of
sovereignty to the extent to which we fear the chaos which allegedly will result from the
absence of the King, whether he takes the form ofautocracy or democracy. For example,
the effectivenyss ofthe police, that apparatus ofthe state closest to the dream ofthe
managed society, is intertwined not only with the amount ofconfidence and trust publicly
invested in them, but also the intensity of the threat:
What makes the presence and control ofthe police ["these uniformed men, who ...
carry arms, ... demand our papers [and] prowl on our doorsteps"] tolerable for the
population, ifnot fear of the criminal? (Foucault 1980a: 47).
As the myth of the transition from a state ofnature to society would have us believe, we
relinquish some ofour powers to others to ward off the greater fear of abdicating all our
freedom - despite the fact that the state ofour freedom has always been a product of these
\' ;.;.~.
very powers which we arrogate to ourselves but which surpass us.
Third, the foundations ofmodem society could not survive the revelation that relations of
power extend well beyond the state'c;operating outside (and are eve,~qonstitutive) ofthe
formallaws and rights intended to contain and regulate them. liThe presence ofthe li:twis
/~
its concealment" (Foucault 1990b: 33):
Power in the West is what displays itself the most,'and thus what hides itself the
best: what we have called 'political life' since the 19th century is the manner in
which power presents its image (a little like the court in the monarchic era). Power
is neither there, nor is that how it functions (Foucault:) 977b: 157).
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Fourth, though Foucault clearly accepts that the rise to power of the bourgeoisie was
"masked by the establishment of an explicit, coded and formally egalitarian juridical
framework, made possible by the organization of a parliamentary, representative regime",
these formal laws and rights were themselves made possible by the spread ofdisciplinary
procedures which "constituted the other, dark side of these processes" (DP: 222). Thus
(bourgeois, as distinct from monarchical) sovereignty does not veil disciplinary procedures
as much as being produced and utilised by them.
It follows that, fifth, it is equally mistaken to treat conceptions oflaw, right and
sovereignty merely as 'ideological' mystifications which conceal the 'essential' brutality
commonly attributed to power; their persistence in the modern epoch is also attributable to
their regulative and strategic utility as "polymorphic" and recurrent (Foucault 1981d: 356),
though perhaps ultimately "transitory" (HS: 89), instruments ofcriticism not only of
monarchical institutions but also of their democratic successors, criticisms which assume
that power relations are fundamentally lawful (HS: 88; 1980a: 141). In the form of
liberalism, for example, power as sovereignty constitutes "both ... a schema for the
regulation of governmental practice and ... a theme for sometimes radical opposition to
such practice" (Foucault 1981d: 356; see also Rose 1993: 284).
Finally, and most importantly, the prevalence ofthe conception of power as sovereignty
can be explained by the fact that its very mechanisms are being colonised and penetrated
by "new methods ofpower whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not
by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed
on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus" (HS: 89). Theories
ofsovereignty, by revealing what they take to be the transcendent principle underlying and
justifYing power, in fact in themselves "tend to render subjects obedient" (de Jouvenel
1952: 45). That sovereignty is becoming another tactic in the arsenal of these new
methods ofpower is something to which theories ofsovereignty are themselves blind,
since by centring their focus upon states, parliaments, elites, bureaucracies, patriarchy or
ruling classes they prove unable to explain or account for "the complexity ofmechanisms
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at work, their specificity, nor the effects of inter-dependence, complementarity, and
sometimes ofblockage, which this very diversity [of relations of power] produces"
(Foucault 1980a: 188).
The persistence of this "juridico-discursive" conception of power thus has a great deal to
do with its naturalisation as a conventional wisdom, its necessary concealment in liberal-
democratic societies which pride themselves on their ability to regulate and hold power in
check, and its practical as opposed to analytical usefulness. It follows that to call it into
question is to threaten how we conceive of our present and to endorse changes in our
hitherto taken-for-granted political practices and beliefs. To sum up: "the juridical model
ofsovereignty" (Foucault 1980d: 15) ought to be criticised and abandoned not merely
because it is inadequate but because it is both a dangerous weapon and a stake of
contention in contemporary power struggles.
We must cease once and for all to describe the effects ofpower in negative terms: it
'excludes', it 'represses', it 'censors', it 'abstracts', it 'masks', it 'conceals'. In fact,
power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains ofobjects and rituals of
truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained ofhim belong to this
production (DP: 194).
In order to free ourselves from the juridico-discursive conception ofpower, Foucault
suggested that we need to develop an "analytics", as opposed to a 'theory', ofpower
relations (HS: 82), or at least "theory as a toolkit" (Foucault 1980a: 145). In other words,
instead ofattempting to say what power is, we must attempt to show how it operates in
concrete and historical frameworks, in the sense of "By what means is it [power]
exercised?" and "What happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others?"
(SP: 217). Similarly,
how does one punish? This was the same procedure as I had used when dealing
with madness: Rather [Sic.] than asking what, in a given period, is regarded as
sanity or insanity, as mental illness or nonnal behaviour, I wanted to ask how these
divisions are operated (Foucault 1981f: 4, emphasis in the original; see also DPS:
229).
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Each ofFoucault's books constitutes a case study ofhow power relations have functioned
in relation to specific experiences such as madness, sickness, punishment and sexuality.
While any attempt to generalise from these specific manifestations ofpower would be
dangerous, it is nevertheless possible and, arguably, useful in an experimental sense, to
distill from Foucault's oeuvre as a whole a rough periodisation of Western technologies of
power from ancient times to the present.
What are the intended effects ofan 'analytics' ofpower relations? Similar to the effects of
writing a history of the present, or publishing documents such as the Riviere dossier: "to
draw a map ... of those combats, to reconstruct these confrontations and battles, to
rediscover the interaction of those discourses as weapons of attack and defense in the
relations ofpower and knowledge" (Foucault 1978a: xi). Since, as argued in Chapter
Two, different maps engender different territories, the drawing of a map will not only
assist further exploration but, more importantly, reconfigure the terrain ofpower relations.
In addition, the utility of analysing the historical conditions ofpossibility ofmodem
disciplinary relations ofpower is to be found not in the capacity to propound an
alternative universal theory ofpower, but in illuminating the changing context which
makes such theories inapplicable. On this basis, we can begin to rethink relations of
power against and in spite of prevailing theories of sovereignty and demonstrate the
deficiencies ofa view which reduces power relations to forms ofdomination completely
independent of the autonomy they are said to restrict. In turn, this will allow us (in
Chapter Four) to explore the intrinsic role of freedom, resistance and struggle within
relations ofpower, and on this basis to suggest an alternative, non-foundational
conception ofpower understood as relations of strategy and government. It will also
allow us (in Chapter Five) to bring to the fore the ramifications ofthis alternative
conception with regard to the production of forms ofknowledge such as the human
sciences, ofrituals of truth like the confession and of the individual human subject itself
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11 Truth and power in Western political rationalities
A significant fmding ofFoucault's work is that the processes whereby some people
discipline or govern others are frequently closely connected to procedures of identity-
constitution or self-discipline. "For example, ifwe take educational institutions, we realize
that one is managing others and teaching them to manage themselves" (Foucault 1984a:
369-70). As Foucault himself summed it up, in his work from Madness and Civilisation
to Discipline and Punish he had "tried to show how we have indirectly constituted
ourselves through the exclusion of some others: criminals, mad people, and so on". In his
last works, chiefly, The History ofSexuality, he turned to the question of "[h]ow did we
directly constitute our identity through ethical techniques of the self which developed
through antiquity down to now?" (Foucault 1988b: 146). According to Foucault,
"pastoral" techniques aimed at governing oneself and others originated in early Middle
Eastern societies, were given a particular gloss by Greek and Roman practices ofma~tery
of the self, and then were taken further by early Christian monastic and penitential
practices. At some point during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these various
"technologies of the self', central to which was the practice ofconfession, fused together
with more global processes ofpolitical centralisation and population management into a
complex system ofrelations which Foucault referred to as modem "disciplinary" power.
From the start, Western political rationalities have been characterised by the intimate
coexistence ofrelations ofpower with forms ofknowledge. In this regard, Foucault
wanted to
show how self-control is integrated into the practice ofcontrolling others. '" [H]ow
is an 'experience' formed in which the relationship to oneself and the relationship to
others are linked together? (Foucault 1988a: 258).
In all those experiences that Foucault himself examined - madness, sickness, punishment
and sexuality - technologies for governing oneselfand others are bound together by the
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notion that the truth of these experiences are, firstly, internal to the self and, secondly, can
be discovered, hermeneutically extracted, and exploited through the intervention ofothers.
The idea that certain truths are only to be found in the relation ofhuman beings to
themselves, is a thread which runs, albeit unevenly, throughout the history of Western
thought. Apocryphally, this 'relation to self' is said to derive from the oracle at Delphi:
'Know thyself'. Equally apocryphally, perhaps, the same saying is attributed to Socrates
(Foucault 1987b: 131). St.Augustine phrased it as follows: "In the inward man dwells
truth" (Taylor 1989: 129); and the thread is also clearly evident among twelfth century
scholastics such as Aelred ofRievaulx and William of Saint Thierry:
The Answer of the Delphic Apollo was famous among the Greeks: 'Man, know
yourself'. The same thing was said by Solomon, or rather Christ in the Song of
Songs: 'Ifyou do not know yourself, go forth' (William of Saint Thierry, in Morris
1972: 64).
The importance of the \Vestern obsession with truths that are deemed to be internal to
ourselves cannot be overstated. The fact that our yearning for truth is nowhere near being
satisfied even after nearly three millenia have passed almost suggests that "existence is so
empty and fragile that it can be endured only by the illusion ofa search for its secret" (Eco
1990: 622). It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that it was on the basis of this
obsession that Western scientific values, political forms, moral customs and economic
practices have come to dominate the rest ofthe planet. This obsession links together
relations of power, forms ofknowledge, feelings ofdesire and procedures ofsubjection,
including mechanisms for governing others and ~hnologies ofthe self. It assumes that
the truth is good and worth knowing; that it is discoverable but not transparent, and is
often mixed up v.ith belief, error and desire; that it requires rigorous procedures which can
plumb the murky depths of the self (or the world) and distinguish between the true and the
false; and that such procedures often require the intervention or assistance ofothers, who
can validate one's findings. All these assumptions are combined at the heart of that which
today characterises the majority ofour taken-for-granted beliefs and practices: "the
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formidable injunction to tell what one is". This injunction is the product of "an immense
labor to which the West has submitted generations in order to produce - while other fonns
of work ensured the accumulation of capital- men's subjection: their constitution as
subjects in both senses ofthe word" (HS: 60).
11/ Pagan and Christian pastoralism
Foucault traced the origins of this powerful injunction back to the ancient societies of
Egypt, Assyria and Judaea, in which a king, a leader or, especially for the Hebrews, God,
was likened to a shepherd leading a flock ofsheep. Similarly, the Platonic conception of
the relationship between God and human beings was like "that between a pilot and the
passengers ofa boat" (Foucault 1980e: 5). However, unlike the great religions, the
territorial focus and finite nature ofGreek and Roman practices ofpolitical leadership
entailed neither the right nor the possibility of a government which would be
understood as an activity of attempting to guide individuals throughout their lives,
and placing them under an authority ofone who is responsible for what they do and
what happens to them (Foucault 1981c: 239).
The shepherd's power over the flock required instead his immediate (and, since early
Christianity, permanent) presence, authority, guidance, vigilance, responsibility and, if
necessary, sacrifice in order to ensure both their general welfare and individual salvation
(Foucault 1981e: 227-30). This pastoral practice thus "involves a power which
individualizes by attributing, in an essential paradox, as much value to a single lamb as to
the entire flock" (Foucault 1981c: 239; Morris 1972: 10). One might say that it is on the
basis ofthis paradox that \Vestern technologies ofpower over almost two millennia have
followed both an individualising trajectory (concerned with the single lamb) and a
totalising trajectory (concerned with the entire flock), tendencies which over the past few
centuries have Come together: on the one hand, "the development ofpower techniques
oriented towards individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and pennanent
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way", and on the other hand, the centralisation of political power in the state (Foucault
1981e: 227).
Equally significantly, pastoral power depended for its exercise on a knowledge not only of
the actions of 'Each and Everyone' (Foucault 1980e: 4) but also their minds, souls and
innermost secrets - hence "it implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct
it" (SP: 214). Such detailed knowledge ofall members ofa community was obtained
through the use ofparticular instruments: techniques of self-examination and, ultimately,
ofconfession, which were intended to enable an individual "to open up entirely to its
director - to unveil to him the depths of the soul" (Foucault 1981e: 238). Inherent in such
pastoral relations ofpower was thus the increasingly permanent role played by
authoritative others (particularly that strata ofsociety which we today call the
intellectuals) in initiating, mediating, guiding and adjudicating the power-effects of these
technologies which individuals direct at the bodies and souls of themselves and others
(Bauman 1987: 10-20).
In contrast to later Christian understandings, for Plato and the Stoics the main emphasis
was placed on progressive self-mastery as a means ofacquiring and assimilating the truth
of the cosmic order (Foucault 1988b: 35). Foucault argued that the Greeks made a clear
distinction between 'know yourself and 'take care ofyourself , with the former in fact
premised on and subordinated to the latter (Foucault 1988b: 19-20; 1984a: 359):
in order to practice freedom properly, it was necessary to care for self, both in order
to know one's self [Plato] ... and to improve one's self, ... to master the appetites
that risk engulfing you [Stoicism] (Foucault 1987b: 116).
"One cannot care for selfwithout knowledge", but in addition, "[t]o care for selfis to fit
one's selfout with these truths" (Foucault 1987b: 116). Thus, while the modem search
for truth within the selfcan be traced back as far as Plato, who derived our power to act
morally from our Idea of the Good (Taylor 1989: 143), the Stoics added an important
detail to this argument by linking self-knowledge and ethical behaviour to the mediating
(~
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intervention ofan 'external master: "For Plato, one must discover the truth that is within
one. For the Stoics, truth is not within oneself but in the logoi, the teaching of the
teachers" (Foucault 1988b: 35). Nevertheless, for the Greeks (though not for the
Christians) the master-disciple relationship was circumstantial, provisional and did not
imply complete obedience (Foucault 1993a: 205).
For both Plato and the Stoics, the process ofleaming, memorising or 'fitting one's self
out' with the principles and rules which would allow one to act ethically required
particular techniques ofcare for the self including an increasingly important role for
writing (both notes to oneself and letters to others), as well as meditating about
anticipated events, testing one's memory, interpreting one's dreams, and putting oneself to
the test in situations which might call for one to abstain from various forms of
gratification, suffer privations or undergo rituals ofpurification (Foucault 1988b: 27-39).
In addition, the art of listening, so as to distinguish between truth and dissimulation, in
oneselfand in another, becomes important for the Stoics, to the extent that, for Philo of
Alexandria, listening required a particular posture (Foucault 1988b: 32). This first major
type ofself-examination - "self-examination with respect to the way our thoughts relate to
rules (Senecan)" (Foucault 1988b: 46) - involved administering and taking stock of
oneself, pursuing virtue via a life ofsimplicity, meditation and guidance by a mentor
(Morris 1972: 15), and rectifying one's mistakes in the light of fundamental precepts
(Foucault 1993a: 210), rather than judging one's own past (Foucault 1993a: 207;
Foucault 1988b: 33).
The ultimate aim was to internalise the truths and principles ofright conduct to the eh'tent
that "[y]ou will have become the logos or the logos will have become you" (Foucault
1987b: 117). The goal of the Greek schools ofphilosophy was focused more upon "the
transformation of the individual", arming the individual with enough precepts to permit
him to comport himself appropriately, than upon the teaching or elaboration of theory
(Foucault 1993a: 205). The care for the self involved ethos,
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the deportment and the way to behave. It was the subject's mode ofbeing and a
certain manner ofacting visible to others. One's ethos was seen by his dress, by his
bearing, by his gait, by the poise with which he reacts to events, etc. (Foucault
1987b: 117).
"Care for self [also] ... implies complex relations with others": firstly, it implies "the art of
governing" others (one's wife, one's children, one's home); secondly, "care for self
renders one competent" politically and socially; thirdly, "in order to really care for self, one
must listen to the teachings ofa master" (Foucault 1987b: 118). "[T]he one who cared for
himselfcorrectly found himself, by that very fact, in a measure to behave correctly in
relationship to others and for others" (Foucault 1987b: 118). Thus the care for the self
was "a way ofcontrolling and limiting" the abuse ofpower. A tyrant who illegitimately
and unduly imposes his whims on others "is in reality a slave to his appetites", whereas
"the good ruler is precisely the one who exercises his power correctly, i.e., by exercising at
the same time his power on himself' (Foucault 1987b: 119).
Conventional wisdom suggests that Christianity set in place a far more severe and austere
array ofmoral precepts than the ancient world had experienced up to that time. For
Foucault, however, the most important changes between Greeks and Christians were not
in the code but in the ethics, in one's relation to oneself (Foucault 1984a: 355):
between paganism and Christianity, the opposition is not between tolerance and
austerity, but between a form of austerity which is linked to an aesthetics of
existence and other forms ofausterity which are linked to the necessity of
renouncing the selfand deciphering its truth (Foucault 1984a: 366; 1987a: 31-2).
And as Morris has argued, in the writings of the eleventh century theologian and scholar
Peter Damiani "the purpose ofrenouncing the world was precisely to know oneself in
one's own true being" (Morris 1972: 31); renunciation did not replace but reinforced the
search for truth within the self
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Early Christianity drew heavily upon Stoicism, especially the latter's emphasis on
subjecting oneself to the teachings ofa master. In this instance, however, the search for
truth within the self is aimed not at self-mastery but at contemplating, and expunging all
that cannot be said to emanate from, the ultimate spiritual master, God himself (Foucault
1993a: 216; 1988b: 45; Taylor 1989: 139). This reflective renunciation of the self is
coupled to a modification ofthe Stoic relation between disciple and master, in that early
Christianity aimed not merely to internalise the teachings of others but in fact to
eh1:ernalise one's inner truths, on a permanent basis, to others with greater experience,
wisdom or seniority (Foucault 1993a: 216,219; 1988b: 44, 47): "'confess, to your
spiritual guide, each ofyour thoughts'" (Foucault 1993a: 204). As such, "Christianity is a
confession": it involves obligations not only to hold as true a dogma and certain books as
well as decisions by certain authorities, but also to know one's own thoughts, faults and
temptations, "to bear public or private witness against oneself' (Foucault 1988b: 40;
1993a: 211). Christianity was also "much more concerned with thoughts than with
actions" (Foucault 1993a: 216), and particularly with intentions. Indeed, for Peter
Abelard, sin lay solely in the intention (Morris 1972: 75). Moreover, for Cassian, the very
act ofverbalisation - or exagoreusis (Foucault 1993a: 220) - contained "a specific virtue
ofverification", for to blush or to try to hide one's thoughts was a sure sign that evil must
inhabit them (Foucault 1993a: 220). However, "the price of the permanent verbal was to
make evel)1hing that couldn't be expressed into a sin" (Foucault 1988b: 48).
The confession thus makes its appearance early on the stage of Western history, eventually
becoming tightly meshed into the Western will to truth, and constituting a condition of
possibility for the development ofmodern disciplinary power relations and the human
.sciences. At first, however, confession and self-examination were applied to no more than
an elite. Far more important, though not dissimilar, were penitential rites and the rigours
ofmonastic life: in the first centuries ofChristianity, "penance was not an act" but a long-
term "status" (Foucault 1993a: 212; 1988b: 41) involving exomologesis, the dramatic,
theatrical 'publication ofoneself as a sinner, as one who prefers spiritual death or
martyrdom to earthly life, and hence involved "a kind ofrepresentation ofdeath"
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(Foucault 1993a: 214). The second major type of self-examination identified by Foucault,
then, is "the examination of selfwith respect to the relation between the hidden thought
and an inner impurity" (Foucault 1988b: 46), aimed at the conversion, renunciation or
"rupture of the self' (Foucault 1993a: 224 n.47).
More importantly, though, in this chastity-oriented, Cassian Christian asceticism "a
process of'subjectivization'" is apparent, a process based not on an ethics ofphysical self-
control but on the development of complex herrneneutic techniques "for analyzing and
diagnosing thought, its origins, its qualities, its dangers, its potential for temptation and all
the dark forces that can lurk behind the mask it may assume" (Foucault 1988a: 240).
Thought about thought, an entire tradition wider than philosophy, has taught us that
thought leads us to the deepest interiority (Foucault 1990b: 13).
This herrneneutics, which aimed to discover the reality (a power, the devil) hidden 'inside'
the thought, "the presence of somebody else in me" (Foucault 1993a: 227 n.44),
constitutes, believed Foucault, "the first time in history that thoughts are considered as
possible objects for an analysis" (Foucault 1993a: 227 n.44). In other words, instead of,
or even in spite ofand because ofthe sehl.lal prohibitions and renunciations imposed by
Christian morality (many ofwhich in fact were ofStoic origin - Foucault 1980a: 191), a
process is initiated which embodies the development and the productive opening up of a .
whole hitherto unexplored area: thought itself Foucault does not explicitly say so, but it
was around this moment in history that the Western will to truth began to look inward, not
merely towards conduct and the body but also, and most crucially, towards discourse and
the soul (Gurevich 1995: 91-2). Philosophy, as a discourse producing thought about
thought, perhaps does not begin with Plato - but with St.Augustine!
It was only between 1000 and 1200, however, that the universal adoption ofindividual
confession by the Catholic Church took place (Morris 1972: 73). Other aspects of
individualism also emerged: the twelfth century saw the development for the first time in
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its full form ofthe art ofautobiography, as well as the development ofportraiture, not
least in the form ofroyal tomb sculptings (Morris 1972: 79, 89). Individualism, as
Foucault and others have shown, is not a modem invention but a phenomenon with a long
and ancient history, albeit understood in very different ways at different times; in twelfth
century European society, for example, economic growth and the expansion ofhigher
education "faced the individual with choices" which a century earlier would have been
unimaginable (Morris 1972: 47; Gurevich 1995: 112). "It was a vigorous, mobile society
which generated, like our own age, both optimism and anxiety" (Morris 1972: 48).
Indeed, one might say that mutations in social relations were the conditions ofpossibility
for the (re)discovery of the individual at different times in Western history: at the brink of
the modem era, for example, demographic expansions, the proliferation ofdisciplines and
the hundred-fold multiplication ofchoices facing subjects allowed for the emergence of the
figure of 'Man'.
An essential ingredient in this emergence was the evolving confession itself. Transmuted
through an ascetic and monastic setting, by the thirteenth century the confession had been
established as a major ritual. Without reducing Christian moralities to a model which
emphasises codes ofbehaviour (since 'ethics-oriented' forms of subjectivation have often
functioned alongside them), Foucault suggests that the organisation of the penitential
system, from thirteenth century to the Reformation, closely conformed to this quasi-
juridical model in which the ethical subject referred his or her conduct to a set oflaws
enforced by authorities (Foucault 1987a: 29-30). "The truthful confession was inscribed
at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power" (HS: 58-9), and was
associated with the shift from where "the individual was vouched for by the reference of
others and the demonstration ofhis ties to the commonweal (family, allegiance,
protection)", to a situation where one's status, identity and value was granted not by
another but by oneself, where one's authentication took place through "the discourse of
truth he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning himself' (HS: 58). Long before
Kantian man shrugged off the tutelage ofothers, the individual was already being
assembled by the Christian confessional.
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IV Reason ofstate
During "the ten great centuries of Christian Europe" pastoral technologies remained
secondary and limited, conditioned as they were on an especially urban experience then in
decline, a certain level ofculture among both pastor and flock, and personal bonds
different to those developed under feudalism (Foucault 1981e: 240). In the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, however, these technologies underwent an institutional crisis
consequent on the general questioning ofways ofgoverning oneselfand others at the end
of feudalism (Foucault 1981c: 239). New forces - indeed, an entire new world - appeared
on the horizon. A new form of political rationality began to take shape, in the context of
the formation of the great territorial monarchies, Catholic and Protestant traditions of
pastoral care, a revival of Stoic practices of self-government (Taylor 1989: 159), and an
increasing concern with the government ofchildren. What was required was "a new
concept ofsocial control ... together with a new formula for the legitimation ofpolitical
authority" (Bauman 1987: 25). At first, this new political rationality took the form of
'reason ofstate', through various treatises on the art ofgovernment which took the
emerging modem state as their object. Consequent upon the collapse of feudal political
structures which had been understood to be divinely-designed, it became possible not only
to question this collapse but, more importantly, to propose human-designed remedies,
which took the form of "a 'social contract', a legislator or design-drawing despot"
(Bauman 1987: 54).
Alongside but to a greater degree than the theories of sovereignty being developed at the
same time by Bodin, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, 'reason of state'
concerned itself with the mundane practices and tactics ofgovernment. For the most part
this art ofgovernment was formulated in relation to Machiavelli's seminal work, which
was interpreted as positing "the Prince in a relation ofexternality and singularity and
consequently oftranscendence to his principality" (Foucault 1979a: 7; see also Pocock
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1975: 161-64, 185). It followed from this that the link between the Prince and his
principality was fragile and threatened both internally (by subjects who had no a priori
reason to accept the rule of the Prince) and externally (by other Princes); and it was
concluded that the aim ofrelations ofpower are to strengthen and protect this link
(Foucault 1979a: 8; Pocock 1975: 198; Berki 1977: 124). One's government ofoneself
(morality), the government of a family (oeconomy) and the government ofa state
(politics) were conceived as interconnected, and increasing importance was given to those
factors that might facilitate practices of government: pedagogical and ethical technologies
ofself-formation aimed at individualising subjects, and policing mechanisms directed at
entire populations (Foucault 1979a: 9-10; Bauman 1987: 59-60). Internal and external
affairs ofstate meshed together ever more tightly:
The classical age saw the birth of the great political and military strategy by which
nations confronted each other's economic and demographic forces; but it also saw
the birth ofmeticulous military and political tactics by which the control ofbodies
and individual forces was exercised within states (DP: 168).
These individualising and totalising tendencies both conditioned and were reinforced by
the crystallisation of a new historical perception of inter-state struggles for survival,
consequent upon the effacement of the hitherto dominant theme of imperial Rome and the
spread ofrepublicanism (Calhoun 1995: 237). In this early modem world, "the principal
difficulty faced is the mobilization of the forces and rational techniques which pennit State
intervention" (Foucault 1981c: 240; 1988b: 152), and such mobilisation and intervention is
essential in order both to guarantee the state through alliances and military strength
(leading to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648), and to increase its forces from within by
means ofa police technology (Foucault 1981c: 240-41).
For the theorists of the art ofgovernment, such as Guillaume de La Perriere, "government
is the right disposition ofthings, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end" (quoted by
Foucault 1979a: 10): 'things', here, refer not only to the territory and subjects of the
Prince (as in the theory of sovereignty), but primarily to their interrelations; and the 'end'
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envisaged is no longer the ancient 'common good' ofobedience to the law, to the
sovereign and to God, but instead 'good government', which in turn was seen as multiple
(falling under the auspices offathers, superiors and teachers as well as the specifically
political authorities), as internal to the state (Foucault 1979a: 9), and as involving an
informed and tactical- as opposed to divinely ordained - use of the law (Foucault 1979a:
13). Thus, this new and pragmatic political rationality, "instead of seeking its foundation
in transcendental rules, cosmological models or philosophical-moral ideas" (Foucault
1979a: 14), was premised on the existence of the state: "the art ofgoveming is rational, if
reflexion causes it to observe the nature ofwhat is governed - here, the state" (Foucault
1981e: 243, emphasis in the original; 1988b: 149; 1981d: 355).
While the development of 'reason of state' was on the one hand delayed by the exigencies
ofwar, financial crises and the pre-eminence of the concept ofsovereignty (Foucault
1979a: 15), on the other hand it paralleled and was assisted by the voracious demand on
the part of the emerging modem state for greater knowledge of its own expanding affairs.
Significant among the new (human and 'inhuman') sciences associated with this demand
was statistics, the science ofthe state (Foucault 1981e: 246; Bauman 1987: 60; Giddens
1991: 42). 'Reason ofstate', as an art of government which is simultaneously an analysis
and an application of that analysis, also readily lent itself to being assimilated into the
Polizeiwissenschajt (police science) of the eighteenth century (Foucault 1981e: 252). The
most prominent feature of this ever-closer correlation ofpower and knowledge was no
doubt the Encyclopedie: an encyclopedia, with its never-ending cross-references and
proliferation of interpretations, was much more in keeping with the contemporary demand
for the production ofeffective and useful knowledge than a dictionary (such as Bayle's),
with its attempt to pin down the meanings ofwords (Bauman 1993: 115). It was thus
fitting that les philosophes dreamed oftheir Encyclopedie as manifesting order and
authority: its vast accumulation ofknowledge was conceived ofas "a grand and noble
avenue, stretching into the distance, and along which one would find other avenues,
arranged in an orderly manner and leading off to isolated and remote objects by the easiest
and quickest route" (Diderot, in Hamilton 1992: 27; see also Bauman 1987: 55).
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In this vein, it is also instructive to note that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that
Enlightenment thought represented the ideology ofthe revolutionary bourgeoisie, the
audience ofthe Encyclopedie, that centrepiece of the Enlightenment obsession with
knowledge as power, was in fact composed as much ofnew state functionaries as of
traditional elites (Hamilton 1992: 29).
[M]anufacturers and merchants showed remarkably little interest in [the
Encyclopedie], or indeed in literature of any kind; for the most part, subscribers
were royal officials, parlementaires, provincial administrators, lawyers,
professionals, and others ofwealth (Wuthnow 1989: 204).
The true patrons and beneficiaries of the Enlightenment were thus not the manufacturing
and merchant classes but the potentates of the old order in tandem with the technicians of
the emerging modem state: "public officials, administrators, parliamentary
representatives, courtiers, lawyers, professionals, military officers, men and women of
leisure, university faculty, and in some cases clergy associated with the hierarchies of state
churches" (Wuthnow 1989: 312). This "rising elite, distinguished by education and
technical merit", was to this general extent part ofa broader bourgeoisie, but its defining
feature was "the vital connection it had to the central governing agencies of its respective
societies" (Wuthnow 1989: 313; Bauman 1987: 31-33).
Moreover, the state in the Enlightenment not only shaped the resources to be made
available for intellectual pursuits, but was itself a constitutive element ofEnlightenment
discourse: "From the beginning, questions of the public good, the relations of political
issues to the scholarly life, and the relevance ofknowledge to the state were to play an
important role in the Enlightenment" (Wuthnow 1989: 172). The modem state reformed
college instruction and established academies; and provided patronage for scholars
(scientists first became important not in the conteh1:s of universities or industries but by
providing administrative services and expertise for an expanding state). The state to some
extent became a subject in its own right, in that it played a major role in advancing the
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publishing industry, and itselfconstituted or created much of the market for Enlightenment
literature; its shadow touched even the Paris salons through associations between the
women who ran them and state officials (Wuthnow 1989: 181-85).
This close relationship between Enlightenment thought and the emerging modem state,
each ofwhich has been hugely responsible for making the present what it is, is simply one
example of the intersection, during the period 1660 to 1760, of "political mechanisms and
discourse-effects" (Foucault 197ge: 82), the knitting together, in a new mode, of
"relations ofdiscourse, ofpower, ofeveryday life and of truth" (Foucault 197ge: 89). It
was during this period that "that great system ofconstraint by which the West compelled
the everyday to bring itself into discourse" (Foucault 197ge: 91) coalesced: a "new
imperative", "injunction" or "constraint" ("1 was going to say this moral"), which "acts to
constitute what one might call the ethic immanent to the literary discourse of the West",
namely, "the duty to tell the most common ofsecrets" (Foucault 197ge: 90). The
Protestant rejection ofthe sacred and ofpriestly mediation ofthe word ofGod, building
upon the privilege accorded by the Renaissance to writing (the invention ofprinting, and
the arrival in the West ofOriental manuscripts) (OT: 38), reorganised the relations of
power over everyday life already assured through the confession, which, in the simple
form of the singular self-regulating verbal avowal, becomes transformed into "a rule for
everyone" (HS: 20): "Western man has become a confessing animal" (HS: 59).
Consider the enormous obligation to confess, and the ambiguous pleasures which
simultaneously make it disturbing and desirable: confession, education, the relations
between parents and children, between doctors and the sick, between psychiatrists
and hysterics, between psychoanalysts and patients (Foucault 1978c: 6).
Along with the spread ofconfessional practices came transformations in literature and
philosophy, the latter "seeking the fundamental relation to the true, not simply in oneself-
in some forgotten knowledge, or in a certain primal trace - but in the self-examination that
yields, through a multitude offleeting impressions, the basic certainties ofconsciousness"
(HS: 59-60).
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In the work ofearly modem philosophers such as Descartes and especially Locke, both
drawing upon the radically reflexive twist woven into Western philosophy by
St.Augustine, detailed self-examination now becomes far more important than it ever was
for the Ancients or the Christians, in that truth is said to reside not outside ofourselves (in
the cosmos, a teacher or God) but in the very practice ofdisengaged self-reflection and
self-objectification (Taylor 1989: 175; Foucault 1988b: 22). The third of the three major
types of self-examination intertwined with practices ofconfession is thus "self-examination
with respect to thoughts in correspondence to reality (Cartesian)" (Foucault 1988b: 46).
In European culture, at least up to the sixteenth century but arguably right up to the
present, "truth always has a price; no access to truth without ascesis [the practice ofself-
discipline]" (Foucault 1984a: 371). In the nonetheless "ascetic" exercise carried out in his
Meditations, (Foucault 1979b: 19-20), Descartes broke with this by basing access to truth
not on ascesis but on evidence, making possible the institutionalisation ofmodem science
and separating ethics and truth (Foucault 1984a: 371-2; HS: 59-60; OT: 55; Taylor 1989:
144). This in turn began to ring the changes for confession's "dark twin": torture.
Classical criminal procedures which had involved torture had tended necessarily to the
confession, both because a confession constituted a strong proofofguilt, and because the
confession extorted from the criminal an acceptance of responsibility (DP: 38). "[O]ne
confesses - or is forced to confess" (HS: 59): not too far from the body where torture
located truth and upon which it inscribed itself, confession located truth in the self and via
more conventional writing techniques inscribed itself in the soul.
V The rise of the disciplines
At the dawn ofthe modem era, as the light ofEnlightenment illuminated 'the West' and
cast a gro\\'mg shadow over 'the Rest', new technologies ofpower and forms of
knowledge multiplied, intertwined and spread, displacing (without replacing) sovereign
power with what Foucault referred to as 'disciplines' or 'disciplinary mechanisms', giving
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new meaning to practices ofpenance and confession, producing new ethics of the
everyday and the common and, via new technologies of the self, offering up for sacrifice
'Man' as at once a subject and an object. Indeed, Foucault at one point more precisely
dated this "moment when, paradoxically but significantly, the most brilliant figure of
sovereign power is joined to the emergence of the rituals proper to disciplinary power":
this was the moment when, "several years" after the event, a medal was struck to
commemorate Louis XIV's first military review on 15 March 1666 (DP: 188-9).
Significantly, in the very next year the King appointed the first Lieutenant-General of
Police (Bayley 1975: 344). However, beyond the outer limit of the period in question, it is
the figure ofNapoleon Bonaparte, the "Newton of 'small bodies'" (DP: 141), which for
Foucault stands "at the point ofjunction of the monarchical, ritual exercise ofsovereignty
and the hierarchical, permanent exercise of indefinite discipline" (DP: 217).
Given that these modem disciplinary mechanisms began to emerge when sovereign power
was still at its zenith, it was necessary that they first orientate themselves in relation to the
king and appropriate the same language and grandiloquence, in order to creep into and
utilise the existing mechanisms ofpower. The infamous lettre de cachet offers a prime
example ofhow, first, mechanisms ofdiscipline infiltrated into those of sovereignty, and
I
second, began to restructure them. Usually portrayed and indeed roundly criticised as a
symbol ofroyal arbitrariness, the lettre de cachet was in fact more likely to be solicited
from someone's family, relatives, neighbours, priest or community; although it was
supposed to be preceded by a police inquiry, it tended to be used by whomever was
enterprising enough to tap into or profit from it.
It [the lettrede cachet] didn't ensure the spontaneous eruption ofroyal arbitrariness
in the most everyday element of life. Rather it ensured its distribution along
complex circuits, and in a whole play ofdemands and responses (Foucault 197ge:
85; DP: 214).
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In this way "political sovereignty comes to insert itself at the most elementary level of the
social body", making available, to those who "know how to play the game", resources and
weapons beyond the traditional ones of authority and obedience (Foucault 197ge: 85).
Nevertheless, the lettre de cachet proved too unwieldly, "artificial", "maladroit" and
"theatrical" an instrument to outlast its colonisation by disciplines developing
in alanguage claiming to be that ofobservation and ofneutrality. The banal will be
analysed according to the efficacious but grey grid ofadministration, ofjournalism,
and of science; except to search for its splendours a little further afield, in literature
(Foucault 197ge: 89).
Thus it can be said that the banal, the commonplace, the mundane and the customary - in
short, everyday life - did not preexist modernity, waiting only to be 'discovered', but was
an analytical product ofmodern disciplines. Moreover, and paradoxically, the
omnipresence of the monarch was a condition for this extension ofdisciplinary power
relations into everyday life (Foucault 197ge: 87) - another reason why discipline,
confusingly but deliberately, still bears many ofthe violent and spectacular trappings ofan
age which for all intents and purposes appears to have been surpassed. Similarly, that
symbol of the disciplinary society, the Panopticon, testifies to the continued presence of
traces of sovereignty in being organised around a central tower (DP: 317 n4). Thus: "At
the moment of its full blossoming, the disciplinary society still assumes with the Emperor
the old aspect of the power ofspectacle" (DP: 217).
The modern age may not have given birth to disciplinary mechanisms per se; it did,
nevertheless, nourish and promote what have become the disciplines. "Many disciplinary
methods had long been in existence - in monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the disciplines became general
formulas ofdomination" (DP: 137), crossing "the 'technological' threshold", that is,
raising themselves to "a level at which the formation ofknowledge and the increase of
power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process" (DP: 224) and spreading
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throughout the social body to fonn "what might be called in general the disciplinary
society" (DP: 209; 1979d: 64) or "a society of the disciplinary type" (DP: 215). This
concerted cultivation, spread and generalisation of the disciplines was motivated both
negatively, by anxieties about the real and imagined contagion and disorder prevailing as
feudal society disintegrated, and positively, by a need to support emerging bourgeois
social and political structures.
Firstly, a deep-seated fear ofthe plague: "Underlying disciplinary projects the image of
the plague stands for all forms ofconfusion and disorder; just as the image of the leper,
cut off from all human contact, underlies projects ofexclusion" (DP: 199; see also 1971a:
202). Second, a fear of the 'dangerous classes' and a need to assure, once again but in a
new fonn, "the ordering ofhuman multiplicities" (DP: 218; Bauman 1987), consequent
upon the massive demographic expansion of the eighteenth century and influenced by the
earlier model supplied by the Great Confinement (Foucault 1971a: 39). In the course of
the generalisation of the disciplines, "[t]he crowd ... is abolished and replaced by a
collection ofseparated individualities" (DP: 201). It is also in this context that the
Physiocratic concept of 'population' comes to be seen as the measure of the wealth ofa
kingdom, and 'reason ofstate' begins to dissolve into various 'political economies' ofthe
liberal and socialist varieties. On the basis of the demographic as well as monetary and
agricultural expansions, the new science of statistics was able to demonstrate to its chief
patron, the centralising administrative state, the inadequacy ofthe family model of
government. The concept ofpopulation, it showed, constituted a specific and more
inclusive entity with its own irreducible regularities and cycles. The family, whose
"relations oftogetherness or dependency" had already been "opened up to administrative
and political control" by mechanisms such as the lettre de cachet, was reduced to a
nonetheless privileged instrument of governance: it provided infonnation on the state of
the population (demography; age; longevity; mortality rates; disease; marriage and
procreation; education and training; income; occupations) (Foucault 1979a: 16-17; 1980a:
171), and as "a relay in the process ofmedicalisation ... it acts both as the pennanent
source and the ultimate instrument" (Foucault 1980a: 177; see also 1971a: 254).
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The de facto shift from sovereignty to discipline, ifnot its subsequent extension in practice
or its recognition in political theory, was now complete:
The population now appears more as the aim ofgovernment than the power of the
ruler .... Interest, both at the level ofeach individual who goes to make up the
population, and also the interest of the population as such, regardless of individual
interests and aspirations, this is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the
government ofpopulation (Foucault 1979a: 18).
Third, and more positively, the impetus towards generalisation of the disciplines coincided
with the rise to economic and political dominance of the bourgeoisie:
In fact, the two processes - the accumulation ofmen and the accumulation ofcapital
- cannot be ~eparated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem ofthe
accumulation ofmen without the growth of an apparatus ofproduction capable of
both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the
cumulative multiplicity ofmen useful accelerated the accumulation ofcapital (DP:
221).
Moreover, the bourgeoisie's formal liberties, equality and representative government
required the support ofan underlying system ofnon-egalitarian, asymmetrical micro-
powers, the dark side of the Enlightenment. While representation made it possible for the
"will ofall to form the fundamental authority of sovereignty", the disciplines guaranteed
"the submission of forces and bodies. The real, corporal disciplines constituted the
foundation of the formal, juridical liberties .... The 'Enlightenment', which discovered the
liberties, also invented the disciplines" (DP: 222).
Unlike the power of the sovereign, the power of the disciplines extracts time and labour,
not wealth and commodities, from bodies, through a system ofcontinuous and coercive
surveillance - it is "power in terms ofthe minimum expenditure for the maximum return"
(DPS: 239). The disciplines are to be distinguished from slavery, in that they are not
based on a "costly and violent" "relation ofappropriation of bodies"; they differ from
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'service', which was based on a master's caprice; unlike vassalage, they are not centred
around allegiance and the products oflabour; finally, they are not to be confused with
asceticism and monastic disciplines, in that they seek neither renunciation nor "an increase
ofthe mastery ofeach individual over his own body" (DP: 137). Christianity may have
bequeathed much to the modem disciplinary society - confession, penitence, salvation -
but each of these has been substantially modified over time, not least by the exigencies of
modernity:
For centuries, the religious orders had been masters ofdiscipline: they were the
specialists of time, the great technicians ofrhythm and regular activities. But the
disciplines .... altered them first by refining them [down to quarter hours, minutes
and seconds] .... [and also by assuring] the quality ofthe time used [through
supervision to ensure its usefulness] (DP: 150).
With the advent of the disciplines, we enter the age of the effectivity ofknowledge and the
productivity ofnetworks ofpower: "We have passed from a form of injunction that
measured or punctuated gestures to a web that constrains them or sustains them
throughout their entire succession" (DP: 152).
The objective of the disciplines is the inculcation in bodies ofan immanent spiral of
increasing compliance and utility: "the formation ofa relation that in the mechanism
itselfmakes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely" (DP: 138). They
seek to achieve this by proceeding "from the distribution of individuals in space", which
"sometimes requires enclosure" (DP: 141), attested to initially by the Great Confinement
and thereafter schools, barracks, clinics, workshops and factories. This "principle of
'enclosure''', however, "is neither constant, nor indispensable, nor sufficient in disciplinary
machinery" which "works space in a much more flexible and detailed way" by
differentiating, partitioning and dividing individuals (DP: 143). As Aries (1962) has
shown, until the eighteenth century the house remained an undifferentiated space,
containing rooms in which one might successively sleep, eat, cook or receive visitors.
Thereafter the spaces of the house became differentiated and functionalised, into bedroom,
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dining room, kitchen and living room (Foucault 1980a: 149); at more or less the same
time, the school, which initially consisted ofa single, suitably demarcated, space, began to
develop individual classrooms (lones and Williamson 1979; Hunter 1988: 59).
Superimposed upon this segmentation - indeed, 'cellularization' (DP: 149) - ofspace was
an apportionment oftime: "adding up and capitalizing" it, dividing and multiplying it into
successive or parallel segments, and organising these progressively from the simple to the
complex (DP: 157-9).
Concomitant with its emphasis on time and space, compliance and utility, the age of
discipline is above all the age of the fabrication of individuals: "[d]iscipline'makes'
individuals; it is the specific technique ofa power that regards individuals both as objects
and as instruments of its exercise" (DP: 170). The modern subject is a product ofa
despotic reason, combining enlightenment and discipline, as in this eerie echo ofFoucault
in the work of one of his chief critics:
We had to be trained (and bullied) into making it [the modern subject], not only of
course through imbibing doctrines, but much more through all the disciplines which
have been inseparable from our modern way of life, the disciplines ofself-control, in
the economic, moral and sexual fields (Taylor 1989: 175).
Three procedures were and are central to this making ofmodern man: hierarchical
observation, normalising judgement and the examination. These terms are significant in
that each hints simultaneously at an exercise ofpower (hierarchy; judgement; testing) and
a formation of knowledge (observation; normalisation; evaluation). In the first instance:
The exercise ofdiscipline presupposes a mechanism that coerces by means of
observation; an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce
effects ofpower, and in which, conversely, the means ofcoercion make those on
whom they are applied clearly visible (DP: 170-71).
In the second instance, "the art ofpunishing, in the regime ofdisciplinary power, is aimed
neither at expiation, nor even precisely at repression. It brings five quite distinct
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operations into play: .... [it] compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes.
In short, it normalizes" (DP: 182-3; emphasis in the original). Normalisation is an
instrument of the disciplines and the human sciences that have been associated with them
since the eighteenth century; since then, "[t]he power ofthe Norm ... has joined other
powers - the Law, the Word (Parole) and the Text, Tradition - imposing new
delimitations upon them" (DP: 184).
Normalisation also feeds on and encourages the paradoxical twin trajectories of
totalisation and individualisation that have been the hallmark of Western political
rationalities:
In a sense, the power ofnormalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by
making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to
I
render the differences useful by fitting them one to another. It is easy to understand
how the power of the norm functions within a system of formal equality, since
within a homogeneity that is the rule, the norm introduces, as a useful imperative
and as a result ofmeasurement, all the shading of individual differences (DP: 184).
Thirdly, hierarchical observation and normalising judgement are combined in the
examination:
the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony ofpower and
the form ofthe experiment, the deployment offorce and the establishment of truth.
At the heart of the procedures ofdiscipline, it manifests the subjection of those who
are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected. The
superimposition of the power relations and knowledge relations assumes in the
examination all its visible brilliance (DP: 184-5).
"[A]t the centre of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect and object of
power, as effect and object ofknowledge" (DP: 192), the examination first enterson the
modem scene in the context of the increasingly regular, extended and more rigorous
inspecting 'visits' to hospitals by physicians since the seventeenth century, including within
its cumulative effects emerging categories of subject (nurse; homo medicus, initially
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itinerant, thereafter resident, and in the case ofmental hospitals, firstly as 'wise man' or
thaumaturge and only thereafter as psychiatrist), the production and dissemination of
knowledge and the variability ofpower relations (DP: 185-6; 1971a: 270-74).
"Similarly, the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination that
duplicated along its entire length the operation of teaching" (DP: 186). The examination,
"the bureaucratic confession offuith" (Marx 1970: 51), permits particular features of the
subjects under observation or analysis to be reported, classified, assessed and utilised, and
functions both to produce and to discipline, since it not only authenticates what in context
is a "transubstantiation of profane into holy knowledge" (Marx 1970: 51), but extorts for
the benefit ofothers an immense tactical knowledge (DP: 187). It was also accompanied
by writing techniques which intensified individualising procedures. Whereas "[f]or a long
time ordinary individuality - the everyday individuality ofeverybody - remained below the
threshold ofdescription" (DP: 191) (because it was only the great and the powerful who
had their lives chronicled), techniques ofnotation, registration, filing and tabling opened
up its human objects to individualisation - and at the same time totalisation: "firstly, the
constitution of the individual as a describable, analysable object, ... and, secondly, the
constitution of a comparative system that made possible the measurement ofoverall
phenomena", groups, collective facts and distributions in a given population (DP: 190).
"The disciplines mark the moment when the reversal of the political axis of .
individualization - as one might call it - takes place" (DP: 192), the moment of
Enlightenment, when a visible power which overshadowed those on whom it was
exercised became transmuted into an shadowy power which illuminated its objects:
"[d]isciplinary power ... is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on
those whom it subjects a principle ofcompulsory visibility" (DP: 187). Concomitant with
the shift in the source oflegitirnate rule from divine right to 'the people', whereas under
sovereign power individualisation was 'ascending' and thus greatest at the highest levels
(through rituals, kinship, deeds, monuments, ostentatious expenditure and allegiance), in a
disciplinary regime "individualization is 'descending'" (DP: 193):
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In a system ofdiscipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient
more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal
and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards the first of these pairs that all the
individualizing mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and when one wishes to
individualize the healthy, normal and law-abiding adult, it is always by asking him
how much ofthe child he has in him, what secret madness lies within him, what
fundamental crime he has dreamt ofcommitting (DP: 193).
In the face ofthis 'descending' individualisation, we are all (potential) criminals now, not
to mention sick, mentally unstable and childlike. In addition, though Foucault never
suggests this, 'descending' individualisation has been accompanied by an 'ascending'
totalisation, in the form of a shift in focus from the individualised 'great men' ofhistory -
emperors, kings, popes and cardinals who were contrasted against the ill-defined and
amorphous 'crowd', 'people' and 'masses' - to the clear collectivities ofmodern
governments, political parties, classes, elites and bureaucracies.
Enter the Panopticon: a "laboratory ofpower"; "a figure ofpolitical technology" which is
"polyvalent in its applications" (DP: 204-5) and "destined to spread throughout the social
body [,] ... to become a generalized function" (DP: 207); it is "the general principle ofa
new 'political anatomy' whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the
relations ofdiscipline" (DP: 208). The theme of the Panopticon is simultaneously
"surveillance and observation, security and knowledge, individualization and totalization,
isolation and transparency" (DP: 249). It
arranges things in such a way that the exercise ofpower is not added on from the
outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the functions it invests, but is so subtly
present in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of
contact (DP: 206).
In other words, power relations become more effective the more they infiltrate into
everyday life, as they shift from being externally imposed to being internally invoked, from
being authoritarian to being participatory, and from acting primarily upon bodies to acting
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in addition and more particularly upon souls and actions: "a physics of a relational and
multiple power, which has its maximum intensity not in the person of the king, but in the
bodies that can be individualized by these relations" (DP: 208).
VI The extension and intensification of discipline
The spread ofdisciplinary institutions outwards from the "exceptional disciplinary model"
of the plague-stricken town, where power perpetually threatened death (DP: 207), to the
Panopticon which amplified and rearranged power relations and made them more
economical and effective, prompted three additional developments. Firstly, the functions
ofdisciplinary institutions shifted from being largely negative (neutralising dangers) to
being positive, seeking "to increase the possible utility of individuals" (DP: 210), "to
strengthen the social forces - to increase production, to develop the economy, spread
education, raise the level ofpublic morality; to increase and multiply" (DP: 208; see also
1976a: 64). For example, the justification for schools during the seventeenth century was
based on their presumed capacity to prevent "ignorance ofGod, idleness (with its
consequent drunkenness, impurity, larceny, brigandage); and the formation of those gangs
ofbeggars, always ready to stir up public disorder ... " (DP: 210). By the beginning of the
French Revolution, the aims ofprimary education had become "to 'fortify', to 'develop
the body', to prepare the child 'for a future in some mechanical work', to give him 'an
observant eye, a sure hand, and prompt habits'" (DP: 210-11). With the discipline
inculcated through education thus becoming central to modem society, new social and
occupational categories began to form: the policeman, the resident physician, the
missionary, the social worker, the psychologist, the prison warder, and not least, the
proselytising power of the educator (Bauman 1987: 48-9). .
Secondly, in the form ofreligious groups and charity organisations, disciplinary centres of
observation tended to be disseminated throughout society (DP: 212), and disciplinary
institutions tended to develop a whole margin of lateral controls:
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Thus the Christian School must not simply train docile children; it must also make it
possible to supervise the parents, to gain information as to their way of life, their
resources, their piety, their morals (DP: 211).
The absence or bad behaviour of a child becomes a pretext for one to question the
neighbours, to delve into the parents' background and to inquire about the number of beds
in their house, and certainly not to leave without providing alms, a religious picture or
additional beds (DP: 211). Thirdly, particularly in France but to far lesser extent in
England, part of the functions ofreligious and charity organisations were soon taken over
by a police apparatus which concerned itself with the minutest details ofthe entire social
body, '''everything that happens'" (DP: 213), from religion, morals, health, the arts and
sciences through public safety to supplies, roads, trade, factories, workers and the poor,
that is, everything except justice, the exchequer and the army (Foucault 1981e: 249;
1976a: 25-26; 1980a: 170-71; 1988b: 156; Tilly 1975: 60).
The emergence ofpositive disciplinary functions - the injunction to 'increase and multiply'
the capabilities of individuals and society, the lateral spread ofsurveillance and the partial
centralisation ofpolicing - were effects ofand the condition for a revival in fortunes for
Christian pastoral techniques, now in great demand by theorists and statesmen acutely
aware of the need to fill the void - or supplement the traces - left by the decline of feudal
society. Already in the twelfth century, the attention of the Catholic Church had shifted
considerably from a focus on the salvation of 'mankind' as a whole to the deliverance of
the individual (Morris 1972: 152); under new circumstances, however, the objective of
pastoral power was transformed from leading people, either individually or as a whole, to
salvation in the next world, to ensuring it in this world, with salvation taking on different
and more worldly meanings: "health, well-being (that is, sufficient wealth, standard of
living), security, protection against accidents" (SP: 215); "health replaces salvation"
(Foucault 1976a: 198).
141
Through Protestantism, eighteenth century pedagogy and nineteenth century medicine, the
Christian confession mutated into a most improbable thing: "a confessional science" (HS:
64), or better, a set of sciences, including psychology, psychiatry and Destutt de Tracy's
science of ideas, or ideology. Converting sin into illness, the human sciences incorporated
practices ofconfession into administrative mechanisms of registration with the not
dissimilar objective ofextorting truth from individualised bodies, though with the
additional emphasis on the multiple accumulation ofwritten, rather than mainly verbal,
traces (Foucault 197ge: 84; Foucault, quoted in Macey 1993: 321). Or, better put:
from the eighteenth century to the present, the techniques ofverbalization have been
reinserted in a different context by the so-called human sciences in order to use them
without renunciation ofthe self but to constitute, positively, a new self(Foucault
1988b: 49).
These recent transformations in Christian practices of self-examination have in turn given
rise to the debates about "the possibility ofconstituting a science of the subject, the
validity of introspection, lived experience as evidence, or the presence ofconsciousness to
itself' (HS: 64), not to mention that hallmark of social scientific practice: ideology-
critique.
These confessional social disciplines, in many cases centred around sexuality, were made
scientifically acceptable, firstly, by combining the confession with examination and
interrogation. Second, by postulating sexuality as a fundamental 'cause ofany and
everything', "the limitless dangers that sex carried with it justified the exhaustive character
of the inquisition to which it was subjected" (HS: 65-6). Third, since sexuality was
assumed to be latent, the confession had to be modified: "it tended no longer to be
concerned solely with what the subject wished to hide, but with what was hidden from
himself' (HS: 66), knowledge which could only gradually come to light through the
respective roles ofquestioner and questioned. Fourth, the discipline ofproducing the
truth required that a close relationship be established between questioner and questioned
in order for the confession to be properly interpreted and scientifically validated: the truth
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was present but incomplete and blind in the speaker, and could achieve completion only in
the one who assimilated, recorded, hermeneutically interpreted, deciphered and verified it
(HS: 66-7). Finally, the confession was given scientific sanction in that its extortion and
its effects were recodified as therapeutic operations (HS: 67).
The confession, "a ritual ofdiscourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of
the statement" (HS: 61), had unfolded within a power relationship ofdependence on the
(at least virtual) presence of another acting as an authority (HS: 61). However, while in
Antiquity and under Christianity mastery ofoneselfor the renunciation of self,
respectively, involved a dissymmetrical relation to (or mastery over) others (Foucault
1984a: 357), once the notion ofmastery was related to the fact ofhuman rationality, as
took place during the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, self-other
relations became more reciprocal (Foucault 1984a: 358). Despite this, rationality
continued to be considered a relatively exclusive property: "every incantation of the
universality of the faculty ofreason was invariably accompanied by a reminder that the
ability to use it is a sparsely distributed privil~ge" (Bauman 1987: 58). At the same time,
the practice ofconfession became much more widespread, particularly so given the
widespread impact ofdisciplinary practices and associated human sciences on modern
social institutions.
In terms of these therapeutic sciences, especially psychiatry and pedagogy, in which
knowledge is understood as "a praxis" tied to "the relation between two individuals, one
ofwhom is listening to the other's language" (OT: 376), the injunction to speak has
become a ritual where truth is corroborated by ordeal, and where the very confession
"produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it" (HS: 62). The practice
ofconfession and associated techniques of self-examination seek "to get individuals to
work at their own 'mortification' in this world" - "a kind ofeveryday death" (Foucault
1981e: 239; see also Goffinan 1968: 24-5). Early forms ofmortification included
confession itself, penance, self-flagellation, exagoreusis, exomologesis, and hermeneutic
forms of'subjectivisation'; more modern forms include those procedures in an asylum, an
~"
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army, a school or a prison aimed at destroying personal autonomy and existing forms of
subjection through the imposition ofnumbers instead ofnames, the replacement of
personal clothing with uniforms and the removal ofproperty, the shaving of the head,
isolation from previous influences (family and work), the prioritising of self-discipline and
the repression ofalternative forms ofknowledge. The individual is then 'remodelled' in
the image ofa specific regime of power-knowledge.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission currently holding hearings on human rights
violations in South Africa since 1960 is a good composite example of the centrality of
confession (as a knowledge-producing and subject-altering rehabilitative ordeal) in modem
society. Through its recorded public hearings the Commission formally and visibly
conducts examinations ofvictims and perpetrators alike, demanding that they verify
incidents that they have been required to re-live. While its seventeen commissioners,
deriving from divergent social, political and racial backgrounds, are subject to close media
scrutiny and a small degree ofpolitical contestation, as a group they are taken to represent
the authoritative conscience of the nation, and, as such, are distanced from those who
appear before them and, in testifying, are specifically identified and individualised. The
Commission is also therapeutic both at the level of individual subjects by requiring
perpetrators not only to reveal their motives but to acknowledge their responsibility, and
at the level of the population as a whole by seeking "to promote or foster reconciliation,
through a telling of the truth" (Lyster 1997: 21). Just as the confession divested itself of
the trappings oftorture, so too does the Commission offer amnesty instead ofprosecution,
exercising a nonetheless mortifying power over life rather than a power that seeks revenge
and kills. Finally, it aims to produce an officially sanctioned "new written history of the
apartheid years", "a mutually acceptable and collective understanding of the truth of the
past, which can endure, which can be taught in schools and which can be passed on"
(Lyster 1997: 21). By thus rewritingour history on the basis of true confessions, the
Commission seeks to transform, heal and unifY an abused South African social order.
~.
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The shift from Christian pastoral practices to the modem disciplines was made all the
easier given the former's already close association with some ofthese 'new' aims: the
welfare function ofmedicine was already assured by the Church, which also provided
many ofthe functionaries required to staffnew state apparatuses, especially the all-
encompassing police, as well as welfare societies and philanthropic associations (SP: 215),
in the process helping to swell the ranks of a self-consciously intellectual stratum.
Ironically, this expansion occurred at the moment when Kant was exhorting 'Man' to
achieve enlightenment by having the courage and resolve to throw offhis dependence on
the authority and guidance ofothers (Kant 1996: 51). As Foucault showed in relation to
the prison, and as attested to by de Jouvenel and Arendt, changes in the relations ofpower
brought about changes in the number and function ofthe subjects ofpower; unlike
violence which relies on implements, "power always stands in need ofnumbers" (Arendt
1969: 42; de Jouvenel1952: 98). Contrasted thus against sovereignty, "the disciplinary
gaze did, in fact, need relays" (DP: 174) in order to function effectively:
As a result ofthis new restraint [the shift by which punishment ceased to inflict pain
upon the body], a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner, the
immediate anatomist ofpain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists,
psychologists, educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they sing the
praises that the law needs: they reassure it that the body and pain are not the
ultimate objects of its punitive action (DP: 11).
This expansion in the number oftechnical relays of relations ofpower was not confined to
the prison but was a society-wide phenomenon: the grouping of large masses ofworkers
in factories created a demand for managers, foremen and clerks; and the state-directed
expansion ofeducation multiplied not only the numbers of teachers and bureaucrats but
also created a whole series ofsupervisers from the ranks ofpupils themselves:
"intendants, observers, monitors, tutors, reciters ofprayers, writipg officers, receivers of
ink, almoners and visitors" (DP: 175).
Furthermore,
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the multiplication of the aims and agents ofpastoral power focused the development
ofknowledge of man around two roles: one, globalizing and quantitative,
concerning the population; the other, analytical, concerning the individual .... [and
producing] an individualizing 'tactic' which characterized a series ofpowers: those
of the family, medicine, psychiatry, education, and employers (SP: 215).
Since their murky origins in ancient societies along the eastern Mediterranean littoral,
these political rationalities which we now label as Western have been characterised by
simultaneously individualising and totalising tendencies. Modem disciplinary power
relations extended these trajectories considerably. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth
centuries, Western Europe experienced a double movement "of state centralisation on the
one hand and ofdispersion and religious dissidence on the other" (Foucault 1979a: 6); as a
consequence ofthis and the close but complex relationship between disciplinary practices
and the centralised modem state, the latter exercises "both an individualizing and a
totalizing form ofpower" (SP: 213). Indeed, at the end ofthe twentieth century, this
phenomenon is stronger than ever, with the simultaneous formation of the European
Union and the spread ofdisintegrative political tendencies so violently evident in the
Balkans and Eastern Europe but also present in the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland),
France (Bretagne), Spain (the Basques), Italy (the South) and Germany (erstwhile East
Germany). The trend towards global cultural homogenisation is being accompanied by a
revival ofethnicity and nationalism, in addition to the fact that most modem nations are
culturally heterogeneous, often based on conquest, and subjected to the hegemony of a
particular aspect (such as London and the South in Britain), not to mention divided in
terms ofclass, gender, and race (Hall1992b: 297, 313).
Coupled to these individualising and totalising tendencies are what Foucault distinguished
as, firstly,
the disciplines: an anatomo-politics ofthe human body ... centered on the body as a
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its
forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into




regulatory controls: a bio-politics ofthe population ... focused on the species body,
the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological
processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level ofhealth, life expectancy and
longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary (HS: 139; emphasis in
the original).
Together, these two poles of "the disciplines of the body and the regulation of the
population" (HS: 139) - the former involving the rapid development of "various disciplines
- universities, secondary schools, barracks, workshops" (HS: 140), and the latter, "the
emergence, in the field of political practices and economic observation, ofthe problems of
birthrate, longevity, public health, housing, and migration" (HS: 140) - were indispensable
elements in the development ofmodem capitalism.
This modem power over life, a constituting gaze directed at living bodies especially by a
medical science which ironically could objectify the individual "only in the opening created
by his own elimination", or death (Foucault 1976a: 197), is also a reflection of the
importance of the everyday - productive activity and family life - in modernity (Taylor
1989: 13). It is manifested in "the coexistence in political structures [of] large destructive
mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life": the French
Revolution coincided with the first systematic public health programme, and welfare
programmes first made their appearance during and after World War 11 (Foucault 1988b:
147).
At the moment the state began to pqiCtice its greatrst slaughters, it began to worry
about the physical and mental health ofeach individual. ... This game between death
and life is one ofthe main paradoxes of the modem state (Foucault 1980e: 4).
"For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political
existence ... " (HS: 142):
147
Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be
able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was
the taking charge of life, more than the threat ofdeath, that gave power its access
even to the body (HS: 142-3).
Death itself has become a threat to modem Western societies premised on the subjection
of live individuals: it was no coincidence that suicide became one ofthe first forms of
individual conduct to enter sociological analysis, or that the death penalty has become
progressively more difficult to apply (HS: 138-9), or that issues important to the aged
(health care and retirement) are becoming central to Western electoral politics.
VII The ldisciplinary society'
Despite occasional references to a "disciplinary society" associated with the omnipresence
ofthe police, and statements such as: "Prison begins far away from the prison gates. Just
outside the door ofyour house" (in Macey 1993: 270), Foucault is not suggesting that we
replace conventional characterisations ofmodem societies as 'liberal-democratic',
'capitalist', 'patriarchal', 'fundamentalist', 'nationalist', 'racist' and the like with a new
designation as 'disciplinary'. Modem societies are as much bourgeois- or male-dominated
as they are imbued with disciplinary mechanisms: notonly can and do these labels
overlap, but existing states ofdomination premised on class, race or gender are, like the
disciplinary mechanisms themselves, global products of the intertwining of specific local
relations ofpower:
'Discipline' isn't the expression ofan 'ideal type' (that of 'disciplined man'); it's the
generalisation and interconnection ofdifferent techniques themselves designed in
response to localised requirements (schooling; training troops to handle rifles)
(Foucault 1981£: 9).
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Fraser believes that one can imagine a perfected disciplinary society where hierarchical,
asymmetrical relations of power and surveillance ofsome by others have become
internalised and hence superfluous. In such a society, "all would surveil and police
themselves", and, consequently, all would be autonomous (Fraser 1989: 49). But this kind
ofnegative after-image of the Marxist withering away of the state is far from Foucaulfs
conception: not only is such a resistance-free, self-policed society an unrealisable Utopian
dream, but the police and other disciplinary subject positions such as teachers, doctors,
wardens and psychoanalysts are necessary conduits ofand supports for modem relations
ofpower. Moreover, 'autonomy' would be meaningless in a society impossibly shorn of
relations ofpower.
In the same vein, "it would be wrong to believe that the disciplinary functions were
confiscated and absorbed once and for all by a state apparatus" (DP: 215). Rather,
'[d]iscipline' may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is
a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments,
techniques, procedures, levels ofapplication, targets; it is a 'physics' or an
'anatomy' ofpower, a technology
which can be taken over or utilised by diverse institutions and apparatuses (DP: 215).
Again:
Power ofthe disciplinary type ~ .. does not adequately represent all power relations
and all possibilities ofpower relations. Power is not discipline; discipline is a
possible procedure ofpower (Foucault 1984a: 380).
It is only on the basis ofproviso's such as these that
one can speak of the formation ofa disciplinary society ... [n]ot because the
disciplinary modality ofpower has replaced all the others; but because it has
infiltrated the others, sometimes undermining them, but serving as an intermediary
between them, linking them together, extending them and above all making it
possible to bring the effects ofpower to the most minute and distant elements. It
assures an infinitesimal dis~5ibution ofthe power relations (DP: 216).
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Thus not only are power relations not reducible to the disciplines, or the latter to the
apparatuses of the state, but it would also be wrong to see the disciplines as replacing or
transcending sovereignty, as ifFoucault had merely reversed Enlightenment histories of
progress in order to relate the story of the rise ofunfreedom.
On the contrary, Foucault rejected both a 'progressivist' and a 'regressivist' history, and
also derided the notion ofa past golden age as an "historical absurdity" (Foucault 1988a:
164). Nevertheless, as specific political anatomies ofpower existing alongside and often
within power as sovereignty, the disciplines do function as "a sort ofcounter-law" in
relation to the fonnal bourgeois freedoms and equality: "introducing insuperable
asymmetries and excluding reciprocities" (DP: 222); undermining the legal fiction ofthe
(work) contract, partially suspending the law, even to the extent of "unbalancing power
relations definitively and everywhere" (DP: 223); and inverting, and substituting
themselves for, the content of the law (DP: 224).
The emergence and consolidation of the disciplinary society to which we have become
accustomed was neither planned nor inevitable, neither freely brought about nor rigidly
determined. As Foucault demonstrates in his account of the birth ofthe prison, what the
legal reformers ofthe late eighteenth century proposed - a 'gentle way in punishment' -
was premised upon, but surpassed by, the piecemeal coalescence ofdisciplinary
mechanisms and the arbitrary yet logical privileging ofdetention. The legal reformers had
proposed that
the punishment must proceed from the crime; for example, the law must appear to
be a necessity ofthings, and power must act while concealing itself beneath the
gentle force ofnature [by] .... set[ting] the force that drove the criminal to the crime
against itself(DP: 106).
Moreover, the idea was that "the guilty person is only one of the targets ofpunishment.
For punishment is directed above all at others, at all the potentially guilty'l (DP: 108).
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Hence, where the body ofthe condemned was once the property of the King, now it
becomes "the property ofsociety, the object ofa collective and useful appropriation"
which is "why the reformers almost always proposed public works as one of the best
possible penalties" (DP: 109). Punishment must be visible, "it must open up a book to be
read"; furthermore, "[t]his legible lesson, this ritual recording, must be repeated as often as
possible; the punishments must be a school rather than a festival; an ever-open book rather
than a ceremony" and hence having effects on the guilty and spectators alike (DP: Ill).
Society as a whole must become a school (Foucault 1979d: 64; Bauman 1987: 71),
perhaps even a medical school (Foucault 1976a: 32-34,68), that punishes potential
criminals even before they have committed a crime and prevents the outbreak ofdisease;
such a generalised and therapeutic pedagogy would seek to normalise subjects precisely by
enlightening them.
In this 'gentle way in punishment', "the use of imprisonment as a general form of
punishment is never presented in these projects for specific, visible and 'telling' penalties"
(DP: 114); indeed, "the idea ofpenal imprisonment is explicitly criticized by many
reformers", for several reasons: it does not correspond to the desired specificity ofcrimes;
it has no effect on the public; it is useless, even harmful, to society (in that it is costly,
fosters the idleness ofconvicts and multiplies their vices); it is difficult to supervise and
cannot prevent arbitrariness; and it is tyrannical to deprive someone oftheir liberty, which
thus presupposes that the judges, the guards, ultimately even society itself, must be
composed of tyrants (DP: 114). Yet "within a short space oftime [under twenty years,
between the principles of the Constituent Assembly and the Code of 1810], detention
became the essential form ofpunishment" (DP: 115); "[t]he theatre ofpunishment of
which the eighteenth century dreamed and which would have acted essentially on the
minds of the general public was replaced by the great uniform machinery ofthe prisons"
(DP: 116). \Vhile the spread ofconfessional practices and the rise of the human sciences
suggest that the prison did not simply replace but at most supplemented and recodified
what the reformers proposed, it must be asked how it happened that the reformers' desire
to react to criminal offences by "restor[ing] the juridical subject of the social pact" was in
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part subordinated to a penitentiary process (already partly discredited due to its
association with the arbitrariness of the lettres de cachet - Foucault 197ge: 86) of
"shap[ing] an obedient subject, according to the general and detailed form of some power"
(DP: 129).
The answer is a new political anatomy:
Small acts ofcunning endowed with a great power ofdiffusion, subtle
arrangements, apparently innocent, but profoundly suspicious, mechanisms that
obeyed economies too shameful to be acknowledged, or pursued petty forms of
coercion - it was nevertheless they that brought about the mutation of the punitive
system, at the threshold of the contemporary period (DP: 139).
It was these "humble modalities, minor procedures [specifically: "hierarchical observation,
normalizing judgement, and their combination in ... the examination" (DP: 170)], as
compared with the majestic rituals ofsovereignty or the great apparatuses of the state [,]
.... which were gradually to invade the major forms, altering their mechanisms and
imposing their procedures" (DP: 170). Not a sudden discovery, this political anatomy was
"a multiplicity ofoften minor processes, ofdifferent origin and scattered location, which
overlap, repeat, or imitate each other, support one another, distinguish themselves from
one another according to their domain ofapplication, converge and gradually produce the
blueprint ofa general method" (DP: 138). It is these small, local, heterogeneous and
unstable relations ofpower, producing, being extended by and operating apparently
innocuously within and through individual subjects, forms ofknowledge and institutions
modelled in terms ofsovereignty, which now demand closer examination.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RECONCEPTUALlSING POWER RELATIONS
I Towards an Analytics of Power Relations
The historical emergence and consolidation of the disciplinary relations of power which
underpin modem political practices, forms ofknowledge and institutions are to be
distinguished, it was argued in Chapter Three, from forms ofdomination such as slavery
and serfdom Reference has also been made, first, to the utility ofmodem relations of
power in fabricating individuals and constituting docile bodies through practices of
surveillance, normalisation and examination, and, second, to the knowledge that is
produced in and through these procedures. We turn now to a more detailed examination
ofpower relations, states ofdomination, freedom and resistance, and how power relations
can be said to produce knowledge and subject individuals. Foucault's relational and
multilevelled conception shifts one's focus away from conventional accounts ofpower as a
kind ofscarce possession which is wielded over against freedom, to power relations,
ubiquitous and micro$copic, which are called into being by free actions.
In thus rethinking how power relations operate in the present, it must constantly be borne
in mind that while Foucault's comments do not in themselves constitute a new theory of
power relations, they are intended to support a process which aims "to cut off the King's
head" (Foucault 1980a: 121). By undermining the self-evidence and exposing the
inadequacies ofcontemporary theories and practices of power, they may ultimately
contribute towards imagining and bringing into being "new schemas ofpoliticisation"
(Foucault 1980a: 190), or !la new economy ofpower relations" (SP: 210). Foucault
suggested that this may be achieved by approaching the question ofpower relations
simultaneously from two sides:
it is a question of forming a different grid ofhistorical decipherment by starting from
a different theory ofpower;, and, at the same time, ofadvancing little by little toward..,~
.~.
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a different conception of power through a closer examination of an entire historical
material. We must at the same time conceive of sex without the law, and power
without the king (HS: 90-91).
The paradox inherent in attempting to produce a new conception ofpower on the basis of
an historical analysis which already assumes this new conception ofpower, should be
obvious; yet paradox is the hallmark ofFoucault's approach. Nor was he unfamiliar with
this strange, almost back-to-front, task that he set for himself: his Archaeology of
Knowledge had attempted to formulate the tools already forged in the heat ofhis prior
analyses ofmadness, illness and the order of things (AK: 16).
Thus armed, as it were, with two crowbars, one speculative in that 'a different theory of
power' can as yet only be imagined, and one concrete in that it is grounded on historical
data, Foucault aimed to pry apart and begin to dismantle the struts and pilings ofour
present conception ofpower as sovereignty. This thesis has already, in Chapter Three,
sought to advance part of the way along the concrete, historical path; this must now be
supplemented by an attempt to outline a theory ofpower relations, once again drawing
directly on Foucault's texts. The ideal outcome would be similar to that radical
transformation ofmedical discourses between 1770 and 1830 to which Foucault refers,
resulting in
the application ofan entirely new ~ille, with its choices and exclusions; a new play
with its own rules, decisions and limitations, with its own inner logic, its parameters
and its blind alleys, all ofwhich lead to the modification of the point oforigin
(Foucault, in Elders 1974: 150; emphasis in the original; see also AK: 170; 1976a:
54).
While the application ofa new'grille' to relations ofpower will lead to a rewriting oftheir
historical and theoretical trajectory, so too will a modification ofthe 'point oforigin' of
current theories ofpower (which Foucault categorised under the term sovereignty and
traced back to Hobbes) make possible a new, practical, effective and productive
'economy' ofpower relations.
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From the start, it is important to remember that disciplinary mechanisms constitute merely
one set ofpossible procedures ofpower, and hence it would be wrong to assume that they
exhaust modem relations ofpower (Foucault 1984a: 380). -J.n-f-aGt, .r~~ Foucault, "power
- - -_ L. . __.__
as such does not exist" (SP: 217,219): "there is no Power, but power relationships which
are being born incessantly, as both effect and condition ofother processes" (Foucault
1989: 187; Deleuze 1988: 27). Power is heterogeneous, in that "it is always born of
- - _....
something other than itself' (Foucault 1989: 186), and is interwoven with all social
_" ., f ~_ "".,.
relations (such as production, technology, warfare, communication, ethnicity, kinship,
~--_._---~-_ ..-_.~_. ~---.
family, friendship, the body, gender, se)..'Uality and knowledge). Relations ofpower "are
the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in,~
, ._.•.,-"-~ .~ --"•._ ...••.,_.. .~-... '" __ ~ ._-"-,_..",,, •.,,_._,~. --~ ,,-,,-- .- 'L'L"~"' ' "'" "-;, '. "-' .,..,- ..J'"
tttteF [social relations per se], and conversely they are the internal conditions ofthese
.- .,,-----_..~-
differentiations" which may be determined by law, status, economic appropriation,
processes ofproduction, language, culture, knowledge or competence (HS: 94; 1980a:
142; SP: 223; 1989: 188).
/"
// As both condition and effect ofsocial division and inequality, power relations or
~ "intersecting relations offorce" (Foucault 1980d: 15) are not reducible to anyone
( particular process, relationship or institution but exist "between every point ofa social
'--.Lbody" (Foucoult 19800: 187):
power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity offorce relations
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own
organization; [and] as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and
~ confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them (HS: 92-3; see also 1980a:
189).
What we understand and accept as "'Power', insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert,
and self-reproducing, is simply the overall effect that emerges from all these mobilities",
this "moving substrate" (HS: 93; DP: 26) of "dispersed, heteromorphous, localised"









other than the instant photograph ofmultiple struggles continuously in transformation", a
perpetually changing series ofclashes which pervade all social relations (Foucault 1989:
188). It is for these reasons that one needs to be nominalistic and heuristic about power:
neither an institution, a structure nor a strength with which we are endowed, "it is the
name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society" (HS:
93).
Power relations are thus in effect omnipresent, "co-extensive with the social 1:?ody",
(Foucault 1980a: 142) and "ubiquitous" (Foucault 1977a: 213; 1980a: 189). "[E]very--
human relation is to some degree a power relation" (Foucault 1988a: 168; 1987b: 122):
~----~-"-------"'~ "-'*-- --..._....,...--..~ -----~ ........ ....-.~-~ .. ", ,....~---~
nit [power] is produced ... in every relation from one point to another"; it is "everywhere;
--- --------.- ~_¥-~- - ~- --- .~.- .._---~--""_.- ----.
not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere" (HS: 93).
.---- ---.- - ~- -- -'-..._---.. __ .._--
The-significance of this last statement must not be overlooked, for many an over-~sty
reading ofFoucault has concluded that power is literally in everything, or everything is
saturated with power. Power may come from everywhere - but it is not everything: for
example, while there are numerous means by which power relations are brought into being
(such as threat ofarms, effects ofthe word, economic disparities, control, surveillance,
knowledge or technology) (SP: 223), and though power is woven, to some degree, into
every relation (such as an individual's or a group's ability to manipulate things or to
influence the production or transmission of information), power is not reducible to any of
these means or relations. Power relations as "relations between individuals (or between
groups)" must be differentiated both from power as "capacity" (to "modify, use, consume,
or destroy things", to work and to transform reality) and from power as relationships of
communication (SP: 217). No doubt an individual's capacity to transform nature - itself
an "inexhaustibly rich source ofpower" (OT: 71) - can have tremendous effects upon
other individuals, and "[n]o doubt communicating is always a certain way of acting upon
another person or persons", which as we shall see is central to Foucault's definition of
power, but power relations are reducible to neither physiological capabilities or labour-
power nor to the production and circulation ofmeaning (SP: 217).
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Nevertheless, power relations as relations between individuals, as capacity and as
communication do overlap and reciprocally support each other: the application ofone's
objective capacities in the modification or use of an object implies relationships of
communication (previously acquired information or shared work) as well as power
relations (in the form ofobligatory tasks, traditional gestures, apprenticeships or the
distribution oflabour); and relationships ofcommunication imply finalised activities and,
by modifYing the information available to partners, extend or alter power relations (SP:
218). Indeed, formalised processes ofenskilling, ofpedagogically inculcating certain
capacities, skills or abilities into individuals, often function by transforming an existing
force ofthe body into "an 'aptitude'" or "a 'capacity'" which in this form can act as a
built-in relay for relations ofpower (DP: 138). Moreover, while the coordination of these
three aspects is not constant or uniform, "there are also 'blocks' in which the adjustment
ofabilities, the resources ofcommunication, and power relations constitute regulated and
concerted systems" (SP: 218). For example, an educational institution constitutes "a
block ofcapacity-communication-power":
The activity which ensures apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes or types
ofbehavior is developed there by means ofa whole ensemble ofregulated
communications (lessons, questions and answers, orders, exhortations, coded signs
ofobedience, differentiation marks ofthe 'value' ofeach person and ofthe levels of
knowledge) and by the means ofa whole series ofpower processes (enclosure,
surveillance, reward and punishment, the pyTamidal hierarchy) (SP: 218-9).
Such "blocks"'or "disciplines" may be articulated in different ways, at different times
giving pre-eminence to power relations (as in monasteries and prisons), to finalised,
technical, productive activities (as in workshops and hospitals), to relationships of
communication (as in apprenticeships and educational institutions), or even to all three at
once (as in military discipline) (SP: 219).
The omnipresence ofpower relations and their tendency to combine and become
systematised and institutionalised must be tempered by the fact that power is also "rooted
deep in the social nexus" (SP: 222, 224). It is both analytically and tactically important to
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emphasise that "power comes from below" (HS: 94; 1980a: 159; DPS: 233): analytical, in
that power relati<?~~en~!J'rim_a.!ilyJocat~djgJ:l_s_t~t~,_aJ~gislatureor a sovereign
-....--- -.- -."" - .. --- --... :>
individual, but are to be found suffused throughout the social body; and tactical, in that
'-- -- ------------- -------------~-_._---_..- -------- -~._-- _.--_..- -
power re1atiQ!!.i:are._notn~d1Jcibl~to an oppression possessed and exercised from on high,
_____----~--- J.
but are entangled in freedom and struggle. Power is not a site, a fortress or a rogue to be
uncI.Oake<fill his lair; it is a relation, a current, a resource, a strategy, an experience and an
ordeal. Ifthere is 'a system' to be opposed, then that system is neither an incumbency nor
a position but a local network ofrelations by and through which power is exercised in our
societies. More Nietzschean than liberal, Marxist or anarchist in inspiration, this idea of
power from below (despite its presence in Hobbes), that "[s]overeigpty always is formed
from the bottom up, based on the will of those who are afraid" (Foucault, quoted in
Pasquino 1993: 81), suggests that power relations are as dependent upon the fear and
resistance they may arouse within, as upon the willing or induced compliance of, the
subjects of these relations.
These microscopic and everyday power relations are both relatively autonomous :£i:om
(DPS: 235; 1980a: 188), and the infinitesimal elements of, the broader, more visible
strategies ofrulers, institutions and groups which are usually assumed to exhaust the
category ofrelations ofpower (DPS: 235; HS: 93):
The panoptic modality ofpower - at the elementary, technical, merely physical level
at which it is situated - is not under the immediate dependence or a direct extension
ofthe great juridico-political structures ofa society; it is nonetheless not absolutely
independent (DP: 221-22).
Thus power relations can be conceived ofas subterranean (though only to the extent that
they are notsuperterranean or confined to the lofty reaches ofkings and states), a kind of
non-primordial, commonplace 'soup of the day' whose ingredients might include, but are
certainly not limited to, force, violence, passion and chance (Foucault 1980d: 17), "the
concrete, changing soil in which the sovereign's power is grounded, the conditions which
make it possible for it to function" (Foucault 1980a: 187, 188, 122; HS: 93; 1981f: 9).
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11 Power relations, states of domination and freedom
It is on the basis of this seed-bed ofmutually supportive and interconnected local power
relations that "general conditions of domination" (Foucault 1980a: 142) such as
capitalism, patriarchy and racism may ultimately blossom. These vast global strategies are
commonly "embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various
social hegemonies" (HS: 92-3) and, "accompanied by numerous phenomena of inertia,
displacement and resistance", adapt, reinforce and transform the local relations ofpower
upon which they depend.
[H]ence one should not assume a massive and primal condition ofdomination, a
binary structure with 'dominators' on one side and 'dominated' on the other, but
rather a multiform production ofrelations ofdomination which are partially
susceptible of integration into overall strategies (Foucault 1980a: 142; HS: 94, 99).
Local and global relations ofpower thus mutually determine each other, or as Charles
Taylor points out, "there is endless relation [Sic.] ofreciprocal conditioning between
global and micro-contexts" (Taylor 1985a: 168). Moreover, what is assumed to be a
binary structure is in fact trinary: much like that order (in The Order ofThings) deemed
intermediate between the structures that regulate and the discourses which rationalise
what we do (OT: xx), Foucault's "micro-physics ofpower" operate at a level sandwiched
"between these great [global and institutionalised] functionings and the bodies themselves
with their materiality and their forces" (DP: 26).
It is important to insist upon this multilevelled and relational operation ofpower, lest one
_.----w--~-._----.-.-~..__ ~_ ~ ._~.. _..J::.:~.-
erroneo,-!sly conclude, as does Taylor, from the idea of the 'multiform production of
.. ----- --.--- _......
relations ofdomination', that "power is a system ofdomination which controls everything
-----_._..,.- ..__.... . . _.-._--------.-------
and which leaves no f09!ll f~r freedom" (Foucault 1987b: 124). On the contrary, for. ~----;
Foucault, "if there are relations ofpower throughout every social field it is because there is
freedom everywhere" (Foucault 1987b: 123); and "people ... are much freer than they feel"
~~
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(Foucault 1988b: 10). Admittedly, his "grand baroque style", combining "splendor and
precision" (Blanchot 1990: 64), was self-consciously aimed at bringing about specific
'effects of truth' , and this dramatic style ofwriting also exacerbated an undeniable
tendency at times to conflate power relations with domination or repression: he once
clearly stated that "techniques ofproduction, techniques of signification or
communication, ... techniques ofdomination" (Foucault & Sennett 1982: 10; Foucault
1993a: 203) as well as technologies of the self are all "associated with a certain type of
domination" because
[e]ach implies certain modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in
the obvious sense of acquiring certain skills but also in the sense ofacquiring certain
attitudes (Foucault 1988b: 18).
In addition, what he initially identified as 'a technology ofdomination' became, on the
same page, first 'a technology ofpower' and then once again 'a technology ofdomination'
(Follcault 1988b: 18). Nevertheless, it can be shown that, in the bulk ofFoucauIt's work,
states ofdomination are conceived ofas very particular and distinct phenomena which
effectively rise and fall, are maintained or transformed and ultimately depend upon mobile,
dispersed and heterogeneous relations ofpower which themselves are as often productive
as repressive, and, moreover, inconceivable without the existence of freedom and the
possibility ofresistance. At stake here is the difference between Foucault's
reconceptualisation ofrelations ofpower as productive and strategic, and prevailing
theories ofpower as sovereignty.
Foucault readily admitted that in his inaugural lecture, "The Order ofDiscourse", he
provided "an inadequate solution" to the problem of "articulating the data ofdiscourse
with the mechanisms ofpower" in that he accepted "the traditional conception ofpower as
an essentially judicial mechanism" (Foucault 1980a: 183), that is, a conception ofpower as
repression (Foucault 1984a: 60). Critics have pointed out that Foucault's first major
publication, Madness and Civilization, also "follows the romantic convention that sees the
exercise ofpower as repression, which is wicked" (Hacking 1986a: 30). Furthermore,
~J
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Foucault revealed that, until his visit to Attica, he had conceived ofexclusion purely as
abstract, functional and constitutive ofsociety:
Through what system ofexclusion, by eliminating whom, by creating what division,
through what game ofnegation and rejection can society begin to function?
(Foucault 1974b: 156)
Thereafter, however, he came to the conclusion that prisons were too complex, costly,
carefully administered and frequently justified not to also possess positive functions
(Foucault 1974b: 156). He defended his early formulations ofpower relations as to some
e},.1:ent warranted, given that, in contrast to the positive power exercised over sexuality, a
"purely negative conception ofpower" was appropriate for analysing the exclusionary
power over madness (Foucault 1980a: 184). However, he accepted that these
formulations had limited validity, since, for example, in the nineteenth century even "the
technology ofmadness changed from negative to positive, from being binary to being
complex and multiform" (Foucault 1980a: 185).
Foucault's views on power relations began to coalesce in Discipline and Punish, but it
was only with the publication of the introductory first volume of The History ofSexuality
that they can be said to have really solidified. Habermas argues that it was at this point
that Foucault replaced "the model ofdomination based on repression (developed in the
tradition ofenlightenment by Marx and Freud) by a plurality ofpower struggles [Cl la
Nietzsche]" (Habermas 1987: 127). The first rule that Foucault had set for himself in his
study of the prison, a rule applicable to any attempt to reconceptualise power relations as
such, was to go beyond the tenacious and predominant conception ofpower relations as
negative and repressive:
Do not concentrate the study ofthe punitive mechanisms on their 'repressive'
effects alone, on their 'punishment' aspects alone, but situate them in a whole series
of their possible positive effects, even if these seem marginal at first sight (DP: 23).
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Similar to the way in which Gramsci declared that Lenin's strategy ofdirectly seizing
control of the autocratic Russian state was unsuitable for dealing with the far more
complex hegemony ofbourgeois democracies (Anderson 1976/77: 20,29), Foucault
suggested that ifpower relations were only repressive they would be much easier to
dismantle (Foucault 197ge: 89; DP: 305): at the very least one could, in the best
traditions ofpolitical philosophy, simply contrast them to freedom and calculate their
limits.
This insight that relations ofpower are positive and productive phenomena, an idea which- -- '-"'--'-~'-" . -.-.'-"_. ~"--~ ~ ~ ~- _. --
we shall consider in greater detail below, formed the basis for Foucault's analytical
.~_.~~> __ ",,~_ ",.. . ',.- - -, __ ·CO. ".
distinction between relations ofpower (or what he also, tellingly, referred to as "strategic
g~es-between liberties") and states ofdomination (or what theories of sovereignty have
ordinarily understood by power) (Foucault 1987b: 130). The former are "variable",
"changeable, reversible and unstable" and allow "different partners a strategy which alters
them" (Foucault 1987b: 114,123). States of dg@n(ltiQn,._Qnlh~_other hand, are "firmly set
_ ..........._~.~---,,~ •... - .- -_··_-_·".._ .. • .. ·,-·,••••_".••__ .~r.~_~,.....~_" __" .•_.,.-~~J
and congealed"; they occur when an individual or group 'blocks a field ofrelations of
power', "renders them impassive and invariable" and prevents "all reversibility of
movement" (Foucault 1987b: 114). Strategic relations ofpower are thus to be
distinguished from states ofdomination, not absolutely, but in the weaker sense that while
all relations ofpower assume social inequalities, few inequalities are so fixed as to be
"""~.
beyond challenge or change. Laclau elaborates:
[A]ll objectivity necessarily presupposes the repression of that which is excluded by
its establishment. To talk ofrepression immediately suggests all kinds of violent
images. But this is not necessarily the case. By 'repression' we simply mean the
external suppression ofa decision, conduct or belief, and the imposition of
alternatives which are not in line with them. An act of-conversion thus means the
repression ofprevious beliefs (1990: 31),
but neither the act nor the repression are necessarily absolute or irreversible. In addition,
Foucault emphasised that states ofdomination themselves need to be rethought as
globalised extrusions of unstable local and strategic relations ofpower: "not the
domination ofthe King in his central position '" but that ofhis subjects in their mutual
Mo
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relations: not the uniform edifice of sovereignty, but the multiple forms of subjugation
that have a place and function within the social organism" (DPS: 232).
These multiple and mutual forms of subjugation are premised on the existence of subjects
capable ofutilising, applying, altering and reversing them, that is, subjects assumed to be
free actors. Power relations thus depend on and are not to be contrasted against freedom.
It follows from this that the commonplace "violence-ideology opposition" (DP: 28; 1979d:
62), in terms ofwhich power relations function either through coercion and constraint or
through the ideological manufacture ofconsent, is inadequate. Free subjects may consent
to violence directed against themselves or others, or forcefully seek to impose consensus;
this can be inferred even from Hobbes' account ofpower in which sovereignty is traced
back to the contractual relationship between mother and child:
Between the child's consent (which does not take the form ofan expressed wish or
a contract) and the mother's sovereignty, which has the goal ofpreserving life, and
the consent ofthe vanquished in the twilight of their defeat there is no substantial
difference (Foucault, quoted in Pasquino 1993: 87 n.24).
Thus, "though consensus and violence are the instruments or the results, they do not
constitute the principle or the basic nature ofpower" (SP: 220) - "power is not a function
ofconsent", even though "consent may be a condition for the existence or the maintenance
ofpower" (SP: 219-220), but nor is the character ofpower mere violence.
Asked whether he would accept an Arendtian distinction between power as domination
and power as consensus, Foucault responded that it might be worthwhile to retain this
distinction as a 'critical idea'; however, "[t]he farthest I would go is to say that perhaps
one must not be for consensuality, but one must be against nonconsensuality" (Foucault
1984a: 379). As will be seen below, Arendt's distinction between power as the capacity
ofa group "to act in concert", and violence as an instrument or tool "for the purpose of
multiplying natural strength" (Arendt 1969: 44-6), corresponds to Foucault's own
distinction between power and violence; yet Arendt would not appear to endorse
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Foucault's view ofpower as a set offorce relations which often violently ifproductively
structure the actions of free beings, nor would Foucault agree that tools of violence, and
not relations ofpower as such, predominate in the.manufacture and augmentation of
human productive capacities.
Whereas violence acts directly upon bodies or things, and can seek only to minimise
resistance (SP: 220), power relations not only depend upon the recognition of '''the other'
(the one over whom power is exercised) ... as a person who acts", but also make possible
"a whole field ofresponses, reactions, results, and possible inventions" (SP: 220; see also
Deleuze 1988: 70). To this extent, violence attempts to suppress the other but power
!
relations perpetually reproduce both the same and the other. Where such a field of
possibilities does not exist, that is, "where the determining factors saturate the whole there
is no relationship ofpower; slavery is not a power relationship when man is in chains" (SP:
221), that is, "a man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over
him. Not power" (Foucault 1981e: 253). This corresponds with Lukes' view that "in a
world characterised by total structural determinism, imposing uniquely determining
constraints upon action, there would be no place for power" (Lukes 1977: 7). It also
illustrates Hoy's (1986: 132-3) point that Foucault is not deterministic about relations of
power: "The technology ofpower does not causally determine particular actions; only
makes them probable". "The characteristic feature ofpower is that some men can more or
less entirely determine other men's conduct - but never exhaustively or coercively"
(Foucault 1981e: 253).
Power relations instead operate indirectly, consisting ofactions which modify the actions
ofothers: "what defines a relationship ofpower is that it is a mode ofaction which does
not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions" (SP: 220).
Power, in constituting the conditions ofpossibility ofaction, is nevertheless not an
ingredient ofevery action: for example, a direct action upon a person, an action, direct or
indirect, upon a body or a thing, and an action, direct or indirect, upon a person incapable
ofaction (or unfree), is not power. However, by treating subjects as active in themselves,
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power relations display one of their most salient characteristics: "[p]ower is exercised
only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (SP: 221). Contrary to our
conventional wisdom which conceives ofpower relations mainly in terms ofdomination
and repression, power relations and freedom are not mutually exclusive:
[F]reedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise ofpower (at the same
time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power to be exerted, and also its
permanent support, since without the possibility ofrecalcitrance, power would be
equivalent to a physica1 determination) (SP: 221; 1982a: 225; 1987b: 123).
It is because people act, in never entirely predictable ways amidst circumstances never
completely predetermined, that they can be said to act freely, even when acting in strict
accordance with one or other constitutive discursive practice.
Slavery, force, coercion and violence may well be the conditions, instruments or results of
relations ofpower, but power is not reducible to any relation which preempts any
possibility ofresistance, refusal or escape, that is, which denies even the most restricted of
free choices.
But ifhe can be induced to speak:, when his ultimate recourse could have been to
hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain
way. His freedom has been subjected to power. He has been submitted to
government. Ifan individual can remain free, however little his freedom may be,
power can subject him to government. There is no power without potential refusal
or revolt (Foucault 1981e: 253)
The relationship between power relations and freedom is thus not a question ofpower
restricting or invading the freedom of individuals - "there are no spaces ofprimal liberty
between the meshes of its [power's] network" (Foucault 1980a: 142) - but ofpower
relations governing freedom and provoking resistance by enjoining free subjects to govern
themselves. As will be argued more fully in the next chapter, both freedom ofthought and
choice, implying sovereignty, and freedom ofaction, implying agency, are simultaneously









hypnosis, in that patients must willingly co-operate with the hypnotist and, allowing
themselves to be subjected to the treatment, are both implicated in the resulting relation of
power and constitute a condition ofpossibility (or determinant) of that relation. Similarly,
one cannot criticise without knowledge of, and thus a degree ofdisciplinary submission to,
that which one criticises (even ifone then proceeds to critically transform that which one
knows), and one cannot play a game without knowing and accepting the rules (even ifone
then proceeds to play the game precisely in order to stretch or modifY the rules).
Finally, it might even be argued that states ofdomination in a pure sense, as described
above - where relations ofpower are fixed and irreversible, and where freedom is entirely
proscribed and resistance is impossible - either do not exist or are exceptionally rare.
Tyranny often requires and indeed calls forth resistance; henchmen, sycophants, those who
are indifferent and those who are afraid make it difficult to clearly identify potential
sources ofresistance; and twentieth century tyrannies like fascism, Stalinism and apartheid
mobilised significant masses of supporters who in turn enjoyed varying degrees of
freedom. Foucault goes so far as to suggest that domination is both "a general structure
ofpower" and at the same time "a strategic situation more or less taken for granted and
consolidated by means ofa long-term confrontation between adversaries" (SP: 226). This
formulation suggests that one way in which one might begin to combat the image that
conjures itself up so easily in the mind, ofpower as negative and repressive, plain
domination which admits ofno weakness, would be to attempt to show (on a different
occasion) how global states ofdomination such as capitalism, patriarchy andrficism were
and are, at least to some extent, productive responses to perceived strategic threats.
In this vein, apartheid could be seen as a colonial settler-inspired establishment and then
defence ofpower and privilege against real and perceived threats ofAfrican hegemo~y;
and patriarchy might be better understood as an ongoing and always contested male
struggle to keep women in subordinate positions. Similarly, capitalism could be conceived
of as a fragile global edifice fashioned out ofcountless anarchical acts by a bourgeoisie
tossed about upon the turbulent waters occasioned by new disciplinary imperatives,
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technological innovation, land enclosures and a rapid increase in 'masterless men', with
the ex-peasant and ex-artisanal working class fighting a rearguard but losing battle against
industrialisation. Western colonialism, too, could be described as the drive on the part of
Europeans to suppress the recognition that their assumed God-given uniqueness was no
more than an insignificant moment amidst a universe of cultural otherness. Of course, the
strategic threats which prompted these strategic responses must themselves be treated as
reactions to prior phases of these perpetual struggles.
To conclude this section, then, states ofdomination, far from exhausting the nature of
power relations, are both the products of, and, at least in a weak sense, remain
characterised by, persisting struggles which may either reinforce or resist ever-mutating
configurations ofpower relations.
[W]hat makes the domination ofa group, a caste, or a class, together with the
resistance and revolts which that domination comes up against, a central
phenomenon in the history of societies is that they manifest in a massive and
universalizing form, at the level of the whole social body, the locking together of
power relations with relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their
interaction (SP: 226).
Thus, notwithstanding circumstances where "the relations ofpower are fixed in such a
way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely limited"
(Foucault 1987b: 123), or where "the practice of liberty does not exist or exists only
unilaterally or is extremely confined and limited" (Foucault 1987b: 114), freedom is still
present and resistance is still possible even ifexisting strategies appear unlikely to reverse
the situation (as in the case of the Victorian wife who stoically capitalises financially and
domestically on her husband's philandering, or the gay or women's liberation movements
which take up and use for their own purposes mainstream myths about homosexuality).
11/ Power relations and resistance
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In the same way that relations ofpower are not reducible to domination, they cannot
simply be contrasted against resistance. The existence of a range ofpossible responses to
actions which act upon our actions, and the dependence of such actions upon the
possibility of such free responses, suggests that a Manichean division between evil power
and good resistance, between the dominant and the dominated, is far too crude an
instnunent for accounting for what is always "a perpetual battle" (DP: 26). Nevertheless,
!
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it is an indication of the Enlightenment-tinted lenses through which Foucault's work has
often been appraised that his conception ofpower relations as omnipresent is criticised for
failing to leave open a space where power's other and opposition - here we shall call it
resistance, though in other contexts it might be called freedom, or truth - can rally itself
and set limits to power's depredations.
It is not difficult to detect the basic presuppositions ofsovereignty underlying this
criticism: first, a 'progressive' space outside ofand standing against 'reactionary' power;
second, the taken-for-granted dichotomies ofpower-resistance, power-freedom and
power-truth - a measure ofhow ingrained in Western 'secular' culture is the Christian
notion that "the truth shall make thee free" (John 8:32), or in more recent terminology,
that enlightenment enables emancipation; and third, the idea that this other ofpower is
both necessary and desirable in order both to hold in check what is supposed to be
inherently negative and repressive and to make possible a Utopia beyond power. This
modem humanist version ofwhat has been called 'self-estrangement theory'''(Fay 1987:
16; see also Meszaros 1970: 28) and which posits that human beings are not only alienated
from themselves but responsible for and capable of transcending this situation, thus
consists in reproaching Foucault for supposedly rendering "tyrranical power"
"irresistible[,] ... unopposable" (Said 1986: 151) and inescapable, and "resistance
incomprehensible and futile" (Lloyd 1993: 438; Dews 1987: 88-94). The iron;' of
investing Foucault's work with assumptions pertinent to self-estrangement theory is that
they do in fact apply: thanks to his own loose and vague comments about 'resistance' ,\.
Foucault was himselfpartly responsible fot·~ffectively misrepresenting himself; but at the
same time he was responsible for offering his audience, in the form oftools fashioned
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within his own oeuvre, means by which they might engage with processes by which they
represent themselves to themselves.
'Resistance' is a concept common to both liberalism and Marxism, albeit tending towards
individualist voluntarism in the former and collectivist activism in the latter. In each,
according to Foucault, the concept is too closely tied to the juridico-political conception
ofpower as sovereignty - in much the same way that the concept of ,repression' is
problematic (DPS: 242). Again in each, it conjures up modernist images of barricades and
batons, of implacable enemies and ever-loyal allies, ofdominators and dominated, and fails
to adequately capture the permanent instability which characterises the immanent and
constitutive fracturing of relations ofpower by confrontations, struggles and strategies.
Power relations are not always imperial, and that which opposes itselfto or resists an
exercise ofpower is not always heroic: at one moment either may comport themselves in
exemplary ways, in the next prove themselves base. Foucauldian aphorisms such as
"where there is power, there is resistance" (HS: 95) are far too glibly quoted and too
hastily interpreted as a licence to surreptitiously reintroduce an untrammeled unitary agent
ofresistance against power (Deacon & Parker 1995: 118). Yet Foucault took pains to
insist that 'resistance' is not something externally opposed to power as a centralised,
homogenous locus but an 'energy' built into power as a dispersed and unstable set of
relations: as he continued in the same sentence, "and yet, or rather consequently, this
resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (HS: 95).
As in much ofFoucault's work, stark dichotomies fall apart to reveal intimate
connections: rather than narrowly conceiving ofpower and resistance as fixed and




Power should be studied not on the basis of the primary terms of the power-relation,
but on the basis of that relation itself, insofar as it determines the elements on which
it bears (Foucault 1980d: 15; emphasis in the original).
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Certainly, "it is not against power that struggles are fundamentally born" (Foucault 1989:
187); instead,
lve must reposition the power relationships within the struggles and not suppose that
kower might exist on one side, and that on the other side lies that upon which power
(would exert itself; nor can we suppose that the struggle develops between power
( and non-power (Foucault 1989: 188).
Resistance is not an external struggle against power, but an internal and dyadic exercise of
power relations, over others as much as over ourselves, and it follows from this that
power relations are complexly manifested by and "sometimes extended by the position of
those who are dominated" (DP: 27). The very presence ofan adversary has often
"supplied the necessary legitimation ofthe rule" (Bauman 1987: 135), and power "exerts
pressure upon [those who are dominated], just as they themselves, in their struggle against
it, resist the grip it has on them" (DP: 27). Take for example the ongoing and
contradictory contestations ofpower inequalities within ostensibly marginalised social
relations: in (butch and femme) lesbian relations, the dominant (male) role may constitute
the other (female) as dependent and nurturing, but in acting as provider may fall into the
trap of (traditional female) self-sacrifice; alternatively, the subordinate (female) role, in
playing out a certain dependency, may learn and master the power to orchestrate that
dependency and thus reconstitute the power relationship in a different form (Martin 1992:
y113). In a more global sense, "[d]estroying the hierarchies on which sexual or racial
\ discrimination is based will, at some point, always require the construction ofother
I exclusions for collective identities to be able to emerge" (Laclau 1990: 33).
Proactive or reactive exercises ofpower include the functioning of those discourses and
forms ofknowledge which at different times may either or both support or criticise a
practice, an institution or a state of affairs. In complex and unstable ways, elements or the
whole ofa discourse can be both an instrument and an effect ofpower relations and a
hindrance or point ofresistance, just as the lack ofdiscourse or silence may either shelter
or render more tolerant a particular exercise ofpower (HS: 101). For example, in the past
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sodomy was treated both with extreme severity (punishment by fire) and with tolerance (in
the existence of societies ofmen within the military, currently frowned upon but still
accepted within the US Army); Moreover, the emergence ofhomosexual discourses
brought about both a plethora ofnew social controls and made it possible for
homosexuality to begin to speak and to demand recognition and legitimation on its own
behalf, often in the same medical vocabulary which had once disqualified it (HS: 101).
Movements of 'sexual liberation' simultaneously make the apparatus of sexuality in which
we find ourselves "function to the limit" and 'surmount' it, by defiantly inventing their
own types of existence even while taking this apparatus as their starting point (Foucault
1977b: 155; 1980a: 219-20). When the suffragettes demanded the extension ofmen's
rights to women, their struggles for equality were in part premised on subjecting
themselves to new rules deemed to be universal and hence liberating. In another example,
the proletariat took up and used for its own purposes and to support its own struggles the
morality imposed on it by the bourgeoisie (though often in a contradictory manner, in that
it embraced bourgeois morality to distinguish itself from 'common' criminals, and hence
both protected itself from extreme forms of bourgeois repression and gave legitimacy to
this repression) (Foucault 1974b: 161).
To the modem bourgeois order, where "alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property, and
Bentham" (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 455), the last named also contributed the model of
that suitably utilitarian device which best exemplifies the complicit functioning of
resistance and power in the form of "a network of relations from top to bottom, but also
to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally ... : supervisors, perpetually
supervised" (DP: 176-7). The Panopticon is "a machine in which everyone is caught,
those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised", regardless of
the fact that "everyone doesn't occupy the same position ... [and] certain positions
preponderate and permit an effect of supremacy to be produced" (Foucault 1980a: 156,
90,200-201; HS: 93-94). Conjured into existence, as it were, by a bumbling bourgeois
sorceror's apprentice, the Panopticon is "an invention that even its inventor is incapable of
controlling" (Michelle Perrot, in Foucault 1980a: 157); efficient, economical and self-
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sustaining, it is a mechanism in perpetual motion, requiring neither fuel nor operator and
directed as much at those who manage it as at those who are to be managed. Educators,
warders, psychiatrists, nurses, all superordinate functionaries of disciplinary institutions
are as much the targets of data-gathering, supervising and normalising power techniques
as their subordinate counterparts, learners, inmates and patients.
Indeed, contrary to the conventional wisdom ofpower as sovereignty, dominant groups
were historically perhaps the first targets for governance. New technologies of sexuality
were applied first to the bourgeoisie, since its "subtle procedures ... could only have been
accessible to small groups ofpeople" (HS: 120). This entailed "the self-affirmation ofone
class rather than the enslavement ofanother" (HS: 123): the working classes were
subjected primarily to the deployment of alliances, and only thereafter to already tried-and-
tested mechanisms of sexualisation such as birth control, the nuclear family and campaigns
against perversions (HS: 122). Similarly, women's consciousness-raising groups first
emerged on a limited scale amongst 'the converted', middle-class white liberals who had
been active in the civil rights and New Left movements and as a result (not that they
would have cared to admit it) were more implicated in capitalist and racist states of
domination than working-class, black or socialist women (Weiler 1991: 457). In another
example, child-centred pedagogies appeared first amongst liberal educators and
progressive movements like those ofMontessori and Dewey, while this century's
increasing emphasis on critical reflection by teachers upon their pedagogical practices
derived from and were directed initially and primarily at middle-class Western educators.
Thus, while what appears from one reading to be modernity's progressive extension of
rights and freedoms to more and more groups and entities (workers, women, blacks,
minorities, pupils, children, those with special needs, underdeveloped countries), is from a
Foucauldian point ofview a process of the constant proliferation ofpower relations first
amongst dominant groups and thereafter their infiltration into the remotest reaches of
social life, along avenues surveyed and charted by science and philosophy.
In its ideal form,
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this architectural apparatus [the Panopticon] should be a machine for creating and
sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, ...
the inmates should be caught up in a power situation ofwhich they are themselves
the bearers
to the extent that they are aware of their permanent visibility regardless of the presence of
an observer (DP: 201). Unlike the traditional fortress-like 'houses of security' ofprevious
centuries, panoptic power does not impose itself upon its objects as iffrom the outside:
The efficiency ofpower, its constraining force have, in a sense, passed over to the
other side - to the side of its surface of application. He who is subjected to a field of
visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints ofpower; he
makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power
relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle ofhis
own subjection,
and to this extent power becomes less corporal (Foucault 1986a: 202-3). The Panopticon
even provides for its own supervision, aside from the fact that its operations will
necessarily be "democratically controlled" (DP: 207): "the director may spy on all the
employees that he has under his orders ... and it will even be possible [for an unannounced
inspector] to observe the director himself' (DP: 204, 250), apart from the fact that,
"enclosed as he is in the middle of this architectural mechanism, ... the director's own fate
[is] entirely bound up with it" to the extent that he would be the first victim ofan epidemic
or a revolt (DP: 204).
Resistances, then, are not merely reactions, ultimately passive, and "doomed to perpetual
defeat" - resistances "are the odd term in relations ofpower; they are inscribed in the latter
as an irreducible opposite" (HS: 96).
[T]here are no relations ofpower without resistances; the latter are all the more real
and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations ofpower are
exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor
is it inexorably frustrated through being in the same place as power; hence, like
(~
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power, resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global strategies (Foucault
1980a: 142).
There is no single, central source ofresistance, but "a plurality ofresistances ....
distributed in irregular fashion .... at varying densities" (HS: 96). Resistance is a
characteristic ofall struggles: it is utilised by superior and subordinate alike and is thus
often indistinguishable from that which is more commonly called power. As Alcibiades
put it to the Athenians on the occasion of the expedition to Sicily during the
Peloponnesian War, "[o]ne does not only defend oneself against a superior power when
one is attacked; one takes measures in advance to prevent the attack from materializing"
(Thucydides 1971: 379). Such measures taken in advance may be justified as forms of
resistance; they are, nevertheless, an example of an exercise of power, albeit by a
nominally subordinate group.
The dependence ofrelations ofpower upon free beings capable ofresisting and not merely
acquiescing suggests that Foucault is as nominalistic about freedom and resistance as he is
about power relations. Like Power with a capital P, resistance as such does not exist; or,
better, resistance is merely an effect ofceaseless clashes between a multitude offorces. It
is in these terms that Foucault's concept ofthe '"plebs''' ought to be understood.
Developed in the context ofremarks on the Gulag, the concept of the 'plebs' - "the
permanent, ever silent target for apparatuses ofpower" - refers neither to a victim nor an
agent; in fact, the 'plebs' is not
the permanent ground of history, the final objective ofall subjections, the ever
smouldering centre ofall revolts. The plebs is no doubt not a real sociological entity
(Foucault 1980a: 137),
and hence it ought not to be confused with "a neo-populism that substantiates the 'plebs'
as an entity, or a neo-liberalism that sanctifies its basic rights" (Foucault 1980a: 138).
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Nevertheless, at the heart ofpower relations "there is an insubordination and a certain
essential obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom" (SP: 225); there is
always something in the social body, in classes, groups and individuals themselves
which in some sense escapes relations ofpower, something which is by no means a
more or less docile or reactive primal matter, but rather a centrifugal movement, an
inverse energy, a discharge (Foucault 1980a: 138).
Far from constituting some natural element against which power happens to strike, the
'plebs' is an intensity, a concentration or force which presents itself only in the presence of
power relations; indeed, it is produced by relations ofpower as both their ever recalcitrant
other and their ever malleable target. The 'plebs' is
not so much what stands outside relations ofpower as their limit, their underside,
their counter-stroke, that which responds to every advance ofpower by a movel)1ent
ofdisengagement. Hence it forms the motivation for every new development of
networks ofpower (Foucault 1980a: 138).
Baudrillard, too, supports this understanding of the other ofpower which is also in power:
I There is something in power that resists as well, and we see no difference here
I
, between those who enforce it and those who submit to it: this distinction has
become meaningless, not because the roles are interchangeable but because power is
in its form reversible, because on the one side and the other something holds out
I
against the unilateral exercise and the infinite expansion ofpower (Baudrillard 1987:
42; emphasis in the original).
Leaving aside Foucault's reservations about the implict populism ofBaudrillard's plebian
'silent majorities' (M.Ryan 1988: 569), the two theorists concur to the extent that power
is conceived as inherent in the relation between things or beings and not in one or other
thing or being.
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IV The inevitability of struggle and the irreducibility of revolt
To understand power in this relational way also suggests that there is little point in asking,
with Habermas (1987: 283-4), Dews (1987: 88-94) or Fraser (1989: 27), why we ought
or ought not to struggle against or resist one or other exercise of power. The question is
pointless because we do not struggle against power but-within relations ofpower which
always involve struggle; one may be able to explain why workers do or do not resist
exploitation, since that depends on the status of their struggle amidst other struggles in a
specific historical context, but one cannot claim that they should or shouldn't struggle.
But ifwe really beg the question, the short answer would be that struggle is not
necessarily preferable to submission, for the latter can have just as significant power-
effects as the former. Like freedom and domination, struggle and submission are not
necessarily opposed, nor even mutually exclusive terms; they are bound together as
elements of "a contest with more than one round" (OT: 385).
While Fraser thinks that what Foucault needs are "normative criteria for distinguishing
acceptable from unacceptable forms of power" (Fraser 1989: 33; see also Calhoun 1995:
119, and Lloyd 1993: 438), she herselffails to offer criteria by which such distinctions
may be made (Bernstein 1991: 149). She appears willing to accept that certain
'constraining' forms ofpower (her terminology) may be productive and hence acceptable -
such as norms of grammar which make meaningful communication possible; rules of the
road which make road-usage viable, safe and efficient; rules oflogic and validity which
govern the formation ofknowledge-claims; and rules ofdecorum and accreditation which
valorise some speakers and not others - but balks at other, unspecified forms ofpower
which involve 'overt or covert coercion' and yet are equally productive (Fraser 1989: 32).
Fraser's lack of specificity here allows one to question her distinction between what is
acceptable and what is unacceptable by imagining forms ofpower which could range from
outright wars ofconquest (yet justifiable in the name of God, or freedom) through torture
and vivisection (which may nevertheless produce truth and promote science) to the
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enforcement of the rights of some to the detriment ofothers (as do various forms of
affirmative action).
More specifically, it is not that some forms ofpower are acceptable and others are not;
any and all forms ofpower may at different times and in different contexts be acceptable
or unacceptable: for example, until recently in the history of the West, the ownership of
slaves, the burning of heretics, t~e torture ofwitnesses and the denial of rights to women,
children and the lower classes was taken to be acceptable; again, until recently, usury,
homosexual relationships and premarital sex were deemed to be unacceptable. Power
relations are neither good nor bad: the use of force is encouraged in cases as far apart as
capit'1-1 crimes and compulsory education; seemingly non-violent relationships ofpower,
I
such as peer pressure, are often frowned upon, and so too are power relationships to
which the victim may have consented in some way, such as date-rape, not to mention
cases where freedom ofchoice may be denied, as in euthanasia (an example of the
hegemony ofbio-power over the right to die).
Hence, let us not blame 'power' for seeking always to govern, always to condition the
field ofpossible actions of others, for this is simply what 'power' does, ubiquitously. Nor
should we blame those who wield (or, alternatively, resist) 'power', for this is simply what
'power' does with one. Rather, we must understand that it is not only that an exercise of
power may seek submission but that an act of submission may also provoke and attract an
exercise ofpower; resistance or the 'plebs' constitute a form ofpower as much as they
stand opposed to power. "I am not blaming those who are resolved to rule [the
Athenians], only those who show an even greater readiness to submit [some Sicilians]" -
thus spake Hermocrates the Sicilian to his warring countrymen, warning of the dangers of
Athenian intervention (Thucydides 1971: 264).
Along with resistance and the 'plebs', Foucault also made reference to "revolt" as an
equally "irreducible" concept. A revolt
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is necessarily a tearing that breaks the thread of history and its long chains of
reasons so that a man can genuinely give preference to the risk ofdeath over the
certitude ofhaving to obey.
Thus another reason why it is neither impossible nor useless to resist is that there is no
power relation capable ofmaking revolt impossible - "Warsaw will always have the ghetto
which revolted and those insurgents who filled its sewers" (Foucault 1981 b: 5).
There are revolts and that is a fact. It is through revolt that subjectivity (not that of
great men but that ofwhomever) introduces itselfinto history and gives it the breath
of life (Foucault 1981b: 8).
There are echoes here of the English Marxist historian E.P.Thompson, for whom it is
through "experience" (or social being's impingement upon social consciousness) that
"structure is transmuted into process, and the subject re-enters into history" (Thompson
1979: 362-63). Foucault's account, however, tends to blur the structure-agency
dichotomy, in that the experience of revolt occupies a field in which subjectivity is as much
an effect as it is an historical datum.
However, the irreducibility ofrevolt offers no guarantee that a revolutionary struggle or a
discourse promoting such astruggle will be immune to being categorised, colonised,
recuperated and pacified. In fact, the rehabilitation ofdiscourse is an everyday reality, "a
part of cultural play" (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 204). Criticisms and alternatives are
always internal to hegemonic discourses (they are their condition ofpossibility, just as
hegemonies are always fractured by deviance); and subjugated or alternative knowledges,
those which differ from and call into question what we take for granted, are often "no
sooner brought to light, ... no sooner accredited and put into circulation, than they run the
risk of re-codification, re-colonisation" (Foucault 1980a: 86; 1987c: 206). Neither bad
nor good, this is a normal phenomenon which must be taken into account.
The moment a kind ofthought is constituted, fixed or identified within a cultural
tradition, it is quite normal that this cultural tradition should take hold of it, make
{~
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what it wants of it and have it say what it did not mean, by implying that this is
merely another form ofwhat it was actually trying to say (Foucault, in Raulet 1983:
204).
An example of such recuperation is the concerted two hundred year old attempt, albeit
only partially successful, to colonise and repatriate the theory and practice of revolution
(Foucault 1981 b: 6), to make people accustomed to it "as interior to a history that is
regarded as both rational and controllable", and in the process legitimising it,
distinguishing its good forms from its bad, fixing its conditions, objectives and means, and
defining the profession of revolutionary (Foucault 1981b: 6). This modem rationalisation
ofrevolt - where power relations produce a knowledge which is also a knowledge of
power relations - is quite evident in the case ofguerrilla warfare, an ancient strategy
distinguished from its modem version (apart from the latter's application to revolutionary
anti-colonial efforts) by the emergence of "a fully fledged doctrine claiming universal
validity" (Navias & Moreman, in Freedman 1994: 311).
Baudrillard has extended Foucault's insight into the scientific taming ofrevolt by arguing
that "[i]n a certain way, psychoanalysis puts an end to the unconscious and desIre, just as
Marxism put an end to the class struggle, because it hypostatizes them and buries them in
their theoretical project" (Baudrillard 1987: 13); indeed, Baudrillard sees Foucault's own
work as 'recuperative', suggesting that Foucault is able to provide such incisive analyses
ofpower relations and ofsexuality "only because power is dead" and because sexuality is
"in the process ofdisappearing" (Baudrillard 1987: 11-13). Baudrillard's suggestion, that
Foucault' s reconceptualisation ofrelations ofpower is itself implicated in struggles around
political theory and practice, cannot be easily dismissed, for Foucault had been grappling
with this problem for years (in fact, it might be said that his entire corpus, as an attempt to
turn the Enlightenment against itself, was an extended commentary on this problem). The
problem had surfaced, as has been shown, in the manner in which Foucault at first treated
power relations simply as negative and repressive (instead ofalso being positive and
productive) and in his initial tendency to conceive ofmadness as an 'essential innocence'
victimised (rather than constructed) by an imperious reason. It also emerged in the
~;r
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context ofhis research into 'ordinary' (as opposed to exemplary) individuals, such as the
murderer Pierre Riviere and the hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin, who appeared as
aberrations within what the Enlightenment saw as the smooth continuity of scientific and
social progress.
In these latter instances, however, Foucault offered a novel account of the process and
effects of the manner in which the power ofWestem reason recuperates its others. In
analysing "The Life ofInfamous Men", Foucault's "dream would have been to restore
their intensity in an analysis", but "there was a risk that they might not pass into the order
ofreasons" intact (Foucault 197ge: 78), precisely because reason had ignored or excluded
them in the first instance: for example, the case ofPierre Riviere had not been
acknowledged, until Foucault, as a 'notable crime', despite its unusually full
documentation (Foucault 1978a: viii). It followed that the least unsatisfactory procedure
was to leave these "lightning-existences" in the same form, assemble them, cite them and
accompany them with some preliminary remarks (Foucault 197ge: 77-78). Thus:
In order that something of this should come across even to us, it was nevertheless
necessary that a beam of light should, at least for a moment, illuminate them. A
light which comes from somewhere else. What rescues them from the darkness of
night ... is an encounter with power (Foucault 197ge: 79).
This 'encounter with power' refers both to the powers which someone like Riviere
encountered and succumbed to in his actual life, as well as to the power relations
associated with Foucault's subsequent excavation ofhis life.
This power which ... spied on them, which pursued them, ... which marked them
with a blow ofits claws, is also the power which instigated the few words which are
left for us of those lives: whether because someone wished to address themselves to
power in order to denounce, to complain, to solicit, to beg, or because power
desired to intervene, and then judged and sentenced in a few words (Foucault
197ge: 79).
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So that it is doubtless impossible ever to recapture them in themselves ...; they can now
only be located when seized in the declamations, the tactical partialities, the imperative
falsehoods which the power games and the relations with power presuppose (Foucault
197ge: 80).
The implication is clear: to bring to light that which has literally been e~tinguished is,
paradoxically, to repeat both its challenge and its silencing. This "most intense point of
lives ... is .. , where they clash with power, struggle with it, endeavour to utilise its forces
or to escape its traps" (Foucault 197ge: 80); and in this chance encounter, through this
"throw ofthe dice", they are ironically once again able to manifest their rage against the
power relations which brought them down (Foucault 197ge: 81). Thus, much ifnot all of
what we know ofRiviere and other 'infamous men' is what relations of power and their
associated knowledges tell us about them, just as all that we know ofmadness is from the
point ofview ofreason and all that we know ofthe Enlightenment is how it conceived and
conceives ofitself Yet it remains possible to know, and draw fruitful and even subversive
implications from, how power relations have suppressed and manufactured, how reason
has rationalised and normalised, and how the Enlightenment has spread across the face of
the globe.
A third reason why struggle and resistance are possible and likely, even ifnot necessary, is
deducible from the fact that all the great systems of domination that have left their mark
on Western history have done so correlative in part to the degree to which they provoked
resistance. Athenian and Roman imperialism, European colonialism, the ancien regime,
fascism and socialism: we remember them as much for the terrible glory of their passing
as for their triumphs and atrocities. Foucault's "initial response" to the question, 'how is
struggle possible?', is instructive: "The movement ofMay [1968] suggests ... [that] the
individuals who were subjected to the educational system, to the most constraining forms
of conservatism and repetition, fought a revolutionary battle" (Foucault 1977a: 223). A
comparable example ofhow systems ofdomination, no matter how imposing, cannot
avoid provoking resistance can be found in the history ofBantu Education in South
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Africa, where students, who had been subjected to a deliberately inferior and oppressive
curriculum, rekindled the struggle against, and played an important role in destabilising,
the apartheid regime.
One can also, from Foucault's ethic ofself-transforrnation, adduce reasons why, at the
very least, one ought not to remain (permanently) passive in the face of power relations:
The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in
the beginning.... What is true for writing and for a love relationship is true also for
life. The game is worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end
(Foucault 1988b: 9).
In other words, there is no ultimate end or direction to history and change; if there were,
the only point to bringing about change would not be to transform oneself, or to become
different, or for the sake ofchange itself, but merely to realise that preordained end, which
is the same as establishing an order which ought never again to be changed. In Foucault' s
universe, it is entirely feasible to call for change for its own sake, without specifYing the
direction or goal ofchange. As Taylor points out, there is, and Foucault does have, "a
value reason for refusing the Enlightenment valuation" (Taylor 1985a: 156); but his value-
laden criticism need not be bolstered by an alternative valuation (though, no doubt, his
criticism is made possible not only by an awareness ofalternative value systems in history
- Greek; Chinese; Catholic; Islamic - but also by the fact that none of these systems,
including the Enlightenment, is internally homogeneous); it is sufficient to ask why it is
that we value certain things (like mainstream Enlightenment conceptions ofknowledge
and power) so much so that we take them for granted.
Nor is one rendered incapable of criticising existing power relations merely because one
cannot stand outside of them: "we can also certainly regret what is bad for us now
without knowing either that things were better before or that proposed ways to mend
things will not actually produce other injustices" (Hoy 1986: 144). One does not have to
believe in a past Golden Age or a future Utopia, or in the essential innocence or
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perfectibility ofhuman beings, or situate one's actions in the context of the search for a
mythical Holy Grail, in order for one not to like, and refuse to accept, contemporary forms
of subjection, or in order to decry specific power relations, examine their operation,
expose their effects and -question their justifications. It is only by assuming ideal selves
and ends that it becomes meaningful for subjects to seek to realise themselves or attain
certain ends; shorn of these assumptions, the political choices and goals ofparticular
subjects become no more and no less than products of the changing histories in which they
are immersed.
In fact, it may be that Foucault is capable ofcriticising power relations because he accepts
his immersion in them. Baudrillard noted that "Foucault's discourse ... is also a discourse
ofpower" (Baudrillard 1987: 9; emphasis in the original); indeed, "Foucault's discourse is
a mirror of the powers it describes" (Baudrillard 1987: 10). But, just like resistance to
power is not inexorably frustrated through being formed at the point where relations of
power are exercised but is all the more real and effective for this, so too does Foucault's
account both reflect and refract modern relations ofpower ofboth sovereign and
disciplinary varieties. Asked, during his debate with Chomsky, why he was so interested
in politics, Foucault responded with his own, personal, 'reason of state': "ifI were to
answer you very simply, I would say this: why shouldn't I be interested? .... The essence
of our life consists, after all, of the political functioning of the society in which we find
ourselves" (Foucault, in Elders 1974: 167-8; emphasis in the original). No doubt the
emphasis here ought to have been on 'shouldn't', in the sense that the ubiquity ofrelations
ofpower in the modem world and their formative role in constituting subjects makes it
well-nigh impossible for one not to be affected by them - or for these relations to persist or
change independently ofhuman action.
Against those who, like Edward Said, lament what they see as "Foucault's unmodulated
minimization ofresistance" and consequently accuse him of pessimism and fatalism (Said
1986: 154), it might be relevant to point out that Foucault's pedigree in this matter is
immaculate: it was Kant who immersed us in the paradox of finding ourselves internal to
.,....
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that which we seek to know, resist or change. As Hacking has argued, "[t]hose who
criticize Foucault for not giving us a place to stand might start their critique with Kant"
(Hacking 1986b: 239). More to the point, though, to claim that "a society without power
relations can only be an abstraction" (SP: 222-3; 1987b: 129; Laclau 1990: 33) does not
entail that a particular relation ofpower is either necessary or repressive, when it could as
well be contingent and benign (Hoy 1986: 144). To suggest that power relations will
always be with us is only fatalist from the perspective ofmodem liberationist activism:
Should it be said that one is always 'inside' power, there is no escaping it, there is
no absolute outside where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any
case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse ofhistory, always
emerging the winner? This would be to misunderstand the strictly relational
character ofpower relationships. Their existence depends on a multiplicity ofpoints
ofresistance: these play the role ofadversary, target, support, or handle in power
relations (HS: 95; see also 1980a: 141-42).
Hence, "[w]e can never be ensnared by power: we can always modify its grip in
determinate conditions and according to a precise strategy" (Foucault 1977b: 160).
As Hoy points out: "Fatalism will result only ifone believes dogmatically that one's
knowledge of the nature ofpower is itselfnot conditioned by power relations" (Hoy 1986:
144). "There is no disillusion without illusion" (Spivak 1987: 123); we despair only
because we still harbour unreasonable hopes; we decry what we see as 'political
pessimism' only because we still believe in Utopia.
Optimism, pessimism, nihilism, and the like are all concepts that make sense only
within the idea ofa transcendental or enduring subject (Hacking 1986a: 39-40),
and, as we shall see in Chapter Five, no such conception of the subject is to be found
within Foucault's work. Finally, to accuse Foucault ofpessimism or fatalism is to assume
that power is everything - that it is an absolute, undeniable truth that power relations are
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inescapable - thus presuming that Foucault's view ofpower relations is itself somehow
objective or external to these relations.
It follows that Habermas is wrong to implicitly associate Foucault's conception of power
relations with the pessimism of Weber's (1992: 181) 'iron cage', where repression
supposedly reigns supreme and from which there is no escape (Habermas 1987: 4, 56).
(Indeed, Weber's metaphor has been rather overworked, especially as it comes from one
who believed that the vocation of the politician - and for Foucault, the essence ofour lives
is political- is, always and necessarily, "to take a stand, to be passionate", in short, to
''fight'' - Weber 1970: 95; emphasis in the original.) Modem societies may be
'disciplinary' but are not 'disciplined' - their others (traditional societies as well as internal
rural margins, global blocs, organisations and corporations as well as internal excluded
minorities, the poor, women and new social movements) deny them the possibility ofever
fully constituting themselves in the form of 'total', disciplined, societies (even ifat the
same time these others spur them on, in vain pursuit of this totalitarian nightmare, to
maintain their coherence in the face oftheir fragility). Though, on the one hand, the
modem tendency is undoubtedly towards uniformisation, the totally disciplined society is
as mythical as utopian harmony (the mistake ofAdorno and Horkheimer (1979) was to
believe that the impossibility of the latter meant the triumph ofthe former). This is
because, on the other hand, social differences are irreducible: difference is precariously
grounded upon the shifting sands ofconstituted social identities (the mistake ofall
imperialists as well as the architects ofapartheid was to believe that differences could be
fixed). Modem society is neither an iron cage nor liable to disintegrate, but a shifting and
unstable matrix ofrelations ofpower and knowledge which generate free and active
subjects.
Power is not omnipotent or omniscient - quite the contrary! .... If it is true that so
many power relationships have been developed, so many systems ofcontrol, so
many forms ofsurveillance, it is precisely because power was always impotent
(Foucault 1989: 183-4).
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Were such a thing as power with a capital 'P' to exist outside of the (admittedly power-
laden) human sciences, it would have to be understood not as "a deterministic divine will,
but as a perpetual bumbler, preparing the ground for the insurrections against him" (Butler
1990: 28).
Modern mechanisms ofpower, whether one focuses on prisons or schools, markets or
states, have, despite their pervasiveness, been ineffective even in their own terms. In fact,
it is this very failure that justifies the need for yet more administration and for the further
refinement of technologies ofpower: the more failures occur, the more the authorities
hire experts, invest additional resources, build more facilities, produce new analyses and
offer alternative solutions, which in turn increases the probability of failures while
simultaneously obscuring the authorities' complicity - and the cycle repeats itself Thus
the less discipline succeeds, the more it becomes necessary (Smart 1985: 106; Gordon
1980: 255).
The spread ofnormalization operates through the creation ofabnormalities which it
then must treat and reform. By identifYing the anomalies scientifically, the
technologies ofbio-power are in a perfect position to supervise and administer them
(Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 195-6).
Consider, for example, the positive functions served by the failure ofthat institution so
central to modernity: the prison. At the very least, the prison serves to differentiate and
regulate illegalities, limiting some, using others (DP: 272). "For the observation that
prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps substitute the hypothesis that prison has
succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency ... " (DP: 277), a controlled illegality
which can be supervised, used against crime per se (informers) but also politically (agents
provocateurs) and economically (strike-breakers) and as "an agent for the illegality ofthe
dominant groups" through the extraction ofprofit from prostitution, arms and drugs
trafficking and the illegal sale of alcohol (DP: 279-80), not to mention white-collar crime
as such.
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To suggest that "a society without power relations can only be an abstraction" (SP: 222-
3), does not imply that this or that specific relation ofpower will never perish or be
transformed, and thus need not lead to indifference or feelings of impotence. Short ofa
world without power relations, it becomes increasingly urgent that modern forms of
political action cease to aspire to Armageddon and begin to focus on how to persistently
undermine existing, and prevent the formation of future, states ofdomination. Foucault's
very argument is in fact a weapon and a stake in the near-permanent civil war which
power relations engender. Not only is power an "essentially contested" concept (Lukes
1974: 9), but it is involved in its own definition: to say something different about power
(say, that power is productive) is in itself an effect ofpower relations and a resistance to
(or redefinition of) power relations (defined, for example, as repressive). As Dreyfus and
Rabinowargue, when Foucault "shows that the practices ofour culture has produced both
objectification and subjectification, he has already loosened the grip, the seeming
naturalness and necessity these practices have" (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 203). It
follows, too, that, as 'effects ofpower', Foucault's analyses and arguments themselves
(not to mention those ofhis sympathisers and not least his opponents) stimulate the
production ofknowledge: it "makes all the more politically necessary the analysis of
power relations in a given society, their historical formation, the source of their strength or
fragility, the conditions which are necessary to transform some or abolish others" (SP:
223).
An historical analysis ofWestern political rationalities, as outlined in Chapter Three, is
thus necessary not in order to tame power relations, but to expose them. Indeed, "[t]he
failure of the major political theories nowadays must lead not to a non-political way of
thinking but to an investigation ofwhat has been our political way of thinking during this
century" (Foucault 1988b: 161). This 'political way of thinking , is quite different to that
of the previous century:
If the workers' misery - this subexistence - caused the political thinking of the 19th
century to revolve around the economy, then fascism and Stalinism - these
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superpowers - induce political anxiety in our current societies (Foucault 1977b:
158).
As is clear frOl1). the history ofMarxism, the conception ofthe political (and of the
'superstructure' generally) has over time become an increasingly central analytical focus,
in spite of a continued insistence on the primacy of the economic (Laclau & Mouffe 1985),
and it is precisely this once-attenuated conception of the political that Foucault identified
as the "missing term" between a Marxist theory of the bourgeois state and the hope of its
future withering away, namely, "the analysis, criticism, destruction, and overthrow ofthe
power mechanism itself' (Foucault 1976b: 459). Foremost amongst such Marxist theories
of the state has been the work ofNicos Poulantzas, whose own analytical trajectory
explicitly included an examination of fascism (Poulantzas 1979). The difficulties of
accounting for fascism and Stalinism in terms ofclassical Marxist theory, and the urgent
need to do so, is thus one indication ofhow these two "pathological forms" or "diseases of
power" (SP: 209) have left their mark on the twentieth century's 'political way of
thinking'; another more mundane reason why fascism and Stalinism have induced an
examination ofthe political (instead ofthe economic) is simply that both fascism and
Stalinism emphasised direct state control of society, both being built around charismatic
leaders made possible by the spread ofdisciplinary forms ofgovernment.
V Transgressing the law
Let us return to what Foucault had to say about 'the strictly relational character ofpower
relationships' and their'dependence on a multiplicity ofpoints of resistance', and try to
understand exactly what he meant by this. To start with, this is to suggest that one takes
"the forms ofresistance against different forms ofpower [or "the antagonism of
strategies"] as a starting-point", resistances and antagonisms which take the form of
"opposition to the power ofmen over women, ofparents over children, ofpsychiatry over
the mentally ill, ofmedicine over the population, ofadministration over the ways people
live" (SP: 211). Fraser suggests that this involves a kind of "politics ofeveryday life":
188
For ifpower is instantiated in mundane social practices and relations, then efforts to
dismantle or transform the regime must address those practices and relations (Fraser
1989: 26).
By starting not from those places or institutions in which power is commonly said to be
located, but from the infinitely varied everyday responses to the workings of such alleged
power~possessing locales, one might become more aware of the interweaving of those
forces which act upon and react to our actions and counteractions.
Consider, for example, an action which transgresses a law: whereas theories of
sovereignty would examine the action and the law as separate entities before judging
either that a transgression did take place and ought to be punished, or that the law had not
been transgressed, what was far more interesting for Foucault was the effect and
dependence ofaction and law upon each other.
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being they
possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, reciprocally,
transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit composed of illusions
and shadows (Foucault 1977a: 34).
The limit and transgression are thus inseparable in their opposition: "Each constitutes for
the other a kind ofpermanent limit, a point ofpossible reversal" (SP: 225). On the one
hand, the limit calls transgression into being and gives it its form:
Transgression is an action which involves the limit, that narrow zone ofa line where
it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its
origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses
(Foucault 1977a: 33-34).
In similar vein, limitations pIcked upon actions do not merely prohibit but may also
provoke reactions:
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The law is the outside that envelops conduct, ... opening around it a space of
uneasiness, ofdissatisfaction, ofmultiplied zeal.
And oftransgression (Foucault 1990b: 34).
On the other hand, "it is not possible to threaten the existence of something without
simultaneously affirming it" (Laclau 1990: 27). Transgression reaffirms the limit even as it
surpasses it, for
transgression forces the limit to face the fact of its imminent disappearance, to find
itself in what it excludes (perhaps, to be more exact, to recognize itselffor the first
time, to experience its positive truth in its downward fall ...) (Foucault 1977a: 34).
Indeed, one cannot know or experience the limits of the law without overstepping them:
"How can one see its invisibility unless it has been turned into its opposite, punishment,
which, after all, is only the law overstepped, irritated, beside itself?" (Foucault 1990b: 34-
5).
However, ifpunishment could be provoked merely by violating the law, the violator would
be in control ofthe law itself, and would, in effect, become the law. Yet the extent to
which transgression seeks to avoid becoming law is the extent to which it ceases to
transgress and ends up buttressing it:
That is why transgression endeavors to overstep prohibition in an attempt to attract
the law to itself; ... ; it obstinately advances into the opening ofan invisibility over
which it will never triumph; insanely, it endeavors to make the law appear in order
to be able to venerate it and dazzle it with its own luminous face; all it ends up doing
is reinforcing the law in its weakness ... (Foucault 1990b: 35).
Anyone who attempts to oppose the law in order to found a new order, to organize a
second police force, to institute a new state, will only encounter the silent and infinitely
accommodating welcome ofthe law (Foucault 1990b: 38).
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[T]o imagine another system is to extend our participation in the present system
(Foucault 1977a: 230).
It is in this sense of the intimate embrace between the law and transgression that power
relations can be said to produce resistance, and that resistance can provoke power. In a
similarly intimate fashion, the power relations which shore up a reactionary state are the
same relations which make possible a revolutionary people, in the sense that resistance is
internal to power relations:
the state consists in the codification ofa whole number ofpower relations which
render its functioning possible, and ... revolution is a different type ofcodification of
the same relations (Foucault 1984a: 64).
Thus states and revolutions are inextricably intertwined, not just because successful
revolutionaries often have little choice but to re-establish state apparatuses but because
relations ofpower presuppose corresponding points ofresistance. "[S]omewhat similar to
the way in which the state relies on the institutional integration ofpower relationships",
argued Foucault, "it is doubtless the strategic codification of these points ofresistance that
makes a revolution possible (HS: 96). 'Codification', here, implies that "[e]ven in the
most radical and democratic projects, social transformation ... means building a new
power, not radically eliminating it" (Laclau 1990: 33).
Foucault tied all this together with a striking simile worthy ofa successor ofNietzsche:
Transgression, then, is not related to the limit as black is to white, the prohibited to
the lawful, the outside to the inside .... Rather, their relationship takes the form ofa
spiral which no simple infraction can exhaust. Perhaps it is like a flash of lightning
in the night which, from the beginning oftime, gives a dense and black intensity to
the night it denies, which lights up the night from the inside, from top to bottom,
and yet owes to the dark the stark clarity ofits manifestation, its harrowing and
poised singularity ... (Foucault 1977a: 35; see also 1971a: 112).
""".
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Resistance is like 'a flash of lightning in the night' ofpower relations; it is like the sound
that shatters the silence that forever enfolds it. Theories of power ~s sovereignty conceive
ofresistance as aiming to overthrow or defend against power, and ofpower as seeking to
put down resistance and quell opposition. Foucault's understanding ofpower relations as
an "antagonism ofstrategies" does not so much reject or deny power as sovereignty as
point to the interconnections between, and nuances of, the contending forces; here, every
strategy is locked into a perpetual spiral of action and reaction, to the extent that the effect
ofan exercise ofpower could be as well to strengthen instead ofweaken its target, and an
act ofresistance may, instead ofwarding offpower, bring it even more quickly into play.
The Allied demand for the unconditional surrender ofAxis forces during World War n, an
act ofpower made ironically at the moment oftheir greatest weakness, provides an
example of such unintended or unexpected consequences. On the one hand, the demand,
in the context of subsequent Allied victories, weakened the resolve ofa failing Italy which
entered into secret negotiations for an armistice, and the collapse ofItaly in turn hastened
the end of the war in Europe and forced Germany to sue for peace in May 1945. On the
other hand, the demand stiffened Japanese resistance and kamikaze attacks in the Pacific,
which in turn were used to justifY the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Even when clearly antagonistic strategies collide the outcome is seldom
preordained: the transformation ofthe clash between apartheid and anti-apartheid forces
into an extraordinarily peacefully negotiated settlement is a case in point (but for an
alternative point ofview, see: de Kadt 1997).
To conclude this section, it is worthwhile returning to our starting point, namely, the
accusation that Foucault, in supposedly conceiving ofpower relations as little more than
domination, leaves no room for resistance, struggle or transformation. Such accusations
commonly cite Foucault's (1977a) article on "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", which is
filled with polemical formulations. For example:
Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs
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each of its violences in a system ofrules and thus proceeds from domination to
domination (Foucault 1977a: 151).
Again: history is about "various systems of subjection: not the anticipatory power of
meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations" (Foucault 1977a: 148). Formulations
such as these are also not confined to this particular text: "We have known for a long
time", recounts Foucault, "that humanity does not start out from freedom but from
limitation and the line not to be crossed" (Foucault 1995: 293).
What Foucault's critics routinely ignore, however, is the very next paragraph in
"Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", which immediately broaches the issue of resistance, or
better, the strategic relationship of forces engaged in struggle:
The nature ofthese rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and the
resurgence ofnew forces that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in power.
Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can
be bent to any purpose. The successes ofhistory belong to those who are capable
of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so
as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had
initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it
function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules (Foucault 1977a:
151).
Despite lurching thus from "domination to domination", rules continue to be violently
formulated, applied and modified, and rulers continue to be violently opposed, overthrown
and replaced. "What is most dangerous in violence is its rationality" (Foucault 1980e: 4):
violence does not dispense with rules but makes them all the more necessary; indeed, the
existence ofrules makes it possible for states of domination to be both established and
contested. Such rule-governed contestation in turn allows for current rulers to be played
and defeated at their own game, much as administrative unification and bureaucratic
rationalisation under the ancien regime made the French Revolution possible, and similar
to the way in which most Eastern European communist regimes were toppled from within
by the 'velvet revolutions' of 1989.
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The question to be asked is thus not, 'How can we resist (power), given that resistance is
already power?'. Instead, the question is, 'To what extent can a particular relation of
power prevail, to the extent that it calls forth and depends on particular forms of
resistance?'. The rules of the game, the structures that govern society, the relations of
power that constitute subjects and produce knowledge - all these depend upon the degree
to which the rules are transgressed, the structures undermined, the relations ofpower
imbued with freedom and resistance. The rules of the game do not fix or determine what
can or cannot be done; they merely specify the extreme outer limits of illegality, the point
at which an action is deemed to be transgressive. As Deleuze puts it: "Law administers
illegalisms: some it allows ...; others it tolerates ... ; others again it forbids ..." (Deleuze
1988: 29). Contrary to both popular beliefand received wisdom, social life is not
essentially lawful or rule-governed but lamentably marred by occasional outbreaks of
violence or illegality. Rather, "the deepest root ofviolence and its permanence come out
of the form ofrationality we use" (Foucault 1980e: 4); transgression exudes from every
social pore, and thereafter is more or less rationalised and regulated. It is thus insufficient
merely "to denounce violence or to criticise an institution"; "[w]hat has to be questioned is
the form ofrationality at stake" (Foucault 1981e: 254). Asking this question "is the only
way to avoid other institutions, with the same objectives and the same effects, from taking
their stead" (Foucault 1981e: 254; in Elders 1974: 172). The point is not to peer up in
awe at the king, but to expose and explore the multiple, everyday and seemingly
innocuous fractures upon which the king relies; it is a question ofexpanding and
exploiting the realms of illegality and otherness, not seeking to tackle the law and
rationality head on.
Power relations, for Foucault, are thus not reducible to a one-sided domination, for even
states ofdomination, in the strong sense, are rule-governed. Resistance and struggle arise,
become generalised and find their unity in and through the interstices ofeven such
apparently fixed and irreversible relations ofpower: "The generality of the struggle
specifically derives from the system ofpower itself, from all the forms in which power is
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exercised and applied" (Foucault 1977a: 217); "the system it [the struggle] opposes, as
well as the power exercised through the system, supplies its unity" (Foucault 1977a: 230).
And this system ofpower, like all systems, is never complete in that it depends upon the
freedoms it attempts to exclude and the resistances it tries to suppress; it is thus
inappropriate to describe these resistances as being 'co-opted into the system', and far
more accurate to treat them as mechanisms which, starting from the realities of subjection,
or normalisation, or commodification, "attempt to control [these realities] socially, not to
wage a merely defensive struggle against an apparently self-regulating and inexorable
structure" (Laclau 1990: 52). In every case, power relations and resistance do not stand
opposed to each other but are intertwined: the lightning oftransgression and resistance
splits and illuminates the darkness of the (lawlike but often not lawful) relations ofpower
upon which it depends.
VI Power relations as war or strategy
Foucault concludes Discipline and Punish with a call to reconceptualise power relations
in terms ofwar or strategy rather than domination and repression:
what ultimately presides over all these [disciplinary] mechanisms is not the unitary
functioning ofan apparatus or an institution, but the necessity ofcombat and the
rules of strategy [;] ... consequently, the notions of institutions ofrepression,
rejection, exclusion, marginalization, are not adequate to describe, at the very centre
of the carceral city, the formation of the insidious leniencies, unavowable petty
cruelties, small acts of cunning, calculated methods, techniques, 'sciences' that
permit the fabrication of the disciplinary individual. In this central and centralized
humanity ... we must hear the distant roar ofbattle (DP: 308).
To understand power relations in this way, as a continuous confrontation of small-scale
forces or local strategies with particular as opposed to universal objectives, "a perpetual
battle rather th~n a contract regulating a transaction or a conquest ofa territory" (DP: 26),
is to allow one to describe it, using a term which has recently become current, as an
"agonism": a combat, a competition or "a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal
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incitation and struggle; less ofa face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than
a permanent provocation" (SP: 222; Gray 1995: 68).
In fact, in this perpetual war there are far more than just two sides:
This is just a hypothesis, but I would say it's all against all.... Who fights against
whom? We all fight each other. And there is always within each ofus something
that fights something else (Foucault 1980a: 208).
Consequently the basic model for politics is not competing interest groups nor conflicting
classes but is literally a war of all against all, where all are suffused by the will to power
which Hobbes considered to be the "generall inclination ofall mankind, a perpetuall and
restlesse desire ofPower after power, that ceaseth onely in Death" (Hobbes, quoted in
Berki 1977: 134; Hobbes 1962: 80), and where the protagonists consist of, or themselves
contain, fragile and transitory coalitions composed of "individuals, or even sub-
individuals" (Foucault 1980a: 208). Unlike Hobbes' naturalist and proto-liberal vision,
however, there is no ultimately sovereign power which calculates threats and risks posed
by others and seeks, through Jeffersonian mechanisms such as the separation ofpowers
and other checks and balances, to avoid war - or better, to constitutionalise it (Foucault
1980d: 18; Pasquino 1993: 80-1). Nor are there any written or unwritten moral rules
capable in the last instance ofneutrally arbitrating between antagonists: "One makes war
to win, not because it is just" (Foucault, in Elders 1974: 182). FromFoucault's
perspective, this "total war" does not exhaust itselfin its contradictions, renounce violence
and end by submitting to civil laws:
On the contrary, the law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the
promised blood, which permits the perpetual instigation ofnew dominations and the
staging ofmeticulously repeated scenes ofviolence (Foucault 1977a: 151).
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This is not to say that anything goes in this world ofwar, or that there are no rules; rather,
the rules themselves are forged in combat and, like a blacksmith's creations, may prove to
be well-tempered and long-lasting or brittle and short-lived.
In contrast, therefore, to the liberal and Marxist schema's which conceive ofpower as
sovereignty, Foucault proposed that analysing power "in terms ofstruggle, conflict and
war ... would ... confront the original hypothesis, according to which power is essentially
repression, with a second hypothesis to the effect that power is war, a war continued by
other means" (Foucault 1980a: 90; emphasis in the original). Although not an original
formulation - consider Mao Zedong's aphorism that "[p]olitics is bloodless war, while war
is the politics ofbloodshed" (in Freedman 1994: 320) - Foucault made great play of thus
reversing von Clausewitz's dictum that "[w]ar is ... a continuation ofpolitical activity by
other means" (cited in Freedman 1994: 207). He elaborates:
It may be that war as strategy is a continuation ofpolitics. But it must not be
forgotten that 'politics' has been conceived as a continuation, ifnot exactly and
directly ofwar, at least of the military model as a fundamental means ofpreventing
civil disorder.
This idea ofpolitics as war has both a theoretical and an empirical basis. Theoretically, in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, broadly contemporaneous with the work of
Hobbes, a beliefmanifested itself in England which presupposed the inadequacy ofthe
judicial model of sovereignty, conceived ofpolitics as war and accorded primacy to a
theory ofhistory as a struggle between classes or races (Foucault 1981c: 238). The
influence of this discourse has been widespread and amply evident in socialism, Marxism,
Darwinism and fascism (Foucault 1980d: 19), not to mention in Nietzsche and in
Foucault's own work. In part, perhaps, this discourse on war was itself an effect of the
increasing appropriation by Europe's centralising states of the institutions and practices of
war and their subordination to the technical and professional control ofa specific military
apparatus; in this wa~ "a society entirely permeated by war-relations was gradually
replaced by a State equipped with military institutions" (Foucault 1980d: 16).
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Empirically, the army amassed by each of the emerging nation-states ofeighteenth century
Europe "guaranteed civil peace no doubt because it was a real force, an ever-threatening
sword, but also because it was a technique and a body ofknowledge that could project
their schema over the whole social body" (DP: 168). Politics between these states was
often resolved by military strategy; simultaneously, the eradication of internal dissension
and the maintenance ofcivil peace was a matter ofmilitary tactics, albeit carried out
increasingly by the multiplying micro-powers ofdisciplinary society (DP: 168). Thus, at
this moment when the Enlightenment was inventing the disciplines which underpinned its
discovery ofcivil liberties (DP: 222), the knowledge-effects ofrelations ofpower became
as important in subjecting an individual or a population as the power-effects of
knowledge: as Kant put it with reference to Frederick the Great, only a ruler who is both
enlightened and "has at hand a well-disciplined and numerous army to guarantee public
security" may profitably dare to encourage his subjects to criticise and question (Kant
1996: 56).
The functions and the types ofobjectives pursued by the modem state and its apparatuses,
with their twin trajectories of totalisation and individualisation, are doubtless ofmajor
significance for any contemporary understanding ofpolitics and power relations. So too
are the acts, desires and interests of those who wish to maintain their privileges,
accumulate profit, operate statutory authority or exercise a trade (SP: 223). Yet relations
ofpower are much too widespread and complex to be reduced to or explained by any set
ofapparatuses or institutions, let alone their plans, objectives or intentions.
[T]here is no power that is exercised without a series ofaims and objectives .... [but]
... let us not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality ... the
rationality ofpower is formed by ... tactics which, becoming connected to one
another, attracting and propagating one another, but finding their base of support




although it is true that its [disciplinary power's] pyramidal organization gives it a
'head', it is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power' and distributes
individuals in this pennanent and continuous field (DP: 177).
Foucault's analysis, without denying that power relations often appear to radiate out to
the rest of society from either a Hobbesian Leviathan or a Rousseauesque general will,
sought to isolate not the source ofpower relations but the network of interlocking
strategies which in themselves are neither authoritarian nor contractarian. At the centre of
the 'carceral city', he suggested,
there is, not the 'centre ofpower', not a network of forces, but a multiple network
ofdiverse elements - walls, space, institution, rules, discourse; ... the model ofthe
carceral city is not, therefore, the body ofthe king, with the powers that emanate
from it, nor the contractual meeting ofwills from which a body that was both
individual and collective was born, but a strategic distribution ofelements of
different natures and levels (DP: 307).
Whatever else the events ofMay 1968 may have signified, they demonstrated that power
relations are not centralised in a single state apparatus, but are localised even in apparently
revolutionary parties and trade unions (such as the Parti Communiste Franr;ais and the
Confederation Generale de Travail) (Kritzman 1988: x-xi). While these "power relations
do indeed 'serve'" the 'interests' offormidable groups and institutions, this is "not at all
because they are 'in the service of' an economic interest taken as primary [as Marxism
claims], rather because they are capable of being utilised in strategies" (Foucault 1980a:
142).
Thus, rather than examining a unitary power as it manifests itself in the centre as state or
sovereign or law, we should investigate strategic relations ofpower which, in "their
multiplicity, their differences, their specificity, their reversibility" (Foucault 1980d: 15), are
often treated as marginal to and on the margins of those great centralised systems to which
theories ofsovereignty pay homage (DPS: 233). Their multiplicity: "they define
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innumerable points ofconfrontation, focuses of instability, each ofwhich has its own risks
of conflict, of struggles, and ofan at least temporary inversion of the power relations"
(DP: 27). Their differences: relations ofpower differ in terms of their effects, their
objectives, how they come into being and how they are institutionalised and rationalised
(SP: 223-4; 1989: 188). Their specificity: though there are continuities between global
states ofdomination and local tactics ofpower, they are neither analogous nor
homologous; the latter enjoy "a specificity ofmechanism and modality" (DP: 27; cited in
Davidson 1995: 276). Their reversibility: given their multiplicity and their dependence
upon freedom, relations ofpower allow for modifications in the manner in which subjects
act upon and react to the actions of themselves and others. For example,liberal welfare
state institutions, through the privatisation ofrisk and insurance, and the supplementation
or replacement of social work with private counselling, self-help manuals and telephone
help lines, implanted into citizens norms originally handled by state apparatuses, and made
possible "precisely the 'reversibility' ofrelations of authority - what starts off as a norm to
be implanted into citizens can be repossessed as a demand which citizens can make of
authority" (Rose 1993: 296).
In reconceptualising power relations as war or strategy, Foucault not only made reference
to, but appears to have been quite strongly influenced by, his studies (in 1975 and 1976) of
that seventeenth century discourse on war which was convinced that "laws were born in
the midst ofexpeditions, conquests, the burning ofcities" (Foucault 1980d: 16; Pasquino
1993: 80). No doubt his early an4 abiding interest in Nietzsche's view ofhistory as a
perpetual struggle offorces against each other, adverse circumstances and themselves
(Foucault 1977a: 149) had a lot to do with it. However, he also expressed reservations
about the 'war-repression' schema and suggested that it be reconsidered (Foucault 1980a:
92). For one thing, the concept ofrepression is problematic in that it is a juridical one
which both refers to sovereignty and derives from the disciplinary realms of the human
sciences (DPS: 242). For another, power relations can be coded or strategically
integrated in the form of 'war' or in the form of 'politics' - but only partly, never totally
(HS: 93). Thirdly, before we conclude, overhastily, that war is "a primary and
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fundamental state of things" and "the nucleus ofpolitical institutions", we should first ask:
"how and when did the beliefarise that it is war that functions in power relations, that an
uninterrupted combat 'works' (travail/e) peace, and that civil order is fundamentally a
battle-order?" (Foucault 1980d: 16).
Foucault appears to be suggesting, consistent with his notion of 'power-knowledge', that
conceptions ofpower are themselves stakes in power struggles (AK: 120), and that any
attempt to reconceptualise power has repercussions at the levels ofboth politics and
theory. His own efforts are no exception; in this respect, however, despite his cautionary
tone, among his last words on the issue was to answer the following question in the
affirmative: ifwe conceptualise power relations "in terms ofrelations offorce, must we
then decipher it following the general form ofwar?" (Foucault 1980d: 15). The History of
Sexuality, originally conceived of as a six-volume project whose whole point lay in "a re-
elaboration ofthe theory of power" (Foucault 1980a: 187), reinforced what had been
proposed in Discipline and Punish: a "strategical model" ofpower relations, drawing on
essential notions offorce and war in Western societies (HS: 102).
The great strength ofFoucault's reconceptualisation ofpower relations in terms of
struggle, combat, war and strategy is that it is also able to account for those characteristics
attributed to power by theories of sovereignty, that it is negative, repressive, centralised
and homogeneous. Power relations conceived ofas "a form ofunspoken warfare",
inscribed in social institutions, economic inequalities, language and individual bodies
(Foucault 1980a: 90; HS: 93; 1980d: 16), allow for the existence ofconcentrations of
power and epic confrontations. It recognises the existence of clearly demarcated front
lines, where enclosures force peasants off the land, patriarchy imposes glass ceilings or
unions withhold their labour; it acknowledges that behind these lines some might find safe
'rear areas' (such as the domestic sphere for a male captain of industry) - areas which
others (feminists) might see as occupied territories. There are, thus, strategic objectives
(aims), astute generals (intentions), overwhelming victories and unconditional surrenders
(ireversible effects ofdefeat and domination). But more often than not relations ofpower
~.
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are characterised by slight adjustments to the balance offorces, modifications in one's
strategic position, mobile defenses, weak probes, tactical withdrawals and limited gains,
interspersed with the occasional heroic resistance or cunningly-executed ambush. One
side seldom overwhelms or totally defeats the opponent (not even when one's demand is
for 'unconditional surrender', as the economic resurgence ofthe defeated powers in
World War II makes clear). Instead, one 'inflicts a reverse' upon them; one 'pins them
down'; one forces a withdrawal; one beats off a counter-attack; one goes over to the
offensive (or defensive); one mobilises, encircles, feints, outflanks, cuts supply lines,
reconnoitres, deceives, surprises, out-manoeuvres or retreats. In short, one battle is
unlikely to win the war: just as there are 'orders of battle' , so permanent provocation is
the 'order' of the day.
Most importantly, the war is continuous; strategies continue to be formulated, even by the
vanquished, in response to other strategies, taking into account the state ofthe war as a
whole and the alignment offorces. And even this total war is seldom zero-sum: "it does
not obey the law ofall or nothing" (DP: 27; Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 58; Poulantzas 1980:
132); one seldom 'wins' or 'loses' outright, one 'gains' or 'takes losses'. Power as war is
far more like a continuous series ofoverlapping border clashes, perhaps interspersed with
'surgical strikes', rather than an all-out assault upon the enemy capital; it is limited, not
blitzkrieg, controlled but no less devastating: the production ofdestruction. Since 1945
at least, war has ceased to be announced by formal declarations ofwar and prosecuted
almost exclusively by regular troops in clearly demarcated zones. Instead, wars have no
fronts, are fought by half-trained guerrillas, last for decades, cause huge civilian casualties
and force mass migrations ofrefugees. But perhaps the best model for this notion of
power as limited war is the Gulf War, in which a numerically superior Iraqi army was first
contained, then rendered incapable ofresistance and finally forced to surrender en masse
by Western (though primarily United States) airpower and electronic counter-measures
backed up by technologically advanced land and naval forces; and yet leaving the
vanquished foe with its territory intact and its government uncontested, thus allowing for
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the continuation of the struggle by other (economic and diplomatic) means (see also Gray
1997).
Conventional understandings ofpower tend to conflate strategy and tactics, indeed, even
subordinate local tactics to the grand strategies of global forms of domination. For
example, the local, tactical struggles ofworking women against the additional burden of
unpaid domestic labour, ofnationalist movements against colonial rule or blacks against
racial discrimination, and even of striking workers against scab labour, were rarely
considered by Marxist theorists as more than either marginal, subordinate or reducible to
the global class struggle ofproletarians against capital. Foucault, on the other hand, while
not denying the importance ofglobal strategies, emphasised the importance ofeveryday
tactical engagements upon which broader struggles depend, to the extent that local
successes or failures are not merely temporary and secondary hiccups but may well sound
the death-knell for one or other primary global strategy:
one must conceive ofthe double conditioning ofa strategy by the specificity of
possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work (HS:
100).
For example, it has been argued that the dramatic transformation ofwarfare during the
French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was less a result ofrevolutionary passion, the
character of a nation or the military genius ofa Napoleon or a Wellington, than ofa
number ofsmall, relatively inconsequential tactical - ordisciplinary - innovations
(columnar or 'impulse' movement, more effective use ofcombined arms, the proximity of
reserves, divisional organisation, multiple axes ofoperation, greater flexibility and timing)
upon higher-level strategic actions (Nosworthy 1995: 86-99; c£ Finer 1975: 149-150).
More recently, with the Cold War, "[t]he principle underlying the tactics of battle - that
one has to be capable ofkilling in order to go on living - [became] ... the principle that
defines the strategy of states" (HS: 137). As the great Prussian practitioner ofthe art of
war, Von Moltke, put it, "[s]trategy leads the movement of the army for the intended
battle; the form of its execution is determined by tactics" (Doctrines ofWar, in Freedman
{~
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1994: 22; emphasis in the original): whereas power as sovereignty assumes the pre-
eminence of intended strategy, power as war recognises the mutually conditioning effects
ofunintended tactical consequences upon strategic planning.
It follows that one must be aware that Foucaulfs use of the term 'strategy' was often
indistinguishable from what one might instead call 'tactics', in that in his work 'strategy' is
usually characterised as local, dispersed, mobile and productive. Three meanings of the
term 'strategy' - as means to an end, as game-plan, and as means destined to win a
struggle -
come together in situations of confrontation - war or games - where the objective is
to act upon an adversary in such a manner as to render the struggle impossible for
him. So strategy is defined by the choice ofwinning solutions (SP: 225).
As "strategic games" (Foucault 1987b: 129; 1988a: 168), "[e]very power relationship
implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle" or confrontation, in which the two
forces do not lose their specific nature but where "each constitutes for the other a kind of
permanent limit, a point ofpossible reversal" (SP: 225). Power relations thus constantly
fluctuate between open confrontations marked by "the free play ofantagonistic reactions"
between governors and governed, and periods ofrelative stability in which the conduct of
erstwhile adversaries can be governed "in a fairly constant manner and with reasonable
certainty" (SP: 225). A proliferation of struggles does not mean that power relations are
inactive, have ceased to exist or are being worsted, but through their existence and
prosecution constitute among the most essential components ofpower. Likewise, long
periods of stable government underpinned by widespread consent do not indicate the
taming ofpower relations, but only a contingently successful strategy. Strategies of
power are always potentially unstable: at best, they equilibrate; at worst, they evolve into
states ofdomination; more often, however, they combine with seemingly unrelated
practices through which individuals govern themselves and others: "power is less a





'Governance', 'government', 'governmentality' or 'governmental technologies' are terms
which Foucault used interchangeably to describe the point where relations ofpower and
states ofdomination intersect with what he called 'technologies ofthe self, especially "the
points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse
to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, ... the points
where the techniques ofthe self are integrated into structures ofcoercion and domination"
(Foucault 1993a: 203; 1988b: 19).
[G]overning people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is
always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between
techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is
constructed or modified by himself (Foucault 1993a: 204).
Moreover, as we shall see in the following chapter, to exercise power over others by
governing them is a process in which these others not only willingly participate but also
produce knowledge of themselves: "the government ofmen demands on the part ofeach
who is directed, beyond acts of obedience or submission, certain 'acts of truth' , ... the
manifestation, in enunciation, ofwho one is" (Foucault, quoted in Keenan 1982: 37). For
example, the modem legal system demands more than a mere admission of guilt; it also
requires "confession, self-examination, explanation ofoneself, revelation ofwhat one is"
(Foucault 1988a: 126). The strategic games that criminals are called upon to play are as
important as their crimes and punishments.
Government or governmentality - which refers broadly to "the way in which you govern
your wife, your children, as well as the way you govern an institution" (Foucault 1987b:
130) - can be defined as
~.
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the totality ofpractices, by which one can constitute, define, organize,
instrumentalize the strategies which individuals in their liberty can have in regard to
each other. It is free individuals who try to control, to determine, to delimitthe
liberty ofothers and, in order to do that, they dispose ofcertain instruments to
govern others (Foucault 1987b: 130-31).
Government is "the way in which the conduct of individuals or ofgroups might be
directed: the government ofchildren, of souls, of communities, of families, of the sick
[and of oneself]" (SP: 221). Indeed, power is "conduct" - it both conducts or leads, and is
a conduct or form ofbehaviour: "To govern, in this sense, is to structure the possible field
ofaction-of others" (SP: 221). The objectives ofgovernment are little different from the
objectives ofwarfare: to impose, as much as possible, one's own style upon the game so
as to derive maximum advantage from it. To speak thus ofpower relations as war,
strategies ofgovernance or rules ofconduct is also to give the lie to those theories of
sovereignty that reduce power relations to physical violence or domination; in fact, it is to
suggest that war itself is less about naked coercion than is commonly assumed: "In war
the moral is to the physical force as three to one" (Napoleon, quoted in Napier 1851: 89),
and "those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without fighting" (Sun Tzu 1963: 79).
Even that most fearsome ofmilitary tactics, the cavalry or bayonet charge, depended on
the psychological preparedness and discipline of the attackers, and was commonly
preceded by a hearty cheer intended to embolden and impel them (Nosworthy 1995: 241;
see also Weber 1970: 265-57).
Foucault's comments on the strategies and tactics ofgoverning oneself and others also
have implications for conceptions ofthe state in terms ofsovereignty. For Foucault, what
is important nowadays "is not so much the State-domination ofsociety, but the
'governmentalisation' ofthe State" (Foucault 1979a: 20). This governmentalisation is
paradoxical in that modem politics is about governmentalisation to the extent that
governmentalisation has allowed the State to survive (and is thus another reason for the
persistence ofconventional theories ofpolitical philosophy despite their inadequacy in
explaining the modem functioning ofrelations ofpower): "it is the tactics ofgovernment
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which make possible the continual definition and redefinition ofwhat is within the
competence of the State and what is not, the public versus the private, and so on; thus the
State can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics
ofgovernmentality" (Foucault 1979a: 21).
The concept ofgovernance thus allows for useful contrasts to be drawn between
prevailing conceptions ofpower, as sovereignty, and the disciplinary relations ofpower
that Foucault believed practically and efficaciously underpin and colonise these
conceptions. Power as sovereignty conceives ofboth power and knowledge in the form
ofa tree, maturing over time: primarily vertical and hierarchical, with roots and branches,
top and bottom, dominant and dominated; where every subject knows its place in a
relatively fixed ifhistorically mutating order of things; and where discourses and texts are
grouped into specialised disciplines and fields and ranged in order of importance. Power
as governance conceives ofboth power and knowledge in the form ofa web, "a fine,
differentiated, continuous network" - institutionally-supported, knowledge-producing and
discipline-effecting relays - "that connects points and intersects with its own skein"
(Foucault 197ge: 89; 1986c: 22): simultaneously vertical and horizontal, hierarchical and
lateral, with nodes and interstices in multiple, complex and contested interconnection such
that what is dominant or subordinate is not always clearly apparent even if always
potentially present; where different and shifting locations may be occupied by diverse
subjects; and where discourses and texts refer constantly to other texts across genre
distinctions. Power conceived in this way as a web of strategic or war-like relations is
appropriate for our rapidly evolving "epoch of simultaneity" (Foucault 1986c: 22), the age
of information and virtual reality in which what only recently was a global village is now
being produced as a global body, in all senses of the word (body politic; body of
knowledge; body corporate; and, not least, the physical body). The next chapter





CHAPTER FIVE: THE PRODUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY
I The productivity ofpower relations
Conceiving ofpower relations as strategies of government through 'mutual subjugation'
and 'permanent provocation' makes it easier to understand one of their most prominent
features: their productivity in relation to knowledge and subjects. This gives additional
substance to Foucault's claim that power relations do not merely distort truth or repress
people.
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it
doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces
things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse (Foucault 1980a:
119).
As Habermas phrases it nicely, "[Foucauldian] discourses emerge and pop like glittering
bubbles from a swamp ofanonymous processes of subjugation" (Habermas 1987: 268).
Yet it mus't be borne in mind that subjugation, for Foucault, is a complex and multiform
series ofinternal and external relationships, and is not reducible to domination or coercion:
How simple and easy it would be, no doubt, to dismantle power, if it only worked to
supervise, to spy upon, to sneak up on, to prohibit and to punish; but it incites,
instigates, produces; it isn't simply eye and ear; it brings about speech and action.
Doubtless this machinery has been important for the constitution ofnew knowledges
(Foucault 197ge: 89).
Power relations do not simply take the form ofprohibition and punishment but are
"positive and multiple"; they are different, not uniform; flowing, not a unity; mobile, not a
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system; and, most significantly, productive - "what is productive is not sedentary but
nomadic" (Foucault 1983c: xiii; 1980a: 142).
The productivity ofpower relations are tied to their propensity to provoke, oblige, entice,
gratify and discipline. Power
incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it
constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way ofacting upon an
acting subject or acting subjects by virtue oftheir acting or being capable ofaction
(SP: 220).
Power relations produce responses, or instigate reactions, which are relational and thus
internal to them, not least because the operation ofpower presupposes free subjects faced
with several possible ways ofbehaving or comporting themselves. To speak of the
-"'.....--------
productivity ofpower relations also allows one to conceive ofpower outside of binary
oppositions or, at the very least, as simultaneously negative and positive: power relations
- ~ - ""
m;Y'mhibit'th~-p~ssibility of some actions and increase the possibility of others.
Foucault's use of the term 'production' in relation to power relations draws upon but goes
well beyond the Marxist emphasis upon explaining power relations by deriving them from
social relations ofproduction. As he puts it, "techniques ofpower are invented to meet
the demands ofproduction. I mean production here in the broad sense - it can be a matter
of the 'production' ofdestruction, as with the army" (Foucault 1980a: 161). To reiterate:
"not only 'production' in the strict sense, but also the production ofknowledge and skills
in the school, the production ofhealth in the hospitals, the production ofdestructive force
in the army" (DP: 219), and not least the manufacture of those being educated, healed or
destroyed (Foucault, quoted in Macey 1993: 288). The productivity ofpower relations
are evident in diverse fields, examples ofall of which can be found in Foucault's own
oeuvre, ranging from the production ofknowledge and wealth through the production of
madness and the manufacture ofdelinquency to the generation of sexuality and the
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production of subjects. Here we shall focus particularly on the production ofknowledge
and of subjects.
11 The production of knowledge
Foucault's account of the role ofpower relations in the production ofknowledge stands
both within and against a tradition which stretches at least as far back asDestutt de
Tracy's institute for the study of ideas, established just after the French Revolution. Since
that time, the relationship between power relations and knowledge has been the subject of
numerous investigations most commonly grouped around the concept of 'ideology'. For
some, such as Karl Mannheim (1954), ideology referred simply and neutrally to any set of
beliefs or ideas. For others, particularly Marxists, who until Foucault made up what is by
far the dominant tendency, ideology has pejorative connotations, referring to 'phantoms'
or ideas which, while credible "sublimates of their material life-process", are often blatant
mystifications in which "men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera
obscura" (Marx, in McLellan 1977: 164). Althusser took this further by radically
distinguishing between science and ideology, and defined ideology as "the imaginary
relationship of individuals to their real conditions ofexistence' (Althusser 1971: 153). In
Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas, too, distinguished "between cognitive
processes that reflect an ideologically defined perspective and thought processes that can
be regarded as embodying a 'critique o/ideology'" (de Kadt 1975: 23; emphasis in the
original).
These kinds ofanalyses ofideo10gy are premised on what, for Foucault, is an
Enlightenment humanist prejudice that insists that truth, or science, or critique,are in
essence disinterested or non-ideological, and that unchecked power-interests will
inevitably tend to distort them:




onlY those who keen their distance from power ... can discover the truth (Foucault. ~
1980a: 51);
and that
knowledge can exist only where the power relations are suspended and that
knowledge can develop only outside its injunctions, its demands and its interests
(DP: 27).
Arguing that the concept of ideology is patently unable to deal with the relationship
between power relations and knowledge, Foucault tackled this prejudice point by point:
those in power know well enough; only those who, willingly or unwillingly, allow power
to play across their bodies and souls can produce truth, and thus knowledge develops only
within the bounds and at the behest ofpower.
In the first place, argued Foucault, 'ideology', at least in the dominant, Marxist tradition,
stands opposed to 'truth' (Foucault 1980a: 118). Here, whereas truth, and especially
'science', are seen as power-free, 'ideology' is that knowledge which has been distorted
by power:
[The concept of ideology] has been used to explain errors or illusions, or to analyze
presentations - in short, everything that impedes the formation oftrue discourse. It
has also been used to show the relation between what goes on in people's heads and
their place in the conditions ofproduction. In sum, the economics ofuntruth. My
. problem [on the other hand] is the politics of truth (Foucault 1977b: 157).
This aspect of the concept of ideology has prompted Marxists like Lukacs to argue that
only the proletariat, to the extent that it becomes conscious of its historical mission as
interpreted by the science ofMarxism, is capable of truly understanding the nature and
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depredations ofcapitalism, while the bourgeoisie has lost any such awareness that it may
have had as a once-revolutionary class. On the contrary, argued Foucault, the bourgeoisie
is not stupid; rather, "one has to reckon with its strokes ofgenius, and among these is
precisely the fact of its managing to construct machines ofpower allowing circuits of
profit" (Foucault 1980a: 160). Rather than attempting to account for the production of
knowledge in terms of ,science' and 'ideology', we must conceive of it instead in terms of
'truth' and 'power' (Foucault 1984a: 74).
Secondly, and again in the Marxist tradition, ideology as 'the econorrtics of untruth' tends
to be treated as secondary relative to an infrastructure (Foucault 1980a: 118): the
conditions of production are taken to determine what people think, and since those
conditions are understood to be alienating and exploitative, it follows that the
consciousness ofpeople will be distorted, illusory or downright false. Truth, on the other
hand, is supposedly the preserve ofthose whose location on the margins ofcentres of
power (subject to alienation in the sphere ofproduction or experiencing dissonance
through exposure to the science ofMarxism) gives them insights into the nature of the
system. Much ofFoucault's work, however, argued that forms ofknowledge are to a
large degree the fabricated effects ofcomplex relations ofpower (which may indeed
include but are not confined to an 'infrastructure'). Contrary to the conventional humanist
wisdom, it is not truth but power which limits power: "it is the power over selfwhich will
regulate the power over others", reducing the ever-present potential for domination to "a
minimum" (Foucault 1987b: 129, 119). This idea that it is precisely those who are
undisciplined, swayed by appetite or interest, who are most likely to abuse power, can be
traced back to Stoicism and was central to the long-standing (until recently) Western
antipathy to democracy. It also has echoes in recent fiction such as Michael Crichton's
Jurassic Park. For the character Malcolm, a mathematician who subscribes to chaos
theory, the discipline and sacrifice required in order to learn how to kill with one's bare
hands also matures one to the point where this power to kill won't be used unwisely:
"[t]he discipline ofgetting the power changes you so that you won't abuse it" (Crichton
1991: 306). In contrast, the power ofmodem science, such as the knowledge and
212
capacity to build weapons ofmass destruction, can be purchased or otherwise attained
without discipline, and hence is far more dangerous.
Thirdly, Foucault argues that the concept of ideology necessarily makes reference to the
modem theory of the subject as a conscious agent (Foucault 1980a: 118):
what troubles me with these analyses which prioritise ideology is that there is always
presupposed a human subject on the lines of the model provided by classical
philosophy, endowed with a consciousness which power is then thought to seize
upon (Foucault 1980a: 58).
He continued:
What I wanted to show [in The History ofSexuality] is how power relations can
materially penetrate the body in depth, without depending even on the mediation of
the subject's own representations. Ifpower takes hold on the body, it isn't through
its having first to be interiorised in people's consciousnesses (Foucault 1980a: 186).
Theories of ideology are completely oblivious to the presence of power relations in and
around the truths they ironically seek to defend against power, and thus persist in
targeting those they assume to have been duped rather than those, including those engaged
in ideology-critique, who take for granted the power of science.
The problem is not changing people's consciousness - or what's in their heads - but
the political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth.
It's not a matter ofemancipating truth from every system ofpower (which would be
a chimera, for truth is already power), but of detaching the power oftruth from the
forms ofhegemony, social, economic, and cultural, within which it operates at the
present time (Foucault 1984a: 74-5).
I
jence, power relations do not operate through ideologies that 'misrepresent' reality or
'jystify' our consciousnesses; on the contrary, common beliefs such that we are politically
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\ duped or sexually repressed are theqJSelves products ofthe manner in which we have been
\
subjected - as sovereign, self-conscious and free individuals - through relations ofpower,
and it is precisely this production ofsoothsaying subjects that must be questioned (see also
l Chapter 2, Section I).
t
What is especially instructive is Foucault's treatment of "the discourse ... constituted by
the ldeologues" as itself a technology ofpower:
This discourse provided, in effect, by means of the theory of interests,
representations and signs, by the series and geneses that it reconstituted, a sort of
general recipe for the exercise ofpower over men: the 'mind' as a surface of
inscription for power, with semiology as its tool; the submission of bodies tmough
the control of ideas; the analysis ofrepresentations as a principle in a politics of
bodies that was much more effective than the ritual anatomy oftorture and
execution. The thought of the Ideologues was not only a theory of the individual
and society; it developed as a technology of subtle, effective, economic powers, in
opposition to the sumptuous expenditure of the power of the sovereign (DP: 102;
see also Bauman 1987: 99).
It follows from this that the theory and concept of 'ideology' itself constitutes an ideology,
or better, constitutes a discourse which operates as a technology ofpower disguised as an
ideology pretending to be a science. Any theory, regardless ofwhether it implicitly sees
itselfas drawing upon the negative Marxist or the 'neutral' liberal concept of ideology,
which claims to scientifically investigate the real and apparent interests of individuals and
groups and the extent to which these interests command representation, immediately finds
itself caught up in the paradoxical but effective consequences of its own mode of
theorisation. The manner in which the sciences ofcraniometries and IQ testing both built
on and extended Western cultural assumptions and racist practices of eugenics (Gould
1981; HS: 148-9), are other prime examples of the way in which knowledge, produced
through relations ofpower, itself serves to extend relations ofpower.
None of this is to suggest that Foucault denied the existence ofideologies, or denied that
knowledge is a target ofpolitical investment. Indeed, in his work he occasionally made
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direct use of the concept of ideology (see 1984a: 71-2; DP: 194), and also used it
indirectly to explain how the effective, practical operation ofpower may be masked by
formal political or juridical mechanisms (in Elders 1974: 171; DP: 222; see also Rabinow
1984: 6, and Chapter Three above). It is to suggest, however, that it is insufficient to
focus on mental or cognitive functions, consciousness or representations when it is
precisely these functions, states and simulations that have been made possible and
constituted by power relations. The instruments, procedures, objectives, status and forms
of institutionalisation ofknowledge, argued Foucault consistently, are inseparably
connected to relations ofpower:
[Relations ofpower consist of] the production ofeffective instruments for the
formation and accumulation ofknowledge - methods ofobservation, techniques of
registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses ofcontrol (DPS:
237).
Lest it be said, again, that this is to eviscerate truth, the production ofknowledge through
power relations is in fact an indication not of the omniscience ofpower relations but of
their inadequacy: "Ifpower relationships have produced forms of investigation, of
analysis, ofmodels ofknowledge, etc., it is precisely ... because the power ... was blind,
because it was in a state ofimpasse" (Foucault 1989: 183-4).
In this regard, statistics, or the science of the state, is often mentioned by Foucault as a
prime example ofa form ofknowledge which was an indispensable requirement for
governing the large, expanding and shifting populations ofmodem states (Foucault 1981e:
245; 1979d: 63), but beyond that, the emergence ofthe human sciences as a whole - "the
formation ofclinical medicine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology, the
rationalization oflabour" (DP: 224), not to mention sociology and historiography
(Foucault 1979d: 65-66) - was premised on particular disciplinary relations ofpower.
(Indeed, Foucault may have been one ofthe first to analyse in some detail the production
ofknowledge through power, but even in this he was only being a good Kantian: "a lesser
degree ofcivil freedom gives intellectual freedom enough room to expand to its fullest
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extent" - Kant 1996: 57). Even the great, ambiguous and never-resolved mid-century
debates within most of these disciplines over whether or not they should model themselves
on the natural sciences - positivism versus hermeneutics, explanation versus verstehen, or,
at another level, structuralism versus humanism - were merely a series of extrusions on the
branches ofmodem discipline (Foucault 1989: 4-5; aT: 348-49,356). However, there is
nothing fixed or immutable about the outcome of such power-induced processes of
producing knowledge: "certain forms ofpower ... of the same type [can] give rise to
bodies ofknowledge that [are] extremely different both in their object and their structure",
in that the hospital which gave rise to psychiatric confinement made possible the formation
ofboth a psychiatric knowledge and an anatomo-pathological knowledge (Foucault
1988a: 265). Nor are these forms ofknowledge simply reducible to relations ofpower,
and thus somehow irredeemably tainted: even ideology is not exclusive ofscientificity
(AK: 186), and the fact that knowledge cannot be divorced from power relations "in no
way impairs the scientific validity" ofthe knowledge in question but is a necessary feature
of thought (Foucault 1987b: 127).
While Foucault and Habermas converged in seeing in psychoanalytic knowledge certain
critical possibilities, they diverged radically with respect to the implications thereof
Habermas argues that the psychoanalytic conversation between doctor and patient offers a
model through which individuals can critically liberate themselves from particular illusions
(Habermas 1987: 299-300), while Foucault thought that, in some ways, psychoanalysis
called into question precisely this modem obsession with liberating alienated man (aT:
376; 1971a: 277-78). Indeed, Habermas' argument, that psychoanalysis and other anti-
positivist,
hermeneutical and critical approaches ... were tailored in their forms ofknowledge
to possibilities ofapplication other than manipulation ofself and others (1987: 272-
73; emphasis in the original),
appears to ignore several recent criticisms which brand these approaches as just as
totalitarian as positivism. For example, an uncritical faith in the "unforced force" ofa
(~
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universal reason tends to conceal real inequalities between and amongst professionals
(such as doctors, teachers, lawyers, priests, social workers and psychologists, intellectuals
alike) and their clients (patients, learners, clients, congregations, the poor, the needy and
the disturbed - the laity in general) (Spivak 1992: 14) and to embroil emancipatory
discourses in paradox, such as those inherent in their aversion to technocratic
manipulation and their impulse to intervene strategically on behalfof the oppressed
(Touraine 1988: 157), or in some subjects 'making' others autonomous without directing
them (Ellsworth 1989: 308).
Taylor, too, suggests that Foucault read "the rise ofhumanitarianism exclusively in terms
of the new technologies ofcontrol" and thus missed the "ambivalence" of the new
disciplines which have not only fed a system ofcontrol but
have also taken the form ofgenuine self-disciplines which have made possible new
kinds ofcollective action characterized by more egalitarian forms ofparticipation
(Taylor 1985a: 165; see also Habermas 1987: 290, 292).
With this idea ofdisciplinary "ambivalence", Taylor comes closer than Habermas to '
Foucault's belief in the close affinity ofknowledge with relations ofpower: "collective
disciplines can function in both ways, as structures ofdomination, and as bases for equal
collective action. And they can also slide over time from one to the other" (Taylor 1985a:
166).
However, the example that Taylor gives of such a 'slide' undercuts his own argument by
revealing a one-sidedness and 'a tendency to reduce power relations to domination. To say
that "[t]he threatened degeneracy ofmodem mass democracies is a slide from one ofthese
directions to the other" (Taylor 1985a: 166; emphasis in the original), is only a partially
valid example: it is in fact an example ofa slide from democracy and freedom to tyranny
and control, not vice-versa, not from anyone ofthese directions to any other but from a
pa~ticular direction to another. Taylor does not even consider that this 'slide' could be
from domination to freedom, which is exactly what Foucault is suggesting when he re-
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interprets modem humanist claims that our societies are more civilised than they were in
the past to refer to the relative success ofthe civilising forces ofnormalisation in
subjecting us to freedom. In the same vein, for Laclau, "bureaucracy - the opposite of
democracy - is the historical condition for it" (Laclau 1990: 54). Taylor does not imagine
this possibility because, for him as also, arguably, for Habermas, power equals domination
against which freedom stands opposed (whereas, for Foucault, power equals subjection of
which freedom is an integral part). In other words, what Taylor is really suggesting here is
that these 'ambivalent new disciplines' are primarily orientated towards freedom, and that
it is an anomaly to be deprecated when they turn out not to be so inclined.
In response to a criticism by Connolly that he misreads and obscures Foucault's
arguments, Taylor offers the shift from nineteenth-century manhood to twentieth-century
universal suffrage as another example of humanitarian progress which Foucault's approach
to truth cannot accommodate. He suggests that this change in how we conceive ofhuman
subjects could be read as a "relative gain in freedom .... [and in] truth", "a less distorted or
more defensible application of the very ethos ofcitizen self-rule itself' (Taylor 1985b:
382). Contrary to Taylor's argument, no one, not least Foucault, is stopping him or
anyone else from interpreting, and even acting upon, this change in terms ofprogress;
rather, Foucault wishes to preclude the common and usually uncritical claim that this
change is qualitatively for the better rather than for worse. For on what grounds is it
guaranteed that now that women have the vote, they are better offwith than without it,
especially ifone takes into account Foucault's argument that new relations ofpower will
have accompanied this change? To suggest that this change constituted a 'more defensible
application ofcitizen self-rule' flies in the face not only ofearly modem history and the
extent to which the conditions for democracy and development in the West were created
"by bloody repression and forced cultural assimilation, by projects ofcentralizing political
power and state building ... , and by ... military conflicts within as well as between states"
(Calhoun 1995: 234; see also Latouche 1993: 88), but as Taylor himselfpoints out, even
that oft-cited benchmark ofdemocracy - ancient Athens - was premised on the exclusion
of slaves, women and foreigners. Women are neither better or worse off with the vote
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than without; they are different beings in a different context and subjected to different
relations ofpower which do not rule out strategic gains or losses but which, in themselves
ifnot in specific historical contexts, are undecidable.
Hence, when Taylor argues that "[w]e will never see what is going on ifwe think of the
disciplines as having their exclusive historical and social significance in forms of
domination" (Taylor 1985a: 166), he is silently assuming that 'what is going on' involves
disciplines which are ostensibly ambivalent but actually orientated towards freedom,
equality, participation and progress. He also argues:
That the aspiration to express one's true nature can become a mechanism ofcontrol
is indeed true, and Foucault can offer insights on this. But just as in the case of
bureaucratization above, you incapacitate yourself to understand this becoming if
you conceive it from the beginning as essentially being control (Taylor 1985a: 167).
In this formulation, by definition, "the aspiration to express one's true nature" is "from the
beginning" not control, different from and opposed to control; it is, in short, freedom.
Control and domination may impinge upon this freedom, may, in Habermas' words,
'foreshorten and distort' it (Habermas 1987: 311), but there is only the remotest
possibility of freedom actually becoming control since there are so many mechanisms
available in order to counteract it. Taylor's Enlightenment understanding ofthe
relationship between power and knowledge, control and freedom, prevents him from
considering the possibility that 'one's true nature', while not reducible to 'control', may
nevertheless be a fabrication.
For Foucault, relations ofpower not only produce but depend upon the production of
knowledge; they cannot be established, consolidated or implemented "without the
production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of ... a certain economy of
discourses oftruth" (DPS: 229; HS: 98):
We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise
power except through the Pfoduction oftruth (DPS: 229-30).
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On the one hand, abundant examples of the ways in which "the exercise ofpower
perpetually creates knowledge" (Foucault 1980a: 52) can be found in Foucault's own
analyses of the coercions and constraints productively exercised over madness, illness,
crime and sexuality. Foucault took every opportunity to restate and reinforce this
fundamental insight ofhis work:
Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history
and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the
child ofprotracted solitude, nor the privilege ofthose who have succeeded in
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of
multiple forms ofconstraint. And it induces regular effects ofpower (Foucault
1984a: 72-3).
However, while Foucault understandably rejected those intellectual self-conceptions
inscribed in Western culture such that truth is somehow free, pure and the product of
genius, it is important to trim the polemical edges off some ofhis arguments in this regard.
The quotation above ought not to be interpreted as suggesting that the free, the eremitic
or the self-liberated have no access to truth whatsoever. On the contrary, what is
important is the discipline involved in seeking the truth, and the manner in which subjects
are incited to form their ways ofbeing (Rajchrnan 1991: 60): truth is the product of
constraint, including those actions freely directed against oneself such as self-denial, self-
regulation or self-formation.
In this vein, Bauman has argued that, for millennia (and uninterruptedly, Gramsci (1971 :
7) would have added), those in search oftruth have legitimated their roles and justified
their differences from the rest of society in three ways: by subjecting themselves to
various ordeals (such as living an ascetic existence; self-immolation; monastic humility; or
enduring the protracted miseries ofstudent life); by treating themselves and their craft as
unique, needing to be protected as taboo and kept free from contamination (thus
emphasising purification rites, sexual abstinence, bohemian difference, value-neutrality,
transcendental reduction or practical institutional isolation); or by laying stress on the
.(~
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degree to which their dedication to the pursuit of the truth is manifested in physical or
mental possession or a professional attitude.
Ordeal, purification and possession; these three seminal and, arguably, permanent
constituents of the legitimation ofpriestly authority have one feature in common.
Theyall proclaim, and explain, the separation of the priesthood from the laity. They
put whatever wisdom or skill the priests may own beyond the reach ofall those who
are not priests. They elevate the priestly ways, by the same token downgrading the
paths of the laity. And they present the resultant relationship ofdomination as one
of service and self-sacrifice (Bauman 1987: 13).
Throughout history, knowledge and power relations have supported each other; and from
the moment that the division of labour elevated intellectuals above the laity, their
pronouncements were not only endowed with the mantle of truth but could be employed
in legitimating this division itself Thus, not only do power relations create knowledge,
but, on the other hand, "and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects ofpower"
(Foucault 1980a: 52; DP: 27; Morris & Patton 1979: 62), as discourses arrrogate to
themselves the mantle of science or revealed truth. In this process, they disqualify other
forms ofknowledge; regulate, train, examine and grade individuals and classify things;
licence or restrict who can speak and about what; and codify mechanisms which allow one
to distinguish between true and false statements, accord value to certain techniques of
knowledge-production and enhance the status ofthose who say what is true (Foucault
1980a: 85; Muller & Cloete 1986: 19; Fraser 1989: 20).
III The production ofsubjectivity
As we have seen, a conception ofpower as strategic relations of governance and
resistance by free subjects stands in stark contrast to conventional accounts ofpower as a
property or a possession intentionally wielded by a agent. The relational format ofpower
means that power can only be exercised (DP: 26, 177; HS: 94; 1981e: 253): indeed,
"[e]verywhere that power exists, it is being exercised" (Foucault 1977a: 213), or,
conversely, "power exists only when it is put into action" (SP: 219). Note that, as argued
I,?
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bove in Chapter Four, the opposite ofthis does not also hold true: every exercise, every
action, does not necessarily involve power relations. However, the exercise ofpower
cannot be attributed to the spontaneous actions ofeither individuals or groups: "power
relations are both intentional and nonsubjective" (HS: 94) - "[p]eople know what they do;
they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don't know is what what
they do does" (Foucault, in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 187). Hence, "power is not built
, up out of 'wills' (individual or collective), nor is it derivable from interests" (Foucault
I! 1980a: 188), and the intentions ofor objectives pursued "by those who act upon the
I actions ofothers" (SP: 423), whether an individual, a group, an institution or a state
I apparatus, are invested in the practical and effective exercise ofpower. However, to say
f that power is nonsubjective does not mean that it is "subjectless", as Habermas (1987:
274) interprets Foucault, since subjects are the indispensable vehicles and targets ofpower
relations.
Similarly, power relations may be about action, but they are not about agents in the
conventional sense ofa transparently self-aware and creative being; at most, power
relations involve agents who have been constituted as such, as subjects acting on other
subjects amidst a complex web ofrelations wherein, moreover, neither set of subjects can
be characterised simply as the 'victims' (Hacking 1986b: 235). The role ofpower
relations as conditions, and not obstacles, for freedom and agency and the production of
subjectivity will be discussed later in this chapter. For the moment, it is worth noting that
this view ofrelations ofpower is analogous to the way in which modem physics conceives
of the material universe:
At the subatomic level the interrelations and interactions between the parts of the
whole are more fundamental ~han the parts themselves. There is motion but there
are, ultimately, no moving objects; there is activity but there are no actors; there are
no dancers, there is only the dance (Capra 1983: 83).
Hence, we should not search for the perpetrators or the wielders ofpower, for what is
important is not who they are, how they appear or where they may be located, but "how it
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is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a
multiplicity oforganisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc." (HS: 233).
A theory of sovereignty such as that ofHobbes fails to pay attention to this aspect of
power. Hobbes conceives ofpower in the form ofa harsh Leviathan, a unitary body
constituted out ofa multiplicity of individual wills, and ignores the local productivity of
relations ofpower and their role in the fragmentary constitution or subjection ofbodies
and individuals. Modern disciplinary power in fact
.--~----- -- -------_ ..~~-",.- -'-" -~------
categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his--_..------~----- ---_._-- _.__._--------., ,---;-- -~_.""'""- ,--
6\vn identity, imposes ~J!!yy_QfJr.ut1Lan..hin:\which he must recognize and whicn----_....._--..., ~ "':......~_...._-.~._ .._.....---_......-------.".
others have to recognize in him. It is a form o.fpower which makes individuals
sybjecls-'_._--'-~< -.--------- --- ------- -. -- -- -
-'-
in the dual sense of "subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his
r- - _
own identity by a conscience or self-kno~.!~£ge"(SP: 212, emphasis in the original).
-:-;---,......._._--_..•.__.._-_._-_._•..---,.,.. - . ----- .
Individuals are ~11:l the targets ofpower relations and the elements of their articulation:------- -- ------ ---- --'- -- .-.
"the individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle" (DPS: 234;
DP;-275.------
Foucault made several references to the dual or ambiguous nature ofthe term 'subject',
and in this regard his work paralleled that of fellow normalien and structuralist Marxist,
Louis Althusser. In his celebrated essay on "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses",
Althusser noted the
amb~~.?ity ofthe te~subj:£!.:..._~~.tg~_o[,d~ary use ?f!h~_te!n.b 2~bj~,~tl!! fCl:~l}P~~:
(ITa free suojeCfi'Vlty, a centre o(4!!tiat!y.e.s., al,ltlior Qf and responsible for its
a~.!!Q~2J a s~§~~g:w~.9_@.P.m!l~tto_a-higheLJl1}lE.~!}iy,. anli~J~eref()!e
stripped ofalljreedom except that gffre_e!y~pting his submission.,.... [TJhe
rn§'idualJ!.. interpellated as qJfrY.lql ~u_bject ·i!!.!!!c{f!!=tf!atj}e.~all submitfreely to
the~C;Jll!JlJtandiizel1ts_ol1b_e.:.Subjj}ft, i. e. in order that he s.hall (freeIyJaccept His ",
subjection ... (Althusser 1971: 169; emphasis in the original).
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The individual, an ambiguous being whose personal rights are nevertheless subjected to
----------~--~-.,.---:---~-----~-
th~~ws ofnature and s9cie!Y,j~LaJSo..n11l.Y"91le_~ong many "subjected sove~.mie.s~
, --~-.-'""---------- -----_.__._~ -~._ •..__.._----
invented by humanism (albeit perhaps the most important of these inventions): there are
the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to God), consciousness (sovereign in a
context ofjudgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), ... [and] basic
freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the demands of an outside world and
'aligned with destiny') (Foucault 1977a: 221).
/
_._-----'----also -----------------..-.-.-~---
Another example of such a "subjected sovereignty" can be seen in the system ofprivate
property: "the proprietor is fully in control ofhis goods; he can use or abuse them, but he
must nevertheless submit to the laws that support his claim to property" (Foucault 1977a:
222).
S.~Jy.,.-Foucault argued that the individual at the heart of Western humanist thought------ -
(whether as nat~Ihero"or-~b~te noIre), is not a natural essence but an 'artlf,!ct'-,"a
reality fabricat~d" -(;;~~~_;_s-e_e_~a1so i976a:-T70),-a""recent and fr~il~"-~roductof
, •••_ •• ,_.__• __ . ...._"_ ._ .< - - ••• ---.--- _., ---_0
disciplinary mechanisms which were b~ilt upon C~is~c:r: practices~ess~~d
ex~~~i~~ and~ame int~theko;;;during the Enlightenment. Indeed, Western
.-- ... .--.-"""- __.0'_- _._.~ ..-..-_~__---_.----_.
individualism,--furfromb~ing a common human experience, is in fact "an eccentricity
among cultures" (Morris 1972: 2), albeit an extremely useful and productive on(;(.
--- ~~~Jndividuals (as well as groups, for that matter) are neither
purely determined creatures nor untrammeled agents. Both their freedom of choice,
implying sovereignty, and their capacity to act, implying power relations, depend on a
prior determination or authorisation by power relations; conversely, relations ofpower
depend on the existence of individuals who are capable of free choice and action, and
upon legitimating forms ofknowledge: Human subjects are the ever-varied, ever-differing
products ofa network ofrelations which, presently, determines that they be free; they are






















prompted by truth, they play the lead roles. The implications of this Foucauldian
conception of the subject for what might be called the 'master dichotomy' ofmodernity,
that between structure and agency, will be discussed further below.
Hence, rather than asking of ideal subjects the Hobbesian question ofwhat they have
yielded up of themselves, their powers or their freedoms in order to be subjected (that is,
in order to join in a social contract), "one should inquire how the relations ofsubjection
are able to fabricate subjects" (Foucau~)Wlio, as such, have been"COiiaemned_.._-'-- .. --~--------_._._- .-~ ,.-------. . -
~to be free ... " (Lac1au 1990: 44; emphasis in the original). Such an in u' cannot Jimit
0:-- --.




the way in which it [discipline] is imposed, the mechanisms it brings into play, the
non-reversible subordination of one group ofpeople by another, the 'surplus' power
that is always fixed on the same side, the inequality ofposition of the different
'partners' in relation to the common regulation (DP: 223).
\
What is required is not an analysis ofthe state but a "political 'anatomy'" ofthe 'body
politic' (DP: 28), a 'political anatomy' which is at the same time a 'mechanics ofpower'
(DP: 138), both a 'theoretical' analysis and a technological 'practice', simultaneously a
knowledge facilitating subjection and a subjection producing knowledge. We have already
referred to the discourse surrounding the concept of ideology as fitting this description.
Liberalism is another example ofa discourse with powerful reality-altering knowledge-
effects. Liberalism is usually seen as a doctrine concerned with maximising individual
liberties, the private sphere or the community ofautonomous individuals - a given,
'natural' reality from which the nature of the state is then derived. Following Foucault,
however, this sphere of individual liberty ought instead to be understood as artificial, a
product of liberal governmental interventions in a population already, to some degree,
rendered 'uniform, regular and calculable' (Nietzsche, cited in Hindess 1993: 303).
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IV Power relations, knowledge and subjectivity
In the preceding two sections, Foucault's notion of the productive capacity ofrelations of
power has been considered analytically and separately in relation first to knowledge and
then to human subjects. However, the creativity ofpower relations seldom occurs in
isolation; it is much more likely that relations ofpower, forms ofknowledge and human
subjects standing in specific relationships to each other, overlap and come to constitute an
integrated whole. That such complex compounds are the rule rather than the ex~eption is
lent support from within language, which makes reference not merely to a dual meaning of
the term 'subject' but a trio ofmeanings: apart from referring to both a free Subject or
< .-----
agent and a subjected or subordinate being, 'subject' is also used when referring to a-discipline or a body ofknowledge. The relationship between tQ.e three senses of the term
can be summed up as follows:
These 'power-knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore, not on the basis of
a subject ofknowledge who is or is not free in relation to the power system, but, on
the contrary, the subject who knows, the' objects to be known and the rilodalities of
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of
power-knowledge and their historical transformations. In short, it is not the activity
of the subject of knowledge that produces a corpus ofknowledge, useful or resistant
to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of




by relations ofpower which at the same time generate knowledge. Indeed, it may be more
accurate to say that, for Foucault, individual subjects are the products ofboth power
relations and knowledge (or 'power-knowledge'): "at the very centre of the carceral city,
\ ~~:::::~~~::~::;: techniques, 'sciences' ... pennit the fabrication ofthe disciplinary
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As mentioned above, foremost amongst those forms ofknowledge that extrude from
processes whereby relations ofpower produce subjects, are the modem human sciences,
phenomena which made their appearance only with the emergence and consolidation of
the disciplines which manufactured 'Man'. The familiar writing techniques which
accompanied the rise of the examination in the seventeenth century - notation, registration,
filing and tabling - "were ofdecisive importance in the epistemological 'thaw' of the
sciences ofthe individual" (DP: 191, 193,226):
A meticulous observation ofdetail, and at the same time a political awareness of
these small things, for the control and use ofmen ... [;] from such trifles, no doubt,
the man ofmodem humanism was born (DP: 141).
'Man', the self-conscious, reflective and creative author ofscientific knowledge and the
empowered agent ofprogressive social transformation, is a recent product ofa centuries-
long process which can be traced back through various brands ofChristianity and
mysticism to at least Greek Stoicism (see Chapter Three).
While the human sciences are unique in having as their object a knowing subject, the
natural sciences share their embeddedness in specifically social practices: "the sciences of
man were born at the moment when the procedures of surveillance and record-taking of
individuals were established", while the sciences ofnature grew out ofgeneral practices of
investigation modelled on the Inquisition or derived from late-eighteenth century
travellers' tales (Foucault 1980a: 74), just as, in Greece, "mathematics were born from
techniques ofmeasurement" (DP: 226; AK.: 189). The development ofparts ofmodem
science, both human and natural, have been directly premised on the requirements of the
military: the military camp which organised space in order to facilitate observation
provided a model for many panoptic technologies (DP: 171; Smart 1985: 86); and the
discipline ofengineering emerged out oftechniques of fortification construction and siege
warfare, with which mathematics was also closely associated (Aries 1962: 197-199). The
young Kant was employed to teach mathematics, geography and fortification to Prussian
officers in Konigsberg. It was also no mere coincidence that the empirical sciences that
{~
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sought to order the things ofthe world began to develop at the same time as "the western
world was beginning the economic and political conquest ofthis same world" (DP: 226).
Social coercion, economic development and scientific progress went hand-in-hand: for
example, it has been argued that "participation in five major wars between 1689 and 1783
was a major stimulus for English industry and trade at a crucial early stage in the world's
first industrial revolution" (Beckett, in Freedman 1994: 255). In similar vein, the scientific
and technological advances that refine mechanisms ofwar are also the benchmarks of
civilisation, as a Japanese diplomat remarked to his European counterpart at the 1899
Hague Conference for Peace and Disarmament: "We show ourselves at least your equals
in scientific butchery, and at once we are admitted to your council tables as civilized men"
(quoted by Best, in Freedman 1994: 268).
~Man', as a recent invention of the human sciences, is also likened to "a face drawn in sand
at the edge ofthe sea" (OT: 387). That is to say, it is possible that recent developments in
the human sciences themselves - notably, the 'linguistic turn' - may have signed the death
warrant of that very figure reflectively awakened, less than three centuries ago, to the
realisation ofits own presence in the present. Beginning as early as Marx's historical
focus on modes ofproduction and continuing with Nietzsche's genealogy and Freud's
explanation of identity in terms ofthe unconscious, "in their development the sciences of
man lead to the disappearance ofman rather than to his apotheosis" (Foucault 1989: 7, 50;
AK: 13; Hall 1992b: 288). When the Enlightenment flung off the self-imposed chains of
religion and tradition, and the following century incarnated god in humanity, Western
philosophy dreamed the eschatological hope ofusing the new-found knowledge ofMan to
liberate him from his alienation and make him "master ofhimself', self-determining, "an
object ofknowledge so that man could become subject ofhis own liberty and ofhis own
existence" (Foucault 1989: 38,36). No wonder so much contemporary thought resists
even contemplating the possibility that God's replacement, the supposed master ofall
meaning, is an even more imaginary creature. Ironically, the primary challenge faced by
God's assassins comes not from his earth-bound minions but from the dense babble of
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voices unleashed by his murder; in the face of their homicidal paranoia, Foucault gaily
retorted:
it is quite possible that you have killed God under the weight ofall that you have
said; but don't think that you will make, from all that you are saying, a man who
lives longer than he (Foucault 1978b: 26; AK: 211).
Ofcourse, Foucault was only repeating what had originally been stated by the man who,
like Mark Antony who came only to bury Caesar, believed that Man was not worth
praising (Julius Caesar, Act Ill, Scene I1): "[i]t may be that mankind will eventually
perish from this passion for knowledge" (Nietzsche, quoted in Foucault 1977a: 163), will
disintegrate under the impact of "the signs that were born in him" (Foucault 1989: 6-7).
V The ldeath' of the subject
Thus has it come to pass that the linguistic turn, which took the Western will to truth one
step further to search for truths deemed inherent within language, threatens the very
existence of 'Man'. For Foucault, this philosophical development constituted either a
revival ofsome ofthe concerns of the Classical age, or an omen "announcing that man is
disappearing" (Foucault 1989: 6; aT: 383).
Le 'je' a explose (voyez la litterature moderne) - c'est la decouverte du 'il y a'. 11 y
a un on. D'une certaine fayon on en revient au pointe de vue du XVII siecle, avec
cette difference: non pas mettre l'homme it la place de Dieu, mais une pensee
anonyme, du savoir sans sujet, du theorique sans identite (Foucault 1966: 15).
The'!' has exploded (witness modem literature) - it is the discovery of 'it is'. It is a
one~-rn-acertaiIi-maImer oneJmsieturiie:a~tQ~~tIie=-pomt ofVieW-o.fthe-xvn century,
with,this difference:-'2~ttJngJlot_IEall in the place of God, but an ano~ymous ---"--
thought, knowledgewithout a subject: theory without identity tMy tranSlafion -















This formulation of the 'death of the subject', ofan I that vanishes without trace in the
vastness of language, has been a familiar refrain in both structuralist and postmodern
theory. Yet, in relation to Foucault's work, to speak in absolute terms ofMan's demise is
something ofa misnomer. It would be far more accurate to phrase the matter historically,
and to conceive of the self-present, self-reflective modem subject as the latest in a series of
historical fabrications assembled by a unique, constantly mutating and ancient will to truth.
"[I]dentityand subjectivity", for Foucault, are not "deep and ... natural" but are
"determined by political and social factors" (Foucault 1980e: 4). "[T]here is no sovereign,
founding subject" (Foucault 1988a: 50-1); rather, "the individual is no more than a pale
form which arises for a moment from a great stock that is both stubborn and repetitive.
Individuals - the pseudopodia of sexuality, quickly retracted" (Foucault, quoted in Macey
1993: 256). In the first place, this pale
form is not above all or always identical to itself You do not have towards yourself
the same kind ofrelationships when you constitute yourself as a political subject
who goes and votes or speaks up in a meeting, and when you try to ful:fill your
desires in a sexual relationship (Foucault 1987b: 121).
And while these different forms ofthe subject are historically interrelated, not least
because they are all deemed to bear truth in some way, "in each case, we play, we
establish with one's self some different form ofrelationship" (Foucault 1987b: 121).
. Thus, the subject has no fixed identity, nor does it create and manipulate discourses or
--~ -
possess power; it assumes different 1 entities and functions within different discourses and
..........---.-- --------
relations ofpower (Foucault 1978b: i3): - --------=
--~----
Identity, it has been argued, is a "political construction which takes place against the
~.=--..... --- ----- -
background ofa range ofsedimented practices" (Laclau 1990: 35; Martin 1992: 102;
,----.-~ -- ~
Calhoun 1995: 212), a claim which both echoes and refines Marx's famous caveat----""...,.. --
regarding a naive voluntarist politics which ignores that "the tradition ofall the dead
._--~-"',....._-,----------- -----_._--~~---_._~._~ .......
---- - ..~~ - .. --___ ..... k. _
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ge..p.erations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (Marx, in McLellan 1977:___.__... ._......... .__ _ _.__.~__ ,.-..__-_.. -_"'-_k __,__".- -..-."... ,.......".
300).
Each one erson i~capturedby a plurality ofcategorizations, each ofwhich works-------- ~~------.~
over, to reconfigure, the other categorizations. At the same time tlie11Ominanr~
cate-gorizations encounter mi"d negotIate withhistorfcarresiQue~arweifiS-emergent
formafIo ,whiclrmay~beSifuply alternative-or-acilvero-Q·~sitiomtl:-lhusidentities
arenorJus p malCan laea typical o:fpostmodem indifference). The are historical
camp exes anexfuredOtffetence-CPOfiock 1992: 163-4).
_._.__.~T _'.'__.- -»<--
It is these 'historical complexes of textured difference' which not only engender that
familiar 'gut feeling' that subjects have single, coherent identities but literally construct
various comforting, but ultimately fantastic, subjective narratives and performances (Hall
1992b: 277). From this subjectivity peculiar to modernity in which "the human being
begins to exist within his organism, inside the shell ofhis head, inside the armature ofhis
limbs" (OT: 318), from this kind of "psychological subjectivity that the psychoanalysts
deal with", we are invited to liberate ourselves:
We are prisoners ofcertain conceptions about ourselves and our behavior. We have
o liberate our own subjectivity, our own relation to ourselves (Foucault 1980e: 4).
)
While Foucault might well be interpreted here as suggesting that we have some inherent
subjectivity which needs to be set free, it is much more consistent with his corpus to
)
understand this 'liberation' as one which renders hollow all injunctions that we are in need
. of liberation, one which liberates us from the belief that we stand in need of liberation.
Freedom is not a state, it is an activity, an insistent and unrelenting struggle: "1 do not
~ tbattbere is anything that is functionally - by its very nature - absolutely liberating.TY is a practice [;] .... 'liberty' is what must be exercised" (Foucault 1984a: 245;
j hasis in the original).
Stuart Hall offers a useful way of thinking about a subjective identity which is never fixed:
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[R]ather than speaking of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of
identification, and see it as an ongoing process. Identity arises, not so much from
the fullness of identity which is already inside us as individuals, but from a lack of
wholeness which is 'filled' from outside us, by the ways we imagine ourselves to be
seen by others (Halll992b: 287; emphasis in the original).
!!!Jris....exis.t.~~_E1an appears as "immediately interwoven with others" (OT: 351): that is;
I - -
the ongo~ituiian,(llth~_~1l21:.~t, "the entire process of sub~:.ation,ofassu~g--
different subjec!:po.s1ti(71'l~tZizek 1990: 253), always !akes place intersubjectively,
_._~,,~_. ~-'""-" .=-~
through and in relation to others (including one's self), who may either be objects for
__---- .._~-------._ ..... :>o~ _ __ _ __~~~
oneselfor subjects for whom one is an object. As Hegel pointed out in his discussion of
,,' ---~---the diale~tic between Lord'and Bondsi'nan, "self-consciousness ... exists only in being
acknowledged" (Hegel1977: 111); or as Taylor puts it, "[o]ne is a selfonly among other
selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it" (Taylor
1989: 35).
The ego ofwhich we speak is absolutely impossible to distinguish from the
imaginary captivations which constitute it from head to toe, in its genesis as in its
status, in its function as in its actuality, by another and for another" (Lacan, quoted
in Dews 1987: 57).
One's 'intuitive' sense ofoneself as a self-present, coherent and autonomous agent thus
paradoxically depends upon being recognised as such by another (Mahoney & Yngvesson
1992: 60).
Lacking a fixed identity, buffeted to and fro by forces which shape it inside and out the
"" ..,..,v......~~_~...-~._......~_........." ..._.'~~---.""~.<="""'_......~_~~_. __,~ . ~~
subject has nevertheless not vanished from Fou~"sworK:'lfls~motionl~~~Lyet still
......",.....--_.........u.__~_.__-.".'='~ __--.._--.;_ ;'. . .-._..- .........,-.-""'...._..-- ....~.,..._",.,..,,-"="'O;;:;"
quivering" (OT: 239). The subject is ~;t'-&;I;Ithas-only been decentred. In The Order
oiThi~s Foucault posed ih~WbI;t-;~-~-probi~~';~-'b;j;~~stig;;d:p~icu;i~~~;-~=
_._-----------.--_.~------..........~""'.......-.."'~"""~"""''''''.---''''~ ...'''.-.........-~"'''''''-.......-- ......-"~-"..---- ..."-.._~"_ ...,,,..,....-,.""~~.- . "..~~-"""'"
approach "which gives absolute priority to the observing subject", but explicitly did "not
wisht~eny the validity of~~lbk;"graPhles 'T(jT:XTII=XiVfA;BI;mchotp'6lllt~
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The subject does not disappear; rather its excessively determined unity is put in
question. What arouses interest and inquiry is its disappearance (that is, the new
manner of being that disappearance is), or rather its dispersal, which does not
annihilate it but offers us, out of it, no more than a plurality ofpositions and a
discontinuity of functions (Blanchot 1990: 76).
"[N]ot one but split, not sovereign but dependent, not an absolute origin but a function
ceaselessly modified" (Foucault 1989: 61), Foucault's conception ofthe subject is
remarkably simil¥ to the concrete position ofwomen and other marginalised strata of
society. Trapped within a body and a society that are not singular but multiple, many
women find themselves simultaneously in exile and dependent; Kristeva (1986: 297) goes
so far as to suggest that the very basis for the reproduction ofa supposedly unitary human
species, pregnancy, is "an institutionalized form ofpsychosis". His failure to specifically
address gender issues aside, Foucault, while clearly critical ofthe idea ofan authoritative,
authorial and autonomous modem subject, argued nevertheless that "the subject should
not be entirely abandoned. It should be reconsidered, not to restore the theme ofan
originating subject, but to seize its functions, its intervention in discourse, and its system
ofdependencies" (Foucault 1977a: 137; see also AK: 200).
The subject is a determined being, often a self-determined one, which exercises and
experiences relations ofpower (and can thus literally be 'empowered') and which
''--.... ---_../ ~.,- ._- - --, . -
pro uces knowledge. Immersed in these processes, the subject is constituted as much
phySi~~ri;~nd~~rporally ~; linguistically ~nd theoreticall;: -- - - ---
The body is the inscribed surfac~ofeveIlts (traced by language and dissolved by
fdeas)-;thelocus ofadlssociated Self (adopting the illusion ofa substantial ullity),
and a volume in perpetual disintegration (Foucault 1977a: 148).'
The body is subject to regimens ofdiet, exercise, health, hygiene, fashion, worship, ethics
and sexuality, "it ~'b~~ken do~ by t~-rhyt~ ofwork, rest, and holidays; it is poisoned
by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws" (Foucault 1977a: 153). Power
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relations have an immediate hold upon the body: "they invest it~ mark it~ train it~ torture it~
fo;~~~it~~~;ry'out tisk;, t~-performcerem;~es,to '~mit signs" (DP: ~6). Consider the
_",__ ,~_._,.",,,,,--~~-"'--A_~-'~""'''''~''<----'-''''''''''''''''--'-'''''~;1
p11Y;i~~estati~;--oith~-·~ffe~t~·ofrelati~~··~i;o~er upQI!the, body ~_.the_ ~~~~e~_
be'anllg·;d·c~nductofthe unemployed~ the indigent~ the homeless or the mad - slack
."'.~-, - , "_'~" -~._.- --..-""'
jaws~ vacant expressions~ dull eyes~ unkempt hair and clotl1it1.g - as much.~sin the:flrm, ..
c~nfident stride of the company executive~ in the inhibitions that the child lacks as much as
."
in the rigours of adult self-subjection.
The gender-differential effects ofpower relations upon the body are also apparent in
gesture, posture and comportment, in the socially reinforced differences between the ways
in which men and women sit or walk:, display or adorn themselves (Bartky 1988: 66-70).
The human subject has always been a cyborg, malleable and manipulable: it is not just the
extent t~-';hichmacmnes'(artifiCiariimbs,organs and mlpiants, contact ie~~s~'hak -_.-,"
____e w ---- -- - ,~ --~ -- ------ -> .....~.-..._.,_••_ ..-., ....-._~...,,_.-._'-'•. ~..- ••_-" -~'""'''-"'-~-~---.~,_......-
/rn;-plants and pace makers) are_12~gi~I!~IJK1.QJ~~_:Jiterally-::bll.j1tJg12.0.1!t.:.podies, but the
--,--,.,._-_._------~--_..~ .~.. . . , ,. - .. " -,- ~"-'" "...._-~...,..,~.,...........
.,,~- .-. '"
"'~--' . -
supposedly 'natural' human body is itse,lf theJabricated effect ofnumerous, often ancient,
~,..- "----,.~...,~,_ .._"._~ -.- .~.~ .... -.- -,
''''~-,._~._..,~ -_.b~'-,_~ ......~. ' " '_ ...'~,__.#.__
but always contested and mutating, technologies ofpoWeql!1Qknow~edge, from
" • ..•_ ,. , -.- .. " _-.'.. _-7,,,••,"-'~,_ .. ' '-'" ,.",.",.-.........","''''''
cirgD..mci§iO~riiualmutilation anci footbinding.tQJ~Q.Qy!m.ilQj!1g,.~posuction and plastic
",__"""",__o",~_",,, "''-,_;....,"_,._. _. ~~__~'". ''' "" .• ",.,,'_
surgery. In addition, as a biological organism the body is constantly in flux, constantly
~~p~~d~cing-itself and is thus fartyom being theJixed, stable entity thClt_~~gh.t.~~~;t
philo~~r.~_L~~~~~d~.~the pancreas replaces most of its cells every'twenty-four hours, the
stomach lining is rene~~d--e~~ry three day-s, wniteblood cellsareiepl~~eQey~~~t_~~~~ais
and all protein in the. brain is replaced·in less than a month (Capra 1983: 293).
" '. ~......
The subjecte.d sovereignty of the. soul~ too, is a product of the exercise ofpower relations
upon the body. "[B]orn ... out ofmethods ofpunishment, supervision and constraint"
(DP: 29), the soul is not
an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is
produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning ofa power
that is exercised on those punished - and, in a more general way, on those one
supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, childre.n at home and at school, the
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colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their
lives (DP: 29).
Produced as much around as on and within the body, the soul constitutes a kind of
personal space which structures human subjectivity or supposedly innate 'personaliti
itself: conformist or non-conformist in attitude, introverted or extroverted in action, or
shy or bold in gaze. Upon this soul "have been built scientific techniques and discourses,
and the moral claims ofhumanism" (DP: 30). Foucault warned that one must avoid
confusing humanism and Enlightenment: the latter is a set ofhistorical events, and an
ethos, which for Foucault remains pertinent (Foucault 1984a: 43-5), but the former, a set
ofhistorical themes, has been "used by Marxists, liberals, Nazis, Catholics" alike and
prescriptively "presents a certain form ofour ethics as a universal model for any kind of
freedom" (Foucault 1988b: 15; see also 1984a: 374).
Despite the leniency, restraint and moderation associated with it, humanism itself is a
product ofeffects ofpower relations, "the return effects ofpunishment" in the form ofthe
pain and guilt felt by the punishing authority (DP: 91). It was the logic ofbio-power, of
ensuring, sustaining, administering and multiplying the lives ofrational subjects worthy of
respect, and not humanitarian feelings, which demanded 'humane' and 'civilising'
alterations in the way we modems treat others (HS: 138).
[1]t is the economy ofpower that they [all normalizing vehicles ofpower, but judges
in particular] exercise, and not that of their scruples or their humanism, that makes
them pass 'therapeutic' sentences and recommend 'rehabilitating' periods of
imprisonment (DP: 304).
Far from being opposed to or distanced from relations ofpower, humanism extends some
relations ofpower by restraining others: "humanism is everything in Western civilization
that restricts the desire for power" (Foucault 1977a: 221; emphasis in the original). When
humanism exhorts us to liberate the body by freeing the soul (by overcoming our neuroses,
or becoming conscious ofour alienation, or otherwise realising our true nature), this is
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more than just a pipe-dream; it further enmeshes the body in relations ofpower: "The soul
is the effect and instrument ofa political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body" (DP:
30).
Thus, bedecked with a fabricated soul and a mutable body,
the subject .... is constituted in real practices - historically analyzable practices.
There is a technology of the constitution of the selfwhich cuts across symbolic
systems while using them (Foucault 1984a: 369).
A decade and a halfprior to this, in The Order ofThings; Foucault had noted (in relation
to Freud) that
the double articulation of the history of individuals upon the unconscious ofculture,
and ofthe historicity ofthose cultures upon the unconscious of individuals, has
opened up, without doubt, the most general problems that can be posed with regard
to man (aT: 379).
Herein lies Foucault' s response to the structure-agency dichotomy that has been so pivotal
in modem thought, and which was mentioned in relation to Marxism at the end ofChapter
Two. This 'double articulation' is the basis for a paradox in which necessity and
contingency, determinism and freedom or structures and agents "intersect at right angles":
at~y given instant~ th~~tructure proper to. individual experience finds a certain
number ofpossible choices (antf6fexcludeapossibffiires) irithe systems ofthe
/.-~---,..~'~._-'---
SOCIety; inversely, ar'eaclr"oflIieir'paints-ofcn6iCe thtn3'ociiil'stitiCfUfes'encounter a
certaii1;:numberofpessible ..individuals(and otners who are not) (aT>: 380Y.
/ . ~c. "..'- '._,'c
In terms of these restricted possibilities, these compelling choices, individual agents are
subjected or subject themselves to social structures which, in turn, depend upon the free
actions ofa limited number of individuals.
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[T]he subject is constituted through practices of subjection, or in a more
autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in Antiquity, on the
basis, ofcourse, of a number ofrules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural
environment (Foucault 1988a: 50-1).
Thus, even bearing in mind that, for Foucault, subjection is both much more than
externally imposed domination, and much less than a freely chosen role, his conception of
the relation between structures and agents, or relations ofpower and human subjects, both
falls within and sheds new light on the framework that Lukes identified as "the dialectic of
power and structure" (Lukes 1977: 29).
Souls, bodies and individuality itself are not the natural carapaces of being but combative
fields which envelop the subject. The practices of selfthrough which "the subject
constitutes himself in an active fashion" are not invented by the individual but are patterns
"which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his society and his
social group" (Foucault 1987b: 122); nevertheless, "agents themselves transform their
own identity in so far as they actualize certain structural potentialities and reject others"
(Laclau 1990: 30). Modem identity can thus be characterised as "necessary drag" (Martin
1992: 103): a facade-like foundation, essential superficiality, a literal persona, or
theatrical mask (Gurevich 1995: 90), which in this case conceals a vital nothingness.
Contingency and necessity combine in these structured practices of liberty through which
human beings actively determine themselves, and to this extent human beings are
simultaneously free and determined: they freely engage in games of truth and plays of
power which determine not only what they should do (though not always what they do
do), but who and what they are.
Hence, to accuse Foucault ofat best promoting some kind of subjectless politics or at
worst denying politics altogether could not be further from the truth. Such an accusation
is reminiscent of the claim that a rational critique of reason is impossible (see Chapter
One) for, as Butler has pointed out, "to claim that politics requires a stable subject is to
claim that there can be no political opposition to that claim" (Butler 1991: 150). Butler
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goes on to suggest that it is insufficient simply to locate free subjects contextually and
historically: subjects are not merely situated but constituted by the positions they appear
to defend (include) or attack (exclude), and while they are able to "replay and resignify"
these positions, they do not instrumentally preside over them (Butler 1991: 155).
The subject is constituted through an exclusion and differentiation, perhaps a
repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy
(Butler 1991: 157).
To speak of autonomy as an effect, however, is by no means to diminish its value, for
to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the
contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its
agency (Butler 1991: 157).
Similarly for Laclau & Mouffe, "[a]utonomy, far from being incompatible with
hegemony, is a form ofhegemonic construction" (1985: 140; emphasis in the original). A
ramification of this is that struggles against (or, indeed, in support of) specific exercises of
power or states ofdomination are not ruled out but are instead redoubled in strength:
subjects and their actions are always already political, so much so that, as products of
power relations (or "an accomplishment regulated ... in advance"), subjects are the
permanent possibility ofdestabilising and reworking power relations themselves (Butler
1991: 158).
Consequently, political analysis should begin by explaining the constitution of, rather than
assuming, the practices of freedom and capacity for resistance ascribed to, and in general
the particular stylised forms of existence of, the individualised subject, this "walking
shadow" or "poor player that struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no
more" (Macbeth, Act V, Scene V). Modem individual subjects may be multiple, unstable
and fabricated, and many modem lives may reach their apogee only at the point where, in
an all too "brief flash ofsound and fury" (Foucault 197ge: 80; c£ Macbeth, Act V, Scene
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V), they exercise power or have it exercised over them, but this does not absolve one from
accounting for the failure ofsubjects to disintegrate entirely or, alternatively, specifying
the reasons for their continued, if fragile, coherence. Prominent within such an account,
which will include relations ofpower, forms ofknowledge, institutional mechanisms and
sedimented 'tradition', will be specific
technologies ofthe self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or
with the help ofothers a certain number ofoperations on their own bodies and
souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order
to attain a certain state ofhappiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality
(Foucault 1988b: 18; 1984a: 355).
Humanism in all its various guises would ,insist that, whatever state of being one attempts
to achieve, it must not only be consistent with reason but emphasise the importance of
toleration and respect for the rights ofother rational individuals in any political or ethical
undertaking. Against the intolerance of an approach which circumscribes freedom by
prescribing tolerance and limiting rights, Foucault believed that "there are more secrets,
more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future", and correspondingly many
more ways in which subjects can freely determine themselves, than can be imagined in a
dogmatic humanism (Foucault 1988b: 15).
VI A subject called 'Foucault'
Last but not least, Foucault's own work, politics and ethics must be considered in the light
ofhis reconceptualisation of the subject in relation to power and knowledge. In the first
place, his work cannot be divorced from its implication in the human scientific forces that
structure the present. Foucault explicitly situated his work in the context of the "five brief,
impassioned, jubilant, enigmatic years" (Foucault 1983c: xi) after 1968, which witnessed
the proliferation oflocal struggles directed specifically at mental illness, prisons, justice,
medicine, work, education and sexuality. These struggles constituted an "insurrection of
subjugated knowledges" (Foucault 1980a: 81; emphasis in the original; 1987c: 202) to the
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extent that they were indissociable from "local, regional and discontinuous theories" which
derived from them (Foucault 1977a: 215). Believing these struggles to "stand at the
threshold ofour discovery of the manner in which power is exercised" (Foucault 1977a:
215), Foucault noted that despite the specificity oftheir targets they were similar in
several respects, each being "antiauthority", "transversal" (multisectoral and
multinational), "immediate" and "anarchistic" (SP: 212; in Macey 1993: 268). Most
importantly, they displayed a common hostility to the totalitarian predilections of
hegemonic scientific, judicial, technological and governmental knowledges: the modem
"regime du savoir" which is characterised on the one hand by a totalising "economic and
ideological state violence which ignore[s] who we are individually", and on the other hand
by an individualising "scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is"
(SP: 212).
As we showed in Chapter Three, a unique and very specific "[p]olitical rationality has
grown and imposed itself all throughout the history of Western societies"; firstly in the
form ofpastoral power, then reason ofstate, "[i]ts inevitable effects are both
individualisation and totalisation" (Foucault 1981e: 254). The last four hundred years in
particular have seen
the increasing intervention of the state in the life of individuals, the increasing
importance of life problems for political power, and the development ofpossible
fields for social and human sciences insofar as they take into account those problems
of individual behaviour inside the population and the relations between a living
population and its environment (Foucault 1988b: 160-61; see also 162).
Given the fact that individualisation and totalisation are the effects of this particular
political rationality, it follows that an individualist discourse like liberalism, or a collectivist
one like Marxism, far from contesting political rationality, assists its growth and the
dissemination of its effects:
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Opposing the individual and his interests to it [political rationality, particularly the
modem state] is just as hazardous as opposing it with the community and its
requirements (Foucault 1981e: 254; 1988b: 162).
"The individual is the product of power" (Foucault 1983c: xiv), and thus to employ stark
\ Manichaen oppositions which idealise the individual and denigrate its totalised or totalising
Iother (Foucault 1988a: 168; Calhoun 1995: 218), or to claim that the rights of individuals
I
\ have been "amputated, repressed, [or] altered by our social order" (DP: 217), is not to
\ challenge but to expedite modem political rationality.
On this basis, Foucault suggested that ifstruggles against forms ofethnic, social and
religious domination prevailed in feudal societies, and struggles against forms of
exploitation which separate individuals from what they produce dominated the nineteenth
century, then today, though previous struggles had far from disappeared, the main struggle
is "against subjection, against forms of subjectivity and submission" (SP: 212). Locating
his work alongside these struggles and the knowledges they produced, Foucault argued
that the modem form of subjection of individuals must be challenged by "putting into
question ... the anthropological status, the status of the subject, and the privileges ofman"
(Foucault 1989: 55), and by asserting the right to be. different while simultaneously
resisting the "government of individualization" which separates people and ties them to
identities in a constraining way (SP: 212).
Thus, "[w]hat is needed is to 'de-individualize' by means ofmultiplication and
displacement, diverse combinations" (Foucault 1983c: xiv), "to refuse what we are .... [,]
to imagine and build up what we could be .... [and to] promote new forms ofsubjectivity"
(SP: 216).
It is up to us to defend ourselves so well that the institutions will be forced to
reform themselves .... In the expression 'defend oneself, the reflexive pronoun is
crucial. The point is to inscribe the life, the existence, the subjectivity and the very
reality ofthe individual within the practice of the law,
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a law "over which governments wish to have a monopoly, a monopoly which we must
wrest away from them, gra-duallyand day by day" (Foucault, in Macey 1993: 418, 438).
I
While eminently liberal in tone, these struggles by individuals against corrupt institutions
also convey resonances of Ghandian passive resistance, in the sense that individuals are
not exhorted to attack injustice but to defend themselves so well from attack that their
opponents will find themselves compelled to relent. Nevertheless, it must constantly be
taken into account that even these 'defensive' struggles must paradoxically rely "for
support on the very thing it [totalitarian bio-powers and -knowledges] invested, that is, on
life and man as a living being" (HS: 144), for they assert "[t]he 'right' to life, to one's
body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction ofneeds, and beyond all the oppressions
or 'alienations', the 'right' to rediscover what one is and all that one can be" (HS: 145).
On the one hand, therefore, there remains a space for theoretical and practical resistance
to a rights-based political rationality to invoke "unbreakable law and unabridgeable rights"
(Foucault 1981b: 8).
On the other hand, the implication of such struggles in that which they oppose, and of
their critiques in that which they call into question, far from leading to quietistic
indifference or a "nihilistic relativism incapable offurnishing norms", is rather "the very
precondition ofa politically engaged critique" (Butler 199: 153). "Each investigation",
each theoretical challenge, each process ofproducing knowledge "must therefore be a
political act" (Foucault, in Macey 1993: 268; emphasis in the original). Theoretical
analysis is nothing less than a political practice, not merely a justilication or rationalisation
ofsuch practice:
Do not use thought to ground a politicalpractice in Truth; nor political action to
discredit, as mere speculation, a line ofthought. Use political practice as·an
intensilier of thought, and analysis as a multiplier ofthe forms and domains for the
intervention ofpolitical action (Foucault 1983c: xiv).
Here Foucault, rather unusually, appears to go so far as to translate his mostly cautionary
critique ofpower conceived ofas sovereignty into a positive recommendation. Taking as
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given that power relations produce, and are extended by, forms ofknowledge, it follows
that one ought to contemplate, undertake and assess political actions to the extent that
they 'intensify' thought - such as forcefully stating or challenging an issue, or
concentrating attention, or arousing ardour - and that one ought to engage in analysis and
critique to the extent to which this 'multiplies' possibilities for political interventions - by
opening up new angles for engagement, inventing new weapons or reconfiguring the
terrain.
Foucault's intense theoretical concerns materialised in practice in other ways, too. He
defined the teaching ofthe philosophy department that he briefly headed at Vincennes as
twofold: "one that is basically devoted to the political analysis of society and one that is
devoted to the analysis ofthe scientific fact and to the analysis ofa certain number of
scientific domains. These two regions, politics and science, seemed ... most fruitful"
(Foucau1t, quoted in Macey 1993: 231). Similarly, Etienne Balibar recalls Foucault
speaking ofaiming to recruit for the new department both 'specialists in power' and
'specialists in knowledge' (Macey 1993: 225).
Nevertheless, Foucault's own political activities on behalfof the Groupe d'Information sur
1es Prisons (GIP) can be seen as much as totalising and individualising human scientific
interventions as attempts to challenge the authority ofsuch interventions, in the sense that
he implicitly acknowledged that any attempt to alter the treatment ofprisoners required
the accumulation ofknowledge about prison living conditions (Macey 1993: 262). Nor
could the GIP or its members escape the ramifications of the Enlightenment insistence that
subjects are constituted in and through a process of speaking the truth: in meetings at
Foucault's apartment, former prisoners attempted to outdo each other in constituting
themselves as subjects capable ofrelating the most relevant and accurate experiences, such
that "each badly wanted to be more ofa prisoner than the others" (Daniel Defert, in
Macey 1993: 268). Foucault's work, too, like the early modem discourse on war that so
fascinated him, can be articulated to a variety of forms (traditional mythical ones like the
yearning for a lost age, the search for a new kingdom, or the desire for millenarian
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revenge, as well as more recognisably modem ones like anarchism, liberalism and
Marxism) and is "capable ofbearing equally well the nostalgia ofdeclining aristocracies
and the ardour ofpopular vengeance" (Foucault 1980d: 18), the New Right conservatism
ofthe anti-Marxist 'moral majority' and the New Left radicalism ofanti-Oedipal 'desiring
machines'. For some, this is what is dangerous about Foucault's work; but for those who
are willing to experiment with the political construction ofnew identities and alternative
futures, it is a challenge.
Personally, Foucault revelled in the indeterminacy ofhis position, resisting any and all
labels intended to individualise, categorise, capture and tame him and instead deliberately
(dis)locating himselfby seeking refuge amidst multiplicity, complexity and paradox, and
attempting to transform himself into a 'non-point' consisting ofan infinity ofoverlapping
points. For instance, as mentioned above, while there is some substance to the argument
that Foucault's personal conception ofpolitics was a liberal one, especially in the light of
his assertion that, as an intellectual, he would prefer to 'respect everyone's freedom' and
let them "draw their own conclusions" (Foucault 1988b: 146), he also refused to give in to
demands to 'prophesy', to say what he thought ought to be done. And for all of
Foucault's "proto-anarchist" posturing (Hall 1986: 48), not to mention mistaken
interpretations by critics like Rorty and Walzer (Rorty 1986: 47; Walzer 1986: 61), he also
derided that doctrine as a "naive, archaic ideology" which romanticises the oppressed
(Foucault 1984a: 71-2).
One epithet which Foucault consistently and vigourously opposed was that of
'structuralist'. Given some ofhis utterances in interviews, it is somewhat surprising that
Foucault went to such lengths to avoid this particular label, bearing in mind that it was a
journalistic commonplace and even a form ofpraise in France during the Sixties to
associate Foucault with Levi-Strauss, Lacan and Barthes. For example, in an interview
given after the publication ofLes mots et les choses, Foucault distinguished Sartre's
philosophy ofmeaning from the work ofLevi-Strauss and Lacan which, he argued,
showed that
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le 'sens' n'etait probablement qu'une sorte d'effet de surface, un miroitement, une
ecume, et que ce qui nous traversait profondement, ce qui etait avant nous, ce qui
nous soutenait dans le temps et l'espace, c'etait le systeme (Foucault 1966: 14;
emphasis in the original).
'meaning' is probably no more than a surface-effect, a sheen or froth [upon
depthless waters], and that that which fundamentally traverses us, that which
precedes us, that which maintains us in time and space, is the system [My translation
- RD)).
References such as these and others, such as the Lacanian-inspired structuralist definition
of 'system' as tIles structures, le systeme meme du langue" (Foucault 1966: 14), not to
mention the stark fonnulations in The Order ofThings itself and the book's
commendation by both Levi-Strauss and Lacan, certainly fueled suspicions (or sustained
hopes, depending on the reader) that Foucault was a 'structuralist'.
Foucault displayed a detailed awareness of the historical, philosophical and political
importance ofthe structuralist movement (AK: 11), locating it "within the broad current
of formal thought" (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 196) which "spanned the entire twentieth
century" (Foucault 1988a: 314) and, after visiting Hungary in 1967, suggesting that the
local ban on discussing structuralism appeared to be linked to the hostile reception given
to structuralist works in France, as ifan attempt was being made to suppress an emerging
non-Marxist culture on the left (Macey 1993: 179). Nevertheless, his constant and
consistent refrain was: "Let me announce once and for all that I am not a structuralist"
(Foucault 1993a: 202; aT: xiv; 1980a: 114; 1989: 25, 79-80; in Foucault & Sennett 1982:
9). Concluding his inaugural lecture, "The Order ofDiscourse", with a challenge to his
detractors to say of the outline ofhis proposed oeuvre "that all this is structuralism"
(Foucault 1984b: 133), he poured scorn on the concept: "Structuralism is a category that
exists for others, for those who are not structuralists" (Foucault 1989: 39,60). His
vehement rejection of the epithet 'structuralist' when applied to himself should perhaps be
understood in the light ofhis desire to challenge the ways in which we have been and are
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subjected. To be a structuralist during the 1960's was to fit into an identifiable intellectual
current; to resist this definition without proposing an alternative was to attempt the
impossible feat of standing outside ofone's milieu. Foucault craved anonymity as much as
he sought critical recognition; in the light ofthe flood ofFoucauldian studies since his
death, it might even be said that he has achieved this impossible junction.
Described also as Gaullist, Marxist, conservative and nihilist, Foucault rejected each label
in favour ofthe collective and contradictory meaning ofall the labels together (Foucault
1984a: 384). As Martin Jay has pointed out, locating Foucault within the framework of
his own oeuvre requires that one admit the instability and inadequacy but also the
contradictory truth of each of the rubrics under which he has been placed, or placed
himself (Jay 1986: 176; see also Said 1988: 3). The French higher education system,
uncertain about whether to categorise the young Foucault as a 'psychologist' or a
'historian of science', eventually opted for neither label and decided to call him a
'philosopher' (Macey 1993: 108-9). A second, trivial but germane, example of the
difficulties in 'placing' Foucault, without any intervention on his part, can be found in
Fons Elders' publication ofthe transcript ofa televised debate between Foucault and
Noam Chomsky in 1971: the captions under the photographs ofthe participants
incorrectly indicate that Foucault is 'on the right' when he is, literally, 'on the left' in the
photographs (Elders 1974: 160-1). Habermas writes ofbeing impressed by "the tension,
one that eludes familiar categories" between Foucault's scholarly reserve and his political
vitality (Habermas 1986: 103-4). In another instance, Maurice Blanchot comments that he
never met Foucault, "except one time, in the courtyard of the Sorbonne, during the events
ofMay '68, perhaps in June or July (but I was later told he wasn't there) ... " (Blanchot
1990: 63).
However, there were several labels which Foucault himself suggested or allowed to attach
to himself: his designation as 'philosopher' (rather than 'historian') by the French higher
education bureaucracy, and also 'Nietzschean' and 'sceptic' (Foucault 1988a: 251-4) (but
not 'scientist' nor 'artist' - Foucault 1980e: 4). There was also at least one label, his own
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category of 'specific intellectual', with which he explicitly associated himself: "I work in a
specific field and do not produce a theory of the world" (Foucault 1988a: 108), attempting
instead "to open up problems that are as concrete and general as possible" (Foucault
1984a: 376; emphasis in the original). As a 'specific intellectual', Foucault's truth-claims
are as embroiled in relations of power as any other human subject:
If! tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I am constituted
as a subject across a number ofpower relations which are exerted over me and
which I exert over others (Foucault, in Raulet 1983: 207-8).
At the same time, the work ofany intellectual qua intellectual is intended "always to do
something ... [;] to change even the smallest part of our reality - people's ideas ... "
(Foucault 1980e: 4). The results of these efforts, he hoped, would be "to produce some
effects of truth which might be used for a possible battle, to be waged by those who wish
to wage it, in forms yet to be found and in organizations yet to be defined" (Foucault
1989: 191).
It was mentioned above and in Chapter Four how Foucault's idea ofpolitics as strategy
was influenced by his studies ofa seventeenth century discourse which treated war as the
permanent foundation ofpower. His comments on this discourse are especially helpful in
understanding how he conceived ofhis own work and his own political position.
The subject who speaks in this discourse cannot occupy the position ofthe jurist or
the philosopher, i.e. the position of the universal subject. In this general struggle of
which he speaks, he is necessarily on one side or the other: he is in the battle; he has
adversaries; he is fighting for victory. No doubt he seeks to make right hold sway;
but it is his own right - a singular right marked by a relation ofconquest, of
domination, or ofseniority (Foucault 1980d: 17).
There are immediate resonances here with Foucault's account ofthe specific intellectual,
who is implicated in the very structures he or she may be seeking to change, and ofthe
relations ofpower which ground all truth claims. There can be no question ofuniversality
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or objectivity here: the protagonist is partisan,. personally committed to success. This
"political and historical discourse which lays claim to truth and right~ but excludes itself
explicitly fromjuridico-philosophical universality" (Foucault 1980d: 17) is not unlike that
ofFoucault himself) offering neither an alternative universal truth nor to mediate between
adversaries but intending only "to apply a truth which would function like a weapon"
(Foucault 1980d: 17). Again like Foucault, this discourse "explains things from the
bottom", analysing history in terms ofviolence, passion and chance and pointing to "the
blood that has dried on the codes of the law" (Foucault 1980d: 17-18).
Habermas took "the incisive observations ofFoucault [on the role of intellectuals] ... as a
self-critical rejection ofexaggerated claims" (Habermas 1987: 57). Perhaps this is
precisely where Foucault would have most wished to be: at the juncture of 'exaggerated
claims' and 'incisive observations', where fiction meets fact, where the transcendental and
the empirical join in unholy matrimony, nowhere and yet everywhere on the political
checkerboard. Preferring always to be elsewhere from or other than where he was located
by others, "a man always on the move" (Blanchot 1990: 68), Foucault's political identity
was closely tied to his personal identity.
I dream ofthe intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in
the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points,
the openings, the lines offorce, who is incessantly on the move, doesn't know
exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive
to the present (Foucault 1977b: 161).
While "very proud that some people think I'm a danger for the intellectual health of
students" (Foucault 1988b: 13), Foucault refused to "offer himself as a model, to produce
himselfas a master" (Canguilhem 1995b: 286); as a specific rather than a universal
intellectual, he did not see himself as leading, or advising the leadership of, a movement
seeking radical social transformation, but was satisfied genealogically locating the fissures
ofmodernity.
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VII Reinventing the self
Proclaiming that~!E~.h~ruism-Q.LpQQtical id~~itY.._~~.~~~._its_~ay", Foucaultar~
..---- -----~.-
"what one is has now become a question one pose~.Lmoment1?ymOIDell1,J:_OJh~p-roblems
------~_.-----------_._-_.-........_-'-"---_._,.....---_.~_...---..---
one encounters. Experiments with, rather than engagement in" (Foucault, quoted in
,------
Gordon 1993: 21). Identity is not given, an attribute on the basis ofwhich one 'engages----------_..-'------- ----
in' politics;Jather,Jdefltitymust-be-'-expeFirnen~wi"fu~,._~itl.!_the consequence that...-- ._"-----'--,--_._-
politics becomes infinitely more fluid and inextricably intertwined with knowl:~¥.::
-,--_.~.~.._,----,._-~_._~---...-..-...-.._-_._-_._-- .._._~--
Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for
experim~ntatiQ1}QrL()urselves, calls us to the sacrifice of thesulJ.jeCtof1illowIedge
(Foucault 1977a: 163).. -----.-.-.--"...,.
To sacrifice the subject ofknowledge is to abandon, at the same time, the generalities of
the human sciences, the scientist as knowing subject and the self-identical agent ofhistory.
T~e problematic identity ofthe selfhas moved to the centre of the political stage. JThe
personal is not only political, for Foucault as for many new soaaf~oveme~ts~-b~tth-e---'-
.,., ",.",,- ,'",'•••~",><,.-..,."..• ". - '.". ,-" , ~.~~_.'"' .••-.~--~_.,.,.",.• '"'-....,. >'""'-"'~~""-" "--,"".,..""',.""_.~. ,~.",.",.,- • ..,."
political is also personal: the exercise ofpower produces persons, and persons exercise
power. Calhoun writes:
Not only is the personal increasingly politicized, ... politics is increasingly
aestheticized. It turns on dramatic performances rather than instrumental struggles
(Calhoun 1995: 231).
For Foucault, at issue in this 'aestheticised politics' ofthe present is the possibility of
whether and the extent to which "the effort to think one's own history can free thought
from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently" (Foucault 1987a: 9).
To attempt to think differently was the objective both ofFoucault's public practices and of
his personal ethics. He was already a long way away from the traditional functions ofan























university without which he could not function, believing that he was unable to be "a good
academic" (though he has been quoted as saying that he could have been "a good monk" -
Macey 1993: 415). He saw his History ofSexuality as an arduous "philosophical
exercise" (Foucault 1987a: 9) aimed at self-transformation, at detaching himself from
himselfby writing "in order to have no fac~" (AK: 17), in order to constantly produce
himself in new and different guises. Indeed, "[e]ach ofmy works is a part ofmy own
biography" (Foucault 1988b: 11), "fragments from an autobiography"; "[m]y books have
always been my personal problems with madness, with prisons, with sexuality" (Foucault,
quoted in Macey 1993: xii). It follows that Foucault's genealogical approach is intended
to render possible a new ethical sensibility in the same way as it is intended to produce
effects of truth or disturb existing configurations ofpower (Connolly 1993: 372). "[F]or
me intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, meaning transforming
yourself ... [M]y problem is my own transformation" (Foucault 1988a: 14).
What can the ethics ofan intellectual be ... ifnot this: to make oneselfpermanently
capable ofdetaching oneself from oneself (which is the opposite ofthe attitude of
conversion)? .... [T]his change does not take the form ofa sudden illumination in
which 'one's eyes are opened', nor ofa permeability to all the movements at work in
the present; I would like it to be an elaboration ofselfby self, a studious
transformation, a slow, arduous process ofchange, guided by a constant concern for
truth (Foucault 1988a: 263-4).
This 'detachment ofoneself from oneself so as "to become other than what one is"
(F~ucaiiliTg~r8-a:-3jOf,thIs-demanding-'; e~e~~i~eolseffupon-se1P'~(Fo-t;~~;it-19-87b~'- 113)
guided by truth, is what philosophy, for Foucault, is all about. And "ifthis is the
relationship we have to truth, how must we behave?" (Foucault 1988a: 330). J!!_g_!Q~!..
words, "instead ofattempting to determJn~_.:\Y.hf!:t}Veshould do on the basis ofwhat we
..--._--_._---------.~-- ...,._".._.~.~_._~'" " ..._~'- ...._,--,~_.__ ..."'".~'".~ •..,_._""•.--_._. "-".
eSseiitiallyare, [Foucault] attempts by analyzing who we have been co~titute(rt6oe,16~
ask"'what we might become" (Rajchman, quoted in Di~orur&. Qiiiiiby 198'8r--Ontne
assii~pti~~that'one's--'imaininterest in life and work is to become someone els;;hatYou'~
--
were not in the beginning" (Foucault 1988b: 9), and given "the idea that the self is not
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given to us~ I think that there is only one practical cogseguence: we have to create
...........'_.."'.__....-,..-'._..".,,~~""_--._---.....~---~.~_.--'--_ ....._--- ~--~




Foucault's work. Unlike "the search for a personal ethics" in Antiquity~ or "obedience to a-,
systemo~ under Christianity~ modern technologies ofthe self consist ofa "search
for an aesthetics ofexistence" (Foucault 1988a: 49; 1987a: 11):
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules
ofconduct~but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their
singular being~ and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic
values and meets certain stylistic criteria (Foucault 1987a: 10-11).
While this aesthetic ethical stylisation ofoneself is a specifically modern phenomenon (and
Foucault's interest therein must be read against the backdrop ofthe shift, in mid- to late-
twentieth century Western politics, from welfarism to neo-liberal government and the
increasing emphasis on self-help and autonomous lifestyles), it retains certain important
affinities with ethical practices in Antiquity. Foucault found it particularly "interesting"
(Foucault 1984a: 348) that, in contrast to Christian and much ofmodern ethics, Greek
ethics was concerned neither with religious problems (such as that of the afterlife) nor
connected to some authoritarian and institutionalised legal system (Foucault 1984a: 343):
their themes ofethical and sexual austerity "did not coincide with the lines ofdemarcation
that may have been traced by the great social, civil and religious interdictions" (Foucault
1987a: 22).
Instead,
the question of style was central to experience in antiquity - stylization of the
relation to oneself, style ofconduct, stylization ofthe relation to others (Foucault
1988a: 244).
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Greek ethics did not concern itself with global prohibitions, not even those severe
constraints to which women were subjected; rather, it addressed the free conduct offree
men (Foucault 1987a: 22):
These themes ofsexual austerity should be understood, not as an expression of, or
commentary on, deep and essential prohibitions, but as the elaboration and
stylization ofan activity in the exercise of its power and the practice of its liberty
(Foucault 1987a: 23).
The modem stylisation ofthe self, too, fuses together the free actions of individuals with
the determining effects ofrelations ofpower and the imperious demand that we speak the
truth; subjects, as the conduits and the detritus ofstrategic games of liberty, invent
themselves anew in the space allowed them by the state ofplay. For example, gay
machismo, and drag queens, are seen as two different attempts to "invent oneself, to make
one's body the place ofproduction ofextraordinarily polymorphous pleasures" by
detaching oneself from the virile masculinity of''jouissance in the ejaculatory sense"
(Foucault, quoted in Macey 1993: 365; emphasis in the original).
However, it would be wrong to suggest that Foucault's 'aestheticised politics' is an option
only for marginalised subjects like social deviants, nonconformists, prisoners, homosexuals
and the mentally ill. Stylistic self-reinvention is not confined to the fringes ofmodern
societies, but to a greater or lesser degree is a feature ofall lives: the basketball player as
much as his fans, the music or fashion buffas well as the rock star and supermodel, the
royal princess as much as the press and the paparazzi. Indeed, in 1971 Foucault suggested
that "it is possible that the rough outline ofa future society is supplied by the recent
experiences with drugs, sex, communes, other forms ofconsciousness, and other forms of
individuality" (Foucault 1977a: 231). Most importantly for Foucault, modern individuals
must "search for styles ofexistence as different from each other as possible", for to
"search for a form ofmorality acceptable to everybody in the sense that everyone should
submit to it", as in the positive construction ofa 'gay' style (Foucault 1988a: 292) or a
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'rock music' style (Foucault 1988a: 316), "strikes me as catastrophic" (Foucault 1988a:
254).
For Foucault, then, we form, style and modifY ourselves, our thoughts and our behaviour,
in relation to rules and routines proposed to or imposed on us by forces which subject us,
through disciplinary or 'ascetic' (even when 'aesthetic') practices or technologies of the
self
There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; no
moral conduct that does not call for the forming ofoneself as an ethical subject; and
no forming ofthe ethical subject without 'modes ofsubjectivation' and an 'ascetics'
or 'practices ofthe self' that support them (Foucault 1987a: 28).
He distinguished between four aspects of "the kind ofrelationship you ought to have with
"<••'r.,-.------~---~-..-"~ ..,"'''..~''''.,- .....-~~-'''=---=---.-~~ .........,-,....,......,"""'"._".--"..~~~."' ...~.....,......- ......__~"_.__"'_-...-.~ ~--, ~..-_~ '"_~~.........__' __-.._~.__.,._.~--._ .....
yourself, rapport asoi, which I call ethics, and which determines how the individual is
'~-suppos~d to constitute himself as a moral subject ofhis own acti~~s" (Fouca~Tt-1984a:
_r:.----..-..,~---~~-....---,-'-~-.. .--...---.-<--...>-.~-'~-~.-- ' ..._.,'~ ....... ~__n--~M'__>..._.........,
352). First, the ethical substance (aphrodisia or aestheticism - the beautiful life - for the
--~
Greeks, and desire for Christians) was what one worked on or at: the strict observance of
rules, fervour in resisting temptation, or the intensity ofone's feelings for another
(Foucault 1987a: 26-7; emphasis in the original). Second, the "mode of subjection (mode
du assujettissement)" referred to established customary or institutional forces which
dictated the framework within which individuals were to act upon themselves: for
example, in terms ofpersonal choice, divine law, natural law, or rationalism (Foucault
1984a: 353; emphasis in the original; 1987a: 27). The third aspect was "the self-forming
activity (pratique de soi) or I'ascetisme - asceticism in a very broad sense" (Foucault
1984a: 355; emphasis in the original), or how we behave ethically, by, for example, acting
in moderation, deciphering our identity, eradicating our desires or reproducing the species.
The last aspect ofone's relation to oneselfwas the telos underlying our ethical behaviour,
depending on the kind ofethical being one aspired to become, such as self-disciplined,
pure, immortal or free (Foucault 1984a: 355.).
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What kind ofethical self-transformation or 'work ofart' did Foucault have in mind for
himself? Perhaps surprisingly for someone apparently so austere and so taken with Greek
Stoicism, it can be characterised simply as 'everything to excess'. In terms of this,
everything that one does, whether privately or publicly, personally or politically, ought to
be as intense as possible, pushed to the limit, taken to the extreme: in sexual relationships
one ought to seek an "intensification of pleasure" (Foucault 1988a: 15); and "some drugs"
might be worth taking as "the mediation to those "incredibly intense joys that I am looking
for" (Foucault 1988a: 12). There must be some substance in thus characterising Foucault:
his critics and supporters are in unison here. Said (1986: 154) refers to the "extremism" of
Foucault's work; Canguilhem (1995c: 289) speaks ofFoucault's "undertaking without
limits"; and Walzer thinks that Foucault ought to be positioned on the political
checkerboard under 'infantile leftism', in that his work involved "an outrunning ofthe
most radical argument in any political struggle" (Walzer 1986: 51). Dews argues that
poststructuralism in general, and, by extension, Foucault's work in particular, is
a mode ofthought that prides itselfon a reckless integrity and consistency, and
which is therefore willing to brave all consequences (Dews 1987: xvi).
Finally, Habermas chimes in by suggesting that for Foucault's mentor, Nietzsche, "[t]he
aesthetic core of the will to power is the capacity ofa sensibility that lets itselfbe affected
in the greatest possible multiplicity ofmodes" (Habermas 1987: 124). Such a sensibility is
clearly one which wishes to experience and experiment with all that life may'have to offer.
Philosophically, Foucault wanted to become more like Jean Hyppolite who, he argued,
had succeeded in displacing Hegelian philosophy five-fold, "leading to the extreme edge of
Hegelian philosophy, and no doubt pushing it over on to the other side of its own limits"
(Foucault 1984b: 134). For Foucault, Hyppolite's approach suggested that "philosophical
thought maintains the discourse of the philosopher within the instance ofan indefinite
vibration", maintaining it always "in excess of' or "beyond" itself (Foucault, quoted in
Macey 1993: 231). While realising the immense difficulties in attempting to go beyond the
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limits ofphilosophy, and the price that one might have to pay for making the attempt,
Foucault did not balk at the task. The key, he suggested, is not to be awed by the
venerability of its ancient traditions, the splendour of its accomplishments or the genius of
its practitioners; instead, one must develop "a sharpened sense ofreality, but one that is
never immobilized before it", be determined "to throw off familiar ways of thought and to
look at the same things in a different way" and display "a lack ofrespect for the traditional
hierarchies ofwhat is important and fundamental" (Foucault 1988a: 328). The key, in
short, is irreverence:
To rid oneselfofphilosophy necessarily implies ... an offhandedness [or] ... an
astonished and joyful stupidity (Foucault 1989: 118).
One must at the same time take care "ofwhat exists and what might exist" (Foucault
1988a: 328), both playfully dismissing philosophy, by exhibiting a "lack ofdeference"
(Foucault 1988a: 312) similar to that shown by Nietzsche, and displaying a "studied" or
"studious casualness" (Foucault 1984b: 133) as one seeks to transform oneself in relation
to it.
"As for what motivated me .... It was curiosity - ... the curiosity that ... enables one to get
free ofoneself After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it
resulted only in a certain amount ofknowledgeableness and not, in one way or another
and to the extent possible, in the knower's straying afield ofhimself?" (Foucault 1987a: 8-
9) or "in the bewilderment ofhim who knows?" (Sheridan 1989: 46; his translation). The
French word "egarement" ("bewilderment") can also be translated as "losing one's way",
"error" or even "madness" (Sheridan 1989: 47); it follows from this that the point of
philosophy, for Foucault, is not necessarily to seek clarity or confirmation but to
'bewilder' or 'derange' oneself, to achieve 'ecstasy' (literally, standing outside ofoneself)
or to go 'beserk' (and be 'beside oneself) (Taylor 1989: 119). Foucault's own work, in
particular, was intended "not to dissipate oblivion" but "to make differences" (AK: 205;
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emphasis in the original), to render our theories uncertain, our politics problematic, and
ourselves indeterminate.
'To philosophise or not to philosophise' is not the question, for we must, necessarily, do
both: freely subjecting ourselves to the forces that engulfus, we must be determined to be
free. Foucault was much impressed by the political spiritualite evinced in Greek ethics,
which, as he interpreted it, did not separate freedom, truth and power relations:
Liberty is ... in itselfpolitical. And then, it has a political model, in the measure
where being free means not being a slave to one's self and to one's appetites, which
supposes that one establishes over one's self a certain relation ofdomination, of
mastery, which was called arche - power, authority (Foucault 1987b: 117).
One's personal comportment, one's invention, elaboration, stylisation, care for and
transformation of self, which always involves standing 'in a certain relation ofpower and
truth towards oneself and others, is, for Foucault as much as for the Greeks, "the concrete
expression ofliberty" (Foucault 1987b: 117). Whatever the effects of liberation, liberty is
I not necessarily one ofthem; to be liberated from colonialism, or capitalism, or patriarchy,
may be "the political or historical condition for a practice of liberty", but in most cases this
is "not sufficient to establish the practices ofliberty" necessary for acceptable froms of
existence (Foucault 1987b: 114). "The guarantee offreedom is freedom" (Foucault
1984a: 245), which may be assisted or impeded, but never guaranteed, by institutions,
laws or resources (Foucault 1984a: 246). To exercise freedom, or to style oneself, is a
political and philosophical ordeal, a permanent critical examination by which one essays to
become other than what one is.
In this context it is appropriate and instructive that the Foucault who conceived ofhis
books as elements ofhis biography was also the Foucault who set great store by that
particular stylistic exercise known as the 'essay'.
The 'essay' - which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the ga:rne
of truth, one undergoes ch~ges, and not as the simplistic appropriation ofothers for
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the purpose ofcommunication - is the living substance ofphilosophy, at least ifwe
assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, Le., an 'ascesis', askesis, an
exercise ofoneself in the activity of thought (Foucault 1987a: 9).
As an element caught up in the power-laden and truth-bearing games that we call social
life, this thesis has attempted to take seriously Foucault's call to use his work as he used
Nietzsche's, as an exercise and a transformation, even a displacement, of the author as
much as of the oeuvre. In this thesis are intertwined power relations, truth and the subject
- Enlightenment critique and criticism ofEnlightenment, confession and examination,
discipline and sovereignty: the disciplined (or written) inscription and transformation of
Foucault (as much as myself), via the production and dissemination of the truth ofmyself
(as much as Foucault).
Foucault's desire to literally (in the literal and figurative senses) bewilder himself, as a
starting point for thinking and acting differently, is no more curious than the prevalence of
paradox in that long and peculiar tradition - Western philosophy - which, armed with
information technology, stands on the world-historical threshold ofbecoming global
philosophy. Philosophical criticism, "the challenging ofall phenomena ofdomination at
whatever level or under whatever form they present themselves - political, economic,
sexual, institutional and so on" (Foucault 1987b: 131), did not come ofage in the
Enlightenment or with Kant; that was merely its moment ofadolescent revolt. Only now,
at the end ofthe twentieth century, as philosophy recognises that it itself is not beyond
challenge, might it be said to have attained maturity.
This critical function ofphilosophy, up to a certain point emerges right from the
socratic [Sic.] imperative: 'Be concerned with yourself, i.e., ground yourself in
liberty, through the mastery ofself (Foucault 1987b: 131).
Thus we arrive once again at our starting-point - the paradox ofphilosophy, as ancient as
it is modem: practice liberty, free oneself (from passions, appetites, instincts, and from
specific regimes of truth which are coupled to particular relations ofpower), by ordering
or acting upon oneself - detennining oneself - in tenus ofparticular technologies of the




Ifone were to assess the implications ofFoucault's work for current understandings of
theory, politics and human subjects solely on the basis ofthe arguments ofhis critics, then
it would be fair to conclude that Foucault attempted, rather prematurely and surely
unconvincingly, to write the historical obituarx ofprogress, to eviscerate our taken-for-
granted theories ofpower and political practices and to reduce subjects to effects of
relations ofpower and knowledge. In these terms, the only lesson to be derived from
Foucault's work is that to call the Enlightenment into question is to surrender to
relativism, pessimism and nihilism. Habermas, Taylor, Walzer, Said, Rorty, Dews, and, to
a lesser extent, Fraser and Bernstein, all draw, and express their dismay at, these
consequences; most ofall, they fear that Foucault's apparently pessimistic critique ofwhat
he saw as a despotic Western rationality was only a mask for a vigourous and compelling
scepticism towards all things thought to be stable and eternal. As Hacking (1986a: 40)
has suggested, their dissatisfaction with Foucault is at least partly "because he has given
no surrogate for whatever it is that springs eternal in the human breast". Without a doubt,
Foucaultrefused to offer us hope, let alone false hope, a placebo or fix to make us happy
and oblivious; he refused to dispense the drugs ofprogress and paradise, or anything like
what Nietzsche called 'metaphysical comfort' (Rorty 1986: 48).
Yet to fail to offer hope is not the same thing as to foster hopelessness. This thesis has
attempted to show that to conclude thus would be both simplistic and over-hasty. In the
first place, Foucault's 'pessimism' is also an 'activism', even a 'hyperactivism', which runs
counter to the critics' fears ofa passive and fatalistic acquiescence to the status quo.
Indeed, he not only referred to himself as, in addition, a 'happy positivist', but even
claimed to be optimistic (AK: 125; 1984b: 133; 1982c: 35)! How might one square up
these apparently contradictory remarks? It has been the intent of this thesis to argue that,
far from drowning us in shoreless seas of 'despotic Reason' or 'power', Foucault's work
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should be seen as a warning, even an inquisition, but also an incitement and a production.
It does not follow that his genealogy ofthe present, in 'telling it like it is', renders theory
useless, power irresistible and subjects superfluous, for this would be to presume that the
present is fixed and that genealogy has established, rather than fabricated, its truth.
Instead, the chorus ofdismay from those who believe our present to be salvageable
suggests that genealogy has succeeded in rendering the present unlike anything familiar,
different from anything we can imagine - and few commentators, whether sympathetic or
critical, appear to be able to grasp the full implications of this admittedly iconoclastic
attempt to salvage the present. Charles Taylor summed up the impact ofFoucault on
friend and foe alike when he wrote: "Foucault disconcerts" (Taylor 1985a: 152; see also
Bernstein 1991: 142).
Deliberately, as will be made clear, this thesis draws eleven conclusions for theory, politics
and human subjects from the work ofFoucault. Theftrst conclusion to be drawn is that,
ironically, it is the central preoccupation of the Enlightenment according to Kant - the
paradox ofa philosophy which problematizes its present and itself - which is the nettle that
must be grasped ifwe are to move beyond Enlightenment as orthodoxy. At the end of the
twentieth century, we find ourselves at a point in our peculiar historical trajectory at which
old certainties are beginning to fade as new vistas open up before us. No doubt we - the
West in particular - have been in this kind ofposition before, and will be again. During the
Enlightenment, the divine and the traditional came to be superseded by the scientific and
the progressive. Now it is Enlightenment itself -less sanguine about progress and
revolutionary change than at its birth - which has become second nature, a globalising
orthodoxy all the more powerful in that it prides itselfon being heterodox. Like all
traditions encountered by modernity, the fate of the tradition ofEnlightenment, too, is to
be subjected to critique. Again like many ofthe traditions which modernity called into
question - such as religion, culture and nation - the Enlightenment will undoubtedly
survive and persist. What is at issue is whether, and how, the Enlightenment can be
renewed and reconditioned; differently put: whether, and how, what prefabricated the
present can be refabricated.
260
Not even Foucault's most trenchant critic, Habermas, would deny the need to
problematize the Enlightenment. It is not an issue ofwhether one believes, as does
Habermas, that the Enlightenment needs to be enlightened about its narrow-mindedness so
that the 'misguided, interrupted and unfinished' process which is modem reason may yet
be guided, continued and completed (Habermas 1987: 57,392 nA). Nor is it necessary
for one to concur, with Foucault, that modem rationalities are not merely unenlightened
but are so normal (and normalising) as to be perverse, such that it has become necessary,
ifAugean, to attempt to think ourselves out of the Enlightenment. Either way, the first
challenge that confronts contemporary theory is to write a history ofEnlightenment and
how we have been enthralled by its truths and by the relations ofpower which
accompanied them. Such a history may require, as botp Taylor and Foucault have
suggested, a re-examination of the origins of Western philosophy itself, as an historically
mutating and institutionalised yearning and search for truth, as exclusionary as it is
exclusive, centred around - even within - the human subject. It is here that Foucault's
genealogical approach comes into its own, since it will be necessary, ifnot sufficient, to
temper and ifpossible breach the diachronicity and coherence ofconventional histories
with a logic of synchronous and antagonistic strategies. This is not to suggest, though,
that one ought to focus exclusively on discontinuity, or celebrate contingency, or extol
difference; rather, it is a question ofproblematizing the superficiality ofthat which
presents itselfas profound, ofwarily exposing the transitory patterns which configure
capricious chaos.
Nor is all this mere relativism, which refutes itself while refuting any possibility ofcritique,
for this would be to ignore the fact that refutation assumes the critique it is accused of
refuting. Rather, to historicise and criticise Enlightenment reason from within is part of
learning how "to think and act in the 'in-between' interstices of forced reconciliations and
radical dispersion" (Bernstein 1991: 9). To acknowledge that our present location within
a social order was made possible ifnot determined by what called itself Enlightenment,
and that the ancient legacies oflogocentrism are internal to who we are, is to make it
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possible to conceive of a critique, and a politics, which are both implicated and
transgressive. It is to engage in the limited but nevertheless effective enterprise of
rendering present and available for critical examination the accumulated historical residue
ofa series ofoften incompatible Western political rationalities. Indeed, in the best
tradition ofEnlightenment, the very means ofexploring the effects ofEnlightenment -
genealogy - itselfmust be handled critically and reflectively. Itself inextricably entangled
in the will to truth and power, Foucault's rational critique of reason seeks not to transcend
but to scrutinise that which has made us what we are. Setting paradox against paradox, it
exploits, in 'homeopathic' fashion, the contradictions ofmodernity. Only by rigorously
yet irreverently exploring the effects, limits and dangers of this reason that we use, might
we begin to know whether, and to what extent, it is possible to govern, to rationally
exercise power over ourselves and others, without fear or domination; only in this way can
we come to know what, ifanything, we no longer require ofreason in order to constitute
ourselves as autonomous subjects.
To problematise the Enlightenment is to pose questions about current conceptions of
theory, politics and human subjects. It is to suggest that Enlightenment has been bought
at the huge, but not 'unreasonable', price of the free participation ofall modern individuals
(from patients, paupers and pupils to consumers and deviants) in their objectification and
subjection to powerful, knowledgeable, and usually institutionally legitimated, others.
Such a genealogical examination of the modern "rationalization ofthe management of the
individual", of the interplay between that which orders human conduct - strategies of
government and resistance - and that which rationalises (both justifying and making more
efficient) such conduct - forms ofknowledge and technological refinements - would make
it possible to define what Foucault called a new kind of 'political spiritualite', to rethink
issues ofsocial (and self) transformation which are always bound up with issues of truth
and power.
The recognition ofhow we have historically constituted ourselves - our unique
configuration ofscientifically sanctioned modes ofsoothsaying and subjection - is thus the
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first step towards experimenting with the possibility ofno longer being, doing or thinking
what we are, do or think. Entirely warranted as it may be, that "the essential thing in a
condemnation is not the quality of the evidence but the force of the one who presents the
evidence lt (Foucault 1989: 182), it cannot be forgotten that the force of the presentation is
accentuated by the rigour of the investigation. fudispensable for genealogy as much as for
any modern science is thus a studious examination of specific contemporary experiences
(not only socially marginal ones like madness or transgression, or particular ones like
sexuality, but especially our supposedly natural subjectivities and even the experience of
freedom itself), in relation to each other as well as historically, for, as Bernstein notes with
reference to the work ofRorty, MacIntyre and Kuhn, an appeal to history is not anecdotal
but critical (Bernstein 1991: 23). Historical analysis as genealogy will no longer simply
rationalise the present, but will be a weapon with which to challenge the modes by which
human beings have been and are being made into known and knowing, governed and
governing, and 'moralised and moralising', subjects.
Through his historical reinterpretations ofhow we moderns have constituted ourselves in
the realms ofreason, health, law, science, sexuality and subjectivity, Foucault deliberately
aimed to 'fabricate' tile present, to play its interpretive violence against itselfso that, on
the assumption that different descriptions distort differently, he would be able to inscribe
effects of truth in the present and upon the real (as opposed to revealing the past or
expressing a truth). This is this thesis' second conclusion: Foucault's 'truth-fabricating'
and 'reality-constituting' approach has major implications for the nature, object and
purpose of theory. Theory becomes a practice in its own right, problematising as much as
enlightening, and dependent on the very social forces with which it concerns itself; its
object, reality, is reconfigured as a terrain which coalesces under the impact ofstrategic
maps, or theoretical practices, such that the object (things, others and their contexts) is
always the object/or theory, forged or fabricated; and its purpose is not to produce a
programme for action but to mount a constructive challenge. A Foucauldian approach is
one which seeks to deploy familiar images in a way which subverts their recognisability, by
going along with a familiar manoeuvre in order to extend it beyond itselfor play it at its
263
own game; which does not so much reveal truths or assume solid individual identities as
reveal their fabrication; and which substitutes for the penetrating but blinkered scientific
gaze an oblique and informing glance.
Thus, what we do with the Enlightenment depends to a large extent on what the
Enlightenment has done with us. This 'we' has several references: it is simultaneously the
all-inclusive 'we' ofhumanity, the exclusive 'we' of the Enlightened West, and the very
specific 'we' of those who have arrogated to themselves the task ofreflecting upon who
'we' are - the intellectuals. We who monopolise the use of the analytical tools bequeathed
to us by the Enlightenment have also been accustomed to legislating how Enlightenment is
to be cultivated. The third conclusion is that, once the nature, object and purpose of
theory is rethought in this way, the traditional prophesying role of intellectuals, as well as
their hope ofarriving at complete and definitive knowledge ofourselves and our history,
must ofnecessity be abandoned. Nonetheless, under these circumstances social
transformation becomes simultaneously problematic, vital and possible. Alongside, rather
than in the vanguard of, struggles by particular groups of the disaggregated masses, and in
terms oftheir own specific practices, concrete problems and particular locales,
intellectuals can question the self-evidence ofmodem political rationalities and assist in
dismantling the coordinates ofexperience which constitute modem subjects, as much as
they struggle within and against the relations ofpower (predominantly institutionalised in
universities) that transform them into objects ofand instruments for the production of
knowledge.
Merely to pose the question of the possibility of transforming our modem forms of
subjectivity is to bring into stark relief the power relations which compose the price we are
paying for our freedom, our capacity for technological development and our ability to
reason in the manner laid down by the Enlightenment. To problematise the
Enlightenment, then, requires a reconceptualisation ofpower relations. For genealogical
purposes, however, conventional theories ofpower, and most particularly Marxist
theories, which focus on individual or collective but always sovereign agents and how
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their possession ofor suppression by power differentially affects their knowledge and their
autonomy, are inadequate. While not denying the particular significance ofthe modern
state in regulating relations ofpower, or of social classes, elites, governments, political
parties and constitutions as forms in which power relations customarily manifest
themselves, Foucault argued that to insist upon their salience is to neglect the complexity,
multiplicity and specific effects of local power relations which, operating independently of
and at a certain distance from these customary forms, often sustain, enlarge and maximise
their effectiveness. Yet because notions ofpower as sovereignty prevail in modern society
(mainly because they disguise, justify and normalise, and help regulate and energise, more
ubiquitous relations ofpower), in order to avoid simply reproducing them Foucault sought
instead to develop an 'analytics', as opposed to a 'theory', ofpower, by not saying what
power is but instead showing how it operates, concretely and historically, in the form of
strategic relations aimed at governing subjects. In short, what is required is an historical
analysis ofthe broad 'body politic', from global political rationalities through local
relations ofpower to individual human subjects.
The historical skeleton of such an 'analytics' ofpower, the rough periodisation of Western
political rationalities which can be distilled from Foucault's oeuvre, must be fleshed out by
a more abstract and imaginative attempt to reconceptualise power relations. This brings
us to the fourth conclusion: Western political rationalities are characterised by the
coexistence ofrelations ofpower with forms of1qlowledge; and these technologies for
knowing and governing oneself and others are invariably tied to procedures of identity-
constitution and knowledge-production through a rigourous and often mediated search for
truth. From Plato and the Stoics and throughout Christianity to the present, the
attainment of individual self-mastery and self-knowledge via the intervention ofan external
master has always been associated with hermeneutic techniques. While these pastoral
technologies of the essay and the assay were initially confined to an elite, the Christian
confessional, the Reformation's rejection ofpriestly mediation and the Renaissance's
privileging ofwriting had began to assemble what today we call 'the individual' long
before Kantian man shrugged off the tutelage ofothers. Contemporaneous with
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contractarian theories of sovereignty, and consequent upon rapid demographic and urban
expansion, the effects of these mundane and pragmatic practices ofpedagogically
subjecting individuals and policing entire populations were amplified by the rise of the
modem state which both shaped the resources available for intellectual pursuits, and
became itself a central focus of these pursuits.
Via procedures ofhierarchical observation, normalising judgement and the examination,
modem subjects, their space segmented and their time apportioned, have come to be
fabricated. Panoptic power relations added new dimensions to ancient individualising and
totalising techniques: a 'descending' individualisation (the observed and self-regulating
inmate: the pervert, the prodigy and the patient) and an 'ascending' totalisation (faceless
and regulated overseers: bureaucracies and social movements). Focusing on
emancipation in the present rather than salvation in the hereafter, this modem power over
everyday life, which artificially divides human scientific knowledge into either an
'anatomo-politics ofthe human body' or a 'bio-politics of the population', is manifested in
the political coexistence ofdestruction and reproduction, conflict and care, and death and
life - the paradox ofwelfare states waging cold war. The human scientific sanction of the
therapeutic practice ofconfession and the corroboration of truth through ordeal, also
justified an exhaustive inquisition of secrets taken to be hidden from, but internal to,
subjects, and breathed new life into the ancient relation between disciple and master.
Ironically, the associated expansion in the number and function of the subjects and relays
ofmodem relations ofpower occurred precisely when Kant was exhorting us to liberate
ourselves from our subordination to tradition.
An historical analysis ofthe trajectory of Western political rationalities ought also to dispel
the misconception that, for Foucault, modem societies are little more than disciplined
"total institutions". Modem societies may be 'disciplinary' but are not 'disciplined' - their
internal margins deny them the possibility ofever fully constituting themselves in the form
of 'total', disciplined, societies (even if at the same time the existence ofthese margins
spurs them on, in vain pursuit of this totalitarian nightmare, to maintain their coherence in
(,);
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the face of their fragility). The Enlightenment may have made it possible to conceive of
society in this way and to normalise subjects precisely by enlightening them, but modem
political rationalities do not represent the way power 'really' works nor are they the latest
in a series ofrelations of domination. Neither 'progressivist' (as ifmore and more power
relations have been brought under the rule oflaw) nor 'regressivist' (as ifpower relations
have increasingly distorted the rule oflaw), modem political rationalities are the product
of gradual but discontinuous and contingent convergences ofa multiplicity oflocal and
comparatively minor, but infinitely productive and permanently contested, linkages, both
new and ancient, between power and knowledge.
Foucault's view that "power comes from below" and that these local relations ofpower
operate relatively autonomously from global concentrations ofpower is very similar to
Marxist accounts of the state and liberal theories ofpopular sovereignty. Where Foucault
parts company with these theories is the extent to which local relations ofpower are not
merely distanced from states, sovereigns, institutions and organisations but make them
-possible. Power relations for Foucault constitute a kind of 'soup ofthe day', the ever-
changing ground or condition ofpossibility ofglobal forms ofdomination, commonly
characterised by overlapping and reciprocally supporting institutionalised processes which
regulate what their members do and how they relate to each other as well as how they
communicate and what skills or ~apacitiesmust be brought into play or inculcated. The
fifth conclusion is that relations ofpower - ubiquitous, localised, self-organising,
refractory and contested - can be genealogically redefined as the effects of, and the
internal conditions for, countless historically and contextually determined divisions and
inequalities.
Foucault's relational and multilevelled conception shifts one's focus away from power as a
kind of scarce possession which is wielded over against freedom, to power relations which
are ubiquitous and premised on the existence offree subjects capable ofutilising or
altering them (to the extent to which subjects may consent to violence directed against
themselves or others, or seek to impose consensus, as much as they might resist such
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violent impositions). Freedom, for Foucault, opens one up to forms of subjection: it is
not a question ofpower one-sidedly restricting or invading the freedom ofindividuals but
ofpower relations governing freedom and provoking resistance by enjoining free subjects
to govern themselves. It follows that, and this is the sixth conclusion, relations ofpower,
perpetually unstable, fractured and antagonistic, incorporate resistance as a dispersed and
volatile energy, not as some external opposition as ifpower had a centralised,
homogenous locus. This requires that we shift our focus to the relational nature ofpower
and to the struggles which are born within the bounds ofthese relations. There can be no
categorical answer to the question ofwhether or not we ought to struggle against or resist
one or other exercise ofpower: relations ofpower are neither good nor bad, neither
acceptable nor unacceptable, for to seek to govern or to structure the field ofpossible
actions ofothers is an irreducible feature of social life. No matter how systematic or
chaotic, necessary or contingent, repressive or benign, power relations cannot avoid
provoking resistance; and resistance is a productive response to forms ofgovernment, not
merely a defence against domination.
While all that we know ofresistance is what relations ofpower and their associated
knowledges tell us about it, just as all that we know ofmadness is from the point ofview
ofreason and all that we know of the Enlightenment is how it conceives of itself, it
remains possible to discover how relations ofpower have acted to suppress, manufacture
and resist, how reason has rationalised and normalised, and how the theories and practices
ofEnlightenment have spread across the face of the globe. The seventh conclusion is that
one is not rendered incapable ofunderstanding, criticising, supporting or resisting modern
political rationalities merely because one cannot stand outside ofthem; on the contrary, for
Foucault, 'the essence ofone's life consists of the political functioning ofthe society in
which one finds oneself. Laws call transgression into being and give it its form, and to
that extent do not merely prohibit actions but also provoke and structure reactions. At the
same time, transgression reaffirms and buttresses the laws even as it surpasses them; and
one cannot know or experience the limits of the laws without overstepping them. The
very process ofdeveloping an 'analytics' ofpower relations is therefore itself a political
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act. Critical analysis must multiply possibilities for political intervention, by opening up
new angles for engagement, and'political actions ought to be contemplated and
undertaken to the extent to which they intensify, concentrate or challenge critical analysis.
Foucault's reconceptualisation ofpower relations in the form ofwar, a perpetual battle or
"agonism", rather than in either extreme ofrational contract or rapacious conquest,
consensus or coercion, captures the manner in which local power relations make global
strategies of both domination and resistance possible. Rever~!pg von Clausewitz, the
eighth conclusion is that politics is the continuation of war by other means. In addition,
the more or less willing participation by the governed in their government suggests that
war itself is less about naked coercion, and more about moral, psychological and political
force, than is commonly assumed. The reconceptualisation ofpower as war incorporates
and goes beyond those characteristics commonly attributed to power by theories of
sovereignty: it allows for concentrations and confrontations, stark oppositions and
ireversible effects, objectives and intentions, but qualifies these by placing at least equal
emphasis on the everyday tactical engagements upon which broader struggles depend,
especially the unstable point ofequilibrium - government - where relations ofpower,
states ofdomination and 'technologies ofthe self intersect. The rules which regulate this
world ofwar, literally ofall against all, are themselves forged in combat, including the
totalising and individualising functions of state apparatuses, and the desires and interests
of the participants. Thus, rather than just supplementing theories centred upon the state
with a Foucauldian emphasis on everyday relations ofpower, the state must be rethought
in terms of these multiple, various, specific and reversible strategic relations.
The ninth conclusion relates to the productivity ofpower relations in relation to
knowledge and subjectivity, which in turn is tied to their tendency to provoke, oblige,
entice, gratify and discipline. Against the one-sided Enlightenment focus on ideology,
which insists that 'true' knowledge is in essence disinterested and that unchecked power
will inevitably distort it, Foucault pointed out that knowledge not only induces effects of
power but develops within the bounds of relations ofpower. In this sense, truth is always
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'interested' or 'ideological', saturated with rather than distantly influenced by political
forces, and a condition and effect of the material fabrication ofhuman subjects. Ironically,
theories ofideology exclude from investigation that 'general recipe' for the exercise of
power over people: the technology ofpower which is science itself Nevertheless, the
fact that knowledge is an outgrowth oftechnologies of governance is an indication not of
the omniscience ofpower relations and the evisceration oftruth, but ofthe inadequacy of
power and the price that must be paid for truth. Contra Taylor and Habermas, even
critical theory ala the Frankfurt School can be as manipulative and totalitarian as the rest
ofthe human sciences. One can only believe otherwise by reducing power to domination
and contrasting it against freedom and truth, which is to fail to grasp the full import of
Foucault's anti-humanist view that the forces ofnormalisation have subjected us to
freedom and in the process fabricated what we now believe to beour true nature.
The tenth conclusion is that power relations also function to constitute human subjects. A
Foucauldian conception ofpolitics, far from being subjectless, assumes that subjects are
indispensable vehicles and targets ofpower. To be a political subject in this sense,
however, is to be constituted as, rather than 'naturally' being, an agent (in the
conventional sense ofa transparently self-aware and creative being). For Foucault, these
are grounds for optimism, not pessimism:
You know, saying that we are much more recent than we believe is not a way of
placing all the burden ofour history on our shoulders. Rather it puts Within the
range ofwork which we can do to and for ourselves the greatest possible part of
what ispresented to us as inaccessible (Foucault 1982c: 35; see also Rajchman
1991: ix).
In other words, describing human beings as subjects does not deprive them ofagency or
the capacity to change; in fact, it makes them all the more active by extending their reach
to include what was assumed to be so obviously necessary, so natural, so taken-for-
granted that it was inaccessible: their subjectivity, their identity, their sexuality, their
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bodies themselves; also their cl,llture, their language, their philosophy, their history, their
morality; their basic institutions, their political forms, their economic practices.
Hence the focus of investigation should fall not upon the intentions ofthose who 'possess'
and 'wield' power, nor upon their 'victims', but upon how both 'sides' have been
constituted, physically and psychically as well as socially and historically, as subjects, of
themselves and others, through a multiplicity ofpower relations. The humanism so
prevalent in theoretical analysis since even before the Enlightenment itselfextends some
relations ofpower by restraining other relations; by exhorting us to realise or liberate
ourselves, it further enmeshes us in relations ofpower. To think ofourselves as fabricated
in this way, and our humanist predilections as fabricating mechanisms, further suggests
that a strategy ofreinvention is more appropriate than a strategy of liberation for beings
which lack any essence which might have required realisation. Like Doctor von
Frankenstein, we modem subjects have created a monster; the only difference is that we
are at once that monster and our only hope of salvation.
In these terms, our capacity to act autonomously is dependent on the manner in which we
have been subjected. While modem individuals, their consciousness, souls and bodies as
well as the freedom deemed intrinsic to them, are not natural essences but artifacts,
ambiguous 'subjected sovereignties', their subjection through and implication in that
which they oppose, is the precondition oftheir agency and criticism, which in turn is the
permanent possibility ofreworking practices of subjection. The eleventh and last
conclusion, then, relates to the need to rethink the structures through which we have
interpreted our world, our history and ourselves, ifwe wish to free ourselves from
ourselves. Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, that "the philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it" (Marx, in McLellan 1977:
158), redirected a relatively self-confident nineteenth century reason, sure ofits truths,
along the path ofpraxis; one hundred and fifty years later, Foucault's work demands that
a much less sanguine twentieth century reason actively rethink its own thought, its
historical a priori.
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In Foucault's work, the dichotomy between continuous, causal structures, and free,
conscious agents, blurs and metamorphosises into contingent conditions ofpossibility and
multiple and contradictory forms of subjection. Necessity and contingency, determinism
and freedom or structures and agents "intersect at right angles" in the form ofstructured
practices of liberty: individual agents actively and freely subject themselves in terms of a
range of 'compelling choices', variable but restricted structural possibilities 'proposed to,
suggested by and imposed on' them. Foucault's twin focus on the forms ofrationality that
structure what we do, and the strategies we freely deploy within these bounds, could thus
be described as Marx's view ofhistory turned inside out, to the extent that neither the
'people' who make it nor the 'circumstances' within which it is made are givens, pristinely
acting upon each other towards dialectical transcendence, but are themselves products of
their interrelationship, their actions already having been acted upon without hope of
transcendence. Under these conditions, we must firstly rethink how we think, in order to
act; then, we must direct our actions at changing our thoughts; and, finally, we must think
how we act, in order to change how we think.
To sum up, then, Foucault's work is entirely coherent and consistent. Grasping the nettle
ofEnlightenment, it suggests that the present can be problematized through the
refabrication ofreceived truths and the reconstitution ofrevealed reality. In this task,
modem intellectuals, suitably critically aware of their erstwhile role in provoking and
legitimising social transformation, have an important role to play, not least in rethinking
power and politics and knowledge and science. Recognising the coexistence ofrelations
ofpower with forms ofknowledge in Western political rationalities, modem relations of
power need to be understood as the effects of, and the internal conditions for, countless
historically and contextually determined divisions and inequalities; while theory needs to
adopt the more circumscribed but still effective stance of rendering present and available
for critical examination the historical trajectory of these political rationalities. The
instability and antagonistic nature ofrelations ofpower allows for localised resistance by
subjects whose raison d'etre, including their identities and capacity to act freely, is
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constituted by a context in which politics is the continuation ofwar by other means.
Given this context in which forms ofknowledge legitimise and extend the relations of
power which make them possible, the principal task is now to rethink and exploit the
prevailing structure/agency dichotomy in terms ofcontingent conditions ofpossibility and
multiple and contradictory forms of subjection.
At stake, finally, is our ability to think ourselves out ofthe Enlightenment paradox of the
parallel growth ofhuman autonomy and the intensification ofrelations ofpower, by
inventing, stylising and experimenting with our autonomised selves. To seek to alter the
manner in which we have been subjected does not supplant but at most supplements and
qualifies more conventional struggles against ethnic, religious or economic domination,
nor does it deny the need at strategic moments to invoke existing laws and individual
human rights. Foucault's personal solution to the problem ofhow to think differently was
to conduct an arduous 'philosophical exercise' aimed at aesthetic self-transformation: not
a surrender to the drifting currents ofhedonistic and sensationalistic postmodem culture,
but a slow and rigourous elaboration of self as a work ofart. It is not a question of
I
universality or objectivity: the protagonist is partisan, wielding truth like a weapon and
experimenting with the production of identity rather than engaging in the politics ofextant
identities. The strategy of the stylisation of the self thus fuses together the free actions of
individuals with the determining effects ofrelations ofpower and the imperious demand
that individuals speak the truth; subjects, as the conduits and the detritus of strategic
games of liberty, multiply and differentially reinvent themselves in the space allowed them
by the state ofplay.
Whereas Foucault's preferred choice in subjective art-work can be summed up in the
phrase, 'everything to excess', this is only one amongst a huge range ofpossible
strategies, past, present and future. However, the key element of any strategy aimed at
rethinking our Enlightened philosophical heritage is not to be awed and immobilised by it
but to approach it irreverently ifrigorously. To rethink the foundations of the present is
dangerous; to forget that all foundations were once constructed is even more dangerous.
273
Hence, "live dangerously," as Nietzsche exhorted. "Build your cities on the slopes of
Vesuvius. Send your ships into uncharted seas. Live in conflict with your equals and
yourselves. Pillage and conquer ... " (Nietzsche 1950: 228; my translation - RD). The
point is not necessarily to seek or attain truth or power, clarity or confirmation, but to
'bewilder' or 'derange' oneself, to free oneself from oneself. In philosophy and against
philosophy, by freely subjecting ourselves to the forces that engulfus, we must be
determined to be free. One's personal comportment, one's ~are for, invention and
refashioning of self, which always involves standing in a certain relation ofpower and
truth towards oneself and others, will constitute the concrete expression ofone's liberty.
That particular stylistic philosophical exercise known as the 'essay' - understood as an
assay or test which induces transformations - must be reaffirmed as central to
philosophical as much as everyday life: practice liberty, by ordering oneself
To return once again to my opening question: what is left to us of theory, politics and
ourselves as subjects, now that pessimism and nihilism supposedly hold sway? Amidst
nothing, there is everything: the reinstatement ofchance, the consideration ofdifference,
the possibility of transformation. Following Foucault, we are the subjects ofan
experiment on ourselves, the white mice in the historical laboratory of Chance, which
wears the mask ofFate. Though crude and far too popular, a mixed metaphor such as
this, combining antiseptic scientific images with magical beliefs ofthe 'antiquarian
margins', nevertheless assists in describing what is simultaneously our predicament and a
set ofmore or less infinite possibilities. Our lives, our histories, the modern social order in
general, is a series ofdiscontinuously unfolding experimental experiences; we experience
the Enlightenment's history. Hear the cry of the tout: Roll up for 'The Enlightenment
Experience'! A social experiment on a planetary scale, in which the participants, finding
themselves subjected by disciplinary technologies involving surveillance (producing
knowledge) and constrainf (exercising power), inexpertly ifscientifically essay to confess
and discover the truth and utility ofthe experiences assayed or freely endured.
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'The Enlightenment Experience', built upon a millennia-long Western philosophical and
political search for the truth that we believe to reside within ourselves, carried along with
it tremendous consequences for the world as a whole. Not only did it make us into very
particular kinds of beings, with highly specific ways of relating to ourselves and others
economically, culturally, morally, sexually and politically, but it also made possible a
modernity in which scientific advances and productive successes have been inextricably
entangled with the subjection of, and mandatory critical introspection by, masses of
individuals, as well as the (sometimes simultaneous) devastation and conservation of
natural and social formations. This is still our reality. A significant difference, however, in
part thanks to Foucault who directed our attention to them, is that the historical processes
which made the Enlightenment possible are today rendering it increasingly problematic.
Scientific and technological development proceeds apace, rendering its own products
obsolete in a matter ofrnonths; the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, the
disintegration ofthe Soviet Union and the new style ofwarfate demonstrated in the 1991
Gulf War suggests that the kinds ofrevolutionary change to which we became accustomed
over the last two centuries are a thing ofthe past; and the realignment ofinternational
relations around new political and economic blocs - East Asia, Europe and America - and
an awareness of the imminence ofecological disaster means that globalisation is now an
issue, not just an inevitability.
The university, that central relay in the distribution ofknowledge and the production of
intellectuals, where it survived co-optation by corporations and governments, is also being
thoroughly subjected to new "technologies ofinformatization" (Derrida 1983: 14-15).
The need to rethink power relations and processes ofproducing knowledge and
constituting subjects has never been more acute, particularly when such a prominent
representative ofthe new informational bourgeoisie as Bill Gates manages to eerily echo
these Foucauldian concerns:
We're experiencing the early days ofa revolution in communications that will be
long-lived and widespread. There will be some surprises before we get to the
ultimate realization of the information highway because much is still unclear. We
r,}
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don't understand consumer preferences yet. The role ofgovernment is a troubling
open question. We can't anticipate all ofthe technical breakthroughs that lie ahead.
But interactive networking is here to stay, and it's only just beginning (Gates 1996:
xii).
Where once human subjects were mediated by significant and authoritative others, now we
stand on the threshold ofa new, but still totalising and individualising, "'mediated' way of
life" (Gates 1996: 5): a furiously fast-paced and 'immediate' kind of life, in which
knowledge takes on the form ofan information highway, networks ofgovernance require
restructuring, and human subjects are invited to interactively participate in their
constitution as consumers.
IfFoucault is to be taken at his word, that the modem self, its politics and its theories are
"nothing else than the historical correlation of the technology built in our history", then it
stands to reason, albeit an Enlightened one, that the problem, and the solution, "is to
change those technologies" (Foucault 1993a: 222-23). This is the logical response to the
productive predicament in which we find ourselves: to wholeheartedly accede to
theoretical experimentation and political play, not in order to bemoan our subjection or to
succumb to despair but precisely in order to refabricate modem life, both personal and
social. It suggests that criticism and struggle should abjure teleological and subject-
centred models ofexplanation and juridico-political models based on conflict over scarce
resources, or by class struggle, or against patriarchy. Theory is not about affirming human
rationality and autonomy nor about resisting indoctrination and control; and politics is not
about liberation, progress and Utopia nor about tyranny, stagnation and the end ofhistory.
It is not a starkly reassuring choice between "struggle or death, bloody war or nothing"
(George Sand, quoted by Marx, in McLellan 1977: 215), but an infinitely more dangerous
experimentation on ourselves. Avoiding defeat but not seeking victory, theory and politics
are about refabricating the contingent truths of the past upon which the present depends,
about engaging strategically in the perpetual battle around forms ofsubjection and
governance, and about continuously reinventing oneself in one's complex relationships
with others. This experimental attitude is not necessary or fixed; it is a strategic and no
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doubt temporary (ifrecurring) operation. This, following Foucault, is the future for social
theory and practice: to critically continue with that peculiar Enlightenment project of
rationalising the management of individuals.
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